The Power of
Rational Insight
for Conscientious Action

Toward a Phenomenology of Conscientious Action and a Theory of the Practicality of Reason

Garret Benjamin Wyner



> Can a man...preserve a constant intercourse between his mind and the first and best of all beings, without growing like to him and being confirmed in pious gratitude and resignation? It is one of the justest observations, that what we do not think of is the same to us as if it did not exist. There is little or no difference between what is not considered and what is not believed. It is the reflection on what is believed that renders it useful to us, and gives it its whole power to influence us.
>
> Richard Price

Toward a Phenomenology of Conscientious Action and a Theory of the practicality of Reason

Garret Benjamin Wyner

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Philosophy)

May 1988

Copyright 1988 Garret Benjamin Wyner

To
Dallas A. Willard

"The student is not above his teacher,
nor the servant above his lord.
It is enough for the student
that he should grow to be like his teacher,
and the servant like his lord."

Ma 10:24-5

Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. . . . On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded. . . .

. . . Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.

David Hume
A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III

The intellectual nature is its own law. It has, within itself, a spring and guide of action which it cannot suppress or reject. Rectitude is itself an end, an ultimate end, an end superior to all other ends, governing, directing and limiting them, and whose existence and influence depend on nothing arbitrary. It presides over all. Every appetite and faculty, every instinct and will, and all nature are subjected to it. To act from affection to it, is to act with light, and conviction, and knowledge.

Richard Price
A Review of the Principle Questions in Morals, Ch.8

Table of Contents

Volume 1

Part One: Introduction

Part Two: The Historical Problem

A. Socrates and Traditional Moral Theory: Problems & Paradoxes

B. Hume's Reply to The Moral Tradition: Hume's Problem

C. Kant's Reply to Hume: Kant's Problem

Part Three: Richard Price's Appeal to Rational Insight

Volume 2

Part Four: An Analysis of Intuition: Husserl's Theory of *Evidenz* or Fulfillment

Part Five: Toward a Phenomenology of Conscientious Action and A Theory of the Practicality of Reason

Analytic Table of Contents

I. Introduction
- 1: The Thesis of the Practicality of Reason
- 2: The Practical, Common-sense Significance of this Claim
- 3: The Central Philosophical Problem with, or Objection to, this View
  - 3A: Further Clarification: The Distinction between Moral Belief and Moral Perception
- 4: How We Propose to Resolve this Problem
  - 4A: The Skeptical Alternative
  - 4B: "Rational Moral Skepticism" and Alternative Forms of Justification
  - 4C: Alternative Forms of Justification Option to Moral Intuitionism
    - <I> Humean Empiricism
    - <ii> The Alternative of Kantian Transcendentalism or Idealism
- 5: The Form of Justification to be used to Defend the Thesis
- 6: Description of the Development of the Argument of the Thesis
- Notes: Chapter One

II. The Historical Problem

A. **Socrates & Traditional Moral Theory**

I. The Socratic Formulation of the Thesis, and the Main Parts of the Thesis to be Examined

1) 1A: The Knowledge that Constrains Moral Action
- a) This Knowledge is not just any Kind of Moral Knowledge, but a Certain Type of Moral Perception or Intuition
- b) The Socratic Method or Dialectic
  - i) This Rational Perception is not = Opinion or Common Sense, and Although It Involves a Rational Process It is not = Logical Argument
  - ii) Elucidation of This Rational Process by an Appeal to Both Different Orders of Existence and Knowledge
  - iii) Application of the Socratic Method or Dialectic to Moral Knowledge

1B: Moral Action
- iv) The Distinction Between "External Rectitude" or Good Action Independent of Intentions, and "Intentional Rectitude" or Good Action Relative to One's Intentions
- v) The Hierarchial Character of Moral Actions with Respect to Their Ends

1C: The Nature of the Constraint of Right Reason over Action
- i) The Thesis of the Power of Reason over Action Refers Primarily to Intentional Right Action; Right Reason as a Principle of Action & Other Principles of Action
- ii) The Two Main Principles of Action: Physical and Rational Desire
  - {a} Physical Desire
  - {b} General Account of Rational Desire as a Principle of Action
  - {c} More Detailed Account of These Two Principles of Action
- iii) Socrates' View of Moral Conflict & Failure and the Question of the Sufficiency of Reason as a Principle of Action
  - {a} Socrates' General Account of Moral Conflict & Failure
  - {b} More Specific Elucidation of the Ignorance of Vice by a Brief Analysis of Some of its Underlying Causes

2: Central Problems With the Socratic Formulation of the Thesis
- 2A: The Problem Concerning Moral Knowledge
- 2B: The Problem Concerning the Nature of Moral Objects or Actions
- 2C: The Problem of the Constraint of Moral Knowledge on Action
- Notes: Chapter Two [Socrates-Plato]

Aristotle
  1: Aristotle's Response to the Socratic Optimism, and His Apparent Denial of the Socratic Formulation of the Thesis
  2: Despite the Appearance of a Major Shift in Viewpoint, Aristotle's Moral Views are Foundationally Identical to the Socratic-Platonic Viewpoint
    2A: The Object of Moral Knowledge
    2B: The Nature of the Knowledge that Constrains Moral Action
    2C: The Constraint of this Knowledge over Moral Action
  3: Aristotle's Attempt at Resolution of the Socratic Paradox;
    The Problem of Moral Ignorance, Weakness and Failure Arising from Moral Conflict
  Notes: Chapter Two [Aristotle]

Stoicism & Epicureanism
  1: Apparent Denial of the Thesis in Stoicism & Epicureanism
  2: Despite the Apparent Denial of the Thesis, the Thesis is Retained
  Notes: Chapter Two [Stoicism & Epicureanism]

Medieval Moral Philosophy
  1: The Practical & Theoretical Sides of the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason
  2: The Practical & Philosophical Significance of Christ with Respect to the Thesis
  3: Apparent Christian Rejection of the Thesis: the Impotence of Moral Philosophy Without Grace
  4: Despite this Appearance, Medieval Christian Philosophy Retains the Thesis; The Relevance of the Religious Standpoint to the Thesis
  5: Despite Acknowledgment of the Thesis, the Grounding of the Christian Medieval Philosophers in Greek Philosophy Prevents an Adequate Account of the Thesis
  Notes: Chapter Two [Medieval Moral Philosophy]

Introduction to the Modern Period
  1: The Recognition of the Need for an Adequate Epistemology to Resolve Ethico-Religious Problems
  2: The Central Problem for Modern Moral Epistemology
  3: The Problem not Original with DesCartes
  4: The Significance of this Assumption about Ideas for our Study
Spinoza
  1: Spinoza’s Acceptance of the Thesis Despite Significant Differences in his Account of It
  2: Spinoza's Inconsistency and Some of the Main Differences Between His Account of the Thesis and the Tradition
  3: The Root of Spinoza's Inconsistency: His Dual Truth Criterion
  4: Transition to Hume
Notes: Chapter Two [Introduction to Modern Philosophy & Spinoza]

B. Hume’s Reply to The Moral Tradition
  1: Hume's Fundamental Philosophical Aim Ethical, Like Spinoza & the Other Philosophers Already Examined, Despite His Alleged Moral Skepticism
    1A: Hume’s “Skepticism” a qualified one and does not imply a genuine moral skepticism
    1B: Hume’s Qualified Assent to the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason
      <I> Hume’s Apparent and Explicit Statement of Opposition to the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason
      <ii> Hume's General Account of Reason and Passion
        {a} His General Distinction of Ideas
        {b} Brief Critique of Hume's Distinction
        {c} The Distinction Between 'Reason' and 'Passion'
        {d} Concluding Statement about Hume's General View of Reason
      <iii> The Nature of These Belief Passions as Having Intentional Features Ordinarily Attributed to a 'Rational' Faculty; Hume's Belief Passions, in Some Sense, Rational
      <iv> Elucidation of the Relation Between 'Passion' &/or 'Reason' and Action
        {a} General Consideration of the Relation Between 'Belief' and Action
        {b} Application of This View of the General Relation of Thought and Action to the Moral Realm

C. Kant’s Reply to Hume

- 1: Summary of Section on Hume
- 2: Transition to Kant: Introduction to Kant's Claim, the Aim of this Section and Kant's Significance for Our Thesis
- 3: Elucidation of Kant's Stand on, and Account of, The Thesis of the Practicality of Reason
  - 3A: Initial and General Statement of Kant's Formulation of the Thesis
  - 3B: The Detailed Account of Kant's Formulation of the Thesis of the Practicality Reason--the Main Parts of the Thesis to be Examined
    - <i> Kant's View of Action--Specifically Moral Action
      - {a} Qualified Restriction of the Immediate Field of Inquiry
      - {b} Action Generally or Non-Moral Action
      - {c} Moral Action Generally--"External" Versus "Internal" Right Action
        - [1] Externally Right Actions qua Legally Right
        - [2] Externally Right Action Independent of Legal Codes, and the Significance of this Study for Kant's View of Moral Action
    - <ii> Kant's View of Reason Specifically Practical or Moral Reason
      - {a} A Brief Synopsis of Kant's View of "Theoretical Reason" with Respect to Its Bearing on Moral Action and the Moral Law
        - [1] Kant's Account of the Ultimate Foundations of "Theoretical Knowledge," i.e., Sensible Intuition
        - [2] Further Elucidation of Kant's "Sensible Intuitions," and His Key Assumption that All We Literally Know are "Phenomena" or Our Own Ideas or Conceptions
        - [3] Kant's Truth Criterion or Criterion of Verification for Veridical Conceptions--His Transcendental Arguments
        - [4] Brief Critique of Kant's Account of "Theoretical Reason"
      - {b} Practical Reason: Elucidation of, and Its Relation to Theoretical Reason; the Cognitive Relation Between Reason and Moral Action
        - [1] Practical Reason and Theoretical Reason
        - [2] Kant's General Form of Justification of Moral Action, i.e., Free Action on the Basis of One's Conception of Moral Law, by an Appeal to Transcendental Argument
          - (A) Brief Critique of This Appeal
          - (B) Hypothetical & Categorical Principles of Action
        - [3] Critique of Kant's Appeal to Transcendental Argument for the Justification of Moral Action
    - <iii> Kant's View of Reason's Constraint on Moral Action
      - {a} Significance of Kant's Appeal to Intuition for Verification of Moral Claims
      - {b} Critique of Kant's Appeal to "Argument" Rather than Intuition as the Source of Reason's Power over Action
      - {c} Moral Reason as a Principle of Action & Other Principles of Action
        - [1] Reason and Will
        - [2] Reason & the Sensibility
    - <iv> Conclusion
- Notes: Chapter Two [Kant's Reply to Hume]

D. Richard Price’s Reply to Hume and Kant

- 1: The Present Status of the Argument, and Why Price has been Selected as the Main Representative for Moral Intuitionism
- 2: Price's General Argument for the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason and Initial Evaluation of It
- 3: Stage #1 of the Analysis of Premise <q>, that All Moral Ideas are Rational Ideas Price's General Epistemology
  - 3A: The Argument [B] for <q> Stated with an Initial Evaluation of It; the Necessity of General Epistemological Investigations to Resolve the Moral Problem
  - 3B: Price's Methodology for Resolving the Unclarity Concerning the Nature of Ideas
  - 3C: The Nature and "Origin" of Our Ideas in General and of Rational and Sense Ideas in Particular

<i> Sense Ideas
<ii> Rational Ideas
3D: A Brief Critique of Price's Account of Rational Ideas
4: Stage #2 of the Analysis of Premise <q>, that All Moral Ideas are Rational Ideas
Price's Moral Epistemology
Section 4A: Price's Claim about the Status of Moral Ideas in View of His General Epistemology
5: Price's Account of Moral Action and the Constraint of Reason on Moral Action
5A: Return to Premise <p> of Argument A: that Some Moral "Ideas" Constrain Action; "Ideas" as Principles of Action and Other Principles of Action
<i> Moral Action
<ii> The Constraint of Reason on Moral Action
{a} Reason and Sense in Moral Action
{b} Reason and Will in Moral Action
Conclusion The Need for a “Realist” Phenomenology of Knowledge

D. An Analysis of Intuition: Husserl's Theory of "Evidenz" or fulfillment

1: General Introduction to the Problem
1A: The Common-Sense Distinction Between Thought & Knowledge and its Main Problem
<i> The Common-Sense Distinction
<ii> The Main Problem Associated with this Distinction
<iii> The Attempt to Meet this Problem by Appeal to the General Theory of Perception Or Sense-Experience
<iv> Inadequacy of this Appeal
<v> The General Bearing of Husserl's Theory of Knowledge on this Problem
2: Husserl's Formulation of the Problem of Knowledge & the General Form of His Resolution of It
2A: The General Nature of Husserl's Account of the Distinction Between Thought and Knowledge and His Main Problem Associated Therewith
2B: Husserl's More Specific Problem
2C: Husserl's Early Concern with this Problem & the General Form of His Proposed Solution
3: Husserl's Theory of the Mental Act with Respect to both Thought and Knowledge & Their Interrelationship
3A: The Main Aim of this Section to Elucidate the Mental Act with Respect to Knowledge. This Will Involve an Analysis of Its Parts and Properties
The Parts of the Mental Act
<i> Parts of the Mental Act Most Relevant to Thought
[1] primary contents or sensate matter (in which sensory universals inhere);
[2] intentional role or the function sensa (or acts!) play in the apprehension of an object;
[3] the matter of an act or its referential quality (in which meanings or intentional qualities, i.e., concepts and propositions, inhere);
[4] the quality of an act or its propositional attitude;
[5] the intentional essence of an act (the intentional unity constituted by an act's matter and quality);
<ii> Parts of the Mental Act Most Relevant to Knowledge
[6] epistemic fullness or epistemic role
[7] relations between acts:
{a} fulfillment;
{b} frustration or conflict;
[8] transcendence or the relation between act and existing object
<i> Husserl's Account of the Mental Act of Thought
{a} Husserl's General Position with Respect to the Nature of the Mental Act of Thought and Its Bearing on Community and Law
{b} Detailed Explication of the Mental Act of Thought via a Discussion of Those Parts of the Mental Act Most Relevant Thereto
[1] "Primary Contents" (also called "Sensa," "Sensate Matter," "Sense Contents" and Sensations)
[2] "Intentional Role" (also called "Function," "Interpretation" and "Apperception")46
[3] The "Matter" of an Act
[4] The "Quality" of an Act
[5] The "Intentional Essence" of the Act

- [6] The "Semantic Essence" of the Act
- **<ii> Husserl's Account of the Mental Act of Knowledge in the Sense of Fulfillment**
  - {a} The Aim of This Section: An Illuminating Critique of Husserl's 6th Logical Investigation
  - **[1] The Main Parts (Sections) of the 6th LI and Their Respective Partial Contributions to This End**
    - (A) First Section: Objectifying Intentions and Their Fulfillments. Knowledge as a Synthesis of Fulfillment and Its Gradations
    - (B) Second Section: Sense and Understanding
    - (C) Third Section: Clarification of Our Introductory Problem
  - **{b} Exposition of Husserl's Theory of the Mental Act that Emerges from Filling in Some of the Details of This Outline**

[1] Fulfillment

- (A) The Aim of This Section to Elucidate What Knowledge in the Sense of Fulfillment is for Husserl
- (B) Concrete Case to Initially Explicate Knowledge in the Sense of Fulfillment
- (C) More Detailed Analysis of Fulfillment by an Analysis of the Difference Between the Fullness Quality of a Mere Intention and an Intuition
- (D) Elucidation of the Process Involved in Fulfillment as a Relation Between Acts which are Relatively Empty and Acts which are More Filled
  - i. The Relation of Fulfillment and Logical Relations or an Inferential Process
  - ii. The Relation of Fulfillment and the Relation of Identity
  - iii. More Precise Characterization of Fulfillment
  - iv. Proximate Versus Ultimate Fulfillments

[2] Categorial Intuition

- (A) What "Categorial Intuition" is for Husserl and Its Significance for His Epistemology and Our Thesis
- (B)The Central Problem with the Phenomenological Elucidation of Categorial Intuitions
- (C)Husserl’s General Account of the Fullness Feature in Such Acts
- (D) More Detailed Elucidation of Categorial Intuition
  - **i. Elucidation of Straightforward, Immediate or Direct Acts of Sense Perception and Their Correlative "Real" (as Contrasted with "Ideal") Objects**
  - **ii. More Detailed Elucidation of Acts of Higher Order as well as Their Correlative "Ideal" Objects**
  - iii. A Central Problem in Husserl Interpretation with Respect to Categorial Intuition
- (E) An Illustration of Categorial Intuition by a Conceptually Based Analysis of the Authentic Presence of Number108
  - i. Presentative Stage
  - ii. The Abstractive Stage

[3] Transcendence

- (A) Initial Statement of What Transcendence is for Husserl & Its Significance for Epistemology Generally and Our Thesis in Particular
  - i. What Transcendence is
  - ii. General Epistemological Significance of Transcendence & Significance for Our Thesis
- (B) More Exact Elucidation of the Relation of Transcendence
  - i. Initial Objection Considered
  - ii. A More Precise Elucidation of Transcendence
- (C) Further Detail: Fulfillment, Transcendence and the Nature of Truth

4: Motivation

- **4A: General Statement of Husserl's Claim about Motivation and Its Significance for His Epistemology Generally, His Doctrine of Intuition in Particular and to Our Thesis**
  - <i> Initial Elucidation of Motivation in Terms of the Analysis of Intentionality Generally and a Certain Class of Intentions in Particular
  - <ii> Types of Motivations: Rational and Irrational
    - {a} Rational Motivations
    - {b} Irrational Motivations
  - <iii> Further Analysis of Irrational Motivation by an Examination of the Association of Ideas
- 4B: The Final Elucidation of Motivation by Comparison with Some Relations Possibly Confused with It

<i> Motivation and Logical Relations
{a} The Significance of This Contrast for Our Thesis
{b} The Non-Necessary or "Contingent" Character of Motivation
<ii> Motivation and Natural Causal Relations
<iii> Conclusion
Notes: Chapter Four

E. Toward a Phenomenology of Conscientious Action and a Theory of the Practicality of Reason

1: Introduction to the Chapter
1A: Restatement of Our Central Claim Concerning the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason & What It Means in View of Our Analysis so Far
1B: The General Form of the "Argument" for This Claim in Terms of Husserl's Account of Intuition
<i> Reason
<ii> Moral Action
<iii> Constraint
1C: The Aim of This Chapter to Prove the Weaker Historical Thesis as an Aid in Proving the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason; the Steps to be Taken to Accomplish this End
The Main Parts of Conscientious Action
<a> moral thoughts or intentions
<b> moral intuitions and more complex "acts" of moral know-ledge
<c> moral strivings
<d> moral motivations:
<i> irrational moral motivations
<ii> rational moral motivations
<e> moral acts of will or volition (as a complex unity essentially involving all of the above)
<f> external moral action (in the sense of a complex unity essentially involving all of the above with the addition of various psycho-physiological processes)
<i> the moral quality of this action (or the mere volitional complex) considered "relatively"
<ii> the moral quality of this action considered "absolutely"
2: The Distinction Between Moral Thought and Knowledge
2A: Introduction
<i> Moral Thought or Intentionality
<ii> The Act of Moral Knowledge
3: Moral Knowledge and Moral Value
4: Conscientious Action
5: Moral Motivation & the Elucidation of the Constraint of Moral "Knowledge" on Action
5A: Aim of This Section
5B: The General Nature of Moral Motivation
5C: The General Distinction Between Rational and Irrational Moral Motivations and the More Exact Elucidation of Rational Moral Motivations
5D: Irrational Moral Motivation
<i> Evil or Vicious Irrational Moral Motivations
{a} The Origin of Irrational Motivations Generally and of Evil Irrational Motivations in Particular
<ii> Good Irrational Moral Motivations, and the Power of Reason over Action
Notes: Chapter Five

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I

Introduction

Section 1:
The Thesis of the Practicality of Reason

At the dawn of scientific reflection the paradigmatic philosopher, Socrates, cried out to a morally confused age that the lost pearl of great price was Philosophy herself or the love of Wisdom. The heart or soul of man was no doubt cold and insensitive--almost lost in a dark cave of blindness and despair--but there was still a flicker of light beckoning him from without--calling him to open his eyes to see the Truth which alone could set him free.

Nowhere in the history of Western philosophy, perhaps, has this call been more forceful sounded than by Socrates, Plato's mentor, in his allegory of The Cave.[1] There he likens the condition of man to that of prisoners chained their whole lives to a wall in the darkness of a cave. Their whole "knowledge" of objects is derived from shadows they cast upon a wall before them. He describes, too, what it would be like if one were suddenly freed of one's chains and able to walk out of the cave into a world of light. We need, of course, in order to appreciate the full force of the illustration, to imagine vividly what it would be like if we were really blind or nearly so from the moment of our birth and then one day, suddenly, we could see. The world would then appear new to us and its beauty would enrapture us as it does young children and young lovers falling in love for the first time. We need to imagine, for example, what it would be like to see a world of soft, white clouds; of blue skies and clear waters; of sparkling dew drops on young green leaves in the morning light of a summer day; of richly colored rainbows and birds flying and singing songs after a short rain--all clearly seen for the first time.

If our imagination is rich enough, it will be difficult for us not to admit that such an experience would transform our lives.[2] Given a choice, we would be hard pressed to return to the old way of life. But, in the Socratic allegory, the pilgrim who had seen the Sun and the New World illuminated by the radiance of its light, does return--not for himself, nor to remain there always, but for the sake of his fellows, whom he now loves and pities and is willing to suffer and die for, if that can bring them out of their cave into the glorious light of the Sun.

They, of course, accuse him of being a fanatic, and, but for their chains, would beat him and kill him, disbelieving all he says. For the blind man has no conception of color, nor the deaf of sound, and if everyone around kill him, disbelieving all he says. For the blind man has no conception of color, nor the deaf of sound, and if everyone around us were blind and deaf we too, no doubt, would resist the call to leave our security for "something more." But the aim of the allegory is precisely to open our minds or hearts to the possibility of the reality of a Goodness, which, once seen, like the light of the Sun in its radiance, would free us from "evil" and the dark world of its bondage. It would give us liberty to walk as young children in a world of goodness and love without fear or shame. In Socratic terms, the aim of the allegory is to convince us of the truth that "knowledge [of the Good] is virtue and vice ignorance." In more contemporary terms, it is to convince us of the truth of *the thesis of the Practicality of Reason*: the claim that if one knows, *in the appropriate sense*, that a contemplated act is good or evil, then one is strongly constrained, perhaps even compelled, to act in accordance with that knowledge. Seeing the Good in particular acts and acting in accordance with that vision, therefore, can be likened to the seeing and acting of a blind man as his eyes are progressively opened: In darkness one cannot find one's way and must be led by others, but in the light--or to the extent one sees all things illuminated by the light--one is free.

It is this thesis that we intend to examine in this paper. Moreover, we hope to show that it is no mere relic of bygone days, but a thesis that the whole history of philosophy--from the Ancients to the Medievals to the Moderns; from Socrates to Augustine to Kant--sustains, with such characteristic statements as the following:

> Thou didst call and cry to me and break open my deafness: and Thou didst send forth Thy beams and shine upon me and chase away my blindness: Thou didst breathe fragrance upon me, and I drew in my breath and do now pant for Thee: now pant for Thee: I tasted Thee, and now hunger and thirst for Thee: Thou didst touch me, and I have burned for Thy peace.
>
> St Augustine
> *Confessions*, Sheed trans. P.192

> . . . the [pure] conception of the moral law, exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone . . . an influence so much more powerful than all other springs which may be derived from the field of experience, that in the consciousness of its worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their master; . . .
>
> Immanuel Kant
> *Metaphysics of Morals*, Abbott trans. P.27

Section: The Practical of Common-sense Significance of this Claim

Many of us, at least in some unguarded moments, perhaps in the morning when we first awake or in the evening when we are all alone, have sensed a certain emptiness, barrenness or lack--even, perhaps, as Sartre would call it, a certain "nausea"--in or with our lives. We may have wondered, "Is that all there is?" We spend our time, above all, "making a living," i.e., making money--not merely or even primarily, if we are to be honest with ourselves, on meeting basic needs, but on satisfying ourselves in the form of increasing consumption and possession of "things" we desire. Even the poor are not exempt from this, in spite of the contrast between "the haves and the have nots." Their ambition is clearly marked: they want that which others have. But sooner or later we all wonder, at least, whether these "goods" promise more than they deliver, for it appears they often do not fulfill the deepest needs of our hearts. We remain barren and empty like prisoners in a cave. If we are rich we insist we're happy, but the quality of our lives suggests otherwise.

Despite our attempts to convince ourselves or others of our happy condition, our emptiness manifests itself in clear symptoms of sickness and disease. It is not merely that we find ourselves, if we are reflective enough, constantly obsessed with--or constantly restless and anxious in the striving after--things to stimulate us. More often than not we find these things actually possessing or controlling us, and we seem to lack the power to do much about it. We may be possessed by sex, for example, and either disbelieve or are awed by the mere idea that some men and women have devoted their bodies to chastity. Or, we may be possessed by television and are amazed by the thought that some people--even children--could voluntarily do without it for a week or year. We may even be possessed by food, to the extent that we cannot control either our gluttony or our obsession with being thin--so much so that not only do we incessantly judge others by their fat content, but many of us actually die from obesity, anorexia or bulemia. Examples of such enslavement can, of course, be multiplied almost without end, but the simple fact is that we find ourselves empty and in conjunction therewith, miserable. In that emptiness and misery we do things we don't want to do, and don't do things we know we ought to. We even find ourselves ambivalently craving things we despise. As a result, we may harm our families, our friends and ourselves--which later we often bitterly, and with tears, regret. This is the human condition.

Whether we see this clearly in our own case or not, it is difficult to deny that the general condition of mankind is miserable. But wherein lies the solution to this misery? And, wherein lies its cause? In seeking release from the pain of misery we typically appeal to the "soothsayers" of our times: to psychiatrists, psychologists and therapists; to doctors, pharmacists and chiropractors; to those who will shock us, behaviorally modify us, Rolf us and exercise us. But all to little or no avail. It is not that such professions do not have a legitimate calling or domain of serviceable function, but they become illegitimate when they extend their profession to a domain they are less qualified to deal with than, perhaps, a sympathetic friend or neighbor. Sooner or later it dawns on us that our misery is rooted in the vicious quality of our world and our lives, and that is not the kind of thing that can be removed from our heart by a surgical operation, psychosomatic drugs, shock therapy and the like. No doubt the appeal to "evil" as the ultimate cause of our unhappiness is unpopular in today's world or, perhaps, too popular, as the case may be; but the doing of things we, at least, believe we "ought" not to do is a moral problem and thus requires a moral, not a medical understanding and solution.

If the thesis of the practicality of reason is true it can suggest the path we need to travel and the Light we need to see, to be liberated from this sad condition. For, its claim is that in the knowledge of The Good there is power--power greater than anything else that may be thought can stand in its way--even the alleged power of our vicious desires. If its claim is sound, the one and only thing that makes us truly miserable and even gives mere "things" control over our bodies, minds and souls is our ignorance or lack of understanding of the truth: *that Goodness is the one and only ultimate principle of order, harmony and creativity*. It is, in Plato's language, *a principle of being*, which as such never fails to affect particular lives and actions as they enter into contact with it. On the Socratic view, it is literally *the governing principle in reality*, and thus in society and in the lives of each and every one of us, insofar as we enter into intimate relation with it. Ignorance or lack of belief in Goodness opens the door of our minds and hearts to surrogate forms of gratification, as if they were or could be final ends or ultimate determining principles of our lives. But Goodness is the sole kind of thing which has the capacity to meet the deepest needs of each and every heart and soul. To the degree, therefore, that one gains access to this Good, via knowledge of the appropriate kind, the power of our illicit desires is weakened, and not only order but a new and qualitatively distinct kind of power and satisfaction enter the soul, viz., the power or freedom to love or to do good. Such is the classical

Socratic view of "the practicality of reason."

Section 3: The Central Philosophical Problem with, or Objection to, this View

Such a claim concerning the power of moral apprehension implies both that there is a class of genuine moral apprehensions and, inseparably connected with these apprehensions, a specific form of motivating power. These claims, however, are widely contested--at least among the intellectual elite--in today's world. This is because, most simply, the apparent objects of moral percepts do not immediately present themselves as "sensible": they are not, for example, seen or heard, and there is a long history of suspicion with respect to alleged non-sensuous or rational percepts. It is our contention, however, that it is primarily unclarity or misunderstanding concerning the nature and possibility of such moral apprehensions that permits serious doubt about their motivational efficacy. Thus, the discussion of the power of moral apprehension naturally centers first, and above all, (although not solely) around the issue of its possibility.

Section 3A: Further Clarification: The Distinction between Moral Belief & Moral Perception

The problem at issue here is not with whether people have moral beliefs. We are relatively safe in assuming that people at least believe themselves to be conscious of moral distinctions. Especially in today's world it is hard to deny this fact. Daily, in the news, if not from personal experience, we awake to hear of mass murderers, e.g., Charles Manson and Jim Jones, or of the torture, mutilation, raping and murder of infants and young children. Looming in the background for some of us is even the vivid and never ceasing recollection of a time not too distant when others took our brothers and sisters, mothers and children, and committed experiments and atrocities on them that are, to most of the young today, simply unbelievable.

> . . . that look was not one between two men; and if I had known how completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different worlds, I would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the third Germany.

> One felt in that moment, in an immediate manner, what we all thought and said of the Germans. The brain which governed those blue eyes and those manicured hands said: "This something in front of me belongs to a species which it is obviously opportune to suppress. In this particular case, one has to first make sure it does not contain some utilizable element."[3]
>
> Primo Levi

Undoubtedly, we have here clear cases of moral belief if not veridical perception of real moral distinctions. But our initial confidence may be quickly shaken when we attend to more complex cases, e.g., abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and perhaps above all, issues traditionally classified as the fundamental issues of life. We have in mind the possible moral dimensions of meaning or purpose in life, of trust and love, and of the reality and presence of a living God. In such cases we find that on either side of the moral issues which arise here, the proponents seem equally convinced that their claims are true and their opponent's claims false. For example, pro-abortionists may insist that a fetus is a mere part of one's body and as such one has a right to do with it as one pleases, while anti-abortionists may equally insist that a fetus is not a mere part of one's body but a living person having rights of its own. Ultimately, each claims to "see," and may deny that the other sees at all. Moreover, it often seems that little in the way of justification is given for why one should accept one claim over the other. Either you see it or you don't and nothing more is to be said. Hence, the appeal to moral "perception," vision, experience or intuition may appear highly suspect.

This conclusion may be resisted on the grounds that one or even both parties are irrationally prejudiced. Their ultimate appeal or justification is not to a sincere or honest hat one or even both parties are irrationally prejudiced. Their ultimate appeal or justification is not to a sincere or honest perception but to a merely subjective, rationally unsupported, dogmatic bias or belief. Especially in complex cases, however, like the ones above, this is a difficult argument to swallow whole, for very frequently the parties on both sides of the issue seem equally conscientious or sincere.

The appeal to power in conjunction with such moral "knowledge" or perception, then, must appear equally suspect. For, it has been alleged, by Socrates and others, that "knowledge" constrains moral action--that in seeing the good one is "constrained" to act in accordance with it, and that no one could actually commit atrocities, such as the ones mentioned above, in the full knowledge that they are so utterly wrong. And yet we are all acutely conscious of the fact that we can and do act against what we at least believe to be right. In fact, this has always been recognized by legal systems as a precondition even of intentional or voluntary wrong-doing. In light of such apparent counterexamples the appeal to both the perceptibility of moral distinctions and its alleged power seems vain. The moral philosopher seems driven either to deny the knowledge of moral distinctions and its alleged power or to seek justification in some other way than by an appeal to moral "perception" or "intuition."

Section 4: How We Propose to Resolve this Problem of Justification for our Claim

Section 4A: The Skeptical Alternative

We said, in light of the apparent counterexamples to moral intuition or perception above, that one might be tempted to conclude that we have no knowledge of objective moral distinctions and, therefore, no reason to believe there are any objective moral truths. The fact that there is such temptation in the present intellectual milieu is evident, for example, to the young teacher of philosophy who raises the issue of moral distinctions in his/her class for the first time. One finds that it is generally assumed in our society that morality is a private, or at most culturally relative, affair, and, as such, largely, if not wholly, arbitrary. But regardless of one's stand with respect to the status of objective moral distinctions, the student of philosophy is called upon to defend his or her claims, this being the hallmark of philosophical work. One appeals to reason and to truth, and it is just this appeal which formed the basis of our earlier "suspicion" with respect to moral intuitions, perceptions or experiences.

Such "rational" suspicion or skepticism, however, must be sharply distinguished from another form of skepticism closely associated with it in practice. There is a form of moral skepticism, or even skepticism with regard to truth generally, which is not, strictly speaking, "philosophical or rational skepticism." This is a skepticism which results, not from a sincere inquiry after truth, but from an actual denial, and sometimes even disdain, of truth. Here we have, not a rational openness or receptivity to truth, like the openness characteristic of young children, but a certain type of "suspiciousness" about the possibility or desirability of truth, and an unwillingness even to look at it. This form of skepticism is more the skepticism of an attitude rather than of an act, proposition or claim of knowledge. One simply assumes there is nothing to see and so one does not even bother to look. In other words, one is irrationally biased or prejudiced.

Such irrational skepticism has causal antecedents in certain experiences and even arguments. In fact, the same reasons or arguments that may lead to rational skepticism may equally lead to this irrational and pernicious skepticism. For example, one has mistaken moral or perceptual experiences, and on that basis comes to mistrust the reliability of experience generally. One observes the sophistical misuse or abuse of argument to convince others of lies and so comes to believe that to be argument's primary or only function. But no such experiences or arguments could ever, in the nature of the case, consistently entail such a skepticism, for in doing so one's skeptical conclusion, theoretically and practically, contradicts itself. One claims to know that knowledge is impossible; one sees that one has mistaken perceptions and on that basis claims that seeing generally is impossible; and one apprehends that "truth telling" may admit of moral exception in some particular case(s) and on that basis concludes there are no objective moral distinctions.

It is because such skepticism is demonstrably absurd and inconsistent that no philosopher of great merit and influence has ever seriously maintained it--not with regard to truth generally or moral truth in particular. In all philosophical endeavor there is an underlying assumption that there is truth and that it ought to be found. Morality and truth appear, therefore, to be inextricably bound up together. Nay, philosophy as a practical pursuit aiming at truth as an ultimate end rests on a moral assumption, i.e., the will to know. Thus, even when skepticism is held in some respect, e.g., as the logical conclusion of certain assumed premises, it is held by such philosophers on rational grounds and it is amenable to change and reformation on just such grounds. Given such inconsistency, one concludes not that there is no truth or that truth cannot be found, but that some one or more of one's premises must be false.

Undoubtedly, there are many who will condescend to use truth, as well as sophistical argumentation, to convince themselves and others of lies. And, no doubt, the elucidation of this irrational skepticism is of considerable importance to moral theory. But we cannot take the time here to elucidate it further, our aim being merely to make clear that despite the extent and form of the skepticism of many of the great philosophers, the root of that skepticism always comes to rest in the drive to justification of knowledge claims generally, moral or otherwise; and this not merely in the sense of providing "arguments" for one's claims, but "good" arguments, i.e., arguments used in the pursuit of truth. If we are right about the work of the for one's claims, but "good" arguments, i.e., arguments used in the pursuit of truth.

If we are right about the work of the great philosophers, our central problem is not essentially, or in the first instance, the problem of whether we know, not even in the moral realm, but only of how we know. The detailed elucidation of the entities and processes involved in arriving at moral knowledge is our need and aim. This latter problem, in contradistinction from the former, is that which has consistently concerned all the great moral philosophers from the beginning. Let us, then, briefly consider our problem from the standpoint of such a rational skepticism.

Section 4B: “Rational Moral Skepticism” and Alternative Forms of Justification

"Rational moral skepticism" is founded on the pursuit of justification of knowledge claims. The temptation, even with such rational skepticism, is to reject any alleged moral "intuitions" and to seek an alternative form of justification. The implication, however, of such a denial, whether implicit or explicit and regardless of the form it may take, may be even more vain. The 18th century philosopher, Richard Price was certain the implication of denying the apprehendability of "real [moral] distinctions belonging to the natures of actions" is to render them indifferent. "This is what is essentially true of them, and this is what all understandings, that perceive right, must perceive them to be."[5] One can either acknowledge that, at least in some cases, we have moral percepts which are veridical perceptions (of Reason or the Understanding) or we have none. Either the mind actually perceives real moral data ore veridical perceptions (of Reason or the Understanding) or we have none. Either the mind actually perceives real moral data or it does not. In the latter case one must explain away the apparent genuineness of the perception. Typically this is done by a form of logical analogy. Moral percepts are compared to cases of mistaken visual or other tactile perceptions, e.g., the mistaken but once almost universally conceded perception that the earth was flat or that the sun revolved around the earth.[6] In such cases, and, it is alleged, in all moral cases as well, there is both seemingly clear belief and strong feeling or conviction of its truth, yet the "belief" is still in error. There is no actual object that corresponds to the belief, and no genuine present-ness of the fact in question. The implications are strikingly clear: if all moral data are of this illusory type then all actions and all characteristic traits are morally indifferent. The torture, mutilation, rape and murder of infants is as morally neutral as a walk on the beach on a summer day. The character of a Gandhi or Mother Theresa is no different from the standpoint of moral "truth" than the character of any of us, including a Hitler, Jones or Manson.

Undoubtedly, the moral philosopher, aware of "alternative forms of moral justification," may well resist this implication. Even if he or she concedes the absurdity or untenability of a full blown moral skepticism, the denial of intuition or moral perception as a form of moral justification does not entail that there may not be some other form of justification for such claims, e.g., a Humean appeal to "objective passions" or a Kantian appeal to "transcendental argument." But it is one of the primary aims of this paper to show that such appeals either inconsistently assume some form of "moral apprehension" or that their views (Hume's and Kant's) entail a moral skepticism which is both in itself untenable and is explicitly denied by the whole philosophical tradition and by those philosophers themselves. We shall try to show that the history of philosophy presents a consistent acknowledgment of the thesis of the practicality of reason, if "reason," in this context, is interpreted as a form of veridical moral "apprehension." Our view is that, although this apprehension may well be construed as "grounded" in some form of "empirical" constituent, such an empirical constituent is always and essentially insufficient to elucidate adequately moral apprehension itself. Thus, our specific problem is: how to make such seemingly non-empirical apprehensions consistent with an empirical constituent or foundation. To make this point clearer we shall now consider the aforementioned alternatives to moral intuition in more detail.

Section 4C: Alternative Forms of Justification Option to Moral Intuitionism

There is a limit to what can, in the nature of the case, plausibly function as a form of verification, plausibly function as a form of verification. As a mere matter of historical fact, there are but two main alternative philosophical views which emerge, one historically following the other, as reactions to the common-sense moral intuitionism generally upheld by the philosophical tradition, viz., Humean Empiricism and Kantian Idealism or Transcendentalism.

Together with moral Intuitionism these views comprise the three main types of "forms of justification" applicable to fundamental epistemological claims, including moral claims generally and the claims of the practicality of reason in particular. Let us briefly consider each of these alternative views.

i) Humean Empiricism

Hume calls into question, and even claims to refute, the philosophical tradition's clear affirmation of the thesis of the practicality of reason. In other words, he rejects the alleged central role of reason in morality both with respect to apprehension of objective moral properties and with respect to the alleged power of such apprehension over action. "Reason of itself is utterly impotent … Moral distinctions …are not the offspring of reason."[7] In doing so, he undoubtedly did, and still does, invoke not merely controversy but intense opposition. Hume is represented, in the light of such claims, as the leading opponent to the thesis and as the father of an army of present day disciples who follow his lead.[8] The class of philosophers who concede, with the tradition, the practicality of reason are typically classified as moral rationalists, and those who follow Hume's lead are typically classified as moral empiricists, or even as moral skeptics. In keeping with this classification the two groups of philosophers tend to act more like two camps at war than as coworkers and colleagues in a common pursuit of truth. Open-minded dialogue and inquiry often degenerate into verbal intimidation, restriction of the theatre of war, and sophistical argumentation. The poor student of philosophy finds himself or herself forced into one camp or the other.

Despite Hume's great following and his bold profession of opposition to our thesis, we hope to show not only that Hume was not a moral skeptic but, more significantly, that there is a plausible sense in which *he may even be said to concede the thesis of the practicality of reason*. He explicitly stated that the most significant work of his life was the moral treatise he wrote at the culmination of his career, *The Enquiry into the Principles of Morals*. In that treatise he clearly asserted his conviction that morality is grounded in the apprehension of objective moral principles.[9] Despite his explicit avowal of the role of reason and his explicit avowal of the role of sentiment, sense or passion in moral action, we must remember that that denial was grounded in certain inherited assumptions and preconceptions about reason and what it could and could not do. He assumed, for example, that reason functioned almost exclusively within the parameters of a ratiocinative process of reasoning, the fundamental elements of which were somehow rooted in sense experience. Moreover, Hume's appeal to passion was an appeal to a faculty having certain selective, intentional or referential features, including the power of singling out morally relevant features of actions, as well as the power or constraint of such apprehension over action. Thus, putting aside the merely verbal issue of how the terms 'reason' or 'passion' were or are used, it is our intention to show that Hume conceded that objective moral distinctions were apprehendable, and that when one apprehended them appropriately they had constraining power over action.

> This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, **in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which is the surest guardian of every virtue.** The animal conveniences and pleasures sink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty and moral grace is studiously acquired, and the mind is accomplished in every perfection, which can adorn or embellish a rational creature.
>
> Here is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted; here is displayed the **force** of many sympathies.[10]

In light of both this claim as well as our earlier claims about justification we aim to show that the root of the controversy around Hume does not center around the question of whether there are apprehensions of moral distinctions, or whether they have power over action, but around the issue of justification in the sense of the elucidation of that moral knowledge. *Hume, in keeping with the tradition, did not deny that there are objective moral distinctions (virtues and vices) or that we have "knowledge" of them; he doubted only the adequacy of previous attempts at justification* *of such knowledge and how that knowledge was to be analyzed.* In this respect, therefore, he differs from a great number of those who profess to be his followers.

Given that the issue is one primarily of justification in the sense of elucidation, it remains that bitter controversy revolves around the precise nature, or account given, of that justification, and, in particular, over the issue of the nature of that faculty which allegedly justifies. The account one gives of this faculty may have profound implications with respect to one's moral theory. Thus, Price, in keeping with the common assumption of his time, stated that the controversy essentially revolved around the issue of *which faculty of the mind perceives moral distinctions*, viz., the Understanding or the Sensibility; and he concluded that Hume's appeal to the sensibility entailed moral skepticism.[11]

But even if it is true that the actual logical implications of Hume's view, i.e., of some of his foundational epistemological assumptions or claims, lead to skepticism, this does not mean that he himself was a skeptic. It does not mean, for example, that he denied the reality or apprehendability of objective moral distinctions, or that he attempted to defend such a skepticism, or that he did not attempt to present and defend a cogent moral theory by an elucidation of its foundational principles. That is, his ultimate appeal to objective moral passions and to objective moral principles on the basis thereof, although allegedly grounded in sense, was emphatically not an attempt to deny or reduce moral principles to mere subjectivity --to a merely private, or even culturally relative, affair. On the contrary, it was an attempt to establish such principles by an appeal to a rigorous criterion of truth or justification.

To appreciate adequately how Hume's appeal to an "alternative form of justification" may have led him to an untenable skepticism which he himself rejects, will require a more detailed analysis of more general underlying epistemological issues which have a bearing on our moral concerns. First, in the attempt to resolve the fundamental problem of justification, or of how we know objective moral principles, Hume (as well as, e.g., Kant and Price) sincerely attempted, not to begin with dogmatic, apriori assumptions about how one's moral theory must be, and then from there to justify those beliefs by finding or develop-ing an appropriate epistemic foundation. Rather, they attempted to look to see what is most primitive in knowledge and then to erect a scientific philosophy thereon. But this reveals that they appeal precisely to some form or another of intuition as a method to determine just those foundational principles or axioms which are to resolve philosophical disputes, even if that intuition is formally restricted to sense for Hume or conceptions for Kant.

Thus, in the attempt to find surer foundations for knowledge generally, Hume echoed the conviction of rational and empirical philosophers alike in his insistence that a true epistemology cannot be grounded on arbitrary or dogmatic apriori assumptions but on *objective experience* alone. On this point he was surely right. To provide an objective edifice the underlying experiences must themselves be objective (at least, in some manner, intersubjectively testable or verifiable) or the edifice will crumble like a house built upon sand. He clearly assumes this in the writing of his book, e.g., in his statements about "perception." In this sense Hume, as well as others typically thought to be opposed, a reunified; i.e., they are all foundationalists.[12]

Agreement here, however, is consistent with the most disparate epistemological and moral theories, since all depends on how one construes the basic epistemic constituents. The intuitionist, for example, also appeals to "experience." But, in cases of moral disagreement, e.g., in cases of abortion, euthanasia, etc., where one "in-tuitionist" is pro, the other con, little has been offered in the way of justification other than a vague appeal to "experience" somehow associated with the understanding. No elucidation is given of precisely how one arrives at one's alleged veridical perceptions. In short, the intuitionist lacks a criterion of truth or adequacy for his or her beliefs, and so no detailed elucidation is given of how to distinguish veridical from unveridical moral perceptions. Either you see it or you don’t and nothing more is to be said. G.E. Moore, in the 20th century, seems to have been an especially clear case of this tendency.

In response to such cases it is not surprising to imagine the modern empirical philosopher shaking his head in frustration, if not in disgust, in the conviction that the intuitionist is simply irrational. Whether or not Price, Kant or anyone else actually sees what he claims to see, it is very difficult for an honest person to accept their claims when anyone can use the same criterion to justify any claim whatsoever. One claims to see that the earth is flat or that the sun revolves around the earth, another claims to see one's past lives or extra-terrestrials, and, finally, another claims to have seen even God. When asked for justification one merely replies: "You just have to see it." It is not surprising, therefore, to find critical philosophers like Russell disparaging Kant because of his alleged lack of an adequate truth criterion in moral matters:

> “He [Kant] was like many people: in intellectual matters he was skeptical, but in moral matters he believed implicitly in the maxims that he had imbibed at his mother's knee.”[13]

Hume and the empiricist philosophers generally, therefore, aim at what they take to be a more rigorous justification of knowledge claims, by seeking firm foundations in experiences most indubitable and commonly shared, i.e., sense experiences. They would ground all knowledge on the primitive information received through the mediation of the senses. Here, at least, they contend, all can appeal to concrete or tangible evidence. On the basis of such experience, the empiricist philosopher presents a criterion of both meaning and truth. In the language of certain modern day empiricists, e.g., logical positivists, "The meaning of a proposition is [identical to] its method of verification."[14] If a claim about an object is empirically verifiable, or a logical deduction from one that is, then it is both meaningful and a case of genuine knowledge; and if not, then not. On this framework or foundation, it has been alleged, modern science has largely been erected, and there is little doubt that much in the way of advance of knowledge has been achieved thereby.

Hume, and empirical philosophers generally, attempt to use such a criterion to elucidate belief generally and moral belief in particular (as well as moral principles). Such belief is characterized as a form of passion--a form of experience associated with the sensibility rather than reason. We hope to show, however, that Hume fails in this attempt because of his nominalism. He rejects both the apprehendability and existence of universals. Thus, he cannot concede universals whether as constituents of the object of knowledge or as constituents (qualities) of the "act" or state of knowledge itself. The result is that he is both vague and inconsistent in his elucidation. He does not wish to relegate or reduce belief generally, or moral belief in particular, to the domain of the merely subjective. But "objectivity," as applied to passion can only mean for him a sort of "qualified universality" of "nature"--an objectivity rooted in the contingent, but, somehow, eternal, fabric of our being.[15] The details of just how passion or sense, being the admittedly subjective thing that it is, can select objective moral virtues and vices are simply not provided by Hume.

More specifically, despite Hume's apparently sincere and painstaking attempts at the elucidation of objective moral beliefs, and the grounding of such beliefs in objective moral principles, the ultimate appeal to mere sense is at variance with the apparent character of moral data and belief. As Hume admits and insists, *moral data are simply not the kinds of things that are sense perceptible.*[16] Moral rectitude, for example, is not something we see with our eyes or hear or smell. And, yet people--Hume in particular-claim to single it out or "know" it nonetheless.[17] But if all scientific or rationally grounded belief is that which is empirically verifiable (or logical deductions there-from), then, since moral data are not empirically verifiable, it follows that such beliefs are not scientific or rationally grounded beliefs. Moral data, if they exist at all, are simply rationally inaccessible to us, and the moral claims of Hume as well as the tradition are without rational support. Skepticism, perhaps even moral nihilism, therefore, may appear top be the logical consequence of Hume’s foundationalist epistemological assumptions.

It is true that Hume attempts to evade such a consequence by his appeal to the derivability of complex or objective passions from subjective sense experiences. His followers too attempt to evade this consequence by their appeal, in the non-moral realm, to, e.g., "eternal linguistic tokens" versus linguistic types, "numerals" versus numbers and the like.[18] But these attempts, as is now increasingly clear, always inject "something more" into such concepts than is strictly allowable on "empirical" grounds. The empiricism of old, or even of our own times, is simply too narrow. It is arguable that Hume himself did not stay within his stated parameters, and few of his modern day followers believe that his severe restrictions on experience can still be maintained.[19] In the moral case, in particular, Hume attributes to the passions, e.g., of humanity or sympathy, a range of properties and relations which are simply inexplicable if the empirical criterion of truth or justification was true. He assigns them selective powers, intentional or referential features, including the power of the objective determination of the moral features of acts.[20]

Perhaps, then, the empiricist philosopher has but two alternatives. On one hand, he might, in opposition to Hume himself, consistently maintain his empirical criterion of truth or justification. On the other hand, he might concede that that criterion is too narrow and must be supplemented in order to account for a broader range of experiences. If he does the former, then moral skepticism, perhaps even moral nihilism, seems inevitable. No mere sense experience is sufficient to verify specifically objective moral claims. But we should also point out that no mere sense perception can justify Hume's mandate, or the mandate of his modern followers, the logical positivists, that all knowledge (as well as all meaningful utterances!) must be empirically verifiable or be logically derived therefrom. For that mandate itself is not empirically testable. Such a claim is, therefore, on its own grounds dogmatic and apriori if not meaningless. In fact, as is now well recognized, empiricism in the narrow sense cannot justify any claim of knowledge--as Hume himself seems to have suspected--simply because knowledge of anything necessarily involves the knowledge of relations, and relations are excluded from the primitive elements given to sense.

The consequences of such an empiricism are clear. They lead ineluctably to complete skepticism precisely as Price maintained. For, all reasoning is grounded on, or justified on the basis of, premises which themselves cannot ultimately be grounded on argument without an infinite regress or vicious circle. Some such premises must be "given" with experiential or intuitive, i.e., self-evident certainty, or nothing at all can be known or known via inference therefrom--so long as we stay within the foundationalist pattern.21 But the empirical, or rather, experiential or intuitive elements allowed by Hume and his followers are simply insufficient to account for the objectivity of the selectivity he ascribes to his passions. Thus, Hume and empiricism generally fail to provide an adequate alternative form of justification for moral claims.

If the first of the two options earlier stated must be restated in light of its skeptical conclusion then there appears to be no other alternative than to concede with Price a broader, although rigorously defined, class of intuitive experience types, as well as a function or power that can adequately account for them. One must admit a power of reason which functions not merely inferentially but intuitively. Empiricism appeared successful only by its reliance on a common set of experiences we all are to some degree familiar with, e.g., ordinary perceptions of macro-observable objects. But it did not clarify the details of such perception so that an adequate truth criterion could be formulated for all cases of intuitive or perceptual knowledge, and in its arbitrary restriction of experience to certain experience types, it led by implication to a denial of even what it thought was most clear, viz., its own empirical criterion of truth.

Despite such implications it is worth restating that Hume did not, as many of his followers today, yield to the skeptical alternative. It is true that he did not allow himself to be forced against his will, by certain logical implications of his epistemology, to concede explicitly the practicality of "reason." But his overriding conviction that one did "apprehend" objective moral distinctions remained, as did his commitment to the constraining "power" of that apprehension--one which could override desires in conflict with morality. His philosophical endeavor was to elucidate or provide an adequate ground of justification for these enduring convictions. Our aim, therefore, with respect to Hume, is to show that he concedes the practicality of reason, *if by reason we mean a faculty capable of objective moral selectivity, apprehension or intuition*, but that he is inconsistent. Either passion, and moral passion in particular, is merely a subjective or private affair, or it is an objective matter of truth and falsity--an issue of the objective quality of actions independent of one's beliefs and feelings about them. If the former, then moral passion appears to be subsumed in some sense under the traditional function of sensibility. The implication will be an absurd and inconsistent skepticism and, possibly, moral nihilism, all actions being reduced to the morally indifferent (as Price claims). If the latter, then moral passion would appear to be subsumed under the traditional faculty or function of reason. If so, that would be tantamount to conceding the thesis of the practicality of reason, despite the fact that no adequate theory of it is provided.

ii) Kantian Transcendentalism or Idealism

One might acknowledge that the thesis of the practicality of reason is true, and that Humean empiricism is insufficient to provide the justification for it (as well as for knowledge claims generally), and still resist the alleged implication of a non-sensible form of intuition. Kant is one who unquestionably accepts the thesis but appears to reject non-sensible or intellectual forms of intuition.

Despite this appearance, we hope to show that Kant ultimately grounds his moral claims in some form of appeal to experience or intuition. It is true that he formally appeals to what he calls "transcendental arguments": but the status of such "arguments" is extremely curious in that they are not, or do not appear to be sound or even valid, and as such they do not appear to justify anything. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Kant allegedly restricts knowledge to the knowledge of conceptions, he accepts Hume's empiricism or his sensible intuitions as the necessary foundation for distinguishing between veridical and unveridical conceptions. In doing so, he too falls victim to Hume's claim that one cannot derive an ought (conception) from an is (sensation). That is, Kant has no account whatsoever of intuition generally, and moral intuition in particular, versus mere concepts. It is, therefore, inexplicable how he can derive moral knowledge via transcendental "arguments" from such an obscure foundation. Now it may be that such "arguments" are actually Kant's attempt at a scientific intuitionism "grounded" or originating in sense. Whether or not this is the case, we hope to show that his actual appeal in moral justification is to experience--even common moral experience--the kind of thing just about anyone can both have and comprehend-as Kant himself acknowledges.

It seems clear to us that the reason for this disparity within Kant's thought is due to the fact that Kant is caught between the desire to avoid vague, irrational or unjustified appeals to common opinion or experience on the one hand; and his implicit acknowledgment of Hume's empirical foundationalism on the other. He is compelled to ground moral and other experience in sense in some manner, and yet he recognizes the insufficiency of sense to account for our apprehension of objective moral distinctions. He simply cannot seem to make his rational insights consistent with the empirical component in his epistemological foundations. As a result, he is caught in the same manner as Hume on the horns of the dilemma of either an untenable skepticism (on the basis of the inadequacy or insufficiency of his empirical foundation) or a seemingly groundless intuitionism. In response to this dilemma, his transcendental arguments enter as attempts to rigorously elucidate rational insight's basis in an empirical foundation. But he seems not to see what this commits him to. In particular he does not seem to see clearly the difference between justification as intuitive (Eidetic) *elucidation*[22] versus justification as inference or deduction; between the founding, grounding or origination (abstraction) of a higher order idea in lower order ideas and sense elements versus the grounding of an idea in other ideas (or sense elements a la Hume) through logical inference or a ratiocinative process of reasoning.

Regardless of Kant's formal stand, it is quite clear that the strength of his "arguments" and the enduring quality of his moral treatises lies precisely in the penetrating moral insights manifested in his discussions of concrete moral examples, and the harmony of those discussions with what the ordinary person finds in his own thought and experience of the moral life. If and insofar as these examples--these appeals to common sense and experience--are treated as mere logical arguments, his moral philosophy appears lifeless and cold: a dry and barren moral formalism. It is, no doubt, quite common for Kant's moral philosophy to be taken in this manner, but only because Kant's examples are interpreted as "arguments." The premises of such arguments then present themselves as mere moral assumptions, and the end of moral controversy mere consistency rather than moral truth. Morality, in this case, falls within the province of moral logicians, and not within the province of the common man *as Kant so repeatedly and emphatically maintained.*[23]

In short, Kantianism when separated from moral experience ineluctably leads, as we see in its modern day disciples, to skepticism, or at best to a "rational" appeal to what, on theoretical grounds, appears to be an "irrational faith," e.g., in the Kantianism of Kierkegaard. But, if Kant's moral examples are treated as occasions for objective intuitions--as forms of justification in the sense of a rendering present of moral facts--then philosophical intuitionism, in the sense of a rigorously scientific elucidation of intuitional experience types, seems to be inevitable. Price's claim, cited earlier, appears true: we must either assume that moral apprehension is not possible, and thus accept the alternative of an absurd and inconsistent skepticism, or with Hume, Kant and the philosophical tradition (we believe), acknowledge intuitive moral apprehensions and seek to adequately "justify" them by an elucidation of the nature of intuition generally, within which moral intuition finds its place.

Section 5: The Form of Justification to be used to Defend the Thesis

If we are right in thinking that the philosophical tradition, including Hume and Kant, concedes the practicality of reason and does so on the basis of an appeal to objective apprehensions or experiences, and if the crucial issue is not so much whether the thesis is true but how it is true, then, perhaps, we should return to the examination of moral intuitionism and of what, specifically, it needs to make it work.

In carrying out this intention, Richard Price will be used as the main representative of the moral intuitionist view. Taking the results of our exposition of his views and of the evaluation of intuition generally, we hope to show that what his view needs to make intuitionism work is, above all, an eidetic analysis, an analysis of the essence, of intuition itself. We shall try to show that what any theory of the practicality of reason needs to make it work is: (a) an elucidation of how non-sensible concepts, in particular, moral concepts, are related to sensible concepts; (b) an elucidation of how we can distinguish mere thoughts (or intentions) of sensible or non-sensible objects from direct apprehensions of those objects themselves; and (c) an elucidation of how higher order intuitions, including veridical moral concepts, can be derived from lower order veridical moral concepts, i.e., an elucidation of the nature of the process involved in coming to see, often on the basis of seen facts, moral realities which we did not and could not see before.

We intend to show that such necessary conditions can be met by the application of Edmund Husserl's epistemological investigations to the moral realm. Although Husserl's almost exclusive concern was in the area of the foundations of logic and epistemology, his conviction always was that such investigations had profound implications for all other disciplines and investigations as well. And, we have found reason to think that such studies, e.g., of intuition, are essential to a philosophical understanding of our moral claims. Our interpretation of Husserl's epistemology is "realistic," which is strongly opposed to the subjective, idealistic view which currently dominates Husserlian scholarship. This interpretation of Husserl's view is of vital significance for our thesis, for it alone provides the wherewithal to elucidate adequately an intuition, which can be central to knowledge generally and moral knowledge in particular.

Our intention, then, is to use Husserl's epistemological theory to outline a phenomenology of conscientious action and a theory of the practicality of reason. There is a consensus of opinion among both rationalist and empirically minded philosophers that some people act conscientiously. Their principles constrain them to act. This is a part of the very meaning of conscientiousness. Sometimes the conscientious person does what he believes he should precisely because he believes he should. It is my intention, therefore, to elucidate conscientious action phenomenologically. Such a phenomenological investigation may elucidate, or even justify, the traditional thesis of the practicality of reason--the thesis that if one knows, in the appropriate sense, that a contemplated action is good or evil then, as the tradition says, one is constrained to act in accordance with that knowledge. One is constrained, perhaps even caused, to do what is known to be good and to refrain from doing what is known to be evil.

All depends, of course, on what is meant by "knowledge in the appropriate sense." It will be my central task in this dissertation, therefore, to give a rigorously clear description of the sense of knowledge that constrains action. Such an elucidation will clarify the sense of "constraint" meant. Moreover, I intend to show that in every case of vicious action one must willfully reject, or turn away from, this knowledge, precisely in order to prevent the necessitating power of truth from determining one's actions. The philosophical significance of such an elucidation or investigation, if successful, will be that moral intuition or apprehension--as well as the power associated therewith, can be elucidated on grounds of principle.

Section 6: Description of the Development of the Argument of the Thesis

Let us then review the development of the argument of this thesis. My central claim is that the thesis of the practicality of reason is true. The proof of this claim, however, cannot be undertaken in a paper of this length. Toward providing such a proof justification is given for the weaker historical thesis that there is a way of understanding moral knowledge, in terms of Husserl's theory of fulfillment of consciousness, which can serve to unify the main types of views held with respect to the thesis of the practicality of reason. Hume and Kant, as well as Price and the tradition, may, in terms of such an account, reasonably be included among the adherents of the thesis of the practicality of reason.

The aim of chapter two is, in part, to present an historical survey of the literature on the topic. The primary aim of this chapter, however, is to delimit the three main types of views held with respect to the thesis, i.e., the traditional, the Humean empiricist and the Kantian idealist. We hope to show that despite appearances to the contrary these views share the common need for a sufficiently clear doctrine of intuitive fulfillment.

That the historical tradition concedes the thesis of the practicality of reason in some form is a claim that we hope to show is undeniable. Even Hume, its greatest opponent, explicitly states that this is the traditional wisdom. It is also our contention, however, but not a claim we can or do defend in this paper, that *Husserl's doctrine of fulfillment of consciousness may also be applied to the historical development of the thesis of the practicality of reason*. If so, we believe a further proof of this thesis may be obtained. It would prove that the complex content of the thesis, and the associated problems, have undergone significant change as aspects of it have been transformed throughout history. (It has undergone its own process of development: and, if we look at it from this perspective, we may well see that even those who have appeared to stand outside it and to reject it --in particular, Hume--may in reality be among its chief proponents, as they strip it of its attending misconceptions and errors to bring its truth to light).

The moral views of Hume and Kant are presented in this chapter as archetypes of the main contending views of our own time. In Hume's case the attribution of intentional features to passion allows for a reasonable interpretation of Hume's view as at least consistent with, if not a concession to, a modified version of the thesis of the practicality of reason. In Kant's case the explicit and repeated, although unclarified, appeal to moral "experience" can alone effectively meet Hume's famous challenge. It alone can allow for moral facts themselves to constrain us in the manner in which Kant asserts they do. In both cases the need for a clear doctrine of intuitive fulfillment is evident.

The attempt to meet this need takes place in the last three chapters of my thesis. In chapter three I discuss Richard Price's view as the archetype for the intuitionist stand on the thesis of the practicality of reason. It is this type of stand that I defend in this paper. We shall show that despite the failings of other intuitionists with respect to subjectivist leanings, Price was a model of penetrating and remarkably exact insight. He was, perhaps, one of the first to recognize clearly what was needed to ground moral problems on an adequately clarified epistemological foundation. He set, therefore, a precedent for all subsequent ethics to follow. Like most intuitionists, however, Price failed to provide the epistemological frame-work he himself so vividly recognized was needed. The need for a rigorously clear account of intuition is recognized but the lack of just such an account is equally apparent.

In chapter four Husserl's theory of intuitive fulfillment is presented to meet this need. In chapter five this theory is applied to concrete moral cases in the form of a phenomenology of conscientious action. Here the attempt is made to set intuitionist and empirical views of moral know-ledge upon the foundation laid by Husserl. The aim will be to provide plausible support for the thesis of the practicality of reason, and thus to vindicate the age-old Socratic maxim that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance.

Our proof concludes with the Pricean observation that although an adequate theory of moral perception is highly complex it is in principle no more complex than an adequate theory of knowledge generally. Thus, the intuitive just-ification of moral knowledge stands or falls with the intuitive justification of anything at all. To avoid a per-nicious skepticism which denies to us knowledge of anything at all we must embrace an adequate theory of intuition or intuitive fulfillment; and, if we embrace such a theory there are no grounds in principle to reject arbitrarily the intuition of moral facts.

Notes: Chapter One

1. Plato Republic VII. 514ff; see also section below on Socrates-Plato (Chapter 2).

2. A well known case of such an experience is that of Helen Keller. In the introduction to Helen Keller's, Teacher Anne Sullivan Macy: A Tribute to the Foster-child of her Mind, with an introduction by Nella Braddy Henney (London: Victor Gollancz, 1956), p.9, Ms. Henney describes this experience as follows: "On April 5, . . . ,the phantom Helen made contact with reality. While Annie Sullivan pumped water over her hand it came to the child in a flash that water, wherever it was found, was water, and that the finger motions she had just felt on her palm meant water and nothing else. In that thrilling moment she found the key to her kingdom."

3. Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, trans. Stuart Woolf, paperback edition (New York: Collier Books Macmillan, 1961), p.96. Primo Levi committed suicide on April 11, 1987. He was recognized as "a symbol to his readers of the triumph of reason [italics mine] over the barbarism of genocide. . . . [but] his violent death seemed to call that symbol into question." It is, therefore, relevant to comment briefly on the significance of his work and death from the standpoint of this thesis. {For all references in this discussion see Alexander Stille, "Primo Levi: Reconciling the Man and the Writer," New York Times Book Review, July 5, 1987, p.5}.

Levi was a chemist who, on the basis of his account of his experience as a Jew in Auschwitz, became a well known existentialist writer. In his last book, "The Drowned and the Saved," Levi speaks much of suicide. "He dedicates an entire chapter to the Belgian philosopher Jean Amery, who had been with Levi at Auschwitz and who killed himself in 1978." And, he attributes this suicide and the suicides of Holocaust survivors generally to their war experiences. Levi is quoted as saying that "the period of their imprisonment (however long ago) is the center of their life, the event that, for better or worse, has marked their entire existence." And Stille's believes that Levi's reference to a passage quoted from Amery may be indicative of the meaning of Levi's own death: "He who has been tortured remains tortured . . . . He who has suffered torment can no longer find his place in the world. Faith in humanity--cracked by the first slap across the face, then demolished by torture--can never be recovered."

I believe the key to the understanding of the significance of Levi's work and the meaning of his death lies precisely in this morally negative outlook on the human condition. Levi saw that evil is not a quality merely applicable to a few rare individuals remote from the lives of all of us, e.g., a Hitler, Manson or Jones. Rather, it is something that manages, in one way or another, to become systematized or socialized to the point that even those enduring and surviving the brutality of a Nazi concentration camp find themselves somehow baptized into an evil that may appear inescapable. So great is the evil or injustice that one may feel falsely guilty of the "crime" of being born. To Levi, Darwin's laws were thrown into reverse. "The worst survived: the violent, the callous, the collaborators and the spies," he said. It was not that Levi himself was one of these but that for him the presence of the reality of that evil was something that he could find no escape from and its seeming power became all the greater as he watched the world quickly forget. The atrocities of the concentration camp were shoved off into the realm of routine and remote historical events.

But the view of moral knowledge as subject to a process of fulfillment to be developed in this paper may help us understand how one can see, while others do not, the concrete reality of evil in the world--even in one's self--and yet be almost oblivious to the reality of good. There is in human life so much concrete evidence of evil and often so little of good that for morally bright or sensitive people the shallowness of common human goals and aspirations can become so centralized--so apparent--in their worthlessness--that the good is lost to view. In this blindness, which is more the blindness of innocence than of evil, one loses hope, falls into despair and dies.

4. It is sometimes maintained that a 'bias' or 'dogma' is "a set of beliefs that is maintained in the absence of compelling--or perhaps even of relevant--evidence." John Dreher, "Foundations of Ethical Theory" (N.P., 1985), 1.20-1.22. Such bias is frequently associated with assumption or presupposition and it is alleged that one cannot avoid such bias or presupposition in logical argument. But all depends on what is meant by the "absence" of evidence. For, one might mean either that one cannot provide good evidence (as the above seems to support) or one can, but has not in the passage in question made this evidence explicit. 'Bias,' in particular, is most frequently used in its pejorative sense but that is certainly not an exhaustive use. It (and 'dogma') may also be used merely to refer to a set of beliefs one happens to hold. And, the mere fact that one holds a set of beliefs does not logically entail that they are irrational, unsupportable, uncompelling or irrelevant.

5. Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, ed. D.Daiches Raphael (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), p.48. Price's Review is an intuitionist response to Hume's moral philosophy. It is worth noting that he was one of the few rationalists to give Hume a fair and respectful hearing. Hume was so impressed by Price's civility "that it gave rise to an acquaintance, which was continued on both sides with uninterrupted esteem and friendship." From William Morgan, Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Richard Price (London: Printed for R. Hunter, successor to J. Johnson, 1815), p.16. Hume was also impressed by Price's acuity in reasoning and "he candidly acknowledged that on one point Mr Price had succeeded in convincing him that his arguments were inconclusive" (Ibid., p.17). Price (like Kant) was also indebted to Hume "whose doubts and objections led him to examine the ground on which he stood, before he ventured to raise his own structure upon it." (Ibid., p.19).

6. See Dreher, Foundations of Ethical Theory, 1.20-1.22; 2.9.

7. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, reprinted from the original edition, ed., with an analytical index, by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), pp.457-458.

8. See Gary Watson, "Free Agency" in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, paperback edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp.98-9. See also: Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit, with an introduction by J.H. Muirhead, 3 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932), vol.1: Moral Phenomena, pp.56-8.

9. David Hume, "My Own Life" in David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed., with an introduction by, Norman Kemp Smith, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), p.236; David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, reprinted from the posthumous ed. of 1777 and ed. with intro., comp. tables of contents, and analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902), pp.272-4.

10. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.276.

11. Price, Review, p.18.

12. See Michael Williams, Groundless Belief, Library of Philosophy and Logic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p.20. Williams claims that many who are often thought to hold radically opposed epistemological views are in fact united on "the foundational view of knowledge and justification." He argues himself for a non-foundational or coherence view. In response, I claim, but cannot take the opportunity here to show, that such views unavoidably lead to an infinite regress or a vicious circle, and, at bottom are just another form of inconsistent or untenable skepticism. For more on this see: Williams, above, p.63; Dreher, (above) p.1.8; and especially, Roderick Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 2,3,10,12.

13. Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not A Christian: And Other Essays On Religion And Related Subjects, ed., with an appendix, by Paul Edwards (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957), p.11.

14. A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism, The Library of Philosophical Movements (New York: Free Press, 1959), p.13; see also Hume, Treatise, p.469: ". . . when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."[Italics mine.]

15. See, for example, Hume's Treatise, pp.xx, 463ff, 469; Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, pp. 201, 272-4.

16. See, for example, Hume's Treatise, pp.463-4.

17. See, for example, Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, pp.271ff.

18. See Dallas Willard's discussion of Sellar's in Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: A Study in Husserl's Early Philosophy (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1984), pp. 208-15; Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp.1-16; Willard Van Orman Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp.139ff; W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1960), pp. 193ff, 200ff, 226ff.

19. Quine is a well known case in point. See, for example, his Word & Object, pp.9, 116; Ontological Relativity, pp.72-4; and his From A Logical Point Of View (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), pp.38-9, 73-4. See also Willard, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, pp.29-32.

20. See, for example, Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, pp.272ff.

21. See note #12 above.

22. See Chapter four of this paper for the account of eidetic analysis.

23. See the numerous citations in the section on Kant above.

II

The Historical Problem

A. Socrates & Traditional Moral Theory

Socrates – Plato[1]

Section 1: The Socratic Formulation of the Thesis, and the Main Parts of the Thesis to be Examined

That Socrates claimed Reason had power over life and action is relatively uncontroversial. From almost every Platonic dialogue we hear proclaimed the maxim, "knowledge is virtue and vice ignorance,"[2] and we believe that that maxim has been the hinge upon which every subsequent ethics, philosophical and religious alike, has been forced to turn.[3]

> Whoever has been initiated so far in the mysteries of Love and has viewed all these aspects of the beautiful in due succession, is at last drawing near the final revelation. And now, Socrates, there bursts upon him that wondrous vision which is the very soul of the beauty he has toiled so long for. It is an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every worshipper as it is to every other. . . .
>
> *And . . . when he has attained this vision of the very soul of beauty . . . once you have seen it, you will never be seduced again by . . . the beauties that used to take your breath away and kindle such a longing in you . . .*[Italics mine.]
>
> . . . if it were given to man to gaze on beauty's very self--unsullied, unalloyed, and freed from the mortal taint that haunts the frailer loveliness of flesh and blood--if, I say, it were given to man to see the heavenly beauty face to face . . . in true contemplation . . . a man will be quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue--for it is virtue's self that quickens him, not virtue's semblance. And when he has brought forth and reared this perfect virtue, he shall be called the friend of god . . . And this is why I say that every man of us should worship the god of love, and this is why I cultivate and worship all the elements of Love myself, and bid others do the same. And all my life I shall pay the power and the might of Love such homage as I can.[4]

That the claim was made is indisputable, but the same cannot be said about precisely what Socrates meant by it. This much of his meaning, however, may be clear: <a> that there really is an objective truth about Goodness, or, more specifically, goodness with respect to the rectitude of an action or life; <b> that the manner of access to it is essentially knowledge or reason in its experiential or intuitive form; and <c> that the nature of this Good is such that if one positions one's self appropriately with respect to it--knows it in the right sense--then that object will have sufficient power to constrain, if not compel, one to act in accordance with it.

Such a general statement, however, will not take us very far. For, it is highly controversial how one is to take such claims. For example, what, precisely, is this Good Socrates refers to, and what is its connection with action? What, precisely, does he mean by experiential or intuitive "knowledge" in this context? And, finally, what, precisely, is this "constraint" or power the knowledge of Good allegedly imposes on moral action? The most extreme claims emerge in response to such questions. It is even suggested, for example, that the extremity of the Socratic viewpoint lies in the fact that he claims that one cannot know (in any sense of 'know') that an act is wrong and still do it. If so, then the Socratic view is clearly absurd. We are all aware that we can and do act against what we take to be knowledge of the better, e.g., we may know it is wrong to lie and lie nonetheless. A more detailed analysis of the meaning of the Socratic formulation of the thesis is required, therefore, if it is at all to be understood and taken seriously. To this end we must attempt to elucidate what Socrates meant by: <a> reason (or knowledge)--specifically, moral knowledge--as well as the object5 which is known or aimed at; <b> moral action; and <c> the kind of force or constraint <a>, moral reason or its object, exerts on <b>, moral action.

Section 1A: The Knowledge that Constrains Moral Action

i) This knowledge is not just any Kind of Moral Knowledge, but a Certain Type of Moral Perception or Intuition

Despite the simplistic interpretation, above, of Socrates' claim that knowledge is virtue and vice ignorance, Socrates was well aware that in some sense of "moral knowledge" one can 'know' that a contemplated act is wrong and still do it, e.g., know that it is wrong to steal a horse or car and still steal it. In the allegory of the Cave, for example, a number of people metaphorically rep-resenting mankind are chained from birth in the darkness of a cave with their backs to a wall. Above and behind them is a fire giving off sufficient light to allow skillful and manipulative "teachers" to cast shadow images on a wall in front of the chained prisoners. Now, undoubtedly, the per-sons imprisoned in the darkness of the cave "knew" or were aware of "objects" moving before their eyes. They lacked, however, sufficient light to see that they were merely shadows cast upon a wall by others who would deceive them. The "teachers" too "knew" that the images on the wall were of their own making, but they lacked the knowledge of what things were really like when illumined by the clear light of the Sun. Socrates, therefore, did not hold that one could not act against moral "knowledge" in any sense of that term.

> [The greatest ignorance is that] of a man who hates, not loves, what his judgment pronounces to be noble or good, while he loves and enjoys what he judges vile and wicked. . . . Accordingly, when the soul sets itself at variance with knowledge, judgment, discourse, its natural sovereigns, you have what I describe as unwisdom . . . when fair discourse is present in the soul, but produces no effect . . .[6]

So what kind of knowledge did Socrates claim constrained moral action? Most generally, he meant experiential, perceptual or intuitive knowledge:[7] something more akin to the direct and full experience of a beautiful sunset, a great work of art or a magnificent symphony, as contrasted with, e.g., the dry and barren descriptive knowledge one might have of those things taken from a history book. In Socrates' commentary on the allegory of the Cave, for example, he describes the Good as apprehended by a "divine contemplation" or a "beatific vision"; as an object that one "must have his eye fixed" on if one is to obtain "the power . . . [to] act rationally."8[Italics mine.] But, for a more precise understanding of this knowledge let us briefly examine some relevant aspects of the Socratic method or "dialectic."

ii) The Socratic Method or Dialectic

a) This Rational Perception is not = Opinion or Common Sense, and although It Involves a Rational Process It is not = Logical Argument

Throughout the Platonic dialogues we find Socrates attempting to guide people through a rational process to the truth by helping them fix their attention on the actual nature of things. He would have them see things as they really are rather than merely accepting the "authority" of traditionally accepted "opinion" (doxa), "myth" or "common-sense."[9] Philosophy or Science itself rests on such a process of education or "rational renaissance" (which brings to mind, of course, a similar, but later, Renaissance of modern European history wherein "the rights of reason" were once again maintained against false authorities, viz., "infallible" Popes and other aspects of an alleged infallible tradition). People of Socrates' day simply assumed that they had knowledge of things, which in truth they lacked, and Socrates' general method, therefore, was simply and initially to expose this truth to them so that they would be more receptive or prepared to look to see things as they really were.

It is true that this rational process of education typically involved both logical argument and question and answer. Socrates relentlessly questioned those who professed to know about their beliefs until, after rigorous testing, they were driven to in relentlessly questioned those who professed to know about their beliefs until, after rigorous testing, they were driven to inconsistency or a confession of inexactitude in their thought.10 But his aim was never, as it typically was for the Sophists of his time and as it too often is for us today, a mere formal or sophistical proof of inconsistency. Rather, he hoped to use that inconsistency to reveal the fallacy of the ultimate premises, assumptions or beliefs on which it was grounded. In other words, *argument was used to reveal, or bring into the fore-front of consciousness, the truth that one's alleged rational perception or knowledge of certain things was mere subjective or inter-subjective opinion. This was--even for Socrates himself--the first step toward philosophical wisdom.*[11]

This recognition of ignorance as an initial step in the advance toward knowledge is significant. For, Socrates was no skeptic, moral or otherwise, despite the skeptical tendency that appears to have followed him.[12] Even his famous confession of ignorance, after all, was a positive insight into the limits of his presently actualized knowledge, and so was an advance in knowledge relative to what he had before. It simply does not follow from the fact that he confessed ignorance with respect to some objects of knowledge that he knew nothing at all; nor does it follow from the fact that he confessed ignorance of the essential character of the Good that he knew nothing about it at all.

b) Elucidation of This Rational Process by an Appeal to *both* Different Orders of Existence and Knowledge

For Socrates, then, there is a rational process involved in perceptual knowledge acquisition which is not identical to any logical or ratiocinative process of reasoning. But, nor is it identical or limited to the process involved in the acquisition of the mere sense-perceptible knowledge of macro-observable physical objects. Rather, the Socratic position is that perceptual knowledge is far broader than this and is subject to a certain form of hierarchial structure involving different orders of being or existence.

On the lowest level of knowledge and being is the concrete sense-perceptible "knowledge" of physical particulars. We can, for example, have sensations of particular instances of red color, elliptical shape, or more complex objects such as flowers or butterflies. Such "particular knowledge," however, although admittedly necessary, is not, for Socrates, sufficient to constitute knowledge in the true or authentic sense of the term. To have such genuine knowledge one must be able to recognize or identify "in" the many particulars a quality or feature they all share, e.g., the red in many flowers; and without such universal knowledge one may, in a very real and important sense, be said to be ignorant or lack knowledge of that thing. For example, a child is not said to know how to distinguish one color from another until, after observing many different instances of different types of color he or she is able to recognize an element of sameness in the many particulars of each type.

But the ability to distinguish between the "one and the many," i.e., between the many particulars and the One "universal" or "Form" in those particulars constituting them all as the same in kind, was, for Socrates, by no means restricted to sense. There are, allegedly, many particular instances of good, just or pious action, as there are many particular instances of two or three things being grouped together as a whole. These cases also are subject to the "one and the many" distinction, in spite of the fact that the universals in question do not present themselves as sense-perceptible physical objects. In their case, too, then, one may be said to be ignorant of the things in question if one lacks universal knowledge of them. Thus, one is not said to know one's basic numbers if one merely "guesses" correctly on certain occasions when two fingers are presented, but only when one is capable of recognizing the same feature applies in the case of two pencils, two trees, two stones etc..

In either case, however, it was precisely because those who professed to have knowledge of such things could not analyze the common or universal element in the many concrete or particular cases that Socrates was able, by logical argument, to drive them to inconsistency and thereby to the revelation that their original assumption of clear "perceptual" knowledge was incorrect. In short, their conceptions were not objective and rational apprehensions of universals, but merely of particulars. Their "knowledge" was, at most, mere "right opinion"--it lacked the clarity, precision or exactitude of thought which characterized true science or philosophy.[13]

The capacity to apprehend a universal element or "Form" in the many particular cases by no means entails that these qualities themselves are in all cases alike. On the Socratic-Platonic view, universals or forms themselves fantails that these qualities themselves are in all cases alike. On the Socratic-Platonic view, universals or forms themselves fall under the "one and the many" distinction; they, too, instantiate certain "higher order" properties. For example, Bob, Tom and Jim all belong to the class of men, as Jane, Sue and Mona all belong to the class of women. Both these classes, however, belong to the higher class of humanity which itself is but a particular member of the class of animals. The class of animals, in turn, falls within the class of living things, which is but one constituent in the more ultimate class of existents. By means of such an example we may gain an initial appreciation of the Socratic claim that there is a hierarchy of universals (principles) leading up to that One most ultimate or first principle that can, in the nature of the case, serve as the foundational principle (ultimate ordering, governing, unifying, harmonizing principle) of all reality.

It must be emphasized that this hierarchy reflects not merely a hierarchy with respect to the objects of knowledge, but a hierarchy with respect to the knowledge of such objects. All knowledge of such objects, like the objects themselves, is not of the same order; nor is it equally accessible or equally simple. The knowledge of particular red things is a necessary condition for knowledge of the quality they all share, i.e., redness, and the knowledge of particular color qualities, e.g., blue and green as well as red, is a necessary condition for the knowledge of the quality they all share, viz., the quality of being all colors. Thus, a hierarchy, not merely of universals, but of the knowledge of universals may become visible from the simplest or most immanent to the most complex or transcendent forms; and, as the terminating point of being lies in an object which is indefinable, since it defines all else, so, too, the terminating point of knowledge is an intellectual apprehension or contemplation of just that object which brings clarity to the mind concerning the fundamental nature and purpose of all things. It is this knowledge (or the capacity for such knowledge) of universals, according to Socrates, which distinguishes rationality, and humanity as rational from non-rational life. And, it is this knowledge of the Supreme Universal, which lies at the basis of Socrates' view of moral knowledge and moral action.

c) Application of the Socratic Method or Dialectic to Moral Knowledge

The kind of knowledge Socrates had in mind, therefore, with respect to the Good was an intuitive or rational apprehension of the objective or common feature that all good or right actions shared.[14] That is, when we observe concrete cases, e.g., of courage, temperance, diligence, honesty etc., there is something which we can, and often do, see in them that they all share, and which marks them off, e.g., from cases of cowardice, intemperance, sloth, deceit etc… Socrates' aim, therefore, was precisely to elucidate what this something is that all such actions share, so that we could distinguish actions accordingly.

As may be evident from the foregoing, Goodness, for Socrates, was by no means a form or property restricted to particular human actions. Rather, it was a property applicable to life, living and Reality itself. More specifically, Goodness was conceived by him to be a first principle--in fact, the first principle (or Form)--responsible for the unity, order, harmony or justice in the whole universe. Reality itself was ultimately and essentially definable as Good. It was this, therefore, which was the ultimate aim or end of his dialectic or education, and this he personally sought, above all else, to obtain.

> And so, Glaucon, we have at last arrived at Dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was finally imagined by us to behold real animals and the stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, if he perseveres by pure intelligence, he attains at last to the idea of the good, and finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the other case at the end of the visible.[15]

It should be clear, therefore, that, for Socrates, the clear and full knowledge of Goodness--even in concrete actions— was not something anyone could just up and have; nor was it the case, therefore, that right action (corresponding to such knowledge) was something one could just up and do. It was not as if one could just vividly focus on the rectitude in an action in order to both apprehend and do it.[16] Just as the apprehension of the beauty in a truly great artistic work is not something the untrained eye can merely "see," so too, a process of moral training or education is required in order for the "moral eye" to see more clearly and exactly--not vaguely and subjectively--the real or full nature of the Good.

Knowledge of the Good, then, is definitely not, by any means, simple or easily apprehendable in all or any of its forms and instances. In fact, Socrates-Plato claimed that it is the hardest knowledge of all to obtain.17 A highly complex, rigorous and arduous process of training or education is devoted to the attempt to inculcate it, as is discussed in Plato's longest and most famous work, The Republic. Its greatest disciple, Socrates, confessed ultimate, although relative, ignorance of it,18 and his greatest pupil, Plato, ultimately appears to despair of ever even glimpsing that which his master saw from afar off.19 It was this kind of knowledge, therefore, that Socrates claimed could and would compel all actions for good, and would constrain particular types of good actions to the degree that that goodness was fully present to the mind.

Section 1B: Moral Action

i) The Distinction Between "External Rectitude" or Good Action Independent of Intentions, and "Intentional Rectitude" or Good Action Relative to One's Intentions

For Socrates, "actions are a class of beings or existents having their own proper and permanent nature or essence independently of our opinions of them"[20] Of actions, Socrates distinguishes those which have value qualities from those which do not, on the basis of how, or of the manner in which, they are done or performed. For example, one may talk or sing well or poorly, and a horse or athlete may run well or poorly. In view of such cases it should be clear that, for Socrates, there is a sense of "good" applicable to actions independent of one's intentions[21] (in fact, independent of personality altogether). The beating, torturing and butchering of another person may, in view of such a characterization, be analyzed as a bad action regardless of one's "intentions" or opinions with respect to it. One may think nothing at all about it, or even be convinced one is doing the greatest service to mankind or acting out of obedience to God.

Socrates is also aware of a class of "good" actions which, in contradistinction from the former, are dependent on, or relative to, one's intentions. He describes such intentional rectitude or right action as action done in "a rightful spirit";[22] as action done "willfully" and with "set purpose" or with "deliberate design to do good,"[23] and also as the domination in the soul of a principle of "right reason" regardless of consequences.[24] The good or virtuous in this context, then, is reserved for beings capable of "right reason," and for those, in particular, with "a heart set on, or touched by, moral beauties wherein the heart or soul becomes one with its object."[25] It is this class of good actions Socrates is most anxious to elucidate, and for which he especially wishes to reserve the epithets "right" and "wrong."[26]

In characterizing intentional rectitude in this manner Socrates appears to distinguish the Goodness or moral beauty in an action or object independent of one's intentions from the moral character associated with the rat-ional apprehension of that Goodness. The moral character of the intentional right act, then, appears to consist in the union of the rational apprehension (or intention) with the Good in the object or action which "touches" the heart and makes it "one with its object." One may, however, wonder whether such a characterization does justice to experience. For, it seems evident that one can be wrong about a contemplated or prospective "good" act, e.g., falsely presume an action is good which is not, or that an action ought to be done which ought not to be done. One might believe one ought to give money to what appears to be a charitable organization which, unknown to us, is actually a privately owned business employing a few handicapped people to appear charitable. In such cases it seems clear that one's action is right with respect to one's intentions, and, yet, there is no actual rational perception of an existing goodness in the act. One may be tempted, therefore, to conclude that the intentional rectitude of an act is wholly independent of any actual perception of the good and possibly independent of any object altogether.

But, the mere fact that one can be wrong in one's judgment with respect to the goodness of an action (or, with respect to one's judgment generally) by no means entails that one is never right or that there can be no actual veridical moral perceptions; nor does it entail that the "object" itself (Goodness) does not, in some manner, determine the moral quality of the intentional rectitude of the act considered. It seems safe to assume that we can know (even know that we know) we ought to give food to a child lying before us, literally dying of malnutrition with no one else to help him or her when we have more than enough food to spare. In some manner, and to some extent, the moral quality of the intentional rectitude of our action in such cases seems partially determined by an objective or independent goodness in the action which is nonetheless perceived. In any case, it appears to be the Socratic view that one can and often does actually gain contact with the good via a rational or intellectual perception or intuition and that it is precisely the perception (or assumption of perception) of such contact with the good that determines the moral quality of the intentional rectitude of such acts. At least it would be odd for one to claim that one believed an action was wrong or morally indifferent and yet that one's intentions were right with respect to it.

To make this claim sufficiently clear requires, I believe, an adequate elucidation of the connection between cases where goodness is authentically present and cases where it is not. Such an adequate elucidation Socrates does not give, and it remains a problem up to today. It is, therefore, unclear, on the Socratic view, how an object or action merely thought to be good can determine the intentional rectitude of the act in cases where the actual object (or action) is not good--even evil. The problem may, even at this juncture, be partially circumvented if we carefully observe that in all cases of intentional rectitude there is at least a thought of, or belief in, the object as good. Such belief or intentionality, then, may be essential to the determination of the moral quality of the intentionally right action. Still, the problem would remain of providing an adequate elucidation of intentionally right action in terms of the nature of, and interrelationship between, cases of the mere appearance of good and cases where goodness is authentically present.

ii) The Hierarchial Character of Moral Actions with Respect to Their Ends

To appreciate more fully the Socratic claim of the ultimate origin of good action--even intentionally right action--in an in dependently existing Goodness we may best proceed by focusing our attention on the differing value qualities of various ends of action. Specifically, we need to consider the possibility of more ultimate or final ends, i.e., what may constitute a truly good human life.

Many of us today may well recoil at the suggestion of one good way of living for all, but it is not Socrates' view that this entails a strict identity of particular ends or goods for everyone. The view of a spiritual vocation for Man has rarely, if ever, been held to be inconsistent with specific differences with respect to, e.g., one's particular vocation, choice of mate etc.. Socrates' view is only that there cannot be a multiplicity of final ends, since, otherwise, there would be ultimate conflict not only between one's own ultimate end and that of others, but between the ends vying for supremacy within the individual himself. One may desire to be faithful to one's wife and desire sexual gratification with another woman at the same time, but both ends simply cannot be obtained without practical inconsistency. Thus, to avoid inner conflict (or, in Socratic terms, inner injustice) as well as to avoid interpersonal conflict between one's self and others (social injustice) there must be some final end or object obtainable by action for all. This end Socrates called The Good.[27]

In speaking of such a "final" end we implicitly distinguish it (or what may be taken for it) from more or less immediate or proximate ends, i.e., distinguish between an end which alone can constitute one's true good and the multiplicity of ends which serve a merely mediatorial or instrumental role. Health, for example, is typically sought as a means toward the end of living a good life, as proper nourishment, medical help etc., are sought as means toward the relative end of good health. But, then, it may be clear that to obtain one's true and ultimate good end mere vague beliefs without actual contact with the good will be insufficient. One must actually see what constitutes this ultimate good in order to determine which ends or goals can actually serve an instrumental role in leading one to a truly good life. It may also be clear that the extent to which one actually obtains this good will depend upon the extent to which one actually sees, and thereby lays hold of, this supreme Goodness. It will depend, therefore, on the extent to which one actualizes one's capacity to know and gain contact with it. Such, in any case, is the view of Socrates.

In view of our exposition, above, growth or actualization in the moral life should appear no different in principle from the actualization or attainment of ends in the non-moral sphere. One certainly cannot reasonably expect to learn to write (play baseball, violin, etc..) well with mere "good intentions": not even if one is convinced that one has written a masterpiece when, in truth, one has written garbage. Rather, one must come to see more and more clearly what constitutes good writing (baseball or violin playing, etc..), both with respect to content and form; and, through a process of discovery and actualization, one must acquire the abilities necessary to write well. When the famous baseball player, Pete Rose, was asked what he attributed his success to, he said, "Other people practice what they're good at, I practice what I'm bad at." So, too, in the moral realm. The veridical apprehension of certain features of the good in concrete cases provides a basis or foundation for higher order veridical apprehensions of other features of the good, possibly culminating in a more perfected knowledge of the ultimate form of the Good which qualifies reality as a whole.

At least in their higher forms, therefore, moral actions, for Socrates, are actions which result from right reason or the rational perception of the Good. The actions themselves, like the knowledge essential to them, are subject to a process of development. As such they belong to the world of becoming or change.[28] The object or end of that knowledge and action--Goodness--is a principle of being; and so, the more we know of it and act in accordance with it, i.e., the more we gain direct contact with it, the more it imposes its nature on us and makes us like or one with it.[29] Since Goodness is the ultimate ordering principle of all reality, it necessarily imposes on our souls a like order, i.e., a principle of inner justice, unity, harmony or peace.

Section 1C: The Nature of the Constraint of Right Reason over Action

i) The Thesis of the Power of Reason over Action Refers Primarily to Intentional Right Action; Right Reason as a Principle of Action & Other Principles of Action

The thesis of the power of reason over action clearly refers primarily, or in the first instance to intentional, rather than mere external, rectitude. It refers to right action done from a rational apprehension or conviction that an action is right, not to right action motivated by, or originating in, a principle other than right reason. The assumption is that reason itself can function as a cause or spring of action in Man, and the specifically Socratic claim is that it may even function as a sufficient principle of action. This is perfectly consistent with the possibility of other principles of action. The fact of moral conflict and failure clearly illustrates that there are distinct, yet morally relevant, principles of action.

But, given that there is moral conflict and failure one may well question the intelligibility of characterizing moral knowledge as not only a sufficient principle of action, but as a principle of action in any sense. For, it is by no means self-evident that "knowledge" has such power. Socrates himself is continually bewildered by the fact that people almost universally appear to lack the power to live well, despite the fact that he attributes it to ignorance. Hence, an adequate understanding of the Socratic claim of the power of knowledge over moral action, as well as an understanding of how, in vicious action, one's sense of right can sometimes be defeated, will require an analysis of morally relevant principles of action. Specifically, it will require an analysis of what, for Socrates (and Greek philosophy generally), are the two main types of principles of moral action: <a> an innate desire for physical pleasure, and <b> an acquired judgment or principle of right reason that aims at, or desires, what is best.[30] We shall discuss each of these in turn.

ii) The Two Main Principles of Action: Physical and Rational Desire

a) Physical Desire

It is evident that people are born with an innate capacity to experience pleasure and pain as well as an innate desire for pleasure and aversion to pain. It is also evident that the first objects of "knowledge" for persons as well as animals, are physical or material objects. It is to be expected, therefore, that the first principle of action to be experienced is desire for or aversion to certain objects in the material world. In view of this fact, and in view of the fact that moral objects are admittedly not material, it is not at all surprising that the manner in which young children are morally trained or educated, both for the ancient Greeks as for us, generally, today, is by the application of sensory stimuli, i.e., physical pleasure and pain, as sanctions for "appropriate" behaviors. One is trained or conditioned, in the first instance, to act rightly in the external sense--to simply do certain actions, e.g., to be moderate with respect to how much food one consumes, without necessarily having any apprehension of a specifically moral value applicable to such actions.[31] On this level, therefore, "moral desires" to act one way or another are grounded almost exclusively in the physiological components of an organisms "nature" and its manner of conditioning.

So far, all this is in accord with current theories of, e.g., behavior modification, which are as applicable to animals as to people. If a child or dog breaks an expensive glass vase on one's table he or she is appropriately sanctioned, e.g., by a scolding or spanking. Even in adult life, where a person or animal may be raised with bad habits, re-training, re-conditioning, re-education or re-habilitation is, for the most part, deemed appropriate in view of this principle of action. Although it is said, "One cannot teach old dogs new tricks" or that "people never change," that is not strictly or universally true. It is just difficult.

b) General Account of Rational Desire as a Principle of Action

For Socrates-Plato, however, the end of moral education by no means stops at the mere conformity of external action to law--even moral law. Rather, its aim is to use such training as a means or aid in the actualization of a distinctly rational principle of action. Persons, unlike animals, have the capacity not merely to act rightly, but to see or know a non-natural quality of rectitude or goodness in actions. In that seeing a new principle of action is actualized which elicits or motivates a desire to act rightly as well as an aversion to do evil. Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not restricted to the merely physiological, and it is by the appropriate application of pleasures and pains that citizens, for Socrates-Plato, are made good.

More specifically, by being trained or habituated to moderate or control one's natural tendency or desire toward physical pleasure (even if that control is imposed by external sanctions) one is in the best position to actualize the latent capacity to be motivated according to one's vision of moral law. For, if one has not been conditioned to act rightly, then non-rational impulses, habits or tendencies toward excessive physical pleasure may impose themselves upon action and actually prevent the principle of right reason from actualizing itself in the particular case. Moreover, the repetition of particular types of actions, according to one principle or the other, may insinuate itself as a fixed principle of action or a character trait governing one's life. One becomes, as a result of the multiplication of such traits, a virtuous or vicious--good or evil-person.

c) More Detailed Account of These Two Principles of Action

We mentioned earlier the close connection between the moral quality of one's intentional action and Goodness itself. For Socrates, this is of considerable importance with respect to the power to act well or rightly. Man differs from animals not only in rational capacity, but precisely in virtue of this rational capacity man differs with respect to what can move or motivate him in his actions. It is true that animals generally present themselves as having desires for objects which are good or "appropriate" to their nature and that these goods are precisely the objects that bring pleasure rather than pain. But, there is a difference between seeking good objects and seeking them because they are, and are apprehended to be, good. Man alone among animals has, according to Socrates, this capacity to rationally apprehend Universal Goodness itself and to seek it because it is good.[32] It is, moreover, because of this capacity that man alone can suffer from guilt and shame in the apprehension of having done wrong.

But, we also mentioned earlier that the distinctive character of this moral knowledge was a form of vision or perception of an object, which presents itself with ever increasing clarity, from its simplest to most complex forms. The nature of The Good, in other words, becomes increasingly clear only through a process of developing consciousness of it.[33] The extent, therefore, of the power of rational desire rooted in moral knowledge is relative not merely to the degree of clarity one is presently capable of with respect to some particular immediate moral apprehension, but to the degree of clarity correlated with the developing complexity of one's moral knowledge itself. It is, therefore, not accurate to liken moral knowledge and its associated power to the case of merely seeing some particular object more or less clearly rather than vaguely. Moral knowledge is more like the case of *learning to see* more clearly the beauty in a great work of art, which increasingly moves the heart as one gains a more complete perception of it as a whole. One's power to act well in life generally, then, is directly proportional to the extent to which one has learned to clearly apprehend the true and full nature of The Good.

> . . . And this is the way, the only way, he must approach, or be led toward, the sanctuary of Love. Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung--that is, from one to two, and from two to every lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning in general to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself--until at last he comes to know what beauty is.[34]

In the process of increasing moral awareness there is a genuine beginning wherein one apprehends that there is indeed something about action or reality--something about its value --one can and most needs to know. This apprehension elicits a rational desire to seek it out. Philosophy herself was called by Socrates the love of such Wisdom or the striving after True Being or Reality. It alone, according to Socrates, ". . . can light the beacon a man must steer by when he sets out to have the better life."[35] And, as one comes closer to it, one is increasingly constrained to act in accordance with it; or, when looked at from the other side, as one enters into a more intimate relation with it, it gives the individual, by its power a new range of abilities one did not have before-one can now act as one could not before.

The fact that the power associated with the knowledge of The Good is, in some sense, relative does not mean that the power of good is merely quantifiable--a mere matter of degree--to the exclusion of fundamental transitions in kind. Rather, there are specific points along the way which indicate major transitions in kind, not merely with respect to one's apprehension of the good, but with respect to one's power to act in accordance with it. One of these points, in particular, Socrates seems almost obsessed with or hungry to personally obtain. This was the point at which Goodness becomes not merely a constraining, but compelling power over action--not merely the final end for a man, but the final end of a man; a point Socrates himself seems to have ultimately failed to obtain.[36]

Perhaps we can think of it this way. In the transition of the moral pilgrim into the state of moral purification one experiences something akin to a religious conversion--Goodness or the moral law infuses itself into the soul and becomes so ingrained in the individual and so identified with one's own self or will that there appears to be no longer a clear cut distinction between The Good as object and the good of the subject. The search for The Good is no longer something experienced as in conflict with the soul, but as on one's side--like the harmony or identity of character sometimes experienced between two lovers, a husband and wife, a father and his son, a teacher and student etc.. One cannot do evil because The Good has now become the all absorbing love or master passion of one's life or soul. One may feel compelled to do good because of the absorbing presence of The Good as the ultimate determining principle of one's life. In this relatively final vision of The Good one comes to see that Goodness is a, in fact the only, unifying or harmonizing principle--not only for the individual soul--but for all souls and all reality. All apparent conflicts of goods are resolved since they are rooted in blindness to True Beauty, which alone can dispel the illusion by its Light. Even egocentricity,37 for example, is transcended in the clear understanding that there is no conflict between the good of others and one's own good. The mystic vision of The Good or the Light of The Sun calls one back into the darkness of the cave--even if that results in one being killed by those one loves and returns to save.[38]

iii) The Socratic View of Moral Conflict & Failure, and the Question of the Sufficiency of Reason as a Principle of Action

a) Socrates' General Account of Moral Conflict & Failure

Despite the fact that Socrates claims there is a distinct principle of rational desire and that it is in principle stronger than any other principle of action, he is well aware of the fact that there can be some form of moral conflict between, or involving, disparate principles of action. He is also fully cognizant that sometimes the principle of physical desire masters the soul and in so doing results not only in vicious action, but in vicious character traits and even a vicious life.

> . . . It [the soul] feels itself divided; as in a chariot drawn by two horses that pull opposite ways, it would attain to rational perfection, yet it is dragged into the mire by blind passion and the lusts of the body. Ignorant man proceeds to his ruin under the illusion that he is pursuing his advantage; though no one desires evil directly, most of us are its thralls. "The soul . . . is dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard when she touches change."[39]

Thus, although Socrates defines wrong action, in the intentional sense, as a kind of ignorance: as the domination in the soul of a principle contrary to right reason, or as a heart or attention set on what is mutable (physical),40 he does not mean that in the case of evil action "the good" is not consciously present or "known" in any sense of that term. Rather, he means that there is a difference in the extent or manner of the presence of the good in conjunction with the presence of an object of physical desire.[41] In every case of wrong doing there is a certain type of lack of the conscious presence of the good that would constrain action if, and in so far as, it were more fully present.

Understood in this way we may now understand why Socrates claimed there was no such thing as moral weakness: no case where another principle of action could, in the nature of the case, literally overpower the principle of right reason. In every case of wrong action, or every case of an apparent moral weakness or failure, either the actualization of a clear moral apprehension, and, thus, rational desire, is obstructed by the strong presence of a physical object desired, or the good is in some measure seen but not desired--even hated--because of misconceptions about its nature.[42] In the former case, the all absorbing presence of the physical object to thought prevents the knowledge that would constrain moral action if present. In the latter case, the relative force associated with what is actually apprehended of the good is stifled by the presence of contrary or negative associations with that good. Goodness is, for example, falsely conceived to be something aiming at the restriction of one's freedom rather than the liberation of it. It is seen as an ogre or tyrannical judge opposed to one's own good. The mind in such cases *does not actually apprehend its own true good as bound up with Goodness itself*. The illicit good desired presents itself as better than the true good demanding obedience. The goods of the body or mutable goods are falsely apprehended to be superior to The Good of the soul. *In sum, knowledge of The Good is never sufficiently present to overcome the power bound up with the presence of the conflicting object*. Evil, wrong action or even moral weakness, therefore, is not due to any inherent weakness of reason or the principle of rational desire, but merely to its lack of presence. In short, vice is a certain form of ignorance, and moral weakness, as such, does not exist.

b) More Specific Elucidation of the Ignorance of Vice by a Brief Analysis of Some of its Underlying Causes

If Socrates is right, moral reason when sufficiently present has power over action. But why is it not generally present, or how is its realization or actualization obstructed? It is abundantly clear throughout the Platonic dialogues that Socrates or how is its realization or actualization obstructed? It is abundantly clear throughout the Platonic dialogues that Socrates and Plato are convinced that in some manner, and to some degree, vice or vicious ignorance is rooted in, or caused by, free will or volition.**[43]** But, given the premise that Man must seek the good when present to thought they seem driven to the paradoxical conclusion that the responsibility for man's condition of vicious ignorance must be sought outside the sphere of individual free will in the social-political environment in which one is raised. In any case, almost no elucidation is given of this free will in man, and the extent to which they appeal to it as the cause of this ignorance is overshadowed by the extent to which they appeal to the social-political environment.

The allegory of the Cave, once again, may well illustrate this dilemma. Man's general ignorant and corrupt condition is attributed, above all, to the false teaching of blind guides. Specifically, we are falsely taught to believe that objects other than Goodness itself, viz., physical or mutable ones, can serve as final ends or ultimate determining principles of our lives and actions.44 As a result, we do not believe that there is a Goodness qua universal Law that rules or presides over all things as a principle of justice, unity, harmony or peace. We do not believe that our one and only obligation is to go about doing good, and that in doing this all else will somehow, and in some way, work out for the best for each and every one of us. Even if we vaguely believe--even see--that Goodness, in some sense, exists, and see its obligatory character, we do not see its nature sufficiently for it to become the master passion of our lives. We believe, for example, that it can be manipulated--appeased and violated at the same time with impunity.[45] In such cases we do not understand the meaning of the supremacy of Universal and Inviolable Moral Law[46]--a law that must be reckoned with and which restricts our freedom only at that point where it results in harm to ourselves and others. We do not see, therefore, that violation of this law necessarily results in a permanent loss of innocence: a stain or mark on soul or conscience that cannot be removed by any act one does, and which, consequently, forms or deforms one's character forever. For, if one saw, or even merely believed, that by doing a vicious action one would be acting against one's own well-being or good, then that belief would elicit a constraining influence against the evil action, precisely in the same way as the belief in the literal impossibility of jumping over a chasm would elicit a constraining influence on one not to jump.

Section 2: Central Problems With the Socratic Formulation of the Thesis

It is, perhaps, even at this early stage in our argument, relatively clear that the central problem with the Socratic formulation of the thesis of the practicality of reason is not so much the problem of whether or not it is true, but the problem of providing sufficient details for an adequate understanding of its nature. But, the failure to clearly and precisely elucidate these details may tempt one to question whether or not the thesis is true. Our aim is ultimately to dispel this temptation by providing just such an elucidation, but, for now, it may help us achieve that end if we isolated some of the more crucial problems associated with the main elements of the Socratic thesis.

Section 2A: The Problem Concerning Moral Knowledge

Perhaps the most serious and fundamental shortcoming of the Socratic-Platonic account is the failure to provide a sufficiently precise account of the knowledge associated with virtue and the correlative ignorance associated with vice. Although it concedes that sensation is somehow a necessary condition for the experience of physical objects, it claims that the knowledge of other objects, viz., universals, can only be explained by an activity of reason on its own contents without the mediation of sense.[47] The account of this activity, however, in terms of the doctrine of recollection from past lives is notoriously inadequate.[48]

In light of this general epistemological shortcoming no adequate elucidation is given, or can be given: <a> of the nature of the non-sensuous knowledge of moral objects or actions, <b> of the distinction between the mere thought of a moral object and the knowledge or intuition of it, or <c> of the alleged process involved in the transition from mere moral belief to knowledge and from lower order to higher order moral knowledge. Such an elucidation, however, seems especially crucial for an adequate analysis of how Goodness itself can enter into relation with the knowing mind in certain intentionally right actions.

Section 2B: The Problem Concerning the Nature of Moral Objects or Actions

In view of these epistemological problems it is not surprising that the Socratic-Platonic account is vague concerning the precise nature or content of the object of moral knowledge, i.e., the ultimate Form of the Good. Thus, the nature of, and interrelations between Goodness and the other Forms, e.g., Being, Truth, etc., as well as between these Forms and their instances, are never clearly explicated. But, more specifically, and, perhaps, more significantly from an ethical standpoint, no clear elucidation is provided for the key distinction between good and evil actions, or between Good and Evil generally. *The failure, however, to adequately elucidate the cause of evil in terms of an influencing (versus determining) cause in conjunction with free will exposes the Socratic-Platonic account to the possibility of an original moral dualism.*[49] For, the cause of the problem of moral conflict and evil is claimed, by Socrates, to be a form of moral ignorance. But, moral ignorance is explained by the intersection in man of two opposing principles, viz., sense and reason, matter and form or the body's conjunction with the soul.50 In the material world, at least, both these principles seem necessary for Socrates-Plato to explain man's actualization or formation toward perfection, as well as his failure to obtain it. Evil, therefore, may seem somehow necessary for good--not something created by an act of will, but rooted in the very nature or fabric of Being or Reality itself. In any case, the reality of particular evil actions consistently demands the reality of evil archetypes, forms or universals, on the Socratic-Platonic account; and no adequate account is given of how such evil universals can fall within the realm of becoming rather than eternal being.

Such a conclusion seems to call in question the central Socratic claim of the essential and ultimate Goodness of Reality; worse, still, the prevalence of evil in the world may suggest that reality is essentially and ultimately evil, if not coldly indifferent.[51] If this suggestion is yielded to, Socrates' moral "intuition" may appear to be a mere idealizers dream with no more force than the dreams of children. Skepticism enters in, paradoxically, as alone "good faith." Undoubtedly this is paradoxical--it is even inconsistent--in view of the necessity of order or unity for there to be anything at all, but the lack of an account of the cause of evil leaves the account open to it. In the modern scientific battleground between order and chaos, chaos is the ultimate victor. In either case, whether evil and good are eternally at war or whether evil is inherently supreme, the claim of the practicality of reason loses force in virtue of an inadequate account of it.

Section 2C: The Problem of the Constraint of Moral Knowledge on Action

Given the lack of an adequate account of experiential or intuitive knowledge generally, and of moral knowledge in particular, it should be clear that no adequate account can be given of the particular form of desire or principle of action associated with that knowledge. The claim, therefore, that knowledge constrains action--even compels action in certain cases--loses force when we consider the fact that so many people seem oblivious to it. But, it is weakened further when we consider the Socratic analysis of this principle as a necessitating cause in the sense that man has not only an inherent tendency toward the good, but must seek it when, and in so far as, it is present to consciousness. For, if The Good is present, one must seek it; and, if it is absent--if one is ignorant of it--one cannot benefit from the power of its presence. How, then, can one be held responsible or accountable for wrong or evil actions? The lack of an adequate reply to this question leaves us vulnerable to suspicion with respect to free will; hence to suspicion with respect to the possibility of good action, a good life and a good world.

In what follows our hope is to show that despite the immense practical significance of these problems and the need, therefore, for an adequately clarified account of the thesis of the practicality of reason, these problems do not provide rational justification for an outright denial that the thesis is true. Such problems do not, therefore, provide legitimate grounds for theoretical or practical despair. We hope to show that despite important modifications in the details of the various formulations of the thesis, the essential character of the thesis is retained by the leading philosophical figures of the history of philosophy--even up to the present age.

Notes: Chapter Two [Socrates-Plato]

1. The main character of the Platonic dialogues is, of course, Socrates. Socrates was Plato's mentor and teacher, and the dialogues are primarily Plato's record of Socrates' teaching on moral topics. Socrates left, however, no written works of his own, and Plato's dialogues often include topics and claims that are not strictly those of his master. It is often difficult, therefore, to discern where Socrates leaves off and Plato begins. Nor can we take the time to discuss this issue further. This is not an attempt at a contribution to the philosophy of history, but an attempt to use historical figures to come to terms with a substantive philosophical issue. It is Socrates--not Plato--who is presented to us as the instrument of Truth in the Platonic dialogues. Our intention, therefore, will primarily be to focus our attention on Socrates as the mouthpiece for an initial elucidation of the thesis of the practicality of reason.

2. See, for example, Plato Phaedo 69d: "It is wisdom that makes possible courage and self control and integrity, or in a word, true goodness . . ."; see also Meno 87b-89d; Protag. 355,356; Hipp. maj. 284, 294a; Republic 6.488b.

3. For the influence of the Socratic thesis on subsequent ethics, see, e.g., Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit, with an introduction by J.H. Muirhead, 3 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), vol.1:54; Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brerton (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), pp.52-3; Mary Midgley, Wickedness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp.20,63; Gary Watson, "Free Agency," in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) p.99; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.161.

4. Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns, ed., The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Bollingen Series, no.71 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp.562-3.

5. The term 'object' used in this paper, unless the context indicates otherwise, is taken to refer to anything at all whether or not it exists. It is a necessary condition that something be referred to to know it exists, but we do not assume that an "object" must exist in order for it to be referred to or even to ascribe properties or characteristics to it. Fictitious objects, e.g., unicorns, are described in story books as having certain properties even though there is nothing which actually has such properties and nothing, therefore, of that type which exists.

6. Hamilton & Cairns, Laws, p.1284. For a discussion of Plato's view on intentional or voluntary wrong doing see, e.g., B. Jowett, trans., The Dialogues of Plato, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875), vol. 5, The Laws, pp.133ff; H.W.B. Joseph, Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic, Oxford Classical & Philosophical Monographs (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp.10ff, 27-28, 31, 43-44; and Plato Laws 3.688d.

7. By "perception" here we mean in the broad sense to include any object self-evidently given as it is in-itself to reason or the understanding independently of logical argument.

8. See Plato Republic 517 (also 514ff; 532); see also Hartmann, Ethics, vol.1:185. Note the following quote by U.V. Wilamoqitz-Moellendorff in Anders Nygren, Agape And Eros, trans. Philip S. Watson (London: S.P.C.K., 1953), p.168:

> . . . Plato is conscious that the Ultimate and Highest is never scientifically demonstrable . . . We apprehend the Highest only in the divine madness, not with the understanding but through inward experience, intuitively.

9. For an interesting discussion of this point see Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, The Universal Library (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1967), pp.234-253; see also Bergson, Morality

& Religion, pp.54ff.

10. See, e.g., Plato Meno 71ff.

11. See, for example, Plato's Meno for the Socratic confession of ignorance as the first step toward wisdom. See, for example, Plato's Euthyphro 6ff for one of many places where argument is used to reveal ignorance.

12. See Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp.23-24.

13. See Jowett, Laws, p.178; Meno, p.273; Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.23; see especially Jowett, Meno, pp.282,288:

Regardless of Plato's clearly invalid inference to the claim of the soul's pre-existence and its recollection of the Forms, i.e., "Evidently, therefore, he had the knowledge as an original premiss . . .," there is no reason to impugn the common-sense plausibility of the premise on which it is based, viz., the "apriori" knowledge of universals.

John Dreher, in "Foundations of Ethical Theory," claims that one main difference between the ancient and modern moral standpoints lies in the fact that they assumed, while the moderns (Dreher) do not, that the central issue in morality is whether or not there are just acts. We intend to show, however, that this claim is not entirely justified--that even if the skeptical question is more prominent today its basis lies in certain epistemological considerations which are as applicable to any claim of truth and not just to truth in the moral realm. The prevalence of such skepticism may well make the ancients appear uncritical in general and morally uncritical in particular. As Dreher puts it: "Like most ancient philosophers, Plato stresses the analysis of proper character formation and more or less uncritically adopts the moral intuitions of the ordinary Greek concerning action. The analysis of justice found in the Republic is confirmed, at least to its author's satisfaction, by the observation that anyone who is just by the Republic's standards would be very unlikely to commit an action which is unjust by ordinary standards and ipso facto by Plato's own standards." (pp.12-13). Cf. H.W.B. Joseph, Knowledge and the Good, see note 6 above; and Sidgwick, Outlines, p.23.

14. See Jowett, Laws, p.179; Phaedo, pp.65ff; Nygren, Agape & Eros, pp.167ff; Plato Rep. 517, 519.

15. Jowett, Rep., p.420.

16. This is important when we consider, for example, certain modern interpretations of the Socratic-Platonic view. Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, for example, appears to understand the Socratic-Platonic view as a case where one need only vividly image or think of a case one takes to be right or wrong to do it. See p.161.

17. Plato Rep. 494d; 517.

18. Jowett, Meno, p.270.

19. Jowett, Laws, pp.7,192.

20. Plato Cratylus 386e-387d.

21. Plato Lesser Hippias 373d.

22. Plato Laws 862b.

23. Ibid., 862b, 869e.

24. Ibid., 863e-864.

25. Plato Symposium 183e.

26. Plato Laws 864a.

27. Plato Gorgious 468b; see also note 26 above. Cf. Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a1-3.

28. Plato Laws 904c.

29. Plato Symposium 183e.

30. Plato Phaedrus 237d.

31. For an example of such training see Elliot Dorff, "Sabbath Spirit and Sabbath Law" (University of Judaism, N.D.), p.10: ". . . long before observant Jews understood, expressed and appreciated those ideas, they lived through the experience of *Shabbat,* the Jewish Sabbath"; and in "Study leads to Action," Religious Education 75 (March-April, 1980): "He [Hirsch] quickly adds that the tradition 'certainly . . . placed its main emphasis not on knowledge but on deeds . . .'"

32. Nygren, Agape & Erose, p.173; Jowett, Phaedrus, p.250.

33. Nygren, Agape & Eros, p.174. The nature of this process will be examined in our last two chapters. There we shall see that the moral thought or intentionality which points to particular goods also extends beyond those goods to a possible fulfilment with respect to Goodness itself. See also Jowett, Symp. p.211; Plato Rep. 514ff.

34. Hamilton & Cairns, Rep., pp.562-3.

35. Plato Rep. 178d.

36. See Nygren, Agape & Eros, pp.51,176,180. I do not believe that Nygren is correct in his conviction that Plato's love or eros is ego-centered--that man's aim is self-happiness. The fundamental focus of the Platonic view of man is always on The Good--not self. It is true that Socrates believed The Good itself and one's own good were always compatable. But, it does not follow from this, nor was it the Socratic view, that one's ego was the intentional object qua ultimate end. Cf. Plato Symp. 180d, 204ff, 268; Lysis 214; Phaedrus 248.

37. Ibid..

38. Jowett, Laws, p.19, 147; see also F.C.S. Schiller, Humanism (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1903), p.12.

39. Radoslav A. Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p.15; Midgley, Wickedness, p.20; Jowett, Laws, pp.11,183,23,141,154; Watson, "Free Agency," p.99; Plato Laws 627b; Protag. 352a; Rep. 430e, 380ff, 379-391; Tim. 42; Phaedrus 246; Phaedo 79; esp. note Phaedrus 237e-238e.

40. Plato Laws 864a; Symp. 183e.

41. Ibid., 689b.

42. Ibid..

43. See F.R. Tennant, The Sources of The Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp.143,297.

44. Plato Rep. 514ff.

45. Plato Rep. 359d ff.

46. Plato Laws 688d.

47. Plato Thaetetus 185e.

48. See note 13 above.

49. Tsanoff, Nature of Evil, pp.15,19; Midgley, Wickedness, pp.203,20,63,54; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p.132; Plato Statesman 272 ff; Thaetetus 176; Protag. 352a; Tim. 42,48,69; Rep., 4.435, 9.588; Phaedrus 244-250.

50. See Tennant, The Fall and Original Sin, pp.143,297.

51. See Russell, Why I am Not a Christian, p.13.

Aristotle

Section 1: Aristotle's Response to the Socratic Optimism, and His Apparent Denial of the Socratic Formulation of the Thesis

The vagueness, mentioned above, concerning the precise character of the knowledge requisite for a truly good life, or, correlatively, the ignorance characteristic of vice, is at the root of Aristotle's criticism of the Socratic thesis. Aristotle observes that this "knowledge" of Goodness is lacking in most, if not all persons outside of Socrates, so he, presumably, infers that it is not attainable for man qua man.[1] Although in a very rare or exceptional case one may be given the natural capacity to attain this vision, this is not a capacity characteristic of persons generally, and so it cannot be the ultimate or final end that man is meant to attain.

> The same applies to the Form <of the Good>: for, assuming that there is some single good which different things possess in common, or that there exists a good absolutely in itself and by itself, it evidently is something which cannot be realized in action or attained by man.[2]

If this is so, then it follows that virtue cannot be knowledge and vice ignorance, as Socrates maintained--at least not knowledge or ignorance of The Good. For, the virtue of a thing is defined in terms of what a thing can do or what it has the power to do,[3] but man, qua man, cannot apprehend The Good. Thus, for Aristotle, man's distinctive virtue is to be defined in terms of man's actual end or good, which is a highly relative matter to be defined not with scientific precision or rigor, but in terms of mere contingent generalities. Man's end becomes a sort of hodge-podge of a number of particular goods commonly said to be worthy of human pursuit, and this hodge-podge of goods Aristotle calls "happiness."[4]

In view of such a relative end, man's virtue is to be essentially characterized in terms of that which best enables him to achieve this end. For most men this virtue is moral virtue which is essentially characterized in terms of relatively non-reflective habits or dispositions.[5] If so, it may appear that Aristotle sharply departs from the Socratic glorification of the power of moral reason over action. In fact, such a conclusion may seem irresistible in view of Aristotle's vigorous contention that there is such a thing as moral weakness and his derision of Socrates for his alleged denial of it.[6]

Section 2: Despite the Appearance of a Major Shift in Viewpoint, Aristotle's Moral Views are Foundationally Identical to the Socratic-Platonic Viewpoint

Despite the appearance of a major shift in viewpoint, it is our contention that the foundational principles of both ethical systems are identical, although in Aristotle there is a progressively clearer analysis of their truth. Aristotle retains the thesis of the practicality of reason with respect to its three essential characteristics: <a> knowledge of an independently existing moral object or action is possible; <b> this knowledge is intuitive; and <c> this sort of knowledge constrains moral action. To make this point clear let us briefly examine a few of the central apparent differences between the Socratic and Aristotelian formulations of the thesis.

Section 2A: The Object of Moral Knowledge

First, although Aristotle rejects the Socratic Good as man's peculiar or distinctive end, he does not reject the reality or even knowability (for certain men) of The Good. Knowledge of The Good, therefore, remains an ideal aim for men. In contrast to man's good, knowledge of The Good, for most men, is unrealizable within the limits imposed by matter, but in so far as man attains it he attains a good or blessed life. Moreover, despite a more rigorous elucidation of goodness,[7] he basically retains all the essentials of the Socratic-Platonic view of The Good and good action. He is even one with them in characterizing the ultimate content of this good as distinctively rational--perhaps even Personal. J.A. Stewart comments:

> The θξωρητικοζ βιοζ is an ideal; it cannot be realized by man, for he is concrete. But the effort to realize it, as far as possible, is all important in human life. The effort to realize it

> coordinates man's powers, and exalts their vitality--it gives him elan, and carries him on to the attainment of many things within his reach, which he would not otherwise aspire to. Perhaps we may venture to translate the doctrine of this section into the language of modern philosophy, and say that Aristotle makes 'the Idea of God' the 'regulative principle' in man's life. Indeed Eudemus puts the doctrine hardly otherwise in a passage which is the best commentary on this section--E.E.:15.1249b6. [8]

Section 2B: The Nature of the Knowledge that Constrains Moral Action

Second, not only does Aristotle insist with Socrates that man has a final, although relative end, but he also acknowledges with Socrates that it is essentially rational or rationally obtained.[9] He goes further than Socrates by more explicitly showing that this end consists not only in a life or activity of reason, but also in one in conformity with moral virtue, which he defines in terms of actions that proceed from settled or fixed characteristics (*hexis*).[10] His definition of moral virtue and vice in terms of such relatively "blind," or seemingly non-rational habits is also significant for any exhaustive ethical study. But these qualifications must not blind us to the essentially rational character of virtue or the essentially irrational character of vice.

Like his mentor Plato, Aristotle allows but two principles potentially to govern men's actions, viz., the principle of unrestrained or irrational physical pleasure seeking and the principle of rational self control. He maintains that the principle of pleasure seeking is formed quite early and naturally, but the principle of rational self control can only be actualized by forces outside the individual himself.[11] This outside force or cause is preeminently the political system within which the individual is reared. Its primary function is to coerce the individual into obedience to its laws, i.e., to repeated actions of self-restraint in relation to pleasures, which literally brings into being the rational principle of action in the individual personality.[12]

Thus, we find that moral virtue for Aristotle does not become genuine virtue until, unless or in-so-far as the individual has come to the point of being rationally "self" governed. In other words, there is no virtue until one's actions proceed from a settled or fixed disposition or character of rationality.[13] The main point of the above discussion is to suggest that, although Aristotle acknowledges, and elucidates to a greater degree than Socrates or Plato, a class of moral actions in some sense non-rational (since non-deliberative), they are none-the-less rational in another sense, in that they are either grounded in actions which are rational or they are grounded in the rationality of the political or educational system itself.

Section 2C: The Constraint of this Knowledge over Moral Action

Third, Aristotle also holds with Socrates that in some manner this end of being rational is "present in" and constrains man's particular actions. He maintains that if, and to the extent that, this rational principle is actualized, one must act in conformity with its dictates. He retains, in short, the thesis that moral "knowledge" is both intuitive[14] and a constraining--sometimes even determining or necessitating--cause of moral action. This is the whole point of his doctrine of the practical syllogism. If one is governed by a principle of rationality, and if one knows, e.g., that all sweets are not to be tasted, and if one knows this is a sweet that ought not to be tasted, then one will not--in fact cannot--deliberately taste that sweet:

> <In the practical syllogism>, one of the premises, the universal, is a current belief, while the other involves particular facts which fall within the domain of sense perception. When two premises are combined into one, <i.e., when the universal rule is realized in a particular case>, the soul is thereupon *bound* to affirm the conclusion, and if the premises involve action, the soul is *bound* to perform this act at once.[15][Italics mine.]

All depends, of course, on whether or not one is, in fact, governed by this ultimate principle of rationality, and the central problem for Aristotle, as for Socrates, is clarifying why it is that most of us are not governed by it, but rather by indiscriminate, irrational or blind pleasure seeking.[16]

Section 3: Aristotle's Attempt at Resolution of the Socratic Paradox; the Problem of Moral Ignorance, Weakness and Failure Arising from Moral Conflict

The apparent difference in Aristotle's attempt at resolution of the Socratic paradox is, once again, more apparent than real. Although vice, like virtue, is defined in terms of habits or characteristics, it, too, is similarly epistemologically grounded, viz., in a lack of having acquired the rational principle that would determine one's actions for good. But no cause of this lack is given or can be given, consistent with his metaphysical principles, other than an appeal to outside or natural causes. Men, like animals, must seek what they know to be good and the only cause for not doing so must be an incapacity to know. Nor can any further aid be hoped for by Aristotle's seeming un-Socratic insistence that there is an intermediate moral state between virtue and vice, i.e., moral weakness (akrasia). It is true he makes a point of ridiculing Socrates for not acknowledging its existence, and he is clear, where Socrates is not, in showing that there is, indeed, some sense in which the morally weak man has "knowledge" and yet acts contrary to it. Yet, if we attend carefully to his analysis of this state it is apparent that the individual fails to act precisely because he lacks the specific kind of knowledge, which if supplied or present, would necessitate that action.[17] Thus, despite Aristotle's appeal to moral weakness, his account of it, like his account of vice generally, is fundamentally identical to the Socratic-Platonic account and does not, as such, help us in the elucidation of that sense of responsibility for wrong doing that both Socrates and Aristotle so strongly wish to maintain.[18]

Notes: Chapter Two [Aristotle]

1.For Aristotle's attack on the Socratic-Platonic view of The Good see Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics 1095a26-28, 1096a10ff; Aristotle The Eudemian Ethics 1217b2-16. See also note #20 on p. 10 of Martin Ostwald, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1962); H.H. Joachim, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp.31-3.

2. Ostwald, N.E., p.13.

3. Ibid., p.304: "'arete' is the quality which enables its possessor to perform his own particular function well"; see also definition of hexis in Ostwald's glossary p. 308.

4. See Aristotle N.E. Bk.I, ch.7 for the discussion of the nature of happiness; see Bk.I, ch.3 for the lack of precision to be expected from the study of common morality.

5. See Aristotle N.E. 1179b5-20; 1103a17-18: "moral virtue . . . is formed by habit"; 1105b1-5: ". . . for the mastery of the virtues, however, knowledge is of little or no importance . . . since repeated acts of justice and self-control result in the possession of these virtues."

6. Aristotle N.E. 1145a15ff.

7. See note #20 in Ostwald, N.E., p.10 in conjunction with N.E.:1096a18-20.

8. J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1892), vol.2, p.448.

9. Aristotle N.E. 1098a10ff.

10. Ibid., 1103b20, 1105a30ff, 1106b20ff.

11. Ibid., 1179b-1180a20.

12. Ibid., 1180a15ff.

13. See Ostwald, N.E., p.171, 153. Cf. Plato's Meno 88a-89a; Phaedo 69a-b.

14. See Ostwald, N.E., p.172; Stewart, Notes, vol.2, p.8.

15. Ostwald, N.E., p.183; see also Stewart, Notes, vol.2, pp.140,162ff; see Aristotle N.E. 1110b25-35 for vice as due to ignorance; and see Ostwald, N.E., note #3, p. 55.

On Aristotle's view "bound" ( ) is also translated as "necessitation" or "compulsion" (see Liddell & Scott's, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.101. This is to be contrasted with mere desire, influence, motivation or striving toward an object which can by an effort of will be easily and immediately overturned. Aristotle appears to mean here, quite literally, that one cannot intentionally act against this type of knowledge. It would involve a practical contra-diction.

To make this distinction sufficiently clear would anticipate our investigations in the last chapter of this book. To make the point clear enough to constitute an adequate verification of it would require a phenomenological elucidation of both will and motivation. Such a study is beyond the parameters set for this book.

Suffice it to say for now that our contention is not that will is non-existent, or has no part to play in practical life or even in knowledge acquisition. On the contrary. It is our contention, although one we cannot develop here, that will is the essential element in the fulfillment of one intention or thought by another in a developing apprehension or rational perception wherein the object itself comes before us in full presence. Our central claim, however, is not that reason compels but that it constrains action. Nor is it an essential part of our claim to elucidate the issue of how one comes to obtain this knowledge that constrains, (i.e., the elucidation of the role of will in the acquisition of this knowledge), but what happens once it is already present. And our position is, that at that point will has already brought us to a point wherein we cannot arbitrarily act against better knowledge.

16. See Stewart, Notes, vol.2, p.136.
17. Aristotle N.E. 1147bff; see also Stewart, Notes, vol.2, p.162.
18. Aristotle N.E. 1148a1-5, 1149a12ff, 1149b17ff.

Stoicism & Epicureanism

Section 1: Apparent Denial of the Thesis in Stoicism & Epicureanism

Socrates' vocation was to enlighten the skeptical mind of man, blinded by vicious ignorance, to the unique character of Universal Goodness. But, the knowledge of this Good was elusive and the ignorance associated with vice seemingly unconquerable, as well as inexplicable, in view of man's alleged responsibility for wrong doing. It was not surprising, therefore, to find in Aristotle the same doubt that appears to have plagued his teacher, Plato, concerning whether or not this knowledge of The Good was really possible for man. This doubt was, perhaps, most apparent in Aristotle's separation of the theoretical and practical disciplines, or in his reduction of the study of common morality to the empirical or non-scientific. But despite such skepticism, and despite important modifications and developments in the Socratic formulation of the thesis, we showed that Aristotle retained the thesis and that it remained in its essentials the same.

This skeptical tendency, however, in conjunction with an ever deepening need or hunger for an unknown Good which could meet the deepest needs of man, appears to form the basis, in moral philosophy immediately following Aristotle, for an almost exclusive practical aim. This aim is not so much one of elucidating the nature of moral reason as to simply hold before the eyes of man The Philosophical Sage--one who had personally experienced something of this Ideal Good himself. In this practical sense we find in Stoicism and Epicureanism almost identical conceptions of what actually constitutes the good life for man as well as almost identical characterizations of The Philosophical Sage.

Despite this similarity we find, that on a more theoretical level, the Socratic exaltation of Reason and the skeptical Aristotlean response, form the basis for a tendency in moral philosophy following Aristotle to move in either one of two directions.[1] On one hand, there was the tendency in Stoicism to retain a qualified form of the Socratic glorification of Wisdom, Reason or the Logos at the expense of pleasure or desire. Pleasure, or the seeking after pleasure, was considered to be the root of evil and as such had to be denied--even despised or hated--at all costs.[2] On the other hand, there was the tendency in Epicureanism to deprecate reason and its alleged power to the exaltation of pleasure as the sole and ultimate good of man.[3] Reason, if it served any value at all, served merely an instrumental role in the acquisition of pleasure. In either case, however, the Socratic formulation of the thesis of the practicality of reason might well appear to be denied. For, in the former case, the extremity with which pleasure or passion is denied seems to take the principle of motivation--the desire or love of the good--out of the Socratic equation. In the latter case, the extremity with which reason is denied similarly seems to remove knowledge and its object out of the equation, thereby reducing "moral" action and the quality of life to a mere naive or dumb hunger after more and more stimulation.[4]

Section 2: Despite the Apparent Denial of the Thesis, the Thesis is Retained

Despite the appearance of incompatibility of these two views with both the thesis and each other, and despite the fact that they are incompatible to the extent that they are or have been carried to the extreme, this is not necessarily so. It is our contention that a careful exposition of each type of view, in the works of their leading representatives, would show that their views are compatible. Even a cursory examination might show this to be the case. Epicurus, for example, claimed that true and lasting pleasure was to be obtained only by a denial of precisely those irrational pleasures deprecated by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle alike, e.g., the unrestrained gratification of one's physical desires for sex, food, liquor, drugs etc..[5] Epicurus even went further than the great rationalists of old in eschewing pleasures they took to be innocent--even good. For example, Epicurus denounces marriage and the bearing and raising of children because of the potential of such states for pain.[6]

Indeed, Epicurus does not merely deny to the wise sage certain types of physical pleasures, but also in keeping with the Greeks of old, praises the distinctively rational pleasures: pleasures described as inseparably bound up with the contemplation of a good life.[7] He does not reject, therefore, the intuitive or contemplative function of reason as essential to living well, but only logic or the ratiocinative function of reason which often leaves one cold and dry.[8] Nor does he reject the tradition's claim of the inherent strength of these rational emotions over the more common physical emotions, for it is Epicurus's primary aim to overcome the fears of death and guilt or condemnation by an adequate insight into what he claims to be the true nature of reality. This rational insight and emotion, in fact, is so powerful that it can transmute even the pain of the rack into a source for joy.[9] Hence, man's supreme happiness is so far divorced from a mere blind seeking after pleasure that, for Epicurus at least, supreme happiness was reserved for the practically wise man alone: the virtuous man who alone could see reality as it truly is.[10]

> Of all this the beginning and the chief good is prudence. . . . All the other virtues spring from it. It teaches that it is not possible to live pleasantly without at the same time living prudently, nobly, and justly,<nor to live prudently, nobly, and justly> without living pleasantly; for the virtues have grown up in close union with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life cannot be separated from the virtues.[11]

But Stoicism, too, only appears to reject the thesis. Despite the stress or emphasis placed on Reason or the Logos,[12] the Stoics always maintained that there were, for example, "movements of inclination . . . to what reason judges preferable."[13] In later Stoicism, in particular, pleasure, e.g., a ". . . strain of tenderness and sympathy with weakness,"[14] was considered to be an inseparable constituent of the good life. Distinctive types of emotions were inseparably bound up with reason, and it was the Stoic contention that these rational emotions were far more powerful by nature than the emotions associated with vice:

> O Philosophy, Thou guide of life! thou discoverer of virtue and expeller of vice! what had not only I myself, but the whole life of man, been without you?[15][Italics mine.]

In spirit, then, if not always in letter, the Stoic denial or rejection of pleasure was only meant to be a denial of those distinct types of pleasures or passions which were irrational and at the root of vice,[15] while, on the other hand, the Epicurean rejection of reason was only meant to be a denial of that distinctive type of reason which was cold and unmotivating. Despite appearances to the contrary, therefore, and despite the fact that each of these main types of views stress and develop one side of the Socratic formulation of the thesis over the other, they retain the thesis of the practicality of reason in its essentials.[17]

Notes: Chapter Two [Stoicism & Epicureanism]

1.See Bergson, Morality & Religion, p.54.

2. C.D. Yonge, trans., Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (New York: Harper & Bro's., 1888), p.194; Sidgwick, Outlines, pp.72-3; Hartmann, Ethics, vol.I, p.133: "To virtue . . . a special quality is attributed, the , the absence of desire . . . [or] freedom from emotion. . . . closing of one's self against value which awakens wishes and passions."

3. Russell M. Geer, trans., Letters, Principle Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964), p.56: ". . . we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. We recognize pleasure as the first and natural good . . ."; Cicero, Tusculan Disp., p.85.

4. Cicero, Tusculan Disp., p.206.

5. Whitney J. Oates, ed., The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers (New York: Random House, 1940), p.63; Geer, Letters, pp.56-7: ".. . not every pleasure is to be chosen. . . . the truest happiness does not come from the enjoyment of physical pleasure."

6. Oates, Stoic & Epicurean Philosophers, pp.263-4.

7. Ibid., p.60; Geer, Letters, p.53: "The gods do indeed exist, for our perception of them is clear"[italics mine]; p.55: ". . . this is the final end of the blessed life"; Hartmann, Ethics, vol.I, pp.131-2.

8. Oates, Stoics &c., p.60.

9. Ibid., p.62: "Injuries are done by men either through hate or through envy or through contempt, all of which the wise man overcomes by reasoning. When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has. He will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom. . . . And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy."

10. For types of pleasures and pains and how they are all traced back to the mind see Cicero, Tusculan Disc., pp.197-8; see also Sidgwick, Outlines, pp.84-6.

11. Geer, Letters, pp.57-8; see also note#8, p.58.

12. Oates, Stoic & Epicurean Philosophers, p.250; pp.294-5: "If an image of God were present, you would not dare to do many of the things you do."

13. Cicero, T.D., p.74, 83; see also Hartmann, Ethics, vol.1, p.54.

14. Cicero, T.D., pp.101,195.

15. Oates, S.E., pp, 247, 320, 380.

16. Cicero, T.D., p.164.

17. Sidgwick, Outlines, p.83; Bergson, Morality & Religion, p.54; Hartmann, Ethics, vol.1, p.54.

Medieval Moral Philosophy

Section 1: The Practical & Theoretical Sides of the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason

The central problem for ancient ethics with regard to the thesis of the practicality of reason was a problem with both practical and theoretical dimensions. On one hand, there was the practical problem of how to live a good life, or *how to obtain that type of knowledge of The Good that constrains action*; on the other hand, there was the theoretical or epistemological problem of elucidating the content of that moral knowledge. In more common sense terms, it is one thing to claim, believe--perhaps even "know"--that the clear vision of supreme Goodness brings one power over one's vicious desires and the influences of a vicious world; it is quite another to adequately describe or elucidate that vision, i.e., to describe the entities and processes involved in its acquisition. One might "know" the way to a friend's house and yet be unable to clearly describe the way--even to one's self--much less others. Similarly, one might obtain the "beatific vision" to live a good life and yet be unable to elucidate that vision and the process involved in its acquisition. But given that people almost universally appear to lack the beatific vision, we can see how hard pressed they might be to provide an account or description of it. In view of such a lack, therefore, it is understandable how skepticism might arise concerning even the possibility of such knowledge.

Section 2: The Practical & Philosophical Significance of Christ with Respect to the Thesis

With the birth, life, death and alleged resurrection of Christ, a new and vitally important element entered the ethical landscape with regard, above all, to the practical dimension of this problem. While the ancients generally, and Socrates in particular, confessed ignorance of The Good or God, Christ is described by his students as one who so fully lived and breathed in the atmosphere of goodness, or the spirit and presence of God, that they believed him to be the literal incarnation of Divinity. To these students, the Logos or Word of Eternal Truth became flesh and dwelt among mankind bodily. Nor did the man, Christ, disown their ascription of divinity to his person, as was the case with all other great moral teachers including John the Baptist.1 Rather, he rejoiced in their discovery and thanked God with all his heart for revealing to them the vision which he claimed alone could free them from the darkness of a degraded heart and world.[2] In any case, it seems clear that his aim, above all, was to be so completely transparent that the pure character of God might shine all the more perfectly through him to the benefit of all. If one could just see as living truth that God Is and is infinitely merciful or forgiving to all his children, one would find the way out of one's miserable condition. More specifically, one would find that to the extent that one abided in the presence of this good God wrong doing would become impossible. To the blind Greek and to the whole world, therefore, the first, and, perhaps, greatest philosopher and apologist of the new faith, Saul of Tarsus-now "Paul," "the little one" of Christ--cried out: "The unknown God, Him we proclaim unto you."[3]

Despite the "religious," "miraculous," or, as some no doubt are inclined to say, "superstitious" overtones of such a claim, the shining purity and humility of the man Christ's character, in conjunction with a wisdom at once unequally profound and practical, left an influence on the philosophical world that has remained to this day. Medieval philosophical ethics, in particular, was almost wholly dominated by the influence of Christ; the primary aim of the fathers of the Church being to interpret the meaning of Christ's words and to elucidate them consistently with an adequate rational or philosophical foundation.[4]

Section 3: Apparent Christian Rejection of the Thesis: the Impotence of Moral Philosophy Without Grace

But, despite this great change in the practical dimension of the problem, thus in the content of the knowledge of man's ultimate end, the rational elucidation of that knowledge (or intimately related faith) still rested on prevailing options with regard to philosophical or moral theory, i.e., on Platonism or Aristotelianism. Hence, it is no surprise to find that the two greatest Christian philosophers of the medieval period derived the ontological and epistemological foundations for their moral views almost entirely from their philosophical mentors: Augustine drank deeply from the well of Socrates-Plato and Aquinas was the chief interpreter of Aristotle.

The significance of this period for our thesis lies, in great measure, in the fact that despite the epistemological grounding of Christianity in ancient philosophy (which, as we have shown, clearly affirms the thesis of the practicality of reason) many assume that the Christian viewpoint is essentially at odds with this thesis. Faith, after all, is one thing--reason another; and in practice, if not in principle, they often appear at odds. Grace is one thing--free will another; and, once again, in practice, if not in principle, they may seem to be opposed. The attempt to integrate or ground Christian religious belief in Greek philosophy or epistemology may well seem vain. Hartmann nicely describes the problem from the modern vantage point in this way:

> It [Christianity] is the antithesis of the doctrine of Socrates. . . . Virtue cannot be taught; for only knowledge can indeed be taught, but *knowledge does not avail*. In the language of our present day concepts it is: Ethics can indeed teach us what we ought to do, but the teaching is powerless, man cannot follow it. Ethics is certainly normative in idea, but not in reality. It does not determine and guide man in life, it is not practical. There is no practical philosophy. Religion alone is practical.[5][Italics mine.]

Augustine, too, seems to express the modern view of the seeming impracticality of reason or the uselessness of philosophy as a source of power and a guide in the moral life:

> They cried out "Truth, truth;" they were forever uttering the word to me, but the thing was nowhere in them; indeed they spoke falsehood not only of You, who are truly Truth, but also of the elements of this world, Your creatures. . . . O Truth, Truth, how inwardly did the very marrow of my soul pant for You when time and again I heard them sound Your name. But it was all words--words spoken, words written in many huge tomes. . . . and I was not nourished by them, but utterly dried up.[6]

Section 4: Despite this Appearance, Medieval Christian Philosophy Retains the Thesis; the Relevance of the Religious Standpoint to the Thesis

In response to such a claim we suggest that one may concede--even avow--with Augustine the limits of Platonism and of philosophical ethics generally for the practical acquisition of that wisdom that constrains action, and yet retain the thesis of the practicality of reason as both theoretically and practically essential. We may well find after all that philosophy can teach us that we are, in our best rational stance, upon a mountaintop glimpsing the city of God from afar off without the power to enter therein. We may sincerely desire to be truly good in heart, and, yet, after arduous truth seeking, by the mere light of reason, find ourselves seemingly unable to accomplish this alone. A certain barrier seems to stand in our way:

> Now that I had read the books of the Platonists and had been set b them towards the search for a truth that is incorporeal, I came to see *Your invisible things which are understood by the things that are made*. I was at a standstill, yet I felt what through the darkness of my mind I was not able actually to see; I was certain that You are and that You are infinite, . . . Of these things I was utterly certain, yet I had not the strength to enjoy You. I talked away as if I knew a great deal but if I had not sought the way to You in Christ our Saviour I would have come not to instruction but to destruction. . . . [For there is a difference] between presumption and confession, between those who see what the goal is but do not see the way; and those who see the way which leads to that country of blessedness, which we are meant not only to know but to dwell in.[7]

We may come to see, too, that this barrier--this powerlessness--is rooted in the fact that the world is submerged in the dark depths of sin and that this sin is somehow deeply present in all of us so that we find ourselves burdened like Bunyan's pilgrim with his load of guilt and shame. We may come to see that the nature of this sin is truly a form of ignorance, although not the innocent ignorance of children, but ignorance intimately tied to a free and willful act which manifests itself only on a deeper level of cognition as a categorical opposition to Goodness and Truth--to God and His Moral Law.

> For I still held the view that it was not we that sinned, but some other nature sinning in us; and it pleased my pride to be beyond fault, and when I did any evil not to confess that I had done it, . . . I very much preferred to excuse myself and accuse some other thing that was in me but was not I. But in truth I was wholly I, it was my impiety that had divided me against myself. My sin was all the more incurable because I thought I was not a sinner; and my iniquity was most execrable in that I would rather have You, God Almighty, vanquished in me to my destruction than myself vanquished by You for my salvation.[8]

We may come with Augustine, therefore, to see that such sin and the burden or pain of guilt associated therewith, produces a certain aversion or fear of moral truth, i.e., a fear to even look at, much less clearly see, the truth about the reality of our sins: a fear of their true moral quality being brought to light, discovered, found out, revealed to others and ourselves. We may come to see all this in spite of our attempts to manipulate our own minds and the minds of others to believe it isn't so. We may come to see, therefore, that the barrier to our living well is simply our own choice.

But in view of such a possibility, we may well wonder how mere reason can enable us to do even this much: to look on, much less obtain, true Goodness. For, how can we look on that which so exposes us and condemns us? How can we look on Him whom we have pierced? One would as much knowingly subject one's self to torture for the mere pain of it. The mere fact that sinful people can even sincerely acknowledge their sins may well appear, in light of the above, miraculous. To do so, Goodness must present something of the quality of mercy--some hope or promise of pardon--in order for us to even approach it, much less see it. How, then, can mere reason, if construed on a naturalistic or egocentric basis--as individuals somehow acting alone, isolated or separated from each other and from God--actually obtain one's final end of living well?

The religious answer, of course, is that one cannot. According to it, even the mere conceptualization of reality as a cosmos in which we are alone is itself a manifestation of the viciously ignorant and unnatural condition of man. As a recent writer has put it, loneliness is "the plague of the modern world." One may concede, therefore, the literal impossibility of practical goodness, in the sense, at least, of an abiding characteristic of a soul at peace with itself, its world and its God without Grace, i.e., without explicit acts of God wherein he increasingly reveals, as the Spirit of Truth, the loving self sacrifice of Himself for us in spite of our sins against Him and all things--including ourselves. This was the view of St. Augustine.

> In that pure eloquence I saw One Face, and I learned to rejoice with trembling. I found that whatever truth I had read in the Platonists was said here with praise of Your grace: that he who sees *should not so glory as if he had not received*—and received, indeed, not only what he sees but even the power to see, for *what has he that he has not received?* . . . The writings of the Platonists contain nothing of this. Their pages show nothing of the face of that love, the tears of confession, Your sacrifice, an afflicted spirit, a contrite and humbled heart, the salvation of Your people, the espoused city, the promise of the Holy Spirit, the chalice of our redemption. In them no one sings: *Shall not my soul be submitted unto God?*[9]

But, we emphatically maintain, despite the awesome practical significance of such a concession if true, that it leaves the thesis of the practicality of reason untouched. For, from the Christian standpoint, what "saves" or ultimately frees man from the stain of sin and the power of vicious desires, is precisely knowledge, i.e., an adequate revelation of God's ongoing redemption throughout history: from the beginning of the world through the natural goodness of His creation, through the Jewish people as the specially chosen of God, through His incarnation in the body of His Son and through all who willingly yield to moral truth and thus take on the character which marks them as children of God. What saves, in short, and however it may be given, is a genuine and clear vision, or intuition of God. Again, St. Augustine:

> Now at last we are in the very *vision and contemplation of truth*, which is the seventh and last level of the soul; . . . What shall I say are the delights, what the enjoyment, of the supreme and true Goodness, what the everlasting peace it breathes upon us? Great and peerless souls--and we believe that they have *actually seen and are still seeing these things* . . .[10][Italics mine.]

Nor does the appeal to "faith" or to "authority" call this claim in question:

> I began to consider the countless things I believed which I had not seen, or which had happened with me not there--so many things in the history of nations, so many facts about places and cities which I had never seen, . . . and unless we accepted these things we should do nothing at all in this life. . . . [Thus] I was coming to believe that You would certainly not have bestowed such eminent authority upon those Scriptures throughout the world, unless it had been Your will that by them men should believe in You and in them seek You.[11]

For, the authority of the Bible itself and the authority of its inspired interpreters is itself grounded in the authority of revelation, i.e., the intuition or apprehension of divine truth.12 The acknowledgment or acceptance of such authority on faith, therefore, whether in the case of the young child or the student of the moral life, is tentative--it merely holds before one's mind a possibility of value which one can and must obtain one's self.

> . . . that which we believe, we desire also to know and understand. . . . For believing is one thing, and understanding another; and we must first believe whatever great and divine matter we desire to understand. Else would the Prophet have said in error, Except ye believe, ye shall not understand. . . . [and] when He spoke of the gift itself that was to be given to believers, He did not say, "This moreover is eternal life, that ye believe," but, This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.[13]

The Christian ethics of the middle ages, therefore, does not deny the power of reason over action. It denies only our ability to attain alone, by unaided human effort, the requisite knowledge or wisdom to lead a good life. The account of "how" one gains such "faith" or knowledge of God, therefore, is inessential to the defense of the thesis of the practicality of reason. For, the thesis of the practicality of reason is merely the claim that knowledge--regardless of how acquired--constrains moral action, and we believe it would do so on its simplest levels--even in the absence of any clear recognition or presence of Grace.

Section 5: Despite Acknowledgment of the Thesis, the Grounding of the Christian Medieval Philosophers in Greek Philosophy Prevents an Adequate Account of the Thesis

If what has been said above is plausible, one might be willing to concede with the Christian Medieval philosophers the significance of Christianity to the practical dimension of the thesis of the practicality of reason. Yet, even given such a concession, one might still deny to them any substantive or significant contribution to the philosophical elucidation of the thesis itself. For, their philosophical systems in general are grounded in Greek ontology and epistemology. Hence, they share the same problem of elucidating the intuitive or contemplative knowledge of the moral object as such and of non-sensuous or universal objects generally. They fail, therefore, to provide an adequate rational or philosophical vindication of the faith. For, if one cannot clearly distinguish veridical from unveridical moral apprehensions, then how is one to distinguish veridical from unveridical interpretations of the words of Christ or God? If one is to rely on the "authority" of the Church, how is one to distinguish between genuine authorities and false ones? If one is to rely on the words of the Scripture itself, how is one to decide which Scripture and which works are canonical--what the words actually mean and whether or not they are true?

> [Reason] is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself.
>
> Joseph Butler[14]

> . . . no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence and assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident, and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in.
>
> John Locke[14]

In saying that Augustine, and the thinkers of this period generally, lacked an adequate theory of intuition we do not by any means wish to imply that they had no theory of knowledge at all, or that they accomplished nothing in the way of resolution of that problem. But, the primary business of the philosophers of this period appears to have been the monumental task of integrating or synthesizing the new faith with what they could find of existing philosophical theory. It was for later generations of philosophers to attempt the independent critique of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the great Greek philosophers. Thus, despite, for example, Augustine's extraordinary psychological acumen, and ability to communicate the data of moral experience, his philosophy was, after all, limited to the Platonism of his day, which was simply inadequate for the task. He is like a carpenter with all the lumber needed to build but with inadequate tools.

In view of these considerations, we do not think it is necessary to present a detailed exposition of the moral epistemology of any of the thinkers of this period; but we suggest that such an exposition, if carried out, would show that it is to all intents and purposes identical to the Platonism and Aristotelianism of old and equally so with respect to its problems. Augustine, for example, like Aristotle, observes the universality of man's viciously ignorant condition. He is certain too, like Aristotle and the Greeks, that one must seek the good when it is present to thought. In the language of Christianity, Augustine has personally experienced the *irresistability of God's grace when present*.[15] Hence, he seems forced against his wishes, like the Greeks, into the same conclusion of a total moral incapacity for virtue in men. Man cannot take a single step toward God. His "freedom" is limited to a mere choice of degrees and types of evil. He seems compelled, therefore, to fix the blame for man's condition of ignorance and consequential corruption, on a choice made by man's progenitor alone, Adam, in his voluntary preference of self to God.

> When I was deliberating about serving the Lord my God, as I had long meant to, it was I who willed to do it, I who was unwilling. It was I. I did not wholly will, I was not wholly unwilling. Therefore I strove with myself and was distracted by myself. This distraction happened to me though I did not want it, and it showed me not the presence of some second mind, but the punishment of my own mind. *Thus, it was not I who caused it, but the sin that dwells in me, the punishment of a sin freely committed by Adam, whose son I am*.[16] [Italics mine.]

Augustine's doctrine of freedom of the will, therefore, seems inconsistently reduced to the Aristotelian "voluntary" power ultimately determined by "external" causes. It seems unquestionable that he has every wish and intention to avoid such a conclusion. He is not only convinced, but clearly sees, that men can and do voluntarily or freely sin, but he cannot seem to consistently maintain this claim on rational grounds. Once again, the only way out of man's condition of vicious ignorance is to acquire the faith and vision of God's forgiving love. This revelation, however, is wholly unmerited. It is a gift or an explicit act of God's will. It may appear, therefore, that free will is once again lost in the equation. Augustine knows that, somehow, man has a part to play in this process--that one can and does choose either to yield to God's truth or to continue in rebellion against Him--but given the irresistability of God's Grace he cannot account for it.

The appeal to God in this manner, however, leaves us with major logical or rational difficulties almost identical to those already discussed. Most significantly, it may appear almost to annihilate the distinction between virtue and vice. If God's grace is irresistible, then how could even the first man, Adam, sin (or even Lucifer for that matter)? If all men inherently lack the knowledge of God that constrains action then how can they be held responsible for knowledge they did not possess--for an ignorance they did not choose? Finally, if God will not choose to open one's eyes then how can God's goodness or grace be consistently maintained?[17] Undoubtedly Augustine might reply that grace is not invoked in these cases. But, how can one refuse to invoke God's grace? He fails in any case, just like the Platonisms of old, to adequately account for the initial presence of evil in the divine world,[18] and his failure to answer adequately such questions results in the same failure as his predecessors to locate clearly the responsibility for vicious ignorance in the individual man.

With these few painfully incomplete observations about the thesis of the practicality of reason in the Medieval period, we pass on to modern philosophy.

Notes: Chapter Two [Medieval Moral Philosophy]

1. For example: Now this was John's testimony when the Jews of Jerusalem sent priests and Levites to ask him who he was. He did not fail to confess, but confessed freely, "I am not the Christ."

John 1:19 (TLB)

And seeing their faith, He [Jesus] said, "Friend, your sins are forgiven you." And the scribes and the Pharisees began to reason, saying, "who is this man who speaks blasphemies? Who can forgive sins, but God alone?" But Jesus, aware of their reasonings, answered and said to them . . . "in order that you may know the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins,"--He said to the paralytic--"I say to you, rise, and take up your stretcher and go home."

Luke 5:20-24 (NAS)

See also Soren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans., with an introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp.44ff.

2. For example: Then he asked them, "Who do you think I am?" Simon Peter answered, "The Christ, the Messiah, the Son of the living God." "God has blessed you, Simon, son of Jonmah," Jesus said, "for my father in heaven has personally revealed this to you . . . You are Peter, a stone; and upon this rock I will build my church . . ."

Matt 16:15-18 (TLB)

At that time Jesus, full of joy through the Holy Spirit, said, "I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and learned, and revealed them to little children."

Luke 10:21 (NIV)

3. Acts 17.23 (NAS)

4. See, for example, St. Augustine, Against the Academics, trans. and annotated by John J. O'Meara (New York: Newman Press, 1951), p.22; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Basic Writings of Thomas Aquinas, ed., and annotated, with an intro., by Anton C. Pegis, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1945), vol.1, p.6.

5. Hartmann, Ethics, vol.1, p.55. Luther puts the issue this way:

The world understandeth not this doctrine. . . . It braggeth of free will, of the light of reason, of the soundness of the powers and qualities of nature, of good works . . .

Martin Luther, A Commentary on St.Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, A revised and completed trans. based on the 'Middleton' ed. of the English version of 1575 (London: James Clarke & Co., 1953), p.41.

6. St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. F.J. Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942), pp.39-40; see also the following other works by Augustine: Against the Academics, p.6 and note #66 on p.197; The Greatness of the Soul, trans., Joseph M. Colleran (New York: Newman Press, 1950), p.8.

7. Augustine, Confessions, pp.123-4.

8. Ibid., p.79.

9. Ibid., pp.124-5.

10. Augustine, Greatness of the Soul, p.104; see also: ibid., p.82 (where greatest action=inaction or dependence of reason on God); Against the Academics, p.169, note#6: "intellectus"=higher intuitional function; p.15: absolute trust in such cognition; p.197, note

#61,66: compatibility of faith and reason; p.22: God as the source of all truth, i.e., synthesis of authority and reason.

11. Augustine, Confessions, pp.91-2; see also Augustine, Faith, Hope and Charity, trans. and annotated by Louis A. Arand (New York: Newman Press, 1947), p.13.

12. See note #14.

13. St. Augustine, St. Augustine on Free Will, trans. Carroll Mason Sparrow, University of Virginia Studies, vol. 4 (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia, 1947), pp.37,67,70.

14. Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion, in The Works of Joseph Butler, ed. W.E. Gladstone, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), vol. 1, p.222; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in The Philosophical Works of John Locke, with a preliminary discourse and notes by J.A. St. John (London: George Virtue, 1843), p.482.

15. Augustine, Faith, Hope & Charity, pp.37,40,91ff,100-1,124 no.76.

16. Augustine, Confessions, p.142; see also Augustine on Free Will, pp.129ff.

17. Augustine, Confessions, pp. 109-10.

18. Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil, pp.16-7.

Introduction to the Modern Period

Section 1: The Recognition of the Need for an Adequate Epistemology to Resolve Ethico-Religious Problems

In the process of the development of our thesis into the Modern Period the ethico-religious issues associated with the thesis become increasingly complex, the meanings of the central terms used vague and ambiguous, and the central problems increasingly persistent and difficult to resolve. This is so despite the Church's claim of infallibility or "authority" on all questions of faith and morality. There is an increasing awareness that resolution of these fundamental issues requires an adequate criterion of truth or justification. To this end, there is, historically, a pivotal move toward the elucidation of reason in its experiential as well as ratiocinative forms--specifically, a move toward the elucidation of "ideas." The subjective or epistemological turn, associated above all with DesCartes as its pivotal figure, as well as the turn to a "science of human nature" in the ethical domain, is an implicit acknowledgment of this need to resolve moral problems by an appeal to a rigorously clarified epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Most central to this elucidation was the ontological status of those seemingly non-sensuous or "universal" contents of mind--the class of ideas under which moral ideas appeared to fall. The assumption was, in part, that the age old problem of the ontological status of universals generally might be resolved by an elucidation of our knowledge of them. The shift of attention, therefore, "inward" did not entail, nor was it factually the case, that the new philosophy of "ideas" had rejected the old philosophy or that it had declared war on the claims of religious truth. At its best it merely sought clarity or scientific rigor in place of mere dogmatic apriori theological presumption.

Section 2: The Central Problem for Modern Moral Epistemology

The need for such a rigorous epistemology, however, does not mean that it was to be immediately forthcoming, nor has it been won still without great trial and effort as well as failure. For, it is our contention, though not one we can take the time to develop here, that despite the significance of DesCartes in making explicit the need for the "subjective turn," he imbibed from the tradition before him certain assumptions about the status of reason and its ideas which may have been incorrect and yet remained--and remain still--highly influential. He assumed, for example, a representationalist theory of perception and cognition out of which the famous "Cartesian Dualism" was the natural consequence.[1] Ideas were to be construed, according to this theory, as essentially "copies," "images," "represent-ations" or pictures of that to which they allegedly referred. But, given such a separation of the mind and its ideas from their objects (at least in the external world), the central problem became how to reunite them. For, at least in the case of "knowledge," the mind or its ideas appear to enter into relation with independently existing objects.[2]

Section 3: The Problem not Original with DesCartes

This problem, however, was by no means original with DesCartes. Even Plato, for all his Idea-ism or Ideal-ism, seems to have held a doctrine like it; in fact, his theory of recollection seems grounded on it. He saw that man had knowledge of universal entities, but he could not account for such knowledge without supposing that those entities were somehow or in some way already in man. He apparently reasoned that since such objects were eternal and in man, man himself must somehow be eternal or have lived before.[3] Thus, despite his endless stress on the difference between the spatial "in" and the qualitative or universal "in," Plato appears unable to fully free himself from represention alist preconceptions--at least, not sufficiently to apply the distinction clearly and distinctly to his theory of the contents of mind.

Section 4: The Significance of this Assumption about Ideas for our Study

This key assumption about ideas seems of utmost importance for our study in view of the fact that it has had a tenacity that has remained up to the present day. Despite all our advance in knowledge in other respects, we are today no less mystified by the fact that thoughts or ideas, being the particular, subjective things they admittedly are, are capable of relating to, contacting, or somehow grasping things totally independent of them. We wonder, "how can something "outside" our thoughts or ideas at the same time be "in" them, or even relate to them without our ideas themselves being changed by their causal relations with it?" If an automobile smashes into one, one will certainly be changed by that relation, but ideas appear to "grasp" things without either the ideas or the things referred to by them being changed by that relation. Once the representationalist assumption is made, however, the relation of ideas to objects--even to other ideas or itself, becomes wholly inexplicable.

It is our contention, which cannot be defended here, that given the representationalist assumption about ideas the unity requisite for the elucidation of either the object of knowledge or knowledge itself cannot be obtained. DesCartes, undoubtedly, attempted to avoid dogmatic, apriori assumptions of any kind and to ground his philosophy and epistemology on an experiential or intuitive base, viz., on the clearness and distinctness of ideas. But, the famous Cartesian Doubt does not witness to the adequacy of his attempt. Given doubt, or the possibility of error in some or certain cases, it simply does not logically follow, nor does experience confirm, that one can never be clear or know. For DesCartes, however, the assumption of a mere contingent relationship between ideas and their objects required some additional support or guarantee than the mere appeal to clearness and distinctness of ideas. To justify any claim of knowledge he found himself forced to appeal to God for the guarantee he could find nowhere else. Such an appeal, however, allowed him only the mere appearance of success during an age where religious conviction rather than religious perception prevailed.

Specifically, and historically, there appear to be two broad types of theories that might be plausibly sustained within such a representationalist and nominalist framework: either theories which attempt to deny the independence of the mind and its object in order to avoid the problem of their relations (as in the case of Spinoza's pantheism), or theories which attempt to carry the assumption of the separation of ideas and its objects to its logical conclusion (as in the case of Hume's extreme atomism). The special problem in the former case then becomes how to distinguish the mind (or its ideas) from its objects; the problem in the latter case becomes, how to get anything sufficiently together to account for the unity or self-identity of anything at all.

Our attempt in what follows is to briefly consider each of these options. But, due to the extent of Hume's influence--especially in the moral domain--we shall concentrate our attention on developing his views. One of our main aims in doing so will be to show that the only plausible line of resolution to our moral problem of the practicality of reason will be to dispense with dogmatic apriori assumptions about the nature of ideas, and turn by intuition to intuition in the attempt to elucidate its nature in its application to the problem of the thesis of the practicality of reason.

Spinoza

Section 1: Spinoza's Acceptance of the Thesis Despite Significant Differences in his Account of it

Despite significant differences in Spinoza's account of the thesis, which distinguishes him not only from medieval Jewish and Christian philosophers alike, but also from the ancients, Spinoza retains the traditional belief in the thesis of the practicality of reason. His overriding concern is ethical: to discover in what human good or perfection consists; to elucidate the nature of the barrier(s) in the way of most persons reaching it; and to show the way or method to overcome these barriers in order to attain that end. He claims, too, that the way to attain this ethical end is by the acquisition of a certain type of knowledge of an object, which has power to bring one into a good and happy life:

> After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; . . . I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be *some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else*; whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.[4] [Italics mine.]

All three elements of our thesis are implicitly contained within this statement as the fundamental conviction of Spinoza's whole philosophy, ethics and life. For, <a> there is a final end or good for man that he is meant to attain which, like the tradition before him, involves a certain type of relationship to Goodness itself or God;[5] <b> moral reason, or the reason that gains access to this good, is essentially intuitive (the "scientia intuitiva"),[6] which, like Augustine's 7th level of knowledge, is the highest form of knowledge.[7] In accordance with the tradition, this knowledge constitutes knowledge in the "genuine" sense in contrast to the lower, and especially the lowest, levels of knowledge which are more closely bound up with sense experience and, as such, are subject to a certain vagueness, unclarity or "lack." Finally, <c> Spinoza claims that "ideas" of certain objects, to the extent that they are clearly known, have power to affect action in accordance with them. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that even emotions are forms of ideas and that all ideas have motivational efficacy or force.

> The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies.[8]

> There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. . . .*In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.*[9] [Italics mine]

Spinoza's Inconsistency and Some of the Main Differences Between his Account of the Thesis and the Tradition

Despite these similarities between Spinoza's formulation of the thesis and that of the tradition, one cannot but notice a "curious conflict of tendencies in Spinoza's philosophy."[10] For, when we examine the details of his view we find that there are very marked differences, not only between Spinoza's account of the thesis and that of the tradition, but between his overriding practical or experiential convictions and his theoretical or logical conclusions. In fact, it is our conviction that despite Spinoza's clearly moral motivation and practical intuitions, concerning the moral character of reality and the practicality of reason, his theoretical system in the end fails to justify his contentions and even leads to almost a complete and inconsistent denial of them.

For, <a> his explicit aim is ethical or moral: he wishes to find wherein human good consists. He is clearly convinced that there is such a good and that it is to be found in God. But one of the logical consequences of his theoretical system is that man is not free. He is forced to conclude, therefore, that "all implication of praise or blame must be removed from ethical judgments."[11] But, then, he cannot ultimately account for the moral category of evil in the world, in much the same way as the tradition could not, given its supposition of the necessitation to seek the good when seen. Unlike the tradition, however, Spinoza seems to drive home the logical consequences of this determinist assumption to the point of denying moral categories altogether.[12] There is no good for man, in the sense, at least, of a victory of reason and good over ignorance and evil. Such a good is an illusion and must be explained away as just another form of ignorance.[13]

But, further, <b> Spinoza claims that moral reason is "intuitive." But his Hobbesian nominalism and Cartesian representationalism lead him, we believe, to assume that God is an inseparable unity of corporeal or extensional and psychical attributes,[14] and that everything else is somehow a mode of this or that aspect of His Being. In terms of such an account, he construes every act of thought as an act of some modification of one's body.[15] In this way the Cartesian problem of the alleged separation of the mind or its ideas and the external world does not, presumably, arise. Such an appeal, however, seems to make his intuitive claim of an epistemological process wherein one moves from lower order ideas (more closely aligned with sense impressions, and, so, vague and unreliable) to higher order ideas (which are relatively free of such sense constituents) inexplicable.[16] At least, given the strong link between ideas and sensation, he does not appear able to account for such ideas in terms of any "pure" contemplation or intuition as he seems to suggest.

Finally, <c> Spinoza claims that moral reason is active or powerful; that the ultimate root of that power lies in its object, the Good or God, and that clear knowledge of that good, to the degree that it is obtained, constrains action accordingly. In fact, the explicit goal of his Ethics is to elucidate how man can move from the state of "human bondage" or ignorance to the state of "human freedom" or the "Power of the Understanding." But, he observes that in moral action the "object" or action in view is typically something not yet existing, but functions rather as a mere possibility for realization. He concludes, on the basis of this fact, *that the real qualities of the object cannot effect or exert any force on the action whatsoever*. Mere belief, therefore, and mere belief only, causes or originates action.[17] Once again, a problem implicit in Cartesianism shows its face--this time in its application to the moral realm: moral belief sometimes affects action in accordance with it without the presence of an existing object. It is inferred, therefore, that the existing object never effects action or that it has no essential connection to beliefs that do. But, Spinoza also observes that mere thought, when divorced from an existing object, does not necessarily constrain action; so, he concludes that thought qua thought is literally powerless. The thesis of the practicality of reason appears to be, in opposition to explicit claims to the contrary, denied:

> When men say that this or that action of the body springs from the mind, which has command over the body, they do not know what they say, and they do nothing but

> confess with pretentious words that they know nothing about the cause of the action, and see nothing in it to wonder at.[18]
>
> … an idea which is clear and adequate has not for that reason any special power to expel an idea which is confused and inadequate. . . . One emotion can be expelled only by another emotion, and the clearest and most exhaustive knowledge that certain emotions are irrational in themselves and harmful in their consequences will not have the faintest tendency to expel them unless it be accompanied by some emotion which is stronger than they.[19]

Section 4: The Root of Spinoza's Inconsistency: His Dual Truth Criterion

It is well known how difficult Spinoza is to understand. It is our belief, however, that the paradox or inconsistency in his writing can largely be explained on the assumption that he, like DesCartes and others before him, appealed to two different truth criteria. On one hand, he appeals with DesCartes to the criterion of clearness and distinctness of idea. Claims of truth are to be judged on the basis of clear insight or intuition of the nature of the facts themselves.20 Like Augustine, Spinoza is a master of psychological and moral insight. He sees certain moral truths, and wishes for his own sake and for others, to clearly understand and communicate them. But, on the other hand, he is a master of logical deduction, and wishes to construct a sound logical system on the basis of indubitable premises. In the attempt, however, to avoid Cartesian occassionalism he grounds his logical arguments, not on experience or intuition, i.e., not on an intuitive elucidation of ideas and their contents as well as their objects, but on dogmatic apriori assumptions about the nature of such ideas and what they can and cannot do.

Spinoza's inconsistency, therefore, does not arise from a consistent intuitive elucidation of ideas, but from his appeal to unjustified assumptions about what ideas must be like. The particular significance of Spinoza's Ethics to our study, therefore, lies in the deductive rigor in which he carried out certain key assumptions of the Cartesian epistemology relevant to our thesis. For, in doing so, he reveals not the failure of intuition as a truth criterion, nor the failure of a system or science of philosophy, but the failure of Cartesian representationalism to systematically and rigorously formulate an adequate criterion of justification in intuition.

Spinoza never intuitively--at least not fully or adequately--elucidated the nature of ideas as they present themselves to us, nor the nature of, and transition to, ideas on higher levels.[21]

Transition to Hume

We have, up to this point, attempted to suggest that the historical tradition concedes the thesis of the practicality of reason in spite of major differences in their accounts or elucidations of it. In view of this disparity we suggested that the fundamental problem in the way of an adequate account of the thesis was the need for an adequately clarified epistemology in general and moral epistemology in particular. Central to this account was the need for a clear account of experiential knowledge or intuition--especially the intuition of universals, conceptual or otherwise. In the chapters on Hume and Kant which follow we intend to develop this claim in greater detail and drive it home by showing that despite appearances to the contrary, both Hume and Kant concede the thesis of the practicality of reason--even the appeal to intuition--but lack an adequate theory thereof. The result is not merely that they are unable to provide an adequate justification for the truth of the thesis, but are unable to account for the truth about anything at all. *Truth and the moral truth of the thesis of the practicality of reason seem to stand or fall together.*

Notes: Chapter Two [Introduction to Modern Philosophy & Spinoza]

1. Norman Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1902), pp.13-4, 51-2, 115; For the influence of the representational theory of perception or ideas on modern philosophy see especially in this work: Malebranche: p.51; Leibniz: p.175; Locke: pp.184-6, 189 no.3; Berkeley: pp.216-7, 221 no.2; Hume: pp.247ff, 249 no.3; Kant: pp. 261-2.

2. Willard, Logic & the Objectivity of Knowledge, p.2ff.

3. Jowett, Meno, p.288.

4. Benedict De Spinoza, Improvement of the Understanding, Ethics & Correspondence, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, with an intro. by Frank Sewall (New York: M.Walter Dunne, 1901), p.1.

5. Spinoza is tagged by Novalis as "the God intoxicated man" and rightly so, for he assumes God's nature and existence as the ultimate premise from which all being and knowledge is to be derived by strict deduction; see Spinoza, Improvement &c., pp. 80, 272; also see Edward's, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.7, s.v. "Spinoza," by Alasdair MacIntyre.

6. Spinoza, Improvement &c., pp. 112,267; see also MacIntyre in Encyclopedia.

7. Ibid., Spinoza distinguishes three levels of knowledge in contrast to Augustine's seven.

8. Spinoza, Improvement &c., p.257.

9. Ibid., p. 273; see also C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, International Library of Psychology, Philosophy & Scientific Method (London: Kegan Paul, 1934), pp.33-5.

10. See Smith, Studies, pp.141-2.

11. See Broad, Ethical Theory, p.44

12. See Smith, Studies, pp.140-1.

13. See Broad, Ethical Theory, p.44.

14. Spinoza, Improvement &c., pp.79-80.

15. Ibid., p.95; see also Broad, Ethical Theory, p.18.

16. Ibid., p.28.

17. Ibid., p.26.

18. See Smith, Studies, p.150.

19. See Broad, Ethical Theory, pp.32-5.

20. Spinoza, Improvement &c., p.112.

21. Broad, Ethical Theory, pp.21-2.

B.

David Hume's Reply to The Moral Tradition

Section 1: Hume's Fundamental Philosophical Aim Ethical, Like Spinoza & the Other Philosophers Already Examined, Despite His Alleged Moral Skepticism

Hume, like DesCartes and Spinoza, was an heir of this tradition of attempting to resolve moral problems by an appeal to epistemological foundations. It is well known that he had high hopes of resolution of such traditional disputes by an appeal to a more critical or rigorous elucidation of the nature of reason and its contents than had been achieved so far.[1] It is, however, less well known that his ultimate aim and the dominating conviction of his thought and character was also ethical.[2]

His first impetus to philosophy originated from his early study of Butler and Hutcheson;[3] both by natural disposition and choice he early on had a passion for virtue and was well esteemed by many for his virtuous character;[4] and he repeatedly, up to the very end of his life, claimed that his greatest work was in the area of ethics, i.e., his *Enquiry into the Principles of Morals.*[5] Moreover, despite the common interpretation of Hume to the contrary,[6] and despite his avowed skepticism in some sense, it is clear from a careful inspection of both Enquiries that he sought to resolve fundamental ethical disputes by an elucidation of the objective or universal principles on which such ethical claims were based.[7]

> The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and

> abstruse subjects…
>
> But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, …, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations?[8]

In short, it is evident from the first section of *Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* that his ultimate aim was ethical: he sought to resolve moral disputes both by <a> an enquiry into, and an exact analysis or elucidation of, the contents of mind (its powers, capacities and limits); and <b> an enquiry into, and a discovery of, the secret springs and ultimate principles, laws or forces by which the mind was actuated, governed or directed in its operations. Simply put, he sought to elucidate the ultimate foundations of moral distinctions. In light of these general considerations we can understand how and why Hume identified his conception of Ethics with that of the ancients,[9] and why he was not a moral skeptic.[10]

Section 1A: Hume's "Skepticism" a Qualified One and Does not Imply a Genuine *Moral* Skepticism

It is true that certain epistemological conclusions either drawn by Hume himself, or more likely, implied by certain of his fundamental presuppositions, entail some form of skepticism. It is also true that Hume characterizes himself as a skeptic and aligns himself with what he calls "Sceptical philosophy."[11] But it may not be clear in what sense he thought of himself as a skeptic, [12] and the mere fact that he acknowledges a certain form of skepticism does not imply that he was a moral skeptic in the pejorative sense in which he is often labeled.

What is clear, at any rate, is that he thought extreme skepticism, or the claim that we can know nothing at all, both with reference to knowledge generally and to the moral realm in particular, was completely untenable. It is "entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action"; "more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind."[13] It is also clear that he was so far removed from skepticism that he sought, like the great moral philosophers of old, to establish a positive system of philosophy on grounds of indubitable, self-evident data. He never doubted that there was such a thing as truth or knowledge and that it was and could be distinguished from false belief, superstition, absurdity and error:

> It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is rally distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which is not beyond the compass of human undestanding.[14]

But, despite this admission, this does not mean that Hume thought from the mere fact that we have genuine, common-sense knowledge of realities, that the elucidation of how we know – the analysis of the entities and processes involved in such knowledge—was by any means easy. In language which sounds very much like that of G.E. Moore in his description of the diaphanous quality of thought, Hume says:

> It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, *by a superior penetration* . . .[15] [Emphasis mine.]

Repeatedly he acknowledges the difficulty involved in such apprehension, and thus the need for such a "superior penetration," "accurate and just reasoning," etc..[16] But this does not in any way call in question the possibility of such insight. "What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood."[17]

Undoubtedly, in Hume's own case, as a pioneer in these epistemological investigations, his success was limited. In fact, it is our contention, but one we cannot take the time here to consider in any great detail, that it is precisely Hume's failure to stay within these parameters that led to the skeptical conclusions typically attributed to him. He did not adequately provide a theory of “intuition” or experiential knowledge, but, instead, inconsistently (although quite probably unintentionally) appealed to the Cartesian dogmatic, apriori assumption about the nature of ideas. We mean, of course, the Cartesian assumption of the separation of thought and object, and the restriction of the objects of thought to its own immanent contents, or in Hume’s case, subjective sensations or “impressions.”

Section 1B: Hume's Qualified Assent to the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason

But further, and most importantly for our purposes, not only was Hume not a moral skeptic, *there is reason to believe he was not opposed to the thesis of the practicality of ‘reason’* either, despite explicit statements to the contrary and despite the fact that his followers have used him as the archetype for the antithesis of that view. Undoubtedly, to adequately defend such a controversial claim would require a thesis in itself, and so we cannot take the time to argue for this claim in any great detail – nor is it necessary for our thesis that we do so. But if this claim can be supported to any degree in the space allotted, then perhaps much of the opposition to the thesis of the practicality of reason might be neutralized given the fact that Hume is considered and used as the primary philosophical opponent to that thesis.

i) Hume’s Apparent and Explicit Statement of Opposition to the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason

It is true that Hume explicitly and emphatically presents himself as the major and irreconcilable opponent to "the traditional view" of Ethics (a view which, he acknowledges, affirms the truth of the thesis of the practicality of reason), and he attempts to clearly show its untenability:

> Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. . . . On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be

> founded; …In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavor to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will… Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.[18]

But, despite the seeming rejection of 'reason' in this statement, in order to determine whether or not Hume was actually opposed to the thesis, and, in either case, in what sense, will depend on precisely how one construes 'reason' and 'passion' in this context. Thus, we must briefly consider Hume's view of these two notions.

ii) Hume's General Account of Reason and Passion

a) His General Distinction of Ideas

In section 2 of the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, "of the origin of ideas," Hume draws a distinction between two types of ideas or ways of knowing a thing.19 Most generally, he distinguishes between the mere thought of an object or the mere thought of a perception of an object.[20] "A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion," and the perception of "a real land-skip" is quite different from the perception of a description of that object.[21]

These "original" percepts are experientially distinguishable from the thoughts that merely represent or "copy" them in virtue of the presence of a certain quality of "force" or "vivacity" that the former have but which the latter lack. It is not, however, necessary that the latter lack this quality wholly, only that there is a perceptible difference between them. In other words, it is not that mere 'representational' ideas completely lack vivacity, "but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. . . . The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation."[22]

> By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And . . . all our ideas or more feeble

> perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.[23]

b) Brief Critique of Hume's Distinction

So far, Hume's analysis may seem relatively uncontroversial. But in the process of the analysis there is a noticeable shift in groundwork or evidential support. Instead of relying solely on this "intuitive" or experiential truth criterion, we find mixed in with it an inconsistent reliance on a different truth criterion. That is, Hume assumes, rather than experientially verifies, that all such "original experiences" fall into the class of percepts he calls "impressions" (elsewhere: "sensations," "feelings" or "outward or inward sentiments"), and that all other ideas either copies of such impressions or complex conjunctions thereof.

But, then, what this indicates is that Hume, like Spinoza, rather than consistently relying on his more intuitive or "empirical" truth criterion ultimately and preeminently had recourse to dogmatic, apriori assumptions of the nature of original ideas or perceptions. In Hume's own case original ideas are ultimately subjective atomistic or individualistic sensations which themselves are "nothing but representations,"[24] or copies of the objects they were allegedly of. The significance of this point to epistemology generally, to moral philosophy in particular and to our own thesis above all, cannot be sufficiently underscored. For, <a> the mere recognition of the necessity of sense experience, or some underlying sensa element for thought generally, or in different words, that sensa elements are inextricably bound up with thought, does not imply (nor is it apprehended or experienced) that all ideas are either of, or like, these underlying sensa elements themselves or ultimately derived from ideas that are. Yet this supposition about "ideas" is to serve as the foundation for both Hume's philosophy generally and his moral philosophy in particular:

> Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reason-ings, and drawn disgrace upon them.[25]

But, <b> it is almost universally conceded that this attempt to ground an adequate epistemology on such sensa alone has failed. For, given such constraints on knowledge it appears impossible to justify any claim of knowledge. This is simply because, as Kant so well saw, such sensa are inadequate to provide the relations necessary to constitute the unity or objectivity of anything at all--even the unity or objectivity of knowledge. Hume's own fundamental apriori claim about ideas, like the general principle of modern positivists, that no statement is meaningful which is not empirically verifiable, must be "committed to the flames," since all that is not founded on experience can be nothing but "sophistry and illusion."[26] But, finally, <c> the significance of this point for our immediate purpose lies in the fact that this restriction decisively determined Hume's conception of both 'reason' and 'passion.' It is, therefore, to this distinction that we must now turn.

c) The Distinction Between 'Reason' and 'Passion'

With this fundamental distinction of ideas as a foundation, Hume goes on in section IV of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, to distinguish two kinds of reason or reasoning correlated with two kinds of objects, "to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact."27 With regard to the 'reason' associated with the 'Relations of Ideas,' it appears that this sense of 'reason' is what Hume principally considers reason or reasoning as such. It is contrasted with, and opposed to, sentiment or taste,[28] and, above all, to experience.[29] What is, perhaps, most important is that 'reason,' in this sense, is non-experiential, and so lacks that quality of force or vivacity referred to earlier which is characteristic of all original impressions or experiences. In more common-sense terms, 'reason' or 'knowledge' in our post-Humean, yet still empirical, age is typically associated with the mere dry or formal accumulation of "data," which, even if objectively true, lacks the "force" or vivacity typically attributed to mere subjective "feeling" or "passion."

One might, however, well question the viability of such a distinction. Why, for example, is the issue of existence as well as the experience of force or vivacity associated therewith--both on the common-sense and philosophical level--restricted to what Hume calls "matters of fact"? Is not the issue of existence and truth applicable to both the terms and the relations associated with, e.g., that class of objects Hume calls relations of ideas? For example, what are logical propositions and logical relations and how are they known?; or, what are numbers and number relations and how are they known?[30] But Hume is comparatively silent on this point, and appeals to the apparent fact that whatever these objects are they are not concerned in the first instance with the existence or non-existence of their objects.

The case of the other class of "objects of human reason or enquiry," i.e., matters of fact and existence, is, of course, quite different. The 'reason' associated with these objects is concerned with issues of existence, while the former is not; and the evidence of the truth of these claims is ascertained in a different manner than the foregoing.[31] But, in attempting to elucidate such evidence or "belief" Hume is, in view of his account of the ultimate origins of our ideas above, faced with a considerable problem. For, given his severe limitations on what can be originally or self-evidently known or experienced the problem arises how to justify our beliefs in almost anything at all. How, for example, can we move beyond the mere present testimony of our senses. Or, more specifically, what is the nature of the "inference" or process from a mere present sensation (or past recollection of one) to the conviction or belief that that object of sensation will act the same way in the future. All knowledge, and in particular, all moral knowledge, Hume claims, is grounded in this assumption that things will behave in the future as they have in the past, but no present sensation can justify such a general or universal statement; nor can Hume appeal to 'reason' without circularity.[32] For, all knowledge of matter of fact relies on that assumption, so we cannot justify that assumption by an appeal to knowledge.

But the implication of this clearly "skeptical" conclusion is not, according to Hume, that we are forced into an inescapable skepticism, but that either skepticism is true or there is a principle other than 'reason' or 'reasoning' which can determine us to form just conclusions about matters of fact.[33] The former alternative is, as we have seen, unacceptable to Hume, and so he intends to resolve skeptical doubt by an appeal to an inner or natural principle or sentiment of "Custom or Habit." That is, according to Hume, the repetition of particular acts produces within us "a propensity to renew the same act or operation, . . ."[34] and this propensity or instinct is the effect of custom. "All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning."[35]

The significance of this instinct or propensity to Hume's epistemology generally, and to his ethics in particular is considerable precisely because it gives us knowledge of ends which are indispensable for an elucidation of moral action; and Hume is by no means restrained in his applause of it:

> Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.[36]

But precisely how does Hume "know" that it is "custom" which is this great guide of human life? Is this, for example, something "perceived" or merely assumed? Moreover, is it at all sufficient to explain, e.g., that felt sense of "necessity" that we experience when we throw a ball up and believe that it will fall down? But, lest we get too carried away by too strict a regard to this habit or custom, Hume reminds us that its sole foundation lies in those original impressions mentioned earlier, along with their characteristic "force" or "vivacity." And, it is this, which alone enables us to distinguish between true and false beliefs.[37]

d) Concluding Statement about Hume's General View of Reason

The upshot of this general survey of Hume's analysis of 'reason' is that 'reason' for him is restricted to the realm of relations of ideas without any experiential component, while beliefs generally are actually reduced to a form of sentiment, instinct or passion. But, given the fact that moral virtues and vices are considered matters of fact rather than relations of ideas, we can immediately see how or why they would fall under the domain of passion rather than reason.

iii) The Nature of These Belief Passions as Having Intentional Features Ordinarily Attributed to a 'Rational' Faculty; Hume's Belief Passions, in Some Sense, Rational

The point of the above discussion for our purposes is that although Hume identifies moral ideas with sense ideas or passions or with the faculty of the sensibility, he by no means intends thereby to make morality either arbitrary or subjective, i.e., to reduce morality to any mere matter of how one subjectively feels at one moment or another. He may be forced to logically concede this on the basis of certain of his epistemological assumptions, but this is not his intention. But, more significantly, the actual way he characterizes such belief passions makes the alleged difference between what some call 'reason' and Hume calls 'passion' indistinguishable. For, Hume's belief passions are actually characterized as highly complex intentional states--having features ordinarily attributed to 'thought' or what we call 'reason' in its objectively experiential sense: First, they have intentional features--they are of or about various 'objects' and so have an intentional "aim" or reach.38 They are "presentations,"[39] "observations,"[40] "views."[41] Elsewhere he uses the terms: "apprehensions," "ideas," "percepts," "concepts," etc.. Second, they are not sentiments, which are essentially subjective or private, but are "objective"--even "universal."[42] Third, they are "communicable," or capable of being present in many minds at the same time in the way no--at least ordinary--sensation can.[43] Fourth, the qualities of truth and falsehood are applicable to them which would be absurd if they were merely subjective sensations.[44]

Thus, despite the fact that Hume rejects 'reason' and elevates 'passion' to the height that he does, when we examine the content of the passion of belief we find that in the final analysis, the issue between Hume and "the Rationalists" more and more appears verbal rather than substantive. If so, our thesis may be reformulated as the claim that an "apprehension" (of the appropriate type) of moral distinctions constrains action, and if one wishes to call this apprehension 'passion' while retaining those intentional qualities attributed to it then that is no objection to our thesis.

iv) Elucidation of the Relation Between 'Passion' &/or 'Reason' and Action

Given this elucidation of reason and passion, it remains for us to elucidate the alleged relation between reason and/or passion and virtuous action. It is to this, therefore, that we must now turn.

a) General Consideration of the Relation Between 'Belief' and Action

Toward this end we must first consider Hume's account of the general relation between belief and action--especially in connection with true versus false beliefs. First, it is important to note that for Hume existence is not a simple predicate--it is not a predicate, which we can by thought or will merely conjoin to other predicates or ideas. We cannot, therefore, simply decide which objects are to function as impressions, or which will have that force or vivacity mentioned earlier. We cannot simply decide by an act of will which objects exist and which do not, or which beliefs are to be true and which false. As we shall see shortly, this point is of considerable importance for a theory of moral action and motivation.

> Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception as commands our ascent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is *not in our power* to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.[45] [Emphasis mine.]

The difference between fictitious beliefs and veridical ones, Hume concludes, must " lie in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments, . . ."[46]

Putting aside, for the moment, the appeal to "nature," what is significant to observe here is that this distinction between the presence of a true belief with its associated "excitement," and the presence of a fiction with its relative "lack" of excitement manifests a fundamental distinction in the determination of motivation and action generally. For, it is precisely the excited or activated sentiment associated with true belief that motivates or prompts one to act in accordance with it rather than in accordance with a mere fiction:

> I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever capable to attain. . . . [which] is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination.[47]

It is apparent, therefore, that on Hume's principles all beliefs or thoughts do not motivate equally. True beliefs motivate to a much greater degree than false ones and to such an extent that they, in comparison with fictions, actually constitute the governing principle of our actions:

> . . . that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our actions.[48]

Moreover, the extent of this force or governance is determined by both the degree to which the object in question is fully apprehended49 and to the fittingness of that object to our natures or "organs."

> . . in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the relations are beforehand obvious to the eye; and *we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the nature of the object*, and disposition of our organs.[50] [Italics mine.]

Despite Hume's ultimate appeal to "nature," above, therefore, sentiment is by no means--especially in the case of principles of action--something wholly divorced from the apprehension of its object.

b) Application of This View of the General Relation of Thought and Action to the Moral Realm

Given this general elucidation of Hume's account of the relation between belief and action we can now consider the case of the apprehension of moral distinctions and its relation to moral action. First, it is quite evident that Hume does not include moral data in the domain of the fictitious, false or unsupported beliefs. In fact, he explicitly states that we have original perceptions or impressions of right and wrong. "Let a man's insensibility be ever so great, he must often be touched with *the images of Right and Wrong*; and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are susceptible of like *impressions*."51[Emphasis mine.] He, thus, has no question that they exist, and that they are known to exist. The issue for him, rather, is only how we know them or what faculty is used in the apprehension of them, i.e., "whether they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense."[52]

But, given the analysis of 'reason' above, that issue may no longer appear as important as it may have during Hume's own time. For, the power of genuine "apprehensions," hence, "moral apprehensions," is conceded, so, what more is needed to justify the claim that Hume, in some sense, concedes the thesis of the practicality of reason? But, even if we put this sense of 'reason' aside for the moment, Hume still concedes that 'reason,' in the more restricted sense, plays an essential role in moral determination. As Hume puts it, "I am apt to suspect, . . . that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions."[53] Or, as he says elsewhere:

> One principle foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action, it is evident that reason must enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind, since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendencies of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor. 54

It is true that immediately following this claim, Hume denies, at least the sufficiency of reason to produce moral approval or disapproval, and that what is allegedly necessary and sufficient to this end is natural sentiment. Reason serves a merely instrumental role in determining means-ends connections, but it is passion which determines which ends are to be pursued. It is clear, therefore, that he has every intention to ground moral claims, in keeping with Hutcheson,[55] on moral sentiment alone. But, the appeal to natural sentiment, as we have shown above, is by no means an appeal to any mere private or subjective state of feeling, but an appeal to a highly complex, selective and intentional state allegedly attributed to the passion of belief or the "objective" passion of sympathy or humanity.

Hume or his modern followers might reply, "So what?" Even if reason serves a necessary role in bringing appropriate objects before us, it is passion or "a finer internal sense" founded on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species that ultimately determines moral distinctions.[56] But, in so saying, Hume implicitly, if not explicitly--in tendency if not in fact--appears to come so close to the traditional view of the thesis of the practicality of reason, wherein the adequate apprehension of the good constrains all action in accordance with it, that the alleged rejection of 'reason' is practically, and almost theoretically, inconsequential.

> There is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote gazette, should communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star, which, though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the senses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons, . . . our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments . . . And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause [57]

Such universal sentiments even have sufficient power, Hume claims, to control and limit "ruder and narrower passions" such as self-love.[58]

The implications of such a claim if true, are of considerable importance not only to our thesis and to Hume's Ethics but to his philosophy generally. As N.K. Smith well puts it:

> Should judgments genuinely cognitive in character have to be recognized as entering into belief--as ultimately, by implication, Hume himself admits is the case--the capital positions in his ethics, no less than in his general philosophy, will at once be endangered. For if, as then follows . . . judgments cognitive in character have similarly to be allowed as entering into all judgments of moral approval and disapproval, i.e., if moral judgments involve judgments of apprehension as well as of appreciation, the whole question of the interrelations of feeling and reason--so fundamental in his ethics, and from his ethics carried over into his general philosophy--may have to be very differently viewed.[59]

In conclusion, then, enough has been shown, we think, to support the claim that Hume concedes, in some sense, the thesis of the practicality of reason. We think it is a claim he might have willingly and explicitly conceded *if* the nature of reason in its experiential sense, as well as the motivational efficacy associated therewith, were adequately elucidated.

Notes: Chapter Two
Hume's Reply to Traditional Moral Theory

1.G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, International Library of Psychology & Scientific Method (New York: Humanities Press,1951), p.147; see also, Edward's Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Hume, David," by D.G.C. MacNabb.

2. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed., with an introduction by, Charles W.Hendel, Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p.vii.

3. Ibid., pp.xxiv, xii, xiii, xxxvi.

4. David Hume, The Life of David Hume (London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell in the Strand, 1777), in the supplement to Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed., with an introduction by, Norman Kemp Smith, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1947), pp.233-4. See also in this supplement, Hume's Letter from Adam Smith to William Strahan, p.247; and pp. 1, 67 in the Dialogues.

5. Hume, Life, p.236.

6. Hume, Inquiry, Hendel ed., p.xxv.

7. Ibid., pp.xii, xx, xvi ff.

8. Hume, Enquiries, pp.12,14.

9. Hume, Inquiry, Hendel ed., p.xviii.

10. Ibid., p.12.

11. Hume, Enquiries, p.41.

12. Moore, Philosophical Studies, pp.147ff.

13. Hume, Enquiries, pp.13,15.

14. Ibid., pp.13-4; see also pp.40ff.

15. Ibid., p.13.

16. Ibid., pp.12-3.

17. Ibid., pp.15-6.

18. Hume, Treatise,, p.413.

19. See no.21 below.

20. No doubt some may take exception to this way of initially drawing this distinction. But the aim here, and I believe Hume's aim too, is merely to draw attention to a very common-sense distinction (which Hume everywhere appeals to) which all parties may initially concede prior to analysis of that distinction. See, for example, Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T.E. Hulme (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), p.1; Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in his Mysticism and Logic (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., Inc., 1929); and Russell's, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1956).

21. Hume, Enquiries, p.17.
22. Ibid., p.17; see also pp.17-22.
23. Ibid., pp.18-9.
24. Ibid., p.151.
25. Ibid., p.21.
26. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p.164.
27. Hume, Enquiries, p.25.
28. Ibid., p.134.
29. Ibid., pp.28, 142.
30. Ibid., p.25.

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p.36.
33. Ibid., p.41.
34. Ibid., p.43.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., pp.44-5.
37. Ibid., p.46.
38. Ibid., p.40; see also, David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in A.I. Melden, ed. Ethical Theories (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), pp.276,310.
39. Hume, Enquiries, pp.5,46.
40. Ibid., p.5.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., pp.272-3.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., pp.94,173.
45. Ibid., pp.47-8.
46. Ibid., p.48.
47. Ibid., p.49.
48. Ibid., p.50.
49. Ibid., p.52.
50. Ibid., p.291.
51. Ibid., p.170.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p.172.
54. Ibid., p.285.
55. Hume, Inquiry, Hendel, ed., p.xxiv.
56. Melden, Enquiry, p.274.
57. Hume, Enquiries, pp.230-1.
58. Ibid., pp.274-5.
59. N.K.Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, in Hume, Inquiry, Hendel, ed., p.lii.

C.
Immanuel Kant's Reply to Hume

Section 1: Summary of Section on Hume

We have seen that Hume explicitly professes to be the major and irreconcilable opponent of the thesis of the practicality of reason, and that his position has been used by his alleged disciples as the sine quo non of what should count as the antithesis to that view. This Humean thesis--the thesis of the im-practicality of reason--is without doubt the dominating view of our times--not merely philosophically but in the everyday world of common opinion. To even suggest in today's world that "mere reason" might have "constraining power," not to mention "compelling power," is to leave one's self open to ridicule by all. What motivates action is desire or feeling--not reason. In fact, the motto is not merely "if it feels good, do it" but "if it feels good enough, one cannot but do it." It is passion, therefore, not reason, that is practical.

But we have argued that Hume's alleged rejection of the thesis of the practicality of reason was a qualified one; that his denial of reason's practicality was definitely not based on a positive elucidation of either reason's impracticality (or weakness), or on the inherently superior power (or practicality) of the passions, but, rather, on dogmatic apriori assumptions concerning the supposed nature and limits of reason. He was forced, therefore, to conclude that passion alone was the sole motivating factor behind all moral action since he assumed either sense or reason was the faculty of moral apprehension, and reason could not be this faculty because of the assumed limits of rational inquiry.

We saw, too, that even given that passion, not reason, is the faculty of moral apprehension, Hume is sufficiently psychologically acute to observe that there is some kind of distinction to be drawn between a moral belief that does not constrain and a moral belief that does. In either case, moral beliefs are subject to a certain selective "intentionality" or referential quality. They are capable of being "of" or "about" their "objects." But, in the latter case--the case where moral beliefs do constrain--they are capable of referring to specific types of objects which tend to produce specific sorts of feelings and desires. In such cases moral beliefs are somehow tied to these existing objects by their grounding in some form of sensible--yet still moral--impression, experience or intuition. These moral passions, therefore, in spite of the fact that Hume speaks of them as if they were wholly separated from the world of existence and truth, or reason and its objects, are essentially tied to genuine or veridical apprehensions. What this suggests is that Hume may not be a modern day moral subjectivist, relativist or skeptic as is the case with many of his modern day disciples.

But, further, even if this were not the case--even if moral "facts" were not given to experience--Hume still fails to wholly remove the indispensable role of "reason" in moral deliberation and action. For, it is precisely that "rational" insight into means-ends connections (a principle function of reason, according to Hume) which ultimately grounds the passion of moral belief itself. Reason tells me, for example, that if I butcher a cow I will have food to eat, which is precisely what causes the desire to butcher the cow. It is, no doubt, because of this fact that Hume suspects "that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions."[1]

In view of such a concession we saw that Hume was not, despite appearances to the contrary, the enemy of reason that he often appears to be. He is, no doubt, forced to concede (given certain of his Cartesian epistemological assumptions) that moral passions are reducible to merely private or subjective states without any objective, or objectively discernible, features, and without any necessary connections either to reason, or to a reality distinct from them.[2] If so, he cannot consistently maintain that there are objective passions of humanity or sympathy which have selectively intentional features. He is forced, therefore, to either accept an untenable skepticism which is inconsistent with his own deepest convictions, or to broaden his view of experience to include other experience types. If he opts for the road to experience, Hume may reasonably be interpreted as conceding the thesis of the practicality of reason--not, of course, in his sense of 'reason,' but in the sense of 'reason' as essentially intentional and sometimes even intuitional. In short, if Hume was sufficiently apprised of the intentional character of reason he may well have conceded reason's practicality in light of the intentionality of such passions as belief.

If this view is substantially correct, then we may have removed any alleged Humean basis for the kind of moral subjectivism or sensationalism that not only governs the actions of most men but which is worshipped as if it was God. If so, we may have uprooted one of the main barriers in the way of mutual understanding between those presently who profess to be for, and those who profess to be against, the thesis of the practicality of reason. Undoubtedly, this concession would still allow for disagreement regarding the precise nature and extent of the ultimate springs of action. We have by no means proven the thesis of the practicality of reason. But modern Humeans and modern Priceans might, in light of the above, be more willing, like their mentors, to sit down and listen to each other's views, and pursue a common truth together in the conviction that each is sincere in their inquiry after truth.

Section 2: Transition to Kant: Introduction to Kant's Claim, the Aim of this Section and Kant's Significance for Our Thesis

Despite the fact that the removal of such a significant barrier should make us more receptive to the claims of reason's practicality, we are not yet prepared to undertake the positive elucidation of the thesis. For, we have suggested that the central barrier in the way of such an elucidation was the lack of an adequate truth criterion, or, more specifically, the lack of an adequate doctrine of intuition. But it may still seem plausible to many in the current intellectual milieu, that we may be able to affirm the thesis of the practicality of reason, and avoid Hume's skeptical tendency by an appeal to an alternative form of justification to intuition, viz., Kant's "transcendental arguments."

The significance of Kant's view for our thesis, therefore, lies not merely in the historical fact that Kant affirmed, while Hume denied the thesis, or that, as an archetypical view it has been the leading contender against Humean-empirical type views. Nor even does it lie in the fact that it is, outside of Humean views, the most dominating ethical view of our time. Rather, its primary significance lies in our contention that *in virtue of the lack of a theory of intuition Kant lacks an adequate epistemological foundation for knowledge, and thus cannot provide an adequate theory of reason's practicality.* Kant leaves the thesis of the practicality of reason fundamentally unclarified, rationally unsupported, and, as such, vulnerable to skeptical rejection of the thesis altogether.

The aim of this section of our paper is to make this point clear. More specifically, we hope to show: that Kant concedes the thesis of the practicality of reason, but fails to provide an adequate account of it. An adequate theory requires an adequate theory of intuition, but Kant fails to provide such a theory, although he, like all the great philosophers before him, admits the reality and necessity of such intuition for providing an adequate foundation, not only for epistemology but for morality as well. Nor, we intend to show, can Kant provide such a theory of intuition. For, although he concedes a form of "sensible intuition," he denies "intellectual intuitions." Intellectual intuitions, however, are essential for the elucidation of relations without which there can be no unity or knowledge of unity. Intellectual intuitions, therefore, are essential for the elucidation of any form of intuition--sensible as well as moral. Kant is forced, therefore, to ultimately ground even the knowledge of sensible intuitions on a mere subjective basis, which cannot transcend those limits without a leap of faith or transcendental argument. Such "argument," however, we hope to show, is itself unclarified, unjustified and inconsistently appeals to the very thing it denies: non-sensuous moral intuitions. The attempt to avoid the appeal to "intuition" by the appeal to an alternative form of justification fails.

We contend, but it is not a claim we can develop here, that the root of Kant's failure or problem is fundamentally the same as Hume's and the tradition's: certain fundamental epistemological assumptions are made about the nature and extent of knowledge and experience which are not justified, and which tend to threaten not only the rational justification of our thesis, but any claim of knowledge whatsoever. Hume and Kant, in particular, share the predominantly Cartesian physicalist or nominalist assumption of the restriction of experience or knowledge to one's own subjective states. This makes it inexplicable how one can ever transcend those limits. Our hope is that the elucidation of this argument shall prepare us in the chapters to follow, for a "new Empiricism or Intuitionism"-one that meets the defects of both the "intellectual intuitions" of the old "intuitionisms" called by that name as well as "sensible intuitions" of the old "empiricisms" (and empirical "idealisms"). All these schools concede the centrality of intuition for rational and moral justification, but give no adequate account of it.

> These facts, which are undeniable, do, indeed, give reason to apprehend that DesCartes system of the human understanding, which I shall beg leave to call *the idea system*, and which, with some improvements made by later writers, is now generally received, hath some original defect; that this scepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with it; and, therefore, that we must lay it open to the foundation, and examine the materials, before we can expect to raise any solid and useful fabric of knowledge on this subject.
>
> But is this to be despaired of, because DesCartes and his followers have failed? By no means. . . . A travel-ler of good judgment may mistake his way, and be unawares led into a wrong track; and, while the road is fair before him, he may go on without suspicion

> and be followed by others; but, when it ends in a coal pit, it requires no great judgment to know that he hath gone wrong, nor perhaps to find out what misled him.
>
> Thomas Reid[3]

Section 3: Elucidation of Kant's Stand on, and Account of, the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason

Section 3A: Initial and General Statement of Kant's Formulation of the Thesis

That Kant explicitly held the thesis of the practicality of reason is uncontroversial. What he meant by it, however, is not. Some, for example, have claimed that he was a moral intuitionist which others emphatically deny; others, that all he meant by reason's practicality was its mere involvement or instrumentality in practical deliberations or decision making--a point which even a conservative Humean might allow. It is necessary, therefore, to attempt an exposition of Kant's view in sufficient detail to make his position clear. Toward this end we shall present some of Kant's clearest and most concise statements on the thesis and then attempt an elucidation of these statements by a more exact penetration into their content in light of their position in the context of his overall philosophical and moral theory.

At the beginning of Kant's greatest work in morals, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,* he makes it quite clear that the relation between reason and moral action is far more intimate than any mere utility for passion or instrumentality in moral deliberation:

> For the pure conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law, exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an influence so much more powerful than all other springs which may be derived from the field of experience, that in the consciousness of its worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere accident, and very often also to evil.[4] [Italics

mine.]

And again, in the introduction of the subsection on the "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason" in the *Critical Examination of Practical Reason*, Kant states:

> But it is not so clear: on the contrary, it must at first sight seem to everyone very improbable that, even subjectively, that exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, and supply a far stronger spring even for affecting that legality of actions, and can produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the law, from pure respect for it, to every other consideration, than all the deceptive allurements of pleasure or of all that may be reckoned as happi-ness, or even than all threatenings of pain and mis-fortune.Nevertheless, this is actually the case, . . .[5]

It is clear, therefore, that Kant fully adopts the traditional view of ethics on the thesis of the practicality of reason, and, thus, asserts that reason serves an absolutely essential or indispensable role in moral action and conduct. But, more specifically, the function of reason is presented here not merely as essential or necessary but sufficient as well. At least with respect to the role of reason, in contrast to the role of the sensibility in moral conduct, it is clear not only that sense does not contribute, as a spring or motive of duty, but it actually detracts from the positive moral quality of the act in so far as it is active. In other words, not only ought and "can" one act from the mere idea or conception of moral law alone, but it is this alone which essentially constitutes right action. If one sees a poor and hungry child abandoned by all and in need, and one acts solely in response to the call of duty to meet this need, then one's action is morally pure or good. But if one, in addition to the apprehension of duty, first considers and acts on the apprehension that in relieving the child's need one will thereby obtain a much desired philanthropic reputation, the moral purity of one's act is, to the extent that one acted on the latter over the former principle, diminished in moral value. [The issue, for Kant of course, is not whether there is a sensible motive merely contingently present, but whether or not it contributes as a ground or principle of action.]

But, further, the sufficiency of moral reason consists not merely in the fact that moral reason can motivate action in accordance with its dictates in the absence of sensible motives, but when "present" in the appropriate manner, it exerts a motivating power far greater than any sense can produce. Once again, "[the mere] conception of the moral law, exercises on the human heart . . . an influence so much more powerful . . . [than] every other consideration." There is, therefore, no obstacle or barrier that can stand in the way of reason's power or overrule its legislation. It is not the case of a weak child having free reign in the park when the big bullies are not there, but more like the case of a strong--in fact, invincible--and good King or Champion who governs with power over any and all contenders.

Kant well knows, as he says above, that "[this] is not so clear: on the contrary, it must at first sight seem to everyone very improbable." The typical Humean view, no doubt, is far closer to common opinion in regarding such a claim as highly suspect. In today's world especially it is so clear that the conviction "that good is more powerful than evil" is one that few people, outside of young children, seriously believes. Nonetheless, Kant claims it is true. It is incumbent upon him, therefore, to provide an adequate elucidation of this claim as well as an adequate justification that the claim is true.

Section 3B: The Detailed Account of Kant's Formulation of the Thesis of the Practicality Reason--the Main Parts of the Thesis to be Examined

Any adequate account of reason's practicality or even impracticality, will necessarily involve some elucidation of the three main constituents contained therein, viz., <a> action--specifically moral action; <b> reason--specifically practical or moral reason (or, as in the case of Hume, some faculty of apprehension, e.g., passion) including its reference to an alleged moral object; and <c> constraint (and possibly, compulsion)--the precise nature of the power <b> (moral reason) exerts on <a> (moral action). A detailed exposition of Kant's view of the thesis, therefore, will require an elucidation of each of these three main elements.

i) Kant's View of Action--Specifically Moral Action

a) Qualified Restriction of the Immediate Field of Inquiry

In one sense of 'moral action' we may mean that whole experience which includes as parts the distinct elements mentioned above, viz., action, reason and the relation of constraint. But even in that case there is still a sense of 'action,' qua element or part of the whole, which may roughly be characterized as that which follows, or is subsequent to, the motive or form of apprehension and desire which precedes it. One may feel inclined to sleep and also feel a motive of duty to work on into the night; yet these feelings present themselves as distinct from the act which follows them. Although, ultimately, our aim is to elucidate moral action as a whole, the latter sense of action--the constituent of that whole--is what will chiefly engage us at present.

b) Action Generally or Non-Moral Action

Kant does not present a theory or philosophy of action generally. Why he does not will hopefully become clear in the course of our study. Thus, when he speaks of "action" in his moral treatises what he has in mind is almost exclusively (but not solely) moral action. But, clearly, all "action" is not restricted to mere moral action, as Kant well knows. A ball may be said to "act" in response to it being struck by another object; a plant may be said to "re-act" in response to its branches being cut off; an animal may be said to "act" in its desire for food, and a person may be said to impulsively "act" in spontaneously jumping out of a burning building. In all such cases, what seems to essentially distinguish cases of action from non-action is a certain force or movement exerted by an object-a certain effect or result of some form of causality. This seems to be the case regardless of the precise nature of the ultimate springs or causes of action, i.e., whether or not those causes are wholly external (the movement of the ball when struck by an external object), or whether or not there is a more or less original or internal contribution by the nature of the moving object itself.

In the latter case, the case of a causal contribution to action by an "agent," we can distinguish further (at least in principle): <a> a unique contribution of the organism to the overall effect or action which is wholly determined by the sum of external forces and the nature of the organism, e.g., the animal's desire for food or the person's impulsive jumping out of a building, and <b> a unique contribution of the organism to the overall effect or action which is, at least, partially undetermined by the sum of external forces and the nature of the organism, e.g., a person may choose to act from one principle of action over another wherein the principles of action function as influencing versus determining causes on the will or agent. The former sort of action <a>, may be considered, in keeping with many modern interpretations of Aristotle, as a "voluntary" act--yet not essentially a free act. The significance of this distinction for our elucidation of Kant is that he believes there are free actions, and he takes it to be one of his central aims, as a moral philosopher, precisely to elucidate them. More specifically, it is Kant's view that all actions outside of free, and specifically moral, actions are governed wholly by natural causal laws, while moral actions are governed by laws of freedom. It is one of his central aims, therefore, to elucidate moral action in terms of an elucidation of such non-natural causal laws.

c) Moral Action Generally--"External" Versus "Internal" Right Action

If, then, we turn our attention to persons, or those organisms allegedly capable of distinctively free as well as moral action, it is clear to Kant, and, perhaps, to most of us, that many actions people do, whether initially considered right or wrong on face value, are evaluated differently once the intentions associated with the action are made clear. For example, one feeds the poor, but we discover that one does so to gain greater wealth from one's "supporters." One is ultimately motivated by greed or personal gain rather than by any sympathetic or benevolent concern for the poor. Another appears to be a friendly, gregarious, helpful and benevolent colleague at work, but underneath the dress of his or her external actions we discover he or she secretly despises others and acts benevolently merely or primarily because it is advantageous for advancement in his or her job.

In such cases, the moral quality of the action, or the action itself, presents itself as essentially an "inward" state. What is essential for the determination of that moral quality is the individual's intentions, i.e., one's conception of the Moral Law and one's volitions or acts of will with respect to it. It is this sense of "moral action" that Kant is most concerned to elucidate and vindicate. More specifically, he wishes to vindicate morality *from the Christian point of view*, and his fundamental moral principle, the Categorical Imperative, may be interpreted as a form of "the Golden Rule": "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." From that perspective it is clear that one's intentions are far more important than one's mere external actions. In fact, it may appear to many of us that such internal considerations are of sole importance for the determination of moral worth or the moral quality of an action. It is, at least, probable that Kant thought that this was so:

> Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a Good Will.[6]
>
> . . . there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and *what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may.* This imperative may be called that of Morality.[7] [Italics mine.]

That Kant does seem to assume that moral action can be elucidated solely in terms of such conceptions and volitions seems evident: <a> from what he says, for example, above; <b> from the fact that he assumes (as we shall see) that all knowledge is restricted to knowledge of conceptions, and <c> by the fact that he provides no theory of action, specifically "good" or "right" action, independent of one's conceptions and volitions with respect to it. He, thus, seems to see no need for such a theory to provide an adequate account of moral action.

Now, undoubtedly, the elucidation of the nature of moral action--at least, "moral action" in the sense of that which proceeds from a certain conception of moral law and the volition associated therewith--will necessarily, and, perhaps, preeminently involve an elucidation of precisely those conceptions and volitions. But it does not follow from this that moral action is solely or sufficiently elucidated by an elucidation of such conceptions and volitions--especially if moral action is construed as independent of, or separable from, "the matter" or content of their objects. Specifically, it does not follow that there is no sense of rectitude applicable to action independent of one's intentions. In fact, it is generally conceded as a principle of positive law that there are "right" and "wrong" actions which are so independent of one's intentions with respect to them. If so, such actions appear to be excluded from Kant's account from the start.

An account of such "externally right action," therefore, may well be indispensable for an adequate account of moral action. Kant, however, does not give such an account. In order, therefore, to help us better understand why such an account may be indispensable; why he does not give such an account and the significance of that lack for Kant's account of the thesis of the practicality of reason, we shall consider this class of "externally right actions" in more detail.

1] Externally Right Actions qua Legally Right

There is a common sense distinction between actions which are considered legally right and actions considered intentionally right. In the case of legally right action, the rightness of the action is essentially, or in the first instance, dictated by a legal code or rule, and the key focus of attention in the determination of rectitude is the relation between an external action and a legal code specifying permissible and impermissible actions. The judge asks, "Did one or did one not commit an act of murder, theft, fraud, etc.?" In such cases, as we are often painfully aware, the emphasis of attention is not on one's intentions in the commitment of the action, i.e., on one's conception or conviction of the truth and authority of the moral law, or on one's free or voluntary obedience/disobedience thereto. A police officer gives one a ticket for speeding even if in all truth one committed the act innocently (one was keeping up with traffic and did not notice the speedometer rise to 65 in a 55 m.p.h. zone).

It is true that "the law" is not, as she is often portrayed to be, wholly blind to intentional or unintentional violations. In every legal system there is a distinction drawn between voluntary and involuntary wrong doing. Involuntary manslaughter, for example, is considered less pernicious than voluntary, and sanctions are dispensed accordingly. It is even possible in some societies for this factor to take on such pre-eminence that it appears to be the sole determinant in wrong doing. In such cases, the art of rationalization and sophist-ication may reach a point so extreme that almost everyone claims intentional innocence (which is "verified" by "competent" psychiatric authorities). The result is that the class of intentional or voluntary evils is restricted to such a narrow class, e.g., those who do evil purely for evil's sake, that the laws are applicable to no one outside of a mere ideal fiction.

Despite such extreme cases, and despite the sensed importance--even pre-eminence--of moral intentions over mere external actions considered independently of such intentions, the law remains essentially "blind." But why is this so? The apparent answer is because there is, or is assumed to be, a relation between the legal code and the moral law independent of one's particular conception of it or volition with regard to it. Simply put, there is a relevant form of rightness of action independent of one's intentions. It is true that there are, and have been, people in power who are tyrants: who institute "laws" merely to enslave people according to their will. It is equally true that much of this manipulation or enslavement is accomplished by deceit: the generally assumed connection between the legal code and moral law is used in the institution of "bad laws." A moral sanction is assumed and appealed to, to justify a coveted class of actions. The discovery of such manipulation or deceit, therefore, may well tempt one to deny altogether the relation between any legal code and a universal moral law. But it seems clear that unless there were some attributable feature of moral good or evil--right or wrong--to some laws one could not come to the realization that one was deceived about some particular class of them. As DesCartes' doubt in a particular case was only possible in virtue of an ability to distinguish between veridical and unveridical apprehensions, so, too, moral doubt seems to presuppose a similar ability to distinguish veridical from unveridical moral apprehensions.

In view of this brief account of legally right action, it seems reasonable to affirm that a legal code may be grounded in moral law and, thus, be right; yet one be ignorant of this fact--even believe that the code is wrong. In such cases it is possible for one to act wrongly--not merely in the sense of a violation of an actual legal code, but in the sense of a violation of the moral law as well, and yet all the while innocently--indeed, even with good intentions. For example, it is logically possible that some TV Christian preachers are "sincere frauds." They actually believe that deceiving people is good for them, and that such actions of deception are right and a necessary part of what constitutes true religion. But all this is no new revelation. Even as far back as Plato this distinction is recognized. The reason why legal sanctions of physical pleasure and pain were so necessary for a just society was precisely because of the fact that most people did not, or could not, see--at least they had not progressed sufficiently to see--the binding character of the moral law. It was necessary, therefore, to use measures better suited--motives actually present--to engage right behavior or right action independently of one's intentions with regard to it.

[2] Externally Right Action Independent of Legal Codes, and the Significance of this Study for Kant's View of Moral Action

Legally right actions present themselves as a mere subclass of externally right actions. One may act against the moral law independent of both any legal rules or institutionalized set of conventions, and independently of any conception that what one is doing is wrong. I once found a baby bird on the ground, as yet unable to fly, and I assumed that in all such cases such birds are abandoned by their parents. I assumed, therefore, that in all probability it would perish. In that conviction or belief I took the bird home to care for it--believing, from past experience, that the bird might still die because of the difficulty associated with nurturing a wild animal. After making some inquiries, however, I discovered that my original assumption was false: the parents feed the bird while on the ground until it can fly. I took the bird back, put it on the ground where I had found it and stood a way off. In a short time the parents came down and fed the baby bird. In that case it seemed clear to me that I initially acted wrongly (in the external sense) even though rightly in the internal or intentional sense. Examples of this kind, of course, can be multiplied without end.

The significance of the discussion above concerning externally right action in general, and legal externally right action in particular, is hopefully to show that such an account is indispensable for an adequate account of moral action. For, even a perfect intention is consistent with wrong action. A child, for example, may mean well but do wrong just as he can intend to write a proper equation and do it incorrectly. An account of mere moral intentions, therefore, is wholly inadequate to provide the elucidation of how one comes to know, and act according to, the moral law itself.

Kant is not concerned to provide a merely formal elucidation of our intentions independently of the truth of the principles or conceptions we act on, but precisely to elucidate the formal character of our intentions in light of an objective, universal and veridical moral law. In other words, he is not concerned to elucidate action in conformity with principles of action which are arbitrary, but to elucidate good intentions which coincide with universal moral principles, universally apprehended or verified as right. *He offers, however, no account of the nature of, and interrelationship between, the rightness of an action independent of conception and the* *rightness of one's intention with respect to it.* As we shall see, he cannot offer such an account, precisely because he, like Hume, restricts the realm of moral investigation to the conceptual. But the significance of this point for Kant's formulation of the thesis of the practicality of reason lies not merely in the fact that an adequate analysis of moral action requires such an account, but in the underlying fact that an adequate elucidation even of moral action in terms of such conceptions (intentionally right actions) requires an adequate elucidation of the object of moral apprehension distinct and independent of one's conception of it. For, any adequate account of moral or right action will require placing the rectitude of an action independent of one's conception of it, and one's apprehension of it into an appropriately clarified intuitive or knowing relation. And this is no less applicable when we shift the burden of attention from the rightness of an external action to the rightness of one's intention.

To further illustrate the importance of such intuition for the determination even of intentional rectitude one need only consider common cases of "corrupt conscientious-ness," i.e., in the sense of an inability to discern the moral quality of one's own intentions. Over and above the sense of a "corrupt conscience" which is applicable to the inability to discern right action independently of one's intentions, e.g., in the bird case, above, one may be unable to clearly see which external acts are right and which wrong, there is a sense of "corrupt conscience" applicable to one's inability to discern the rightness of one's intentions themselves. For example, let us suppose that in spite of the fact that I saw that I ought to take the bird back, and did so, I was unclear whether I did it from a benevolent motive or a motive to appear to myself and others a morally upright fellow. As we shall see in detail in our last chapter, such an elucidation is necessary in order to distinguish cases of conscientious-ness and unconscientiousness in both these respects.

In spite of the lack of an account of rectitude independent of one's conceptions of it, Kant, then, purports to present a moral truth criterion for the discernment of veridical versus unveridical moral apprehensions or beliefs. He is well aware of the fact that some people really believe that there is a universal goodness somehow present in the world--even that there is a good God presiding over all things, while others believe this is mere fantasy. In the latter case, one may still conform to all the conventional rules regulating moral action--even conform to the formal or social conventions of one's Church--yet, their morality or religion is a lie. In this case, too, the lack of genuine belief may make one far more susceptible to manipulation of one's own mind: the law is a mere fictional concept, which, for the ease of conscience should be removed or shunted off to the fringes of thought as quickly and as permanently as one can.

But, in the former case, too, the mere fact of having such belief does not guarantee its truth--especially not with respect to one's beliefs about the multiplicity of aspects or features typically assumed to fall under the moral concept in question. One believes that there is a God, but what type of God? An angry God? A merciful God? An apathetic God? One may have sufficient morality and religion only to make one miserable. But, if our knowledge of rectitude is confined to the conceptual or the circle of ideas as Kant seems forced to concede, then it may well appear inexplicable how he can possibly provide an adequate truth criterion to resolve such moral problems. To better understand why Kant's account fails in this respect and to come thereby to a better understanding of his view of the practicality of reason, we must now turn to the analysis of his view of reason--specifically, practical reason, and moral reason in particular.

ii) Kant's View of Reason Specifically Practical or Moral Reason

a) A Brief Synopsis of Kant's View of "Theoretical Reason" with Respect to Its Bearing on Moral Action and the Moral Law

It is evident from our study so far that any adequate account of the thesis of the practicality of reason will require an adequate epistemology, or an elucidation of moral concepts. An adequate understanding of Kant's formulation of the thesis, therefore, will require an elucidation of his view of concept analysis generally and of moral concepts in particular.

[1] Kant's Account of the Ultimate Foundations of "Theoretical Knowledge," i.e., Sensible Intuition

For Kant, perhaps even more so than for Hume, "the world," (i.e., at least the external world and all universal objects), is unknown to us. We have no independent knowledge of "essences," "natures" or "things-in-themselves." The separation of thought and object so pronounced in DesCartes is brought here to its highest expression. We cannot compare our ideas of the world with the world itself as if we could have knowledge of it not conditioned or determined by our ideas of it. All we know are "phenomena," i.e., our own ideas (conceptions or representations) of the world, and it is through, or by means of, these alone that we gain "access" to a world or reality "out there."

The primitive or foundational "knowledge" of phenomena Kant calls "sensible intuition." Such intuitions may be roughly elucidated as follows: First, every sensible intuition is, or contains, some sensa element or sensory matter (particular sense impressions), e.g., visual and tactile impressions. This data the mind allegedly receives as the end of a causal (spatio-temporal) process involving material objects impinging on the surfaces of our bodies. It is not that we "know" either these material objects in the external world and compare them with associated sensa data, or even that we know these sensa, but that the sensa constitute a necessary but insufficient element in the apprehension of phenomena. That is, the sensa are not strictly seen or apprehended, but they somehow function in (are "used" or "apperceived") in the perception of phenomena.[8] In more common-sense terms, these sensa are essentially particular feelings or impressions, e.g., particular visual impressions like color and shape sensations, and they serve as the necessary foundation or ground for our apprehensions--especially our veridical apprehensions--of the world. Through them we can at least know that there is a world "out there" even if its "nature," or what it really is, remains unknown or obscure.

[2] Further Elucidation of Kant's "Sensible Intuitions," and His Key Assumption that All We Literally Know are "Phenomena" or Our Own Ideas or Conceptions

But, second, although necessary, sensa elements are insufficient to constitute our sensible intuitions, or, at least, conceptions or perceptions of objects or phenomena. That is, sensa "knowledge" of phenomena allegedly constitutes non-propositional, but immediate experiential knowledge of a particular physical object or phenomena, (i.e., by this we allegedly actually grasp something of the existing thing itself "bodily" or in reality), and, as such, it constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition of one's propositional or mediated knowledge of the truth of judgments concerning the "objects" sensed, (i.e., knowledge of the object's actual "nature" or properties). Over and above such sensa we need to account for the unity of the phenomena--the fact that the alleged properties of the object, given via sense, appear to be related or interrelated in such a way so as to constitute a whole and a whole of a particular type. Simply put, judgments require a knowledge of distinct things in relation.

But, on Kant's view, there are no "intellectual intuitions" (non-mediated direct apprehensions of universals), e.g., intuitions of relations or "material essences." Thus, there can be no direct or non-sensible mediated knowledge of things-in-themselves, what a thing is or its "nature" (since no such "nature," "essence" or "whatness" of a thing is, or can be, empirically sensed). The phenomenal unity we experience, therefore, must be accounted for otherwise, viz., by reason's active and categorical classification or unification of its own partial and empirical, ideas or contents. Our conceptions or "knowledge" of the world--in fact, the world or reality itself as we know it--is conditioned or determined precisely by our own conceptions. It is essentially a theoretical construct or ideal--a making rather than a discovery or perception--with, of course, one qualification: that allegedly material or sensible, (spatio-temporal), objects take precedence over non-sensible objects. Thus, any alleged non-sensible object, e.g., number, identity, substance, etc., and, above all, the moral law, cannot be strictly known, since not strictly sensibly intuited.

[3] Kant's Truth Criterion or Criterion of Verification for Veridical Conceptions--His Transcendental Arguments

Despite this claim of "mental" or "rational" categories imposed on phenomena, and thus his fundamental divergence from the "ontological categories" of Aristotle and the philosophical tradition, Kant does not despair of genuine knowledge. His principal aim, in fact, is to meet the skeptical challenge posed by Hume. He aims, therefore, to provide some form of justification--some form of valid or inter-subjectively verifiable thought--with respect to such non-sensible or noumenal objects. There is a way such objects can be "known" or justified on an empirical foundation without any alleged supposition of "intellectual intuitions." This manner of justification he calls, "transcendental argument."

It is not completely clear and highly controversial what precisely such "argument" consists in, but a rough characterization may be presented as follows: Kant claims that in the case of transcendental argument we allegedly infer or deduce the conditions which would have to be fulfilled if there were to be a possibility of a judgment being true, and he describes the conditions necessary for the possibility of knowledge in terms of the traits or characteristics an object must have in order that it can be known.9 He has no doubt that there is knowledge. His problem is to elucidate how knowledge is possible. And, for Kant, for knowledge to be possible certain necessary conditions must be met. Specifically, the nature of an object--its properties or traits--will necessarily condition or determine the manner in which it is to be conceived or known. It will determine or condition the requisite form or method of verification. If the object in question is a microscopic virus, then that object will impose on creatures like ourselves certain necessary conditions with respect to how such an object can be perceptually apprehended, e.g., it will be necessary for one to use a microscope. Given, therefore, that an object has x,y,z characteristics or features the nature of the knowledge of such objects can be determined. The function of transcendental argument, then, is to transcend or bridge the gap that holds between what we can actually experience and that reality which Kant and all of us, somehow, "know" exists, and, as Kant well knows, must exist in order for us to know anything at all. In other words, its function is to "transcend" the limits of experience in the rational "apprehension" or thought of non-experienceable objects which are indispensable for the possibility of knowledge.

[4] Brief Critique of Kant's Account of "Theoretical Reason"

But the conditions in the object (its actual characteristics) for the possibility of knowledge are distinct from the conditions in the mind for knowledge (the necessary and possible conditions applicable to knowledge itself), so if we are restricted to the knowledge of mere conceptions as Kant maintains, with no independent access to a reality distinct from it, it seems that Kant can deduce or know absolutely nothing about a reality "out there." Even if we knew a reality independent of our concepts of it that would not be sufficient to elucidate the necessities and possibilities imposed on the knowing act (or state) itself. The fact that a virus is, in virtue of its nature, microscopic prescribes necessary conditions on how it is to be known or verified. But the elucidation of the necessary conditions for knowledge involves an elucidation of distinct parts and properties applicable to the act of knowing alone. Sensa, for example, are allegedly necessary but insufficient conditions in the mind for knowledge; they are not conditions in the object of knowledge. In either case, Kant conflates necessities and possibilities applicable to a reality distinct from knowledge with necessities and possibilities applicable to knowledge itself.

In doing so he fails to provide an adequate alternative form of justification for our claims of knowledge. He fails, therefore, to meet Hume's challenge.

But, further, his appeal to sensible intuition as a foundation or support for knowledge, or his appeal to the knowledge of concepts seems unwarranted, and seems to imply just that intellectual intuition he explicitly rejects. Although we do not have knowledge of things-in-themselves, not only in the sense of non-sensible or noumenal objects, but in the sense of alleged material objects in an external world, we do have, according to Kant, "intuitive knowledge" of our own ideas or concepts. In their case, a direct relation obtains and is apprehended between an apprehension and its object. The objects (here conceptions) are "given" as they are in-themselves without the mediation of further concepts. In other words, in their case we have "knowledge by acquaintance," "perceptual knowledge," or an intuitive apprehension as compared with inferential, propositional or judgmental knowledge.10 In fact, Kant must allow such knowledge in order to avoid complete skepticism. For, without such an assumption one must inevitably fall into circularity or an infinite regress, e.g., one asks, "how do you know that our ideas of our ideas are veridical?," etc..

This is true not only with respect to "phenomena" or conceptions generally, but with respect to the function of sensa in particular. For, how does Kant "know" that sensa are connected to external reality or to the properties of external existing objects? What is the basis or justification for this special status of sensa, or sensible intuitions generally? The issue, of course, is not whether he is correct or not, e.g., in his claim about the apperceptive function of sensa, but how he knows, i.e., the elucidation or justification of that claim. The appeal to our knowledge of conceptions, phenomena or a sensible form of intuition, therefore, seems to already presuppose breaking through "the circle of ideas"--to presuppose the indispensability of an intellectual "intuition" as a criterion of justification and truth. If so, what justific-ation is there to restrict the function of intuition to sensible versus non-sensible objects?

The attempt to disarm intellectual intuitions of their applicability to a non-sensible domain of reality seems arbitrary, for they appear to be indispensable for all apprehension, intuition or knowledge whatsoever. One merely shifts attention to another aspect of the domain of reality as a whole whether ones ultimate appeal is to ideas, linguistic entities, functions, etc.. If this is so then it may well be the case that no clear elucidation can be given of how we know such "higher order" or non-sensible objects as "The Moral Law" without an adequate doctrine of intuition. Without such a doctrine, therefore, it may already appear evident that Kant cannot provide an adequate theory of the practicality of reason.

b) Practical Reason: Elucidation of, and Its Relation to Theoretical Reason; the Cognitive Relation Between Reason and Moral Action

[1] Practical Reason and Theoretical Reason

Theoretical and practical reason are not, for Kant, two essentially different faculties functioning wholly independently of one another; nor does practical reason begin where theoretical reason leaves off in the discernment of a new class of objects. There is but one faculty of reason which apprehends a single domain of objects, but which, in the domain of moral action, manifests a distinction between merely cognitive and volitional functions. Thus, the full elucidation of reason's relation to moral action will involve, in addition to the elucidation of reason's cognitive function, an elucidation of its practicality.

What this practical function is may best be illustrated by comparing the respective roles of practical and theoretical reason in moral action. On Kant's view, theoretical reason is indispensable for moral action. It gives us awareness of situations, i.e., phenomena, or the world as it appears to us, as well as of the natural causal laws associated therewith. Reason tells me, for example, if I butcher a cow, I will have food to eat; or, if a cup is poisoned then I will get sick, and possibly die if I drink it. Theoretical reason, therefore, appears to be a necessary condition for moral action. It is not, however, according to Kant, sufficient. For there to be moral action one must have a "moral intention," i.e., one must be free to act according to one's conception of moral law. Kant claims, therefore, that reason has a practical function: it can act freely on the basis of "maxims," i.e., subjective principles of action. What this means, however, will require a more detailed elucidation.

[2] Kant's General Form of Justification of Moral Action, i.e., Free Action on the Basis of One's Conception of Moral Law, by an Appeal to Transcendental Argument

On Kant's view, as we have seen, the intuitive apprehension of an alleged non-natural moral quality or moral law, as well as an intuition of a "self" or non-natural free will are excluded by his critique of reason. Justification of such claims, therefore, must proceed by way of transcendental argument: If there is to be such a thing as moral action (and Kant assumes there is, or, at least, we act as if there was), certain absolutely necessary conditions must be met. It is necessary, above all, that we be able to will particular actions as instances of a principle of action or "maxim". For Kant, this means it is necessary that we have the power or capacity to act according to one's conception of laws or principles of action. Such action, on the basis of one's conception of law, is to be sharply distinguished from merely acting according to law. For example, a ball when dropped falls to the ground in accordance with the law of gravitation, but it does not, we may safely assume, act thus according to its conception of such law. Only rational creatures, Kant claims, have this capacity to act according to one's conception of law, and this, presumably, because <a> although animals have sensory experiences, they do not have the capacity for such conceptions of "principles," and <b> because they do not have the freedom to choose which of these principles to act on.

(A) Brief Critique of This Appeal

The appeal to transcendental argument rather than experience or intuition, however, may well leave us in the dark. After all, it was assumed that all we can know are concepts. How then can we move from the mere concept of a moral action to the existence or assumption of existence of moral law (or principles of action), and free will? By "principles of action" we take Kant to mean that in moral action we act according to some conception of some phenomena or object that allegedly functions in such a way so as to influence, motivate, prompt or determine action. In other words, if there is to be such a thing as moral action, we must act as if there were such principles of action. Yet it is unclear how, given the epistemological restriction of knowledge to conceptions, he can distinguish conceptions that function in this way versus conceptions that do not without an appeal to the actual characteristics of such objects (or principles). One may act as if there was a Martian flying next to one (e.g., in cases of psychosis or drug induced hallucination), but that doesn't imply that there is one. Nor is such a case at all phenomenally identical to cases of action where one is certain of some factual state of affairs. Not anything--certainly not any mere conception--functions as a principle of action. Jones' conception of a round square, for example, prompts nothing in relation to action, while his conception of a beautiful and naked woman does. It does not seem legitimate, therefore, for Kant to infuse the moral law into such conceptions or principles of action as something which functions as a force or constraining power over action, and especially not (as we shall see shortly) as a principle which does so not merely arbitrarily or contingently, but absolutely with the force of universal moral law.

But, second, it is equally unclear how Kant can legitimately move from the domain of the merely conceptual to the domain of an existing non-natural causality or freedom of will. If he had legitimately obtained for us the moral law as a principle of action--specifically, a law of Duty or Obligation--he would have some justification for claiming the reality of a free will, since an "ought" without a "can" is clearly absurd. The veridical apprehension that I ought not to lie clearly implies that I can, in that instance, refrain from lying. But, in view of our critique above, if Kant is not justified in his "deduction" of such principles of action, he is equally unjustified in his deduction of free will.

No doubt Kant might reply that the move from the conception of moral action to the conception of moral law and freedom is a merely logical or inferential one, and, so, does not directly deal with the issue of existence. Yet, the restriction of knowledge to conceptions seems to provide no way to distinguish within the class of conceptions: <a> mere conceptions from <b> conceptions acted on as if there were principles of action; nor either of these from <c> conceptions acted on in the certain conviction that there are principles of action. Metaphysical issues do not disappear by merely shifting one's reference from the "outer" to the "inner" world.

(B) Hypothetical & Categorical Principles of Action

But, to continue with our exposition, if there is to be distinctively moral action, mere action on the basis of maxims is insufficient according to Kant. One must act only in accordance with objective maxims, i.e., maxims that are universalizable. Although all maxims are subjective principles of action in the sense that they are principles that a subject actually chooses to act on, moral maxims are objective, Kant claims, in the sense that they can consistently be acted upon by all people in the same or like circumstances.

More specifically, there are two main types of maxims, viz., hypothetical and categorical. Hypothetical maxims are principles of action, which function as means to some higher order end or principle. One may choose, for example, to deceive an employer about one's qualifications for a job in order to gain employment. Categorical maxims, on the other hand, are principles of action chosen for their own sake and not as a means to any other end. As final or ultimate ends they function, therefore, as imperatives, which command absolutely.

Qua final or ultimate end, therefore, there can be just one categorical maxim, and it is, Kant claims, the distinguishing feature of moral action that it is action in conformity to such a categorical maxim or universal law. And, since it is universal, it is applicable to all rational creatures as such in virtue of their capacity to apprehend or conceive such law. Thus, in all cases of immoral action we find implicit therein not a denial of the existence of universal law, but an attempt to make an exception in one's own case. In considering whether one should break a promise to a friend, for example, one cannot, Kant believes, universalize such a maxim. For, if everyone broke their promises, no one would take promise keeping seriously, which would nullify promise keeping in any particular case. One would, Kant claims, contradict oneself. In more formal terms, the ultimate consequence of universalizing such a maxim would be: 'No person is a person who can take promise keeping seriously,' which is, according to Kant, practically inconsistent with the maxim 'Some persons (oneself in this particular case) are persons who can take promise keeping seriously.' Herein lies the ignorance (irrationality) often attributed to immoral action.

Kant's use of transcendental argument to justify the claim of the existence of universal moral law is by no means restricted to the bare form of law. He clearly recognizes that such a bare assertion of law would be relatively powerless for many if not all moral actions and would thus fail to elucidate them. Thus, for example, the assumption of a categorical imperative, or an "ought" on action implies too, as a necessary condition, that one can obey or disobey it. It leads, therefore, to the assumption of freedom, or a cause that is not determined by natural causal law. By means of such transcendental argument Kant also proceeds, step by step, to "justify" an alleged self, a Kingdom of persons treated as ends rather than means, God and the immortality of the soul. The exposition of these claims, however, is not necessary for our immediate purpose since they are all similarly grounded. What is necessary is the understanding that the nature of the reason or reasoning that gains access to the relevant forms of moral data is both theoretical and practical in the following sense: theoretical reason provides a transcendental argument for the belief in, or mere possibility of existence of, moral law, freedom, etc.. which are indispensably necessary conditions for moral action; while practical reason, allegedly, makes these facts immanent or real in the sense that one acts on them--takes a leap of "rational" faith--as if there really were such principles or laws even though they cannot literally be "known," i.e., intellectually intuited or experienced.

> [Practical Reason] is a sufficient substitute for all a priori justification, . . . For it adds the notion of a reason that directly determines the will . . . and thus it is able for the first time to give objective, though only practical, reality to reason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed speculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use of reason into an immanent use . . .[11]

[3] Critique of Kant's Appeal to Transcendental Argument for the Justification of Moral Action

We have seen that Kant appeals to transcendental argument--not any form of non-sensuous intuition--as an alternative form of justification for moral claims. The ultimate premises in such argument are, presumably, propositions or judgments referring to moral actions. If so, it is unclear what could serve as the existential support for these premises in order for their conclusion to be true and the argument sound. Intellectual or non-sensible intuitions are excluded, so the only other option available for verification would seem to be sensible intuition. Sensible intuition, however, is restricted to the categories of space and time. It cannot, therefore, provide veridical support for sound inferences to true conclusions about non-sensible or noumenal objects such as, e.g., the moral law, freedom, self, God, etc.. Kant's moral claims, therefore, appear unjustified.

Kant might reply that the conclusions reached are not essentially claims of "knowledge," but, rather, mere "posits" achieved by a rational leap of faith. The rationality or justifiability of the posit and/or the leap is grounded in its theoretical and practical consistency and universalizability respectively. It is not inconsistent with our sensible intuitions, and the fact that categorical maxims are possible, i.e., that our subjective maxims can, in principle, be universalized (and thereby gain the force of universal law or a categorical imperative), provides sufficient justification for the positing of such moral law. It justifies the leap in which we act as if we knew there was such a moral law.

Even if we put aside the problem of how Kant can make legitimate inferences to claims about non-sensible objects from sensuous premises, the appeal to consistency and universalizability do not appear to provide the justification needed. Mere logical consistency proves nothing and one may well question whether the mere universalizability of a maxim is capable of justifying a claim about its morality. For, although Kant attributes such a capacity or function to practical reason in virtue of the criterion of universalizability it seems that mere universalizability can only, at best, make a maxim practically objective or universally practicable--it does not make it moral.

Kant claims that in order to determine whether or not an action is moral, we need only ask ourselves, "Can I will that my maxim become a universal law?" But, as a criterion to decide whether or not a particular maxim is moral or not, the universalizability criterion appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary, since many self evident moral cases are not universalizable in Kant's sense, e.g., Jones' duty to choose a specific vocation, marry a particular woman, have a baby, etc.. It is not sufficient, since many actions are practically universalizable, yet not moral, e.g., the maxim that everyone blow one's nose once a year, or that everyone periodically take a deep breath.

The denial of universalizability as an adequate criterion to determine morality, however, must be carefully handled, for, there is a sense in which moral maxims may be said to be "universalizable" in a way that distinguishes them from non-moral maxims or actions. Any appeal to a Law, in the strict sense, as opposed to, e.g., a mere empirical generalization, will necessarily imply strict universality. What this means is that the law holds or obtains in virtue of certain underlying features which the terms governed by that law share, regardless of specific or contingent differences irrelevant to such determination. In the case of mathematics, for example, mathematical law specifies that 2 + 2 = 4. This is so, whether or not the particular items numbered are sensible or non-sensible, green or blue, small or large, etc.. Thus, in the case of moral actions, moral law will specify which actions a moral or rational agent ought to do independent of specific individuals or contingent differences irrelevant to the determination of the rectitude of the action in question, i.e., whether or not the individual is small or large, a talented or untalented musician, etc.. Construed in this way, Kant's appeal to universalizability would only appear to be a vindication of the common-sense moral consciousness (which Kant everywhere appeals to) that lying, for example, is morally wrong regardless of who it is that lies and what time of the month it was done.

> I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. . . .
>
> Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt, common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes, and use it as the standard of their decision. . . . we only, like Soc-rates, direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ, . . . the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest. [12] [Italics mine.]

These passages should be very carefully attended to. For, we believe, they clearly reveal Kant's implicit appeal to two different truth criteria or criteria of justification, i.e., on one hand, the universalizability criterion, and, on the other hand, the intuition of non-sensible universal objects. We must not be confused by the apparent concession to Kant above regarding a viable sense in which universalizability might be applicable to common moral experience. For, the implication there was that we first have a clear and concrete instance of moral action before us, *and then apprehend in it a non-empirical moral quality that makes all such right actions the same*. Kant, however, is a nominalist, so he cannot admit the knowledge of universals in this sense. Moreover, his universalizability is merely a formal not a material one and its function is precisely to establish whether or not particular subjective principles of action are moral or not. What this amounts to, then, is that we are first to look at an action *independently of any existential moral considerations*, and then inquire whether or not it can be consistently universalized. If it can be universalized the action is moral and the maxim a categorical maxim or imperative. If it cannot, the action is immoral and the maxim merely subjective. Kant cannot consistently, therefore, justify his moral contentions without either denying the common (and non-sensuous) moral consciousness or explicitly conceding it along with its non-sensuous form of intuition.

But even if Kant was not a nominalist and even if we granted him that general form of universality applicable to moral actions above, Kant's criterion of universalizability would be inadequate. For, it is consistent with the common moral consciousness that many classes of moral actions are highly specific in their application, i.e., conditioned by the nature, past moral and non-moral choices, circumstances, etc., of the individual in question. One's choice of a right vocation, for example, may be conditioned by one's particular nature, one's past actions and acquired character traits, one's present circumstances, etc.. In such cases the actual material conditions as well as the knowledge of them clearly seems to enter into the determination of whether a particular action or principle of action is moral or not. Nor are these considerations unique to the moral realm; for, in this case, too, it seems one must meet certain absolutely necessary conditions, e.g., to be able to solve problems in calculus, run a 4 minute mile, write a book, etc.. In view of such cases it should be apparent, not only that we cannot determine whether an act is moral by merely asking if one's maxim can be universalized or made applicable to all, but we often cannot determine whether an act is moral *even with experiential knowledge of some general form of universality*. An account of such universality is indis-pensable for an adequate understanding of the universality attributable to moral action which could show how "material" essences or conditions can enter into such determination without reducing them to the merely contingent.

As a criterion to determine whether or not a particular maxim is moral, Kant's universalizability criterion seems useless. It is not necessary in principle, nor is it factually the case that we must or do first inquire whether or not a principle of action is universalizable, and then, on the basis of this, decide whether or not a particular case is moral. Rather, it is far more consistent with the common moral consciousness and far more probable rationally that we find or "see" a certain action to be right, and on the basis of this come to see wherein its universality consists. Kant's failure, then, lies in his nominalism. Kant does not make clear to himself or us the character of this universalizability, nor the manner in which it comes to consciousness. He fails, therefore, to establish the supreme principle of morality on adequately clarified rational grounds.

iii) Kant's View of Reason's Constraint on Moral Action

a) Significance of Kant's Appeal to Intuition for Verification of Moral Claims

We have found reason to doubt Kant's use of transcendental "argument" as an adequate form of justification generally or for moral justification in particular. But, as we focus our attention on the constraint that reason allegedly imposes on action, the appeal to "argument" of any kind as a source of power reveals itself in all its absurdity. If this can be made clear, then, perhaps, it should make us more receptive to our main claim in this discussion of Kant: that it is not unreasonable to interpret Kant's transcendental arguments as an initial and, perhaps, half conscious attempt to provide a rigorously scientific intuitive criterion of justification to replace the more subjective and vague intuitions of Hume and the tradition generally. But, whether or not this is so, Kant's ultimate appeal for justification of his moral claims generally and his claims concerning the constraint of reason on action in particular is an appeal to experience--not argument.

Nowhere is Kant's need to appeal to intuition more evident or more relevant to our thesis than in his attempt at elucidation of the constraint imposed on moral action by reason. Here he is literally forced to rely on moral experience rather than moral argument. For example, in describing the steps involved in which moral ideas come to be attained and attain power on or over us, Kant says: "Now . . . the second exercise comes in, the **living exhibition** of morality of character by examples, in which **attention** is directed to purity of will . . . the pupil's **attention is fixed** upon the consciousness of his freedom, . . ."[13] Else-where it is described as a ". . . mere habit of **looking** on such actions . . .";[14] as a case in which "we must **fix attention** . . . on the subjection of the heart to duty";[15] as ". . . a law, the practicability of obedience to which I see **proved by fact before my eyes**. . . . a "law **made visible** by an example . . .";[16] as a fact shown "by such **observations as everyone can make**."[17] [Emphasis mine.] And the examples can be multiplied almost without end.

It is difficult to see how Kant might deny such an appeal. Perhaps, he might say that the seeming endless appeal to experience is merely similar or analogous to the kind of clarity he wishes to attribute to transcendental argument--that despite such similarity they are, nonetheless, essentially distinct:

> But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations, in which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes.[18]

b) Critique of Kant's Appeal to "Argument" Rather than Intuition as the Source of Reason's Power over Action

But the "clarity" associated with argument, at least argument in any sense independent of experience, is distinct from--in fact, world's apart from--the clarity associated with experience, despite Kant's claim to the contrary. Moral arguments may well be "clear" in the sense of being clearly logically consistent, yet not at all clear in the sense of a moral belief or thought which has that kind of vivacity or clearness and distinctness Hume, for example, attributes to true beliefs as compared with beliefs or thoughts which lack this vivacity. We all, in fact, recognize a pre-analytic common sense distinction between the power associated with the mere thought of something--even a thought functioning as a premise or conclusion of a logical argument, and the power associated with thoughts which present themselves as veridical experiences of existing objects or states of affairs. If all children in Los Angeles are children who are mutilated by a race of insane persons, and if one's child is a child in Los Angeles, it clearly follows, that one's child is mutilated by a race of insane persons. No doubt the mere thought of such a thing might be, to some degree, repulsive to any sensitive parent, but one can easily see that the power of such a claim is by no means "as certain" or as powerful as "that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes." In other words, it is by no means as certain as actually seeing one's child before you being mutilated by an insane person.

But, second, despite the fact that the study of Kant's ethics in modern classrooms almost exclusively focuses its attention on mere logical consistency rather than the common moral experiences of mankind, this is not what Kant, at least, focused his attention on--in his classroom or in his moral treatises. His was anything but a cold and lifeless formalism. In view of this fact, perhaps what he meant by the seeming identification of the clarity of argument with experience was the clarity of arguments grounded in premises themselves experientially verified. Thus, if we knew, or even with good evidence believed, that there were no survivors of a plane crash, and if we knew someone dear to us was on that plane, the conclusion would have a force that would seem, at least at first sight, to be almost as certain as if we saw the fact before our eyes.

But, even in such a case as this, although the extent of clarity and the power of the conception would approach that of clear insight, there would still be a marked difference between them. For, the degree or weight of certainty of a mere "argument" is never (in principle at least) as certain or as powerful as perfect experience, insight or intuition. One might well construct a "perfect proof" of the existence of God--many may well have thought they did--and, in light of such a proof one might be convinced 'that God is.' But it is highly questionable whether one's belief in God on the basis of such argument would be as certain or as powerful as the experience of beholding Him before one's face. At least in the biblical scriptures, which purport to be an historical record of part of an ongoing personal relationship between God and Man, the cases where one is reported to have seen God are strongly contrasted with cases where one is certain--even knows--that God exists, but where his presence is not before one's face. We find men falling prostrate on the ground in reverential fear of his majesty or power, although they were certain of his existence prior to that time. But one can multiply such cases indefinitely. Many, undoubtedly, "knew" that little children were tortured, mutilated, and murdered in Nazi concentration camps--even during the time it was happening-but that belief, even supported by good argument--indeed, even grounded in experience itself--is qualitatively different from the clear and vivid experience of, for example, seeing one's own child butchered before one's face.

Third, even if we conceded that the conclusion of such an argument had the same clarity and force as experience, that still would not show, as Kant claims, that proof via argument is as certain or as powerful as insight. For, even in that case the clarity of the conclusion of such argument would ultimately be derived precisely from the clarity of its underlying premises, in turn ultimately justified by experience. But, then, what experiential premises could serve, given

Kant's epistemological assumptions, as the existential, veridical or evidential foundation for a true moral conclusion in such an argument? A moral conclusion cannot be derived from mere sensible intuitions because we cannot deduce an ought from an is, i.e., we cannot deduce moral conclusions from non-moral premises or premises restricted to the spatio-temporal sphere. But nor can Kant consistently derive a moral conclusion from moral or non-sensuous (intellectual) intuitions, for then the ultimate appeal to transcendental argument rather than intuition would be pointless.

Finally, Kant's actual and repeated characterization of the reason that constrains action in terms of its degree of vivacity or force seems to drive home our claim that, despite what he says, his ultimate appeal for moral verification is to intuition, not argument. This is so even if there may be associations with that conception that bother him and even if he uses the terms "argument" or "transcendental argument" to describe the process in which we come to non-sensible veridical apprehensions of universal moral facts via the mediation of concrete cases in which they are instantiated.

More precisely, according to Kant, what ultimately constrains moral action is no mere vague or confused idea of the moral law and no mere concept or thought without any intuitive support, but, rather, a rigorously clear and purified idea of it, and its degree of strength or power over action is directly proportional to its degree of clarity:

> [Duty] must have not only the most definite, but when it is represented in the true light of its inviolability, the most penetrating influence on the mind. . . . [it must be] a plain and earnest representation of duty.[19] . . . [it must be] a lively representation.[20] Morality then must have the more power over the human heart the more purely it is exhibited.[21]

The constraint of reason over moral action, therefore, is clearly tied to the vivacity of a conception. If so, this raises serious epistemological problems for Kant. For, as we saw in our discussion of Hume, the constraint or the motivating power of a concept or apprehension is tied to the vivacity of that conception, which, in turn, is rooted in the alleged temporal and spatial proximity of their objects. Such concepts lose their power to the extent that they become more remote or further removed from "sensible intuition." The presence of a delightful meal, e.g., broiled lobster delicately seasoned in a wine or sherry sauce with butter, garlic and herbs will entice me, draw me or excite my desire for it in a way that a mere vague thought of a lobster dinner will not. No doubt if one is rich enough in imagination it may seem possible to experience a similar desire. But, for Hume, even in the case of a rich or vivid imagination, *the vivacity of the conception and the power associated therewith is never qualitatively the same as a conception more closely tied to present empirical impressions, sensations or sensible intuitions.* The vivacity of an experience, in short, ultimately justifies a claim of moral knowledge and in so doing determines the extent of its power. It was, no doubt, Hume's clear recognition of this fact and his recognition of the reality and power of true morality that led him to ground morality in the sensibility rather than reason.

This Humean position Kant appears to adopt in toto. In the case, therefore, of admittedly non-sensuous or noumenal objects, e.g., the Moral Law, freedom, God, etc., *the conceptions associated with such objects lack direct sensible support. They are not tasted with the mouth, seen with the eyes, held by the hand, etc.. What, if anything, therefore, can serve as the intuitive, experiential or existential support for such claims? What, therefore, can "found" their power?*

The appeal to transcendental argument is an appeal to the mere supposition of the existence of a moral law, freedom, etc.. It is an appeal to a so-called "rational faith." One acts as if there were such a law, etc.. But, acting as if there were a law does not imply that there is a law, nor is action on the basis of the mere presumption of law equivalent to action on the basis of clear knowledge that there is such a law. But, given Kant's (as well as Hume's) analysis of motivation or power as essentially tied to sensible intuitions it would seem as if all non-sensible cases of constraint would be inherently weaker than sensible cases. *But this is precisely what both Hume* *and Kant, as well as the entire philosophical tradition, emphatically deny.*

It is clearly evident from the citations above, that Kant believed that moral conceptions were capable of being present in precisely the same manner as conceptions tied to sense impressions--in fact even more present. For, the "rationality" of their presence gives them a certain universality, and thus a certain freedom or liberation from the partial, contingent, inadequate presentations of sense. As a result they are not limited for their force to temporal and spatial contingencies. They can be present to all people, at all times and in all places in a way no physical object or physical sensation can. As a result they are subject to quantitatively greater and qualitatively richer degrees of vivacity, clarity, purity, etc.. Spatial-temporal considerations, therefore, do not limit either the proximity of these "rational intuitions" or their strength.

Kant, therefore, is driven to one of two alternatives: either he must deny this rational presence and power or affirm it. If he denies it, we should remove from all his moral cases, which purport to describe the "knowledge" of the moral law or the practicality of reason all features that make it appear experiential. If so, we believe, we would remove the justification for his moral contentions as well as his moral influence. His ethics would be reduced thereby to an even greater formality and barren consistency than that which so commonly characterizes Kantian scholarship today. If he affirms it, then we must concede that there is a valid form of intellectual intuition of moral data that nonetheless very much needs rigorous elucidation. We must make it explicit in this case that Kant's moral cases or examples are precisely concrete manifestations or instantiations of a truly universal moral law rationally perceived.

Assuming we are correct in our belief that Kant actually appeals to some form of intuition of moral facts, it is certainly clear that he gives no account of this presence. For, he cannot on his principles even explicitly acknowledge that there is such a presence much less give an account of the manner of its presence and how it is acquired. It is for this reason that one might well claim, not only does Kant fail to provide an adequate theory of the practicality of reason, but he fails to provide any theory of it at all.

c) Moral Reason as a Principle of Action & Other Principles of Action

[1] Reason and Will

It is clear from what has been said that Kant speaks as if the mere conception of duty was sufficient to determine moral action in accordance with it. This may seem, however, difficult to reconcile with his central claim that man is free. It is one thing for a rational conception to influence, motivate or constrain us, it is quite another for it to compel, necessitate or determine us. That he maintains that man is free, and that he means it in the common sense, is everywhere clear:

> A man may use as much art as he likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act that he remembers, as an unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one can never altogether avoid, and therefore as something in which he was carried away by the stream of physical necessity, and thus to make himself out innocent, yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his favor can by no means silence the accuser within, if only he is conscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, in possession of his freedom; . . .[22]

Precisely how, then, are these seemingly disparate points of view to be reconciled? If our moral conceptions are vivid and clear nothing can, allegedly, stand in the way of their power over action--apparently, not even our own will; and if our moral conceptions are weak and languid, while the conceptions of sense are strong, why are we to blame? In actual fact Kant finds this problem a mystery--he simply has no account of it and says so. All he insists on, and all he purports to have shown via transcendental argument, is that we are free. How we are free, or the manner of its operation, is to him inexplicable.[23] The lack of such an account, however, may not only make it inexplicable how freedom operates, but make it inexplicable how there can be freedom at all:

> It may therefore be admitted that if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external actions, as to know all its motives, even the smallest, and likewise all the external occasions that can influence them,

> we could calculate a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is free.[24]

Kant may be convinced that this is so, but without a detailed elucidation of what in the world this could possibly mean it is a difficult claim to swallow. It appears to be a manifest contradiction in terms. Given that a man is free even God's knowledge of the mere motives or influences on us or our freedom would never by itself be sufficient for the determination of one's choice with respect to which motive one will actually act on. It would not even be sufficient for God's knowledge of that choice and resulting action.

Kant does not present to us, therefore, any account of the role of freedom in moral action. What he does offer us is, at most, the vague (and, as we have shown, unsupported) transcendental argument to the effect that we can establish the claim that man is free. The manner in which he attempted to justify this claim was on the supposition that man has a dual nature. On one hand, he belongs to a sensible world in which natural causal law dominates; on the other hand, he belongs to a non-sensible, noumenal or rational world in which freedom or a non-natural, spontaneous causation reigns. As we have seen, this freedom is not known, but merely thought as an indispensably necessary condition for moral action. But, even if we concede to Kant that man is free, the concession may well seem merely formal and empty--at any rate, useless practically. For, if reason is a sufficient principle of action, as Kant clearly maintains, this would seem to imply that moral action is precisely determined or necessitated by reason, rational conceptions or intuitions. And, whether or not action is determined by natural causal law or determined by reason it is still determined. The mere possible existence, much less role, of freedom appears highly questionable.

[2] Reason & the Sensibility

Far more significant than the relation between reason and will or freedom, at least in view of modern empirical and skeptical tendencies, is the relation between reason and the sensibility. An account of this relation is especially important for Kant in view of his apparent concession to the role of some form of moral sense or feeling in moral action.

It is true that he often seems to speak as if the appropriate conception of duty constrains action--even compels it--without the mediation of any sense or feeling. It also seems as if this is the way "moral rationalists" are frequently understood by moral empiricists, who often seem to "see" more clearly that in every moral action, in addition to some cognitive element, there is some "feeling" that plays an essential role. Despite this appearance, Kant explicitly characterizes the moral situation as one in which there is always a mediating moral desire or feeling between the reason that apprehends the good and the action which follows it, which is essential to the power that elicits the moral action. He holds, however, that the relation between the moral cognition and desire is no mere contingent one, but an essential one. It is emphatically not as if one could have the clear moral cognition without the moral desire or the moral desire without the clear cognition. They are distinct but inseparable. We have here, in modern terms, a synthetic apriori connection. Yet, it is the conception that Kant claims necessarily elicits the moral feeling. In and of itself it inspires, awakens or brings into being, in a way reminiscent of Plato, what Kant more explicitly calls a "feeling" of "respect,"[25] "esteem"[26] or "awe"[27] in the subject for the Moral Law.

Moreover, despite the fact that 'feeling' is ordinarily associated with, or attributed to, mere sensation in natural causal conjunction with a sensible object, Kant claims the moral feeling of respect or reverence for the Law is definitively not any form of sense impression,[28] nor is it tied to any sensible object. It is, rather, a wholly unique feeling essentially bound up with, and produced by, moral reason alone.[29] More specifically, it is a feeling and desire elicited only by the clear apprehension of the universal Moral Law. Mere sense, therefore, can never produce such a feeling, and it is precisely in virtue of this fact that persons, and persons alone, have such feelings.[30]

Thus, although Kant concedes the existence and necessity of a moral sense or feeling for the full elucidation of moral action, the nature of that feeling essentially differs from the nature of the feelings attributable to ordinary sense perception or experience. Kant, and the moral rationalists generally, may well claim that the moral conception alone constrains action as long as they are understood to mean in the sense that no feeling derived from the sensibility mediates its causal efficacy.[31] It is not, then, because we have a "sensible feeling" or "natural moral sense" that we are responsive to the Moral Law.[32] If that were the case morality would be grounded in our physical nature, and, as such, contingent or variable. One's virtue would depend on whether we were gifted with more or less of it than someone else, like a greater sexual propensity or propensity for drink. This is, no doubt, the received wisdom of our day. But, it is Kant's view that we are, to the contrary, responsive to the Moral Law because of the universality of that law, the universality of our cognitions of that law and the universality of our reverence for that law clearly cognized. In short, we are capable of morality in virtue of the fact of our rationality--not our humanity--which makes such morality applicable to all rational creatures as such, whether they are aliens from another world, angels in Heaven or God Himself.

That there is such a class of uniquely rational feelings, desires or pleasures Kant thinks is amply confirmed by the fact that they are so often found to conflict with the feelings desires and pleasures of mere sense. So great is this disparity in kind and so compelling is the conception of moral law, that we often do everything we can to evade the power of its influence. For, "the voice [of the Moral Law] makes even the boldest sinner tremble, and compels him to hide himself from it":[33]

> Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only reluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find out something that may lighten the burden of it, some fault to compensate us for the humiliation which such an example causes. Even the dead are not always secure from this criticism, especially if their example appears inimitable. Even the moral law itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavor to save oneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought that it is for any other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the level of our familiar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that we all take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our own interest well understood, but that we want to be free from the deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such severity?[34]

Despite the fact that the essential disparity between "familiar inclination" and "reverence for the law" is more often than not revealed in cases of conflict, it is by no means necessarily or best revealed in this way. For, unlike sensation or natural inclination, moral feelings can last or endure.35 Sensations, after all, are intense only as long as the sensible object is physically present. Its desire or pleasure, therefore, is limited by the spatial and temporal proximity of its object. If a beautiful and voluptuous woman walks past me wearing a bikini on a beach in Australia, the attraction I may feel as a result of my perception will not last long, unless, of course, I allow myself to be solicited and in some form or another keep my attention fixed on her. But, in the case of moral feelings, desires or pleasures, the objects, e.g., the moral law, the kingdom of persons, God, etc., are eternal or universal objects. The feelings associated with such objects, therefore, can, in a way the others cannot, endure. They are not restricted to where one lives or the times in which one is placed. In their case one might experience them even on the rack and they offer to us the possibility of lasting joy and eternal peace.

It is of great significance to our fundamental claim concerning the practicality of reason that, for Kant, not only do these feelings differ in kind; they differ, too, in strength. The Moral Law, in fact, according to Kant, to the degree that it is clearly apprehended is invincible. No other principle of action, neither sense, nor even will, can stand in its way: For, "it weakens self-conceit . . . it removes the resistance out of the way . . . [it] de-prives self-love of its influence, and self-conceit of its illusion, it lessons the obstacle to pure practical reason, and produces the conception of the superiority of its objective law to the impulses of the sensibility."[36] ". . . this respect weakens the impeding influence of inclinations by humiliating self-esteem, . . ."[37] It is, in short, *irresistible:*

> . . . before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose it or not, and though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my superior rank. . . . Respect is a tribute which we cannot refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.[38]
>
> . . . it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, gives the mind a power unexpected even by himself, to tear himself from all sensible attachments so far as they would fain have the rule, . . . [and] when it is properly applied to the human heart, [it] is the most powerful spring . . . of good conduct.[39]

iv) Conclusion

In conclusion, it is our contention that Kant's affirmation of the thesis of the practicality of reason can alone be justified on the basis of an implicit concession to intuitionism. He clearly has such a tendency, although it is more something he seems to be striving toward than an actual possession. It is by no means an explicit appeal--quite the contrary--for, he denies intellectual intuitions and thus, by implication, must deny moral intuitions as well. In virtue of this denial he does not, nor can he, provide any theory, much less an adequate theory of the practicality of reason. It is our belief, however, that during Kant's own time there was someone who, in this respect, saw more deeply than Kant the necessity of an adequate account of the intellectual intuition of moral facts for providing an adequate theory of the practicality of reason. This person was Richard Price to whom we now turn as the main representative of the type of view that we intend to defend in this paper.

It has been one of our intentions in this paper to unify seemingly disparate camps of war by showing that the problem of the status of moral experience or intuition was a problem that has concerned all moral philosophers from the very beginning of moral inquiry; a problem moreover that stood at the very foundation of an adequate elucidation of the practicality of reason. We do not think, therefore, that Kant or Hume are to be in any way looked upon with disdain for their rejection of "non-sensuous intuitions." As great philosophers their rejection was above all else a rejection of that subjectivism or emotivism and skepticism that too often governs man and places a barrier in his way to what alone can constitute true and lasting life and joy. Our hope is that this has been made clear in this historical chapter.

Notes: Chapter Two [Kant's Reply to Hume]

1. Hume, Enquiries, p.172.
2. This is a result of his Cartesianism. See Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy. The whole work merits careful reading.
3. Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Ch. 1, in Willard, Logic & the Objectivity of Knowledge.
4. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, trans., Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and other Works on the Theory of Ethics (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1873), pp.27-8.
5. Ibid., pp.249-50.
6. Abbott, Kant's Ethics, p.9.
7. Ibid., p.33.
8. Willard, Logic &c., pp.80-1.
9. Norman Kemp Smith, trans., Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), pp. 137ff,268-71,346-7; see also Willard, Logic &c., p.214 and no.35 on pp.251-2.
10. Smith, Kant's Critique, pp.65,314.
11. Abbott, Kant's Ethics, pp.137-9 and note on p.139.
12. Ibid., pp.19-20.
13. Ibid., p.259.
14. Ibid., p.253.
15. Ibid., p.253.
16. Ibid., p.169.
17. Ibid., p.250.
18. Ibid., p.245.
19. Ibid., p.255.
20. Ibid., p.245.
21. Ibid., p.254.
22. Ibid., p.192.
23. Ibid., pp.193-4, p.351.
24. Ibid., p.193.
25. Ibid., p.330.
26. Ibid., p.172.
27. Ibid., p.330.
28. Ibid., p.172.
29. Ibid., p.169.
30. Ibid., p.169.
31. Ibid., p.164.

32. Ibid., p.165.
33. Ibid., p.172.
34. Ibid., p.170.
35. Ibid., pp.255, 253.
36. Ibid., pp.166-8.
37. Ibid., p.172.
38. Ibid., pp.169-70.
39. Ibid., pp.250-1.

III

Richard Price

An Appeal to Rational Insight

What His View Needs to Make it Work

Section 1: The Present Status of the Argument, and Why Price has been Selected as the Main Representative for Moral Intuitionism

We have attempted to show that the history of philosophy consistently maintains the thesis of the practicality of reason, if 'reason' is interpreted in its experiential or intuitive sense. We argued that this was so even in the case of Hume, despite explicit statements to the contrary, in view of the intentional character of his "moral impressions or passions"; and we argued, too, that this was the case with Kant, despite his explicit denial of intellectual intuitions, in view of his implicit appeal to moral insight as the ultimate justification for specific moral claims. We claimed, therefore, that the heart of the controversy did not revolve around whether there was such moral apprehension, but over the elucidation of it, i.e., over what would count as an adequate theory of intuition--a necessary condition for an adequate theory of the practicality of reason.

Such an adequate theory of intuition could not be provided by either Hume's empiricism or Kant's idealism because, we suggested, of their nominalism--an "original defect," as Reid might have put it, inlaid in those systems and especially attributable to DesCartes, but, very possibly, originally rooted in the pre-scientific materialism inherent in the beginning of philosophical investigation itself. To avoid, therefore, the skepticism that has inevitably resulted from that defect we suggested we return to the intuitive foundation that we claim all the great philosophers have themselves appealed to and subject it to rigorous scrutiny in order to erect thereon an adequate theory of reason's practicality. Toward this end the general aim in this section of our paper is to examine more closely the traditional intuitionist standpoint on the thesis of the practicality of reason. We shall consider the view of its leading modern representative, Richard Price, and attempt to discover what such a view needs to make it philosophically plausible.

With respect to why we would choose Price as the leading modern representative of the intuitionist standpoint, it has been said of his ethical theory: ". . . soon after its publication, the [Price's] *Review* was acknowledged to be the most able defense of rational intuitionism in the English language."[1] C. D. Broad has taken a similar stand: "Until Ross published his book *The Right and the Good* in 1930 there existed, so far as I know, no statement and defense of what may be called the "rationalistic" [intuitionist] type of ethical theory comparable in merit to Price's."[2] But, further, Price's Review, like Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, was written in large part as a response to the challenge set by Hume; thus, it more intimately connects us with the modern foundations of the three main types of ethical theories dominating contemporary ethical scholarship: ethical empiricism, idealism, and intuitionism. The manner in which Price and Hume engaged in controversy also bears mentioning here as a model for us all. They did not engage in intellectual warfare as enemies or opponents, but, rather, as colleagues in a common pursuit of truth. In this regard Hume was very impressed with Price because he, unlike so many others, gave Hume a fair and attentive hearing. So at home was Hume apparently with Price that in private correspondence he even conceded to him the inconclusivity of certain of his arguments.[3]

Section 2: Price's General Argument for the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason and Initial Evaluation of It

That Price maintained the thesis of the practicality of reason can hardly be denied. Everything he says, explicitly and implicitly, breathes out both its spirit and form:

> . . . excitement belongs to the very ideas of moral right and wrong, and is essentially inseparable from the apprehension of them. . . . An affection or inclination to rectitude cannot be separated from the view of it. The knowledge of what is right, without any approbation of it, or concern to practice it, is not conceivable or possible. And this knowledge will certainly be attended with correspondent, actual practice, whenever there is nothing to oppose it.[4]

This much is clear. What is, however, of principal concern to us is not the mere fact that he held the thesis--perhaps, not even that it is true. We shall consider his elucidation or account of it in order that we might better understand in precisely what sense it may be true.

Price's primary form of justification for the thesis of the practicality of reason is not deduction or any formal ratiocinative process of reasoning, but "experience," or an intuitively based analysis of reason generally and of moral reason in particular. Nonetheless, we may formulate an explicit argument for his view as follows:

> Argument A:
> <p> Some moral ideas constrain moral action <q> All moral ideas are rational ideas
> ____
> <r> Therefore, some rational ideas constrain moral action

The argument, as stated, is valid, but to evaluate its soundness we shall consider each of the premises, <p> & <q>, in turn. With respect, then, to premise <p>, that some moral ideas constrain moral action, we should note first, that in one sense this premise is unobjectionable. It is conceded by all, and by Hume and Kant in particular, that something constrains or determines moral action. If we take 'ideas' in the widest possible sense, so as to include 'impressions' (or 'passions'), we can see immediately how premise <p> may appear quite Humean. It should be clear, therefore, why Price, Hume and others of their day assumed that the most fundamental point of controversy was not over premise <p>, but over premise <q>, the claim that all moral ideas are rational ideas. In other words, the central issue was over the nature of the faculty that apprehends moral distinctions.[5]

Before considering this second premise, <q>, however, we should at least take note of the weakened quantifier 'some,' rather than 'all,' in premise <p> above. For, it is not the case for either Price or Hume, regardless of which faculty apprehends moral distinctions, that just any moral idea or passion constrains moral action. This is significant in view of the fact that one might be tempted to believe that the issue of the constraint on moral action is a problem for the moral rationalist alone. In fact, it is a problem whether one holds the thesis of the practicality of reason or the thesis of the practicality of the passions. For, in either case, one must distinguish those moral ideas or passions that constrain from those that do not.

The point, therefore, of the rationalist's claim with respect to the practicality of reason is not that just any kind of moral consciousness constrains moral action, but that *only thought of a sufficiently enriched or complex form* does so. It is this that he has his eye on; it is this that he is attempting to analyze, and it is this that he always (even if not sufficiently) distinguishes from thought (or passion) which lacks the sufficient complexity or richness for the governance of action. Thus, Socrates distinguished the power of true knowledge or wisdom from the weakness of mere opinion, and in one form or another, as we have seen, so also did Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, etc.. The distinction between "ideas" that constrain and ideas that do not, therefore, is emphatically not a distinction reserved for the moral rationalist alone--it is incumbent upon all to distinguish these two cases of "ideas," especially in analyzing cases of moral "conflict." In subsequent discussion it will be important for us to keep this distinction constantly in view.

Section 3: Stage #1 of the Analysis of Premise <q>, that All Moral Ideas are Rational Ideas

Price's General Epistemology

Section 3A: The Argument [B] for <q> Stated with an Initial Evaluation of It; the Necessity of General Epistemological Investigations to Resolve the Moral Problem

What reasons does Price give, then, for his second premise, <q>, that all moral ideas are rational ideas? Once again, the primary form of justification appealed to is experience, but that does not exclude the formulation of an argument which may better help us locate his position within the context of his times in contrast to our own. The explicitly formulated argument for premise <q>, then, is as follows:

> Argument B:
> <s> Either moral ideas are rational ideas or moral ideas are sensible ideas (since, <s'> all ideas are either rational or sensible).
> <t>No moral ideas are sensible ideas.
>
> ---
>
> <q> Therefore, all moral ideas are rational ideas.

The argument is, of course, valid, but to evaluate its soundness we shall consider each of the premises, <s> and <t>, in turn. This analysis will take up the main body of this chapter. Let us, then, first consider premise <s>, that either moral ideas are rational or sensible.

We have indicated that premise <s> is itself grounded in the assumption <s'>: all ideas are either rational or sensible. That all ideas are either rational or sensible was not an assumption unique to Price, but a common assumption of his time. On one hand, it was assumed that there were sense "ideas," or ideas that persons had in common with brutes or animals; on the other hand, that there were rational ideas, or ideas that persons had uniquely. Hume's central argument against the thesis of the practicality of reason was grounded precisely on this assumption among others. He argued that moral ideas were sense ideas on the basis of his claim that they were not rational ideas.6 Price, then, merely follows Hume and the others of their day in the appeal to what seemed to them a self evident truth:

> For, granting that we have perceptions of moral right and wrong, they must denote, either what the actions, to which we apply them, are, or only our feelings; and the power of perceiving them must be, either that power whose object is truth, or some implanted power or sense. If the former is true, then is morality equally unchangeable with all truth: If, on the contrary, the latter is true, then is it that only which, according to the different constitutions of the senses of beings, it appears to be to them.[7]

This distinction, however, more recently has been called in question--especially by some of Price's commentators.8 It is a charge, too, leveled not merely against Price, but against more recent deontologists as well, e.g., Prichard, Ross, Carritt and Raphael.9 For, first, one might plausibly argue that it is possible that what we call "rational ideas" may be reducible to sense ideas in much the same way as it is commonly supposed we can reduce water to H20. If so, then, there may not be two kinds of cognitive functions at all. But, second, it may also seem plausible that there are other types of 'ideas' or, at least, morally relevant "principles of action" which lie outside this restricted scope, e.g., a principle of "conscience guided will."10 Or, third, it may equally be plausible that when we speak of moral "ideas" constraining action we mean a unique class of "ideas" explicable only in terms of two or more of the general classes of ideas or principles of action mentioned above such that adequate elucidation cannot place them merely in one or the other category without falsifying their nature.

In any case, if anything is clear from our study so far it is that the elucidation of the nature of our ideas in general, not to mention other mental functions or principles, is by no means a task that is clear in its own nature. It is, therefore, necessary before discussing <q> or the nature and origin of our moral ideas, to elucidate as precisely as we can the nature of our ideas in general. Price understands this. The recognition of the need for such general epistemological studies for moral or ethical theory is one of the distinguishing features of his contribution to modern ethics.[11] Of the significance of such epistemological investigations to his own moral theory Price says:

> *There is nothing in this Treatise, which I wish more I could engage the reader's attention to, or which, I think, will require it more, than the first Chapter, and particularly the second Section of it [on the origin of ideas]. If I have failed here, I have failed in my chief design.*[12]

Section 3B: Price's Methodology for Resolving the Unclarity Concerning the Nature of Ideas

To resolve this issue of the nature and origin of our ideas in general, Price pre-eminently appeals to an empirical or, at least, experiential methodology. He would have each one of us *look for ourselves* to determine, most generally, what things are, and, more specifically, what our ideas are, rather than relying on the received "wisdom" of the day. In this respect Price is merely appealing to a criterion of truth and justification that the whole tradition of philosophy acquiesces in. But it does not follow from this that the whole tradition relies on this criterion equally explicitly or consistently. In fact, we have offered reason to believe that, especially in the case of Hume and Kant, no explicit clarification was given of the nature of that discerning or intuitive function of mind that apprehended either impressions, concepts or "objects" of any kind. Moreover, in view of this shortcoming, one is left more vulnerable to deeply rooted social tendencies to rely on dogmatic apriori assumptions about the mind and its ideas rather than intuitive justification alone. It was assumed, for example, that the mind's ideas and "knowledge" were wholly restricted to physical representations, and its objects to impressions or conceptions of the physical--leading, we claimed, to the general skepticism and possibly even moral nihilism of our day. The method of the tradition generally, and of Hume and Kant in particular, therefore, was not consistently "empirical" in the sense of constructing an epistemology on the examination of the mind's cognitive activities *themselves*.

One of the distinguishing features of Price's methodology, then, lies in his clearer or more explicit, as well as more consistent, appeal to experience or intuition as the fundamental criterion of truth and justification. He would have us look at our experiences or intuitions themselves, as well as the objects of such experiences, *to see what they are* or how they present themselves to be--without attempting to force our theories of what they must be like on the facts themselves. Like Kant, in particular, then, but far more more consistently and explicitly, Price's appeal is truly to "knowledge . . . within the reach of every man, even the commonest."13

Section 3C: The Nature and "Origin" of Our Ideas in General and of Rational and Sense Ideas in Particular

To discern the nature and origin of our ideas in general, Price would have us, then, look at our ideas themselves and how they originate in consciousness. He simply takes this appeal to be self-evident and/or implied in the very notion of an "original" idea.14 If we are to know what a rose is and how it differs from other flowers, roses, etc., or if we are to know what a whale is and how it differs from other mammals, fish, etc., we look--attentively, carefully, rigorously--at these things themselves to discern, in terms of the features they have or lack, what they are and how they differ from other things. So, too, Price claims, we can do this in the case of our ideas; and, in so doing, an initial examination presents three distinct meanings or references for the term 'idea':

> In short. There are three senses in which the word idea has been used, and which it is necessary to distinguish.--It has been used to signify sensation itself. Thus tastes, sounds and colours are often called ideas. But this is using the word very unwarrantably.--It is also used to signify the mind's conception or apprehension of any object. This, I think, is its most just and proper sense.--It is further used to signify the *immediate* object of the mind in thinking. This sense of an idea is derived from the notion that when we think of any object, there is something *immediately* present to the mind, which it perceives and contemplates.[15]

These three senses of the word 'idea' comprise, then, what Price construes to be, an exhaustive catalogue or inventory of ideas. We may subsequently refer to them respectively as sense ideas, rational ideas and ideas as objects. We can, however, immediately discard as a unique class of ideas, 'ideas as objects'; for, although it is true that whenever we refer to an idea it becomes an "object" of thought, that would not mark it off in a distinct category from the other two types of ideas. This is important. For Price believes one of the primary reasons for our general epistemological and moral confusions is due to our not sufficiently attending to the clear, although general, distinction between an idea and its object. Often, what is in truth not an idea, but the distinct or independent object of an idea is characterized as if it were the idea itself, and this is especially true, Price believes, in the case of moral data. And, although Price would be the first to concede with Hume that it is very difficult to carry out the "superior penetration" (in Hume's language) which discerns which items are ideas and which objects, all philosophers acknowledge that there is such a general distinction--that things-in-themselves or the objects of ideas are not the same as the ideas themselves and we must not conflate them. As Joseph Butler, one of both Price's and Hume's mentors, put it, "Everything is what it is and not another thing."16 Ideas as objects, therefore, need not be considered as a special class of ideas.

Turning, then, to the remaining ideas of sense and reason, we should note initially and most generally, that the notion that there is a general pre-analytic common-sense distinction between sense ideas and rational ideas is indisputable. It is true that both persons and animals appear to share many types of "ideas," e.g., apprehensions of and desires for: food and drink, physical pleasure--even, perhaps, parental affection, natural benevolence, etc.. But persons appear to have certain ideas which animals lack. At least, few of us would sit down with a dog, chimpanzee or even dolphin (to pick the best examples) and ask its opinion on the nature of gravity, the motion of the planets and the stars, the solution to an equation in the mathematical or logical calculi, or the meaning and purpose of life. Such a general and vague distinction between sense ideas and rational ideas does not, of course, take us very far, but it does seem to point to some difference between certain of man's conceptions and that of other animals.

The central issue, then, is not so much whether there is some difference between these ideas, but one's account of the difference; and, for Price, what we most need to attend to in order to elucidate this difference is the origin of these ideas. For Price concedes to Hume that all our ideas, in some sense, originate in sense or subjective experience. If this, then, is all "empiricism" means--that the ultimate origin or foundation of all human knowledge is in sensation--then we are all empiricists, since it is doubtful whether anyone ever seriously denied it. Even Plato, we may recall, held that sense ideas were necessary for re-collection of the Eternal Ideas, and Price explicitly states that rational ideas are "not first in time."17 What we most need to know, then, is not whether sensation is in some sense "original," but in what sense and how, precisely, rational ideas originate therefrom. More specifically, we need to ask: Does the fact that rational ideas originate, or are "founded" in sense ideas, entail that they are, somehow, reducible to sense impressions, experiences or ideas?; or, is it possible, despite such a foundation, for genuinely new or original (simple indefinable) rational ideas to emerge from, or via the mediation of, sense without being reducible thereto?[18]

i) Sense Ideas

Turning our attention, then, to "sense ideas," Price claims that eidetic analysis reveals that they may be most generally and essentially characterized as ". . . implying nothing real without the mind; that is, nothing real besides its own affections and sensations," and he further subdivides them into (i) "the immediate effects of impressions on the bodily senses," e.g., tastes, smells, and colors; and, (ii) ideas arising only by occasion of other ideas; "as the effects in us of considering order, happiness, and the beauties of poetry, sculpture . . ."19 In either case, however, Price's general position appears to be that animals as well as people have the capacity to have their own state altered in specific ways in virtue of their having sense organs and in virtue of their physical contact or causal interrelations with an external material world. There is data "passively" received but not yet known much like a plant or rock may receive an alteration of state but not "know" anything at all. That is to say, the mere fact that one has some sensation or sense idea, e.g., of railroad tracks converging, is alone insufficient to constitute knowledge that what is experienced is as it momentarily may appear to be. As Price puts it:

> *Sense* consists in the obtruding of certain impressions upon us, independently of our wills; but it cannot perceive what they are, or whence they are derived. It lies prostrate under its object, and *is only a capacity in the soul of having its own state altered by the influence of particular causes.* It must therefore remain a stranger to the objects and causes affecting it.[20] [Emphasis mine.]

But, despite this initial plausibility, Price's characterization of sense ideas may not be all that clear. For what does he mean by the claim that sense ideas "imply no-thing real without the mind" or that it must "remain a stranger to the objects and causes effecting it?" Surely he cannot mean that they do not, in any sense, refer to "objects"--even independently existing objects--nor can he mean that they give us nothing with respect to the existential content of our ideas relevant to the determination of the existence of their objects. For, in that case, how could he reconcile this with his claim that "Sense presents particular forms ["individuals"] to the mind; . . . [or] Sense sees only the outside of things . . ."[21] Or, perhaps more importantly, how, in that case, would it be possible to know anything at all? Second, although Price was acutely sensitive to the necessity of carefully distinguishing the apprehension or conception of an object from the object apprehended, this does not guarantee that he is always successful or even clear in the attempt.[22] For, according to Price, impenetrability presents itself as a genuine feature of material objects, while color, allegedly, presents itself as a quality of the experience of an organism. But, on the basis of the mere appeal to experience or intuition, there appears to be no initial justification for such a bifurcation: white color presents itself to intuition just as much a quality of, e.g., this wall before me, as impenetrability. In view of these considerations, therefore, Price may well appear unclear, inconsistent and possibly even arbitrary in his intuitions.

Undoubtedly, there is some warrant to the above criticism. In the latter case, especially, i.e., with respect to color qualities, there is, perhaps, a genuine inconsistency, and one, which we need and shall address later on. But even given such inconsistency (which may well be due partially to the complexity of the subject matter and partially to the age-old difficulty of consistently relying on insight rather than deeply embedded conventional tendencies to conflate assumptions with genuine intuitions) this in no way invalidates Price's general claim regarding sense. Moreover, in spite of the problems above, Price's general position may still be made relatively clear. His claim is merely that in every sense experience the sensation or sense idea itself is solely a particular temporal unit resulting from a physical organism's causal contact with a material world, and if it refers at all it refers only to the "outside" or a part-icular of an objectivity rather than the objectivity as a "whole" or what it really and essentially is. For example, a particular momentary percept of railroad tracks converging gives us only a particular appearance or perspective with respect to railroad tracks themselves, but does not alone tell us whether that momentary percept is true: it does not even tell us what the object of that percept essentially is. Price's general claim about the nature of sense ideas, then, may well seem to retain its initial plausibility. Sense ideas in and of themselves do not appear to imply existence or truth, and, in view of this fact, we may perhaps better understand how animals can be said to "think," i.e., have sense ideas, and yet fail to "know" anything at all. There is little doubt, for example, that animals are capable of having particular sensations of objects, e.g., percepts of the person standing before them or another animal attempting to steal their food, but it is highly questionable whether such sensations or ideas constitute knowledge of truth.

ii) Rational Ideas

Price claims that persons, however, as distinct from animals, "necessarily desire some farther acquaintance with [these particular ideas and, thereby, with their correlative objects],"[23] i.e., there is "something more" we can both desire and come to "see." We are not, for example, confined to mere particular sense impressions--not even mere conjunctions of such impressions--of railroad tracks converging, but we can go beyond such sensations in the veridical or rational apprehension that in truth railroad tracks do not converge. Rational ideas, then, in contrast to mere sense ideas, have the capacity for knowledge--they *do imply real and independent existence and truth.*

For Price, this means that the mind has an "active" function: it observes (compares, evaluates) the particular or distinct features of objects provided by "passive" sensa and in so doing comes to "see" or apprehend in them or through them something new, viz., a universal quality they share, which mere sense, of course, since it is limited to particulars, cannot provide.

> By the notices conveyed to the mind through the organs of the body, or its observation of the necessary attendants and concomitants of certain sensations and impressions, it perceives the figure, extension, motion, and other primary qualities of material substances. By contemplating itself, it perceives the properties of spiritual substances, volition, consciousness, memory, &c. *To all these ideas, it is essential that they have invariable archetypes actually existing, to which they are referred and supposed to be conformable.*[Italics mine.]
>
> After the mind, from whatever possible causes, has been furnished with ideas of any objects, *they become themselves objects to our intellectual faculty; from whence arises a new set of ideas, which are the perceptions of this faculty.*[Italics mine.] Previously to this, whatever ideas we may be furnished with, nothing is understood. Whatever subjects of knowledge there may be in the mind, nothing is known.[24]

The "newness" at issue, then, is a newness applicable to both the idea and its correlative object. Both are universal or non-sensuous, and, as in the case of sense ideas, Price claims there are two main types:

> The Second class [of ideas] may be subdivided into such as denote the real properties of external objects, and the actions and passions of the mind: And those, which I have described as derived immediately from intelligence.[25]

In either case, however, Price is referring to a new or unique class of rational ideas not reducible to sense, and in the case of "higher order" rational ideas, i.e., those "derived immediately from intelligence," he is referring to a unique type of rational idea not reducible to rational ideas of the lower type. When he uses the term "derived," therefore, he does not mean a logical or combinatorial process of reasoning. This is significant. For in the empiricism of, e.g., Locke and Hume, the rational power of mind is restricted to the comparison of "objects" or "matters of fact" which sense alone, allegedly, can provide. But Price, in accord with the tendency of contemporary scholarship, recognizes the insufficiency of mere sense to account for these rational ideas (e.g., conceptions, propositions). At least, modern empirical attempts to reduce, for example, propositions, numbers and linguistic types to sentences, numerals and linguistic tokens or sensible psychological states--not to mention logical, combinatorial and intentional relations to natural causal relations--have failed. This is so, despite the attempts of some more tenacious empiricists, e.g., Hartry Field, to do *Science without Numbers*. For, even Field acknowledges that even if we concede that he is successful in reducing talk of numbers to talk of numerals (which is a considerable and, for the most part unwarranted, concession) there remains the problem of doing *Science without Linguistic Types*.[26]

It is because sense ideas, qua particulars, lack this capacity that price claims the true, authentic or proper sense of the word 'idea' is inapplicable to them. To refer to sensations as sense "ideas" misleadingly suggests that they are capable, in and of themselves, of objective reference, i.e., of the apprehension of necessity or universality. But they are not, Price claims, capable of such objectivity and their association with genuine ideas obscures this fact. In light of this claim, even the characterization of sensation as "subjective" or "particular" must be carefully handled. For, in one sense, the momentary percept of railroad tracks converging is not given, qua mere sense idea, as the same for you or for me, nor even the same for either one of us on multiple occasions. It can only be given as the same in multiple instances if such a percept has or instantiates a certain universal property. Otherwise, how is it that we all can know what it is to experience this type of sensation? To perceive that element of sameness in or through multiple presentations is, once again, precisely to perceive via a rational or non-sensible idea.

To show that rational ideas are not reducible to sense ideas and that they are not, therefore, identical to any mere "habits of association" or "custom," but that they are genuinely new or original ideas, Price presents a number of arguments in conjunction with the experiential or intuitive analysis of particular cases. With respect to such cases, then, each individual is expected to sincerely undertake the attempt to "look" at how one comes to acquire one's ideas of particular types of objects. In proceeding in this manner, Price contends, we can come to see essential differences between mere sense ideas and rational ideas.

In terms of a general illustration of this difference Price claims, in agreement with Aristotle in his De Anima, that we can observe a general judgmental power attributable to the mind that simply cannot be reduced to the limited province of each of our senses:

> . . . that the power which judges of the perceptions of the senses, and contradicts their decisions; which discovers the nature of the sensible qualities of objects, enquires into their causes, and distinguishes between what is real and what is not real in them, must be a power within us which is superior to sense.[27]

He points out that each sense or organ is characterized in terms of it having its own appropriate object. One sense, therefore, cannot "judge" of the objects of another sense.28 The ear cannot "perceive" color, nor can the eye "perceive" sound. What, then, Price would ask, is it that is capable of looking at and comparing the distinct data of all the senses in order to determine, for example, whether or not they actually present an existing object--or even the same object whether or not it exists--at different times? It is without doubt that our senses sometimes deceive us. The impressions we receive via the mediation of our senses sometimes represent objects in a way they are not. One "sees" a dead animal on the road, which in reality is just a rag, and another "hears" a gunshot while driving on the freeway, which, in reality, is merely the backfire of a car. What, then, is it that holds before its view a number of such impressions in order to judge between, and by means of them, in the apprehension of truth? In short, what is it that has this capacity to know? Price answers, it cannot, for the reasons given, be just another sense. Rather, it presents itself to us as a power of in-sight or under-standing; there is something we can know in or under all these sometimes conflicting particular impressions; something that provides unity and identity amidst diversity and change. In sum: there is a power of understanding capable of apprehending objects as they are essentially, or in-themselves, in or through the mediation of sense, in the acquisition of new or original rational ideas.

> Sense presents *particular* forms to the mind; but cannot rise to any general ideas. It is the intellect that examines and compares the presented forms, that rises above individuals to universal and abstract ideas; and thus looks downward upon objects, takes in at one view an infinity of particulars, and is capable of discovering general truths. -- Sense sees only the outside of things, reason acquaints itself with their natures. -- Sensation is only a mode of feeling in the mind; but knowledge implies an active energy of the mind.[29]

To further elucidate the distinctive newness or originality of rational ideas Price would have us consider any of the vast number of concrete cases of ideas we are all intimately familiar with. He has us consider, for example, the familiar case of pain. We have all experienced painful sensations and, no doubt, animals have also. But it is one thing to merely have, or subjectively experience, painful sensations and quite another to have an objective apprehension or conception of pain, i.e., a conception of what it is and what its causes are. To apprehend pain, in the latter sense, it may be necessary for us to have had particular sensations of pain in order to determine what it is and how it differs from other things. But the determination or judgment of what pain is is distinct from the particular sensations of pain "used" in the acquisition of that apprehension. If this were not so, it would be inexplicable how one can think of pain, describe it to one's physician and have him understand what we mean even when one is not now experiencing or feeling it. There is, therefore, certainly some difference between feeling pain and knowing what it is. Once again, Price:

> In a word, it appears that *sense* and *understanding* are faculties of the soul totally different: The one being conversant only about *particulars*; the other about *universals*: the one not *discerning*, but *suffering*; the other not *suffering*, but *discerning*; and signifying the soul's *Power* of surveying and examining all things, in order to judge of them; which *Power*, perhaps, can hardly be better defined, than by calling it, in Plato's language, the power in the soul to which belongs , or the apprehension of TRUTH.[30]

Of the vast number of concrete cases Price would have us consider to elucidate the essential difference between rational ideas and sense ideas Price mentions, for example, the ideas of solidity (impenetrability), inertia, sub-stance, duration, space, infinity, equality, identity, power or causation, abstract ideas, etc.. It is not necessary for us to consider all these cases. Even one clear case is sufficient to prove his point. This is important in view of the fact that a very common form of "argument," or rather rhetorical device, often used to call in question such cases is the attempt to find borderline or unclear cases and then to "argue" from these to the unclarity or falsity even of the self-evident cases. But we have already shown the invalidity of such "arguments." Nonetheless, it will help us to drive Price's point home if we consider just a few more of these cases in some detail.

Let us consider, then, the idea of impenetrability. It is necessary, of course, for us to acquire this idea that we have, some time or other, observed particular cases of two bodies touching yet not penetrating each other.[31] It is on the basis of such sense experiences of particular cases that we can acquire the clear idea or conception that no body can, in the nature of the case, penetrate another body. But if all we "knew" were these mere particular sense observations, this idea of the necessary or essential impenetrability of bodies would be inexplicable. For, there are many cases in which sense alone presents apparent exceptions to this necessity, i.e., instances in which two substances appear to run together. For example, in magic shows we seem to see a person walk through a wall or pass a coin or ball through glass. What, then, is it that enables us to know that such cases are mere illusions or false appearances? How can mere sense distinguish between what is authentic or veridical in such cases and what is not? In fact, it, alone, cannot. Mere sense "ideas" cannot account for ideas of necessity or the absolute assurance in every case of that kind.

Nor can elucidation be hoped for by the appeal to mere habits of association, custom or empirical generalizations. For, as Hume well recognized, habit or custom can never give us the kind of necessity or universality that we so clearly experience in these cases--it can never imply existence and truth. It is not a case of a mere inductive probability, as in the case of the probability of "heads" on repeated flips of a coin, but the case where one knows with certainty that no material body can, in the nature of the case, penetrate another.

> The eye of sense is blunt. The conceptions of the imagination are rude and gross, falling *infinitely* short of that certainty, accuracy, universality, and clearness, which belong to *intellectual discernment*.[32]

In Hume's observations of the relation of causality, the recognition of the insufficiency of sense is especially evident: for, "what we observe by our external senses is properly no more than that one thing follows another or the constant conjunction of certain events, e.g., the melting of wax after placing it in the flame of a candle.[33] What we never see (by sense alone) is that one thing causes another. The primary difference, then, between Hume and Price in this respect essentially consists in the fact that Hume is forced on grounds of principle to conclude that such cases are inexplicable, while Price is not. Indeed, Price can and does offer some account of it.

In disposing of "custom" or "habits of association" in this brief manner we must emphasize that this in no way implies that such habits are not of absolutely fundamental importance for an adequate elucidation of knowledge generally, the moral life in particular and the theory of the practicality of reason above all. We need and shall discuss in detail the relevance of such habits--especially the "motivation" associated therewith--to our thesis in the following two chapters. But it bears mentioning now that there is a sense of "newness" applicable to such habits which is "something more" than the particular sense impressions which make it up. That is, it is evident that the repetition of particular sense ideas of the same type can elicit something new experientially, e.g., an "expectation" of the recurrence of some event. One sees, for example, the same woman on a number of occasions with brown hair and so is momentarily shocked when she next appears as a blonde. The expectation in such a case is evidently "something more" than one of the particular impressions that constitute it, and, yet, does not imply any new or original type of idea. But such cases fall infinitely short of that apprehension of necessity that we have found in the cases already mentioned.

To consider, then, one last case, before turning to the analysis of moral ideas, let us consider the nature and origin of abstract ideas. Price is well aware of the fact that many philosophers claim such ideas are formed or created by the mind rather than perceived or discovered. This, of course, is especially important both in light of Price's appeal to the "active" power of mind and the tendency of modern idealism to interpret this as an appeal to the formation rather than the discovery of the mind's objects. But Price claims if this were true, then it would follow that one has such ideas at the very moment they are supposed to be forming them. It is assumed, for example, that one has a particular idea or image of a particular triangle in mind when one attempts to form or create a general one. But in order to form such a general triangle, applicable to many if not all cases, it seems one must already have some conception in mind of what to do, i.e., some conception of the properties or characteristics attributable to any and all particular triangles in contrast to circles, squares, etc.. When an architect draws a particular roof pitch (angle) on the blueprints for a home surely he, the builder and their client must be aware that that particular pitch or angle relates to "something more" than the mere particular angle on the blueprints. If not, it is difficult to see how the discussion of it can be of much or any value to the builder or the client with respect to the roof pitch of the home.

Thus, via the intuitive examination of the nature and origin of our ideas we can experientially verify that we do have original rational ideas which are not reducible to sense. Their originality consists primarily in the fact that they are first with respect to their kind and from them, it is alleged, subsequent or higher order rational ideas may be derived. But, and, perhaps, most emphatically, their originality does not consist in any alleged independence of their origin with respect to sense. Nothing Price has said is even opposed to acknowledging the necessity of some sense data for the acquisition of every rational idea. Rather, the point is merely that such "sense ideas" are entirely insufficient to rise to those distinct kinds of ideas attributable to reason or rational creatures alone.

> All that can be pictured in the imagination, as well as all that we take notice of by our senses, is indeed particular. And whenever any general notions are present in the mind, the imagination, at the same time, is commonly engaged in representing to itself some of the particulars comprehended under them. But it would be a very strange inference from hence, that we have none but particular ideas. As well almost might we conclude, that we have no other notion of any thing than of its name, because they are so associated in our minds that we cannot separate them; or of the sun, than as a white, bright circle, such as we see in the heavens, because this image is apt to accompany all our thoughts of it.[34]

Section 3D: A Brief Critique of Price's Account of Rational Ideas

We believe that Price's general account of rational ideas, above, is plausible and in its generality for the most part true. But when we turn to some of the details of his account, the vagueness--perhaps even inconsistency--of his account, especially from a more contemporary standpoint, may tempt us to question the legitimacy of his claims altogether. For example, Price essentially characterizes rational ideas as implying real and independent existence and truth, but in doing so he seems to conflate objective reference with a referent that exists. It is one thing, for example, to think of the "nature" or "essence" of a unicorn--what it objectively is, or, rather, what properties it would have if it existed--it is quite another to claim that a particular unicorn or the class of unicorns exists. The rationality of an idea seems to define a certain class of ideas as objective or universal and as such commune-icable, but it does not seem as a class to imply real and independent existence and truth as Price appears to claim. But, if this is true, then the attempt to ground the authenticity of moral ideas, i.e., the truth and existence of their objects, on this distinction may equally appear to fail:

> For, granting that we have perceptions of moral right and wrong, they must denote, either what the actions, to which we apply them, are, or only our feelings; and the power of perceiving them must be, either that power whose object is truth, or some implanted power or sense. If the former is true, then is morality equally unchangeable with all truth: If, on the contrary, the latter is true, then is it that only which, according to the different constitutions of the senses of beings, it appears to be to them.[35]

No doubt, there is warrant to this criticism. But, in response, Price's aim seems merely to be to elucidate a general and fundamental distinction between the function of the sensibility and reason or the understanding, not to provide a detailed elucidation of certain differences within the class of rational ideas. In view of this fact Price might have said that it is not that our rational ideas always perceive truth but that they alone, in contrast to sense, have the capacity to apprehend truth. The essential dispositional property or capacity to perceive truth does not entail that every idea of that rational faculty necessarily is one in which truth is discovered, but that it is something that faculty can do, even if it is not doing it in some particular instance, in much the same way as a glass pitcher can break even if it is not now broken.

Moreover, this capacity to apprehend truth is essentially tied to our capacity to compare and contrast distinct or particular sense ideas of objects in the apprehension both of what a thing is and that it is. We need to be able to compare and contrast a number of distinct or particular sense ideas in order not only to determine what a thing is but in order to determine that the thing merely thought of is the same thing that presents itself to us as an actually existing object or truth. In short, the mere rational capacity to apprehend universality or sameness is a necessary, although insufficient, condition for the apprehension of truth or existence.

> To all these ideas, it is essential that they have invariable archetypes actually existing, to which they are referred and supposed to be conformable.[36]

> Sense presents particular forms to the mind; but cannot rise to any general ideas. It is the intellect that examines and compares the presented forms, that rises above individuals to universal and abstract ideas; [37]

But even if Price's general claim, above, is true, the modern sensitivity to alleged non-existent "objects," e.g., mermaids and unicorns, not to mention inconsistent or contradictory objects such as round-squares, may make the claim of "invariable archetypes actually existing" suspect. For, how do we distinguish between "invariable archetypes" that exist from those that do not? Or, from the side of experience, how do we distinguish between veridical rational apprehensions and unveridical ones? The historical personality, Socrates, is reidentifiable over time (not to mention the historical "Snow White"). He may appear, therefore, to have a "nature" or "essence." But Socrates does not exist. What, then, is the ontological status of his essence? Thus, even if we grant to Price that there is some sense in which one might appeal to knowledge, rather than the mere thought of universals, the distinction is not sufficiently clear.

Certainly this is a shortcoming in Price's account. But it is, nonetheless, clear that when Price speaks of rational ideas as implying existence, and, especially, as implying the existence of universals, he has in mind a certain type of rational idea. In such cases, he is clearly attending to an idea which he observes has a certain quality of clarity or vivacity wherein the existing object at issue is clearly presented with the properties ascribed to it.38 He is appealing, in other words, precisely to the intuitive criterion of truth or justification wherein a sufficiently clear or vivid idea guarantees the existence of its object. If one knows X, it follows that X exists. Price, therefore, practically, if not theoretically, draws a distinction within the category of rational ideas between those ideas that have independently existing referents and those which do not--a point that I think simply must be kept in mind for an adequate appreciation or understanding of Price's stand on morality. For, it is quite clear that when he turns to an analysis of moral ideas the type of rational idea he has in mind is the veridical one. Undoubtedly, the lack of clarification of this intuition will prove to be the weakest point in his account, but that there is such a distinction to be found therein is, I think, sufficient to support his main claims about morality.

To conclude this discussion of Price's account of the general nature and origin of our ideas, I think he does offer justification for the traditional division of ideas into sense ideas and rational ideas, and he offers a strong but inadequate epistemological foundation for his subsequent analysis of moral ideas. He does not, however, provide a sufficiently rich or detailed account of just how rational ideas emerge or are derived from sense ideas; nor of how rational ideas emerge from each other. More importantly, he does not present an account of precisely how our rational ideas come to pass beyond mere referentiality in the apprehension of actually existing entities themselves.[39] He does not, therefore, provide an adequate theory of intuition. But with this initial account of ideas as a foundation we are now at least prepared to proceed to Price's analysis of the nature of our moral ideas or to the analysis of premise <t> that no moral ideas are sensible ideas.

Section 4: Stage #2 of the Analysis of Premise <q>, that All Moral Ideas are Rational Ideas

Price's Moral Epistemology

Section 4A: Price's Claim about the Status of Moral Ideas in View of His General Epistemology

In view of his general account of ideas above, Price claims that moral ideas are original rational ideas--not merely or solely matters of how one subjectively or arbitrarily feels, but objective matters of truth and falsity. Thus, the raping, butchering and murdering of a two-year old child is, Price would claim, wrong in the nature of the case--not merely wrong today and right tomorrow, but always or eternally wrong. Not wrong merely because you or I momentarily feel it is abhorrent, nor right because the murderer felt nothing at all (or even found it pleasing), but simply and essentially or inherently wrong, whether or not anyone feels anything at all. To be called upon to justify such a self-evident fact is, Price believes, a sad commentary of his time (perhaps, an even sadder commentary of our own), and to some of us it might well appear to be the kind of thing that only a modern day philosopher would waste his or her time on. But the prevalence of views to the contrary, at least apparently and on grounds of principle (if not practice), e.g., Hume's, Smith's and Hutcheson's, demands such a justification.

If, Price is correct--if moral ideas are simple or original and, as such, indefinable ideas of the understanding, then it should be apparent that the appropriate form of "justification" for them would not primarily be logical proof, but conceptual or intuitive analysis. This point is of special importance for Price's moral claims in view of the fact that in evaluating Price's "arguments" for the rational character of moral ideas, his commentators often seem to interpret him as essentially presenting logical proofs.[40] Taken in this way his claims may well appear inconsistent and many of his arguments invalid. We suggest, however, that such an interpretation of Price does not do justice to his intentions. It is true that such an interpretation is in some sense warranted--he is, of course, as we are now, presenting "justification" of some sort and he does present logical arguments for many of his claims--but this is not the primary form of justification he is appealing to.

That Price's primary form of justification for his moral claims is intuition--not logical proof--is substantiated by the whole tenor of his treatise, by his recognition of the fact that ultimate indefinables or ultimate premises are necessary conditions for the justification of anything at all and by his explicit and repeated appeals to self-evidency. We have already, I think, sufficiently shown this to be the case, but in view of such apparent criticism it bears repeating:

> Nothing can be done to convince a person, who professes to deny this, besides referring him to common sense. If he cannot find there the perception I have mentioned, he is not farther to be argued with, for the subject will not admit of argument; there being nothing clearer than the point itself disputed to be brought to confirm it.[41]

And with regard to moral ideas, in particular, Price says:

> Most of the confusion in which the question concerning the foundation of morals has been involved has proceeded from inattention to this remark. There are, undoubtedly, some actions that are ultimately approved, and for justifying which no reason can be assigned; as there are some ends, which are ultimately desired, and for chusing which no reason can be given. Were not this true; there would be an infinite progression of reasons and ends, and therefore nothing could be at all approved or desired.[42]

It also bears repeating that in making this appeal to "common sense" Price, like all the great philosophers, is not appealing to the mere general set of opinions or beliefs people actually hold. He is fully aware that there is a form of "common sense" which is "perverted," or "corrupted" or a mere matter of opinion and, as such, unreliable. His appeal to common-sense, then, is not an appeal to this, but an appeal to a rational capacity to clearly see or apprehend essential or necessary truths--a capacity all rational creatures are capable of in contrast to the special abilities, e.g., of mathematical logicians, that are reserved for the relatively few. His appeal, therefore, is the same appeal that, e.g., Kant makes despite his and his followers' frequent emphasis on consistency. In view of this fact it may be appropriate to compare Price's statements above with the following statement by Kant:

> Here it would be easy to show how . . . men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ; and that, therefore, we do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed . . . the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest.[43]

This point simply must be kept in mind as we proceed now to analyze Price's "arguments" for the claim that moral ideas are rational ideas or apriori.

First, then, let us consider *the argument from possibility*. Price says:

> It is undeniable, that many of our ideas are derived from our **INTUITION** of truth, or the discernment of the natures of things by the understanding. This therefore may be the source of our moral ideas. It is at least possible that right and wrong may denote what we understand and know concerning certain objects, . . .[44]

In response to such an "argument," one may, no doubt, object that a mere possibility simply does not imply an actuality.[45] After all, it is "possible" that there are extra-terrestrials in my bathroom, that Shirley MacLaine will be reincarnated as a turnip, etc.. The force of the argument may appear, therefore, considerably weak. But this is so only because the type of "possibility" one has in mind here is a mere logical possibility or mere lack of contradiction. The possibility in question is, then, seen on a par with the ridiculous cases cited above. Such an interpretation of Price, however, does not do justice to the actual meaning and force of his argument, since it does not accurately characterize the type of possibility he has in mind.

For, first, we must keep in mind that all--including Hume, and his modern day followers--concede the appearance of objective moral facts, e.g., the rape, mutilation and murder of a child at least appears evil.46 Immediately we can see, therefore, that the moral case is unlike the ridiculous cases cited above. The fundamental ground for their doubt with respect to the moral case, then, does not lie here, but is rooted instead in more general epistemological claims with respect to the nature of our apprehensions and their "origins." Specifically, the moral sense theorist more or less implicitly denies that reason or the understanding is a source of new or original ideas, and/or they deny its applicability to the moral realm. In fact, all of Hume's arguments against the "rationality" of moral ideas, as well as against the practicality of reason, were grounded on this assumption among others. Hence, his arguments were merely directed against certain rationalist theories of morality which, allegedly, attempted to deduce moral propositions from non-moral propositions.

Price, however, has shown that there is no reason to deny that reason is a source of new ideas. Nothing whatsoever has been offered by Hume, which even needs to be considered as an objection to the claim that moral ideas are simple or original ideas given to the understanding. The most Hume has shown is that one cannot deduce a moral conclusion from non-moral premises. This, however, does not show either that morality is reducible to sense (or passion) or not "derivable" from the understanding. Such claims are simply assumed by Hume without justification on the basis of such dogmatic apriori assumptions as "all our ideas are either *impressions or copies of impressions*." But this assumption, as Price has shown, is "destitute of all proof; supposes, when applied in this as well as many other cases, the point in question; and, when pursued to its consequences, ends in the destruction of all truth and the subversion of our intellectual faculties."[47] Hence, there is no logical or rational objection to the claim that the understanding may be the source of our ideas of right and wrong.

But having shown both that moral ideas appear to be original rational ideas or apprehensions of real existence and truth, and that no reason whatsoever has been offered by Hume or anyone else to believe otherwise, Price has given "good reasons"--even if not conclusive--for placing moral ideas within the range of rational apprehensions of real independent existence and truth. In other words, the "possibility" that moral ideas are rational ideas; thus, ideas capable of perceiving moral truths, is no mere "logical possibility." At the very least, it is a cogent inductive probability grounded in the testimony of common-sense or intuitive experience which has not in any way been refuted. In more formal terms, given: <i> that moral ideas are either rational or sensible; <ii> that they are ordinarily thought to be rational apprehensions of real moral facts; <iii> that no evidence whatsoever has been offered (e.g., by Hume) to the contrary, and <iv> that it is a rule of applied logic that clearer claims are to be preferred to more doubtful ones,[48] there is good--even if not conclusive--evidence for the claim that moral ideas are rational ideas denoting "what we know concerning certain objects."

But Price by no means wishes to ground his claim on that argument alone. His primary "argument" is, as one would expect, the argument from intuition or common-sense and all other arguments may well be said to be ultimately rooted in the results of this. Price says:

> I know of no better way of determining this point, than by referring those who doubt it to common sense, and putting them upon con-sidering the nature of their own perceptions.--Could we suppose a person, who, when he perceived an external object, was at a loss to determine whether he perceived it by means of his organs of sight or touch; what better method could be taken to satisfy him? There is no possibility of doubting in any such cases. And it seems not more difficult to determine in the present case.[49]

Again, by "common sense" Price, like Kant, does not mean mere common opinion or belief which is, in a very important sense, opposed to the view he holds, for people "commonly" conflate objective properties of objects with their attending sensations.[50] Rather, he is referring to that careful, attentive, objective or intersubjectively verifiable looking at the nature or attributes of one's percepts (or the objects of one's percepts), which, although it is within the rational capacity of all, is not by any means "common" or easy--not even in the case of the looking at and the elucidation of sense. We are, then, to determine the nature of our moral ideas, as we did with respect to rational and sense ideas generally, by an appeal to the same type of intuition which is exemplified in cases where one analyzes one's perceptions of external objects to determine whether or not one obtains them by, e.g., sight or hearing. In doing so, Price claims we can, as in their case, "see" that moral ideas are of the rational type:

> . . . let any one compare the ideas arising from our *powers of sensation*, with those arising from our *intuition of the natures of things*, and enquire which of them his ideas of right and wrong most resemble. On the issue of such a comparison may we safely rest this question.[51]

Price would have us look at particular or concrete moral examples to determine whether our ideas of such cases are like cases of mere sense impressions, e.g., one's subjective visual impression of a flat earth or more like cases of objective truth and falsity, e.g., one's judgment that this ball will fall when dropped. The answer, he thinks, is clear. If someone took your child from your arms and repeatedly smashed his or her little head against a wall to test its sensitivity and endurance for pain, as the Nazi's did not so long ago, would this not be wrong? Or, is it merely or solely a matter of how you feel, which, if the feeling could be altered, e.g., by psychotropic drugs or brain stimulation, so would the moral character of the act? You say, "it appears wrong,"[52] but what reason can you have for doubting that it is as it appears to be?

There is no doubt that in conducting such an analysis, one observes that there are many subjective feelings, impressions or ideas attending one's moral perception, and, on the basis of this fact, one may be tempted to conclude that the apparent moral "fact" may be definable in terms of these subjective ideas. But the fact that "some kind of feeling" or subjective ideas generally--even always--attend a perception of truth does not entail that that perception is merely or solely the feelings or ideas that accompany it. A mere effect or concomitant of a perception is not the perception itself. But, the awareness of truth is not always attended with some particular feeling. The fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that the tree in front of me has 2 leaves rather than one produces little or no change in my sensibility. It is, no doubt, true that moral perceptions--even mere moral convictions or beliefs--are often attended with more intense feelings than some other types of apprehensions, which may be why they are so amenable to sense reduction. But this is merely a fact that warrants explanation; it does not in any way show that moral ideas are not rational ideas or reducible to sense.

We may reformulate Price's third argument, *the general argument from the suitability of quality attribution*, as follows:

> <a> If right and wrong were merely qualities of subjective sense experience then the assertion of an action that it is right or wrong would be absurd.
>
> <b> It is not the case that the assertion of an action that it is right or wrong is absurd.
>
> ---
>
> <c> Therefore, it is not the case that right and wrong are merely qualities of subjective sense experience.

In other words, Price argues that if morality were merely subjective or, rather, solely a matter of sense rather than reason, then its meaning would be exhaustively characterized by such particular or contingent properties. It would be absurd or inconsistent to attribute moral qualities to anything other than the particular sense experiences of individuals, just as it would be absurd or inconsistent to say, 'a square is round or dizzy,' or 'a fire is pain.' For, in either case, an incompatible predicate would be attributed to that subject. But there is no such absurdity or incompatibility between rightness and action. We attribute rightness to actions at least as much as we attribute that quality to allegedly "moral feelings." Yet, if rightness were not a property of actions themselves, but merely or solely a property of private feelings or sensations, then there would be such an incompatibility.[53]

The seeming weakness of this argument may be immediately apparent. For, <a> it is not absurd to attribute moral qualities to moral feelings, so, Price may appear to concede that moral ideas are sense ideas, and <b> Price himself attributes secondary qualities, e.g., color qualities, to our experiences of objects, rather than to the object of experience which may seem incompatible with his intuitive criterion above. Color certainly appears to be a property of external objects--not a property of one's sensations or experience of objects. Most people would say 'the tree is green'--not 'my sensation or perception is green'; and, although we do say 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder,' we do not, presumably, mean that one has a beautiful eye. It may well seem possible, therefore, that Price's criterion of the absurdity or incompatibility of quality attribution is not an adequate criterion, or is irrelevant to the issue of the real nature of things generally and of moral ideas in particular.

The apparent weakness of this argument may, however, be somewhat mitigated if we carefully consider the possibility that the particular cases above constitute borderline cases. It may not be the case, for example, that the status of secondary qualities with respect to the object of apprehension (e.g., green color with respect to this tree) is as troublesome as the status of the sensations or experiences of those qualities themselves. These sensations may well have qualities that closely resemble the qualities we attribute to the objects of such sensations. Moreover, the apparent concession to "moral feelings" may be overturned by the appeal to a unique class of rational feelings or affections. Since they are feelings of a sort they may resemble sense feelings, but this does not entail that they are identical. But the possibility that these cases constitute borderline cases may help us appreciate the viability of the argument. Such cases in no way imply that his criterion is arbitrary even if he may not always apply it consistently or with adequate justification in some particular case.

This argument, therefore, is grounded on the claim that the nature of an object, or the meaning of a term, is always elucidated in terms of its alleged properties. To attribute to an object properties inconsistent or incompatible with its nature, as given to experience, must result in absurdity. In the moral case, therefore, if actions are, in the nature of the case, indifferent, then it would be as absurd to claim they are right or wrong as it is to claim that 2 + 3 = a tangerine, a round is square or an amoeba knows Latin. Nor can any borderline cases overturn this argument. For, otherwise, one might argue that one cannot know whether or not one has a cheek or nose because it is unclear where one's nose leaves off and one's cheek begins.

But Price's claim that moral ideas are, upon eidetic analysis, *predicable in a way distinctively different from mere sense ideas* is reinforced by two more particular arguments. We shall call them <i> *the argument from the suitability of truth quality attribution*, and <ii> *the argument from the variability of intensity*. With respect to <i>, Price contends that if moral ideas were merely subjective sensations then we could not be mistaken about them, since all passive sensate data are mere appearances and, as such, are alike "true," i.e., they are not the kinds of things, as are judgments, that can be true or false. The mere sense impression of railroad tracks converging, for example, is not true or false as such--it is simply a sense experience. Only a judgment that one may make with respect to the ascription of a property to a subject may be true or false, e.g., the claim or judgment (not the mere appearance) that rail road tracks do, in fact, converge. But we are often mistaken about our apprehensions of moral data. Therefore, moral ideas must be objective and corrigible matters of truth and falsity, i.e., they must be rational ideas.[54]

This argument should be closely attended to. For, no one can or does deny the appearance of moral error; yet, the claim that moral ideas are rational ideas or susceptible to such true or false determinations, is frequently denied on the basis of the assumption that they are, after all, merely appearances. For example, after conceding the appearance of moral objectivity, Cua claims, "it appears to be an assumption rather than an objectively established fact."[55] And Hudson, after stating that: "There is no denying that men normally think themselves able to act from a sense of duty and often appear to do so,"[56] goes on to deny the veracity of such appearances. But what does Cua, for example, mean by an 'objectively established fact'? Are not all 'facts' grounded, in some sense, on appearances of precisely the same kind as the moral facts above? One must be consistent: either reduce all objective facts to appearances and, thereby, reduce appearances to appearances of appearances etc., or show precisely why moral appearances should be treated any differently than any other appearances. If one cannot do this then Price has once again provided good reasons for placing moral ideas on a par with any ideas that intuitively present themselves as suitable objects for the attribution of truth predicates. In short, *moral ideas stand or fall equally with all truth.* No doubt much more is needed to give an adequate elucidation of how moral ideas--or any ideas--can actually present their objects "bodily" or authentically, but there is no reason to place moral ideas in a class with ideas which are mere subjective appearances on a par with fictitious objects like mermaids and unicorns or, as done so frequently, on a par with the subclass of mistaken sense perceptions, e.g., the appearance of a flat earth.

Turning, then, to Price's second argument under this general heading, *the argument from the variability of intensity quality*,[57] we have shown that the whole history of philosophy consistently acknowledges, explicitly or implicitly, the intuitive or experiential criterion of truth and justification wherein the vivacity or intensity of an idea guaranteed the existence of the object conceived. It was not, of course, that the lack of such vivacity entailed the non-existence of the object in question but that when this vivacity was sufficiently present there was a perfectly legitimate or valid sense in which one might well say the object is known, i.e., that it exists. Now Price's position is that rational ideas alone present themselves as susceptible to this type of variation in intensity--an intensity, moreover, which presents itself to us as essentially distinct from the intensity associated with any mere sense idea.

As we saw from our analysis of Hume, the idea of existence was not arbitrarily or indiscriminately attributable to any objects of thought. One cannot, for example, arbitrarily conjoin the "quality" of existence to e.g., unicorns or round squares and thereby make them exist. There is, therefore, even on Hume's account, a distinctive difference between this vivacity and the variation of intensity associated with mere "ordinary" sense impressions. The variation of intensity associated with mere subjective feeling may, while vivacity cannot, be associated with any object whatsoever or may be experienced without the presence of any explicit object at all. How one subjectively feels at any given time or toward any given object, is a function of a multitude of factors some of which are purely the result of the arbitrary or contingent constitution of one's nature and circumstances. One may feel, as a result, delighted one minute and despondent the next. But, the variation of intensity or vivacity associated with ideas, which grasp existing objects presents itself as directly proportional to the degree to which one enters into a closer epistemic relationship with that object. The vague apprehension of my bed moving turns into an ever clearer apprehension of a major earthquake through subsequent experiences of the same type.

Even Hume seems to have recognized that unless there were this difference between our ideas we would be unable to distinguish true from false appearances and, thus, fall into the absurd skepticism he so much deplored. We would be at a loss to account for the fact that we experience this vivacity consistently with regard to certain objects rather than others. Why, for example, are trees and stones presented to us with this vivacity while unicorns and mermaids are not? Even Hume, therefore, must account for the difference between sense impressions or appearances that are merely more or less intense and ideas that differ with respect to vivacity. This is necessary despite Hume's attempt to reduce all ideas to mere sense impressions and despite the possibility that sense impressions may well be necessary (but insufficient) conditions for those ideas that guarantee, by their vivacity, the existence of their objects. Price's "argument," then, is that moral ideas present themselves as susceptible to precisely this type of variation in vivacity or intensity and so are rational ideas. Truth generally, and moral truth in particular, do not change merely because one's subjective feelings do. Cruelty, for example, does not become less wrong simply because one feels little or nothing at all.

Price's final argument for the rational character of moral ideas is an argument from the nature of action. Price says:

> . . . all actions, undoubtedly, have a nature. That is, some character certainly belongs to them, and somewhat there is to be truly affirmed of them. . . . But if this is not allowed; if no actions are, in themselves, either right or wrong, or anything of a moral and obligatory nature, which can be an object to the understanding; it follows, that in themselves, they are all indifferent. This is what is essentially true of them, and this is what all understandings, that perceive right, must perceive them to be.[58]

He takes it to be self-evident that all actions, events, ends, sentiments, etc., have a nature. There is something we can affirm true of them--some distinguishing characteristics or properties belong to them as things of that type which mark them off from trees, numbers, causal relations, etc.. To deny that actions have inherently, or in truth, a real character of rightness or fitness, therefore, is to claim that they are essentially indifferent. That character of moral indifference is what is essentially true of them or what they are. But if all actions are essentially indifferent, then there can be no moral objection to acting one way rather than another. There can be no moral difference, or difference with respect to the value quality of the action, between chopping someone's legs or head off and saving a starving and persecuted child.

In short, if all actions are indifferent--if that is what is really true of them--then it is meaningless or absurd to judge one action better than another in any sense at all. There is no reason for one's actions to be changed, altered or limited by anyone--not even one's self. One "ought" (if this has any meaning at all), to labor to get rid of any and all such moral delusions; above all, the delusion that any particular end "ought" to be pursued over another. For, such beliefs are merely false or foolish restrictions on, or violations of, one's nature. The absurdity of all this, however, is immediately apparent. In fact, it is impossible to so conceive a state of affairs. It is impossible to consistently convince one's self that rightness is merely a matter of how one feels and has no basis in truth. One cannot but think or judge of actions as more or less fitting or right in relation to more or less fitting or right ends. Nor can or does Hume himself, as we have seen, attempt to deny this. Price claims, then:

> In short; it seems sufficient to overthrow any scheme, that such consequences, as the following should arise from it:--That no one being can judge one end to be better than another, or believe a real moral difference between actions; without giving his assent to an impossibility; without mistaking the *affections of his own mind for truth*, and *sensation* for *knowledge*.--That there being nothing intrinsically proper or improper, just or unjust; there is nothing obligatory; but all beings enjoy, from the reasons of things and the nature of actions, liberty to act as they will.[59]

From a more modern Humean stand one might, no doubt, object that having a nature or character does not imply a rationally apprehended objective quality or property in actions. Emotivists, for example, concede that moral ideas do, in fact, have a character, viz., the character of being emotions or subjective sense feelings.[60] But the issue is not whether or not subjective sensations have a nature. This all may concede, as well as the fact that there is some sense in which moral sensation or feeling is associated with actions. Rather, the issue concerns actions themselves, and Price asks of them: Are they or are they not indifferent? If moral right and wrong are merely matters of private sensation or taste, like a momentary twitch, then it would be meaningless or absurd to attribute to actions, which are essentially indifferent, objective moral qualities. Such a consequence, Price claims, is plainly absurd and the sole apparent plausibility of the objection lies in shifting our attention from the actions themselves to our experiences of actions, and, specifically, to some "feeling" or other which generally attends these experiences.

Having presented his main arguments for the claim that moral ideas are rational ideas--not sense ideas--Price concludes his analysis with the following claim:

> Thus, then, is morality fixed on an immovable basis, and appears not to be, in any sense, factitious; or the arbitrary production of any power human or divine; but equally everlasting and necessary with all truth and reason. And this we find to be as evident, as that right and wrong signify a reality in what is so denominated.[61]

In response to this claim, and in way of conclusion of this section, it seems to me that Price has successfully demonstrated that moral ideas are rational ideas, i.e., that morality is grounded in objective truth, on a par with any other claim of truth. This is, however, considerably different from providing the details necessary for an adequate moral epistemology. Precisely how, for example, does one break through the circle of moral ideas in the grasp of independently existing moral qualities.[62] The main weakness of Price's account, however, is the general weakness of all epistemology. Hence, the peculiar nature of the weakness of moral intuitionism lies not in the strength of any alternative account, but in its relative silence with respect to presenting a scientific procedure or method by which such a theory can be worked out. We need to know precisely how interdisciplinary intuitive research, and intuitive moral research in particular, can be carried out--confirmed and disconfirmed--at least in principle, and the lack of an adequate theory of intuition makes such research appear inexplicable. In turning now to Price's elucidation of the constraint of reason on moral action we shall see that it is precisely this deficiency which constitutes the chief stumblingblock in the way of an adequate theory of the practicality of reason.

Section 5: Price's Account of Moral Action and the Constraint of Reason on Moral Action

Section 5A: Return to Premise <p> of Argument A: that Some Moral "Ideas" Constrain Action; "Ideas" as Principles of Action and Other Principles of Action

So far we have argued that moral ideas are rational ideas, or, correlatively, that they are not sensible ideas. It might seem in light of *Argument A*, therefore, that we have shown that the thesis of the practicality of reason is true. But when we took it for granted that premise <p> of *Argument A* was true--that some moral ideas constrain action--we took "ideas" in the broadest sense so as to include, for example, "sense ideas." But, in view of that fact, premise <p> may not be as innocuous as it may have seemed earlier. For, even if Price has successfully shown that moral ideas are rational ideas, he has certainly not shown that these ideas in and of themselves are principles of action. In other words, even if there are objectively real moral qualities of actions cognized immediately or intuitively, no reason has been given so far for interpreting reason in any other way than as a merely cognitive, versus causal, principle. It is possible, therefore, that there are other morally relevant principles, if not "ideas," which function as principles of action, e.g., a principle of sense, will or even divine aid or grace. To show that the thesis of the practicality of reason is true we need, therefore, to examine in some detail: <a> Price's view of moral action; and <b> his view of reason as a constraining power or principle of action.

i) Moral Action

In our section on Kant we discussed at length the common-sense distinction between two types of right or good action. On one hand, right action may be construed as a quality of an action *independent of one's beliefs about it*; on the other hand, right action may be construed as a function or quality of one's action *dependent on one's beliefs, convictions or intentions*. With respect to Kant's stand on this distinction, we found reason to believe that he could not give an adequate account of right action--*not even of intentionally right action*--because of his explicit, although formal, denial of intellectual moral intuition. In other words, we found reason to believe that without an account of right action distinct or independent of one's beliefs one could not give an account of right action in terms of such belief.

But Price's explicit intuitionism does not restrict him, as it does Kant, to the knowledge of conceptions. He can, therefore, more consistently and on grounds of principle, acknowledge this distinction as well as give an account of it:

> **Abstract** virtue is, most properly, a quality of the external action or event. It denotes what an action is, considered independently of the sense of the agent; or what, *in itself* and *absolutely*, it is right *such* an agent, in such circumstances, should do; and what, if he judged truly, he would judge he ought to do.-- **Practical** virtue, on the contrary, has a necessary relation to, and dependence upon, the opinion of the agent concerning his actions. It signifies what he ought to do, *upon supposition* of his having such and such sentiments.[63]

It should be clear that this account coincides with the account we presented earlier. Price's absolute or "abstract" virtue coincides with what we earlier called "external rectitude." Price claims, for example, that there are innumerable cases in which we are, or believe ourselves to be, mistaken about our moral judgments: ". . . through involuntary mistake, a man breaks the most important engagements, hurts his best friends, or bestows his bounty on the most worthless objects; . . . through religious zeal and a blind superstition, he commits the most shocking barbarities, imagining he hereby does God service, and, from an apprehension of their lawfulness, practices violence and deceit; . . ."[64] In all such cases it is clear that there is, or at least there appears to be, a sense of rectitude which is distinct and often independent of the mind and its perceptions.

Turning, then, to Price's account of relative or "practical virtue," this sense of rectitude is almost identical Kant's view of "intentional rectitude." Price describes it as ". . . the ultimate principle of conduct, or the determination of a reasonable being, considered as arising from the perception of some motives and reasons and intended for some end. According to this sense of the word action, whenever the principle from which we act is different, the action is different, though the external effects produced may be the same."[65]

Despite this general similarity between Kant and Price with respect to intentional or practical virtue, the fact that Price can, while Kant can not, explicitly and on grounds of principle, acknowledge a form of rectitude distinct from, or independent of, our conceptions has a considerable bearing on their respective accounts of rectitude generally and on their accounts of the thesis of the practicality of reason in particular. For, first, in virtue of the fact that Price can distinguish these two forms of rectitude, he can also account for the case where they coincide, i.e., the case where one not merely acts with good intentions, but knows that one is acting rightly. For example, it is right to feed a starving child regardless of one's intentions; yet one may also know it is right and act because it is right.

In making what must surely seem an almost trivial claim, we must, if we are to understand Price's general position, constantly keep in mind the parallel Price claims holds between the moral case and the non-moral one. That is, with respect to the moral coincidence mentioned above Price is, for the most part, merely appealing to the familiar general distinction between truth on one hand, and knowledge of the truth on the other. There is, for example, an analogous distinction that might be drawn between one actually winning the lottery and merely believing one has when one has not. In some cases, one may actually win the lottery and not merely believe, but know that one has--even know that one knows that one has. So, too, Price claims, this is the case with moral belief and knowledge in conjunction with right action.

Trivial as the case may seem, the fact that Price can while Kant can not, explicitly and consistently concede such a coincidence places him in a position to use such moral knowledge as a foundation for the elucidation of significantly different types, as well as degrees, of moral action. Price can, for example, provide an account, consistent with his epistemology, of how a judge may do wrong (in the absolute or abstract sense) in convicting an innocent man to death on the basis of misinformation; and, yet do right (in the relative or intentional sense) in acting conscientiously or on the basis of his conviction of moral truth.66 Price's account provides, therefore, the wherewithal to present an initial elucidation of at least the various simple types of conscientious and unconscientious action. This is something Kant could not do. But, in so doing, Price's account brings forcefully into view the relevance--indeed the necessity--of moral knowledge for moral action even in the intentional sense. Specifically, it shows the absurdity of the Kantian tendency to construe *mere good intentions* as all that is necessary, sufficient or possible for a determination of moral action.

Given that there is such moral knowledge, Price is also in a position, where Kant is not, to provide an account of more complex states of moral cognition and correlative action grounded on simpler or lower order ones. That is, relatively simple, but veridical, moral apprehensions and correlative actions may serve as necessary but insufficient conditions for more complex apprehensions and actions in much the same way as sense ideas served as necessary but insufficient conditions in the acquisition of knowledge generally.

Let us briefly consider some non-moral cases to illustrate this point. There are types of actions in human life, which present themselves as more interesting and more complex than others, and which seem to require--even necessitate--a relevant process of development for their attainment. Whether the action is writing a novel, playing the violin, solving problems in calculus, riding a bike, etc., one must undertake a relevant process leading to the desired end. This will involve the performance of certain simpler acts in order to come to the place of being able to perform the more complex ones. If one is to be able to write a novel (and especially if one is to do it well) one must, at the very least, learn how to recognize and distinguish the letters of a particular alphabet or language as well as how to form them correctly so that they can be recognized by others. One must also learn how to distinguish and form more complex symbolic patterns and unities, i.e., words; now not merely to recognize and distinguish them syntactically, but to understand what they mean or refer to. Finally, on the basis of such prior actions one must go on to learn how to understand and express more complex thoughts via more complex symbolic structures, e.g., sentences, paragraphs, etc..

In all such cases, therefore, it should be clear that in order to be able to undertake the more complex activities one must meet certain absolutely necessary conditions with respect to both knowledge and action on a simpler level. But, then, this may equally be the case with respect to moral knowledge and action. We suggest that there is a similar process of development or fulfillment applicable to the moral domain such that on the basis of the acquisition of simpler or lower levels of moral knowledge and action one becomes capable of the attainment of more complex ones leading up to what has traditionally been called a moral life. Certain types of moral actions, therefore, may not even be conceivable, much less actualizable, without one meeting certain necessary conditions which include prior moral insight and action. The distinction between absolute and relative virtue and the possibility of their coincidence, then, takes on, in view of this possibility, vital significance for a theory of the moral life, if not for a theory of the practicality of reason. For, even if moral knowledge was not a principle of action it would be, in view of the above, still requisite for certain more complex types of moral actions.

But if it is a principle of action then it may well be the case that the extent of its power is wholly determined by the degree to which one has attained deeper insight into the nature of more complex moral truths.

But Price's explicit and more consistent appeal to intuition outside the limits of mere spatial and temporal relations also provides a basis for an intelligible account of free will, which seems simply inexplicable on Kant's view given his formal restriction of intuition to the categories of space and time. Price, then, may be able to present some degree of plausibility for the common sense understanding of intentional action as action not only dependent on one's moral beliefs, but dependent on an explicitly undetermined *act of free will*. To illustrate this point one need only examine carefully their respective accounts of practical or intentional virtue. Price says for example:

> . . . from knowing the nature and capacities of a being, his relations, connexions, and dependencies, and the consequences of his actions, the whole of *what he ought to do . . . may be determined*, . . .[67] [Italics mine.]

& Kant claims:

> . . . if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external actions, as to know all its motives, even the smallest, and likewise all the external occasions that can influence them, *we could calculate a man's conduct for the future with as great a certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse*;[68] [Italics mine.]

In Kant's case, it is especially problematic how he can reconcile the above statement with his claim that man is free. This is precisely because he is, on grounds of principle, restricted with respect to "knowledge" claims to sensible intuition or the categories of space and time; hence, to a strictly determining or necessitating causality. Price, however, is not so restricted, and his more consistent and explicit appeal to intuition allows him to distinguish between a merely influencing versus determining causation which seems absolutely essential for an adequate account of free will. Price can more consistently claim, therefore, as we can see in the above statement, no absolute determination of conduct or action, but only a determination of obligation. In light of this fact, Price's view may hold more promise than Kant's for elucidating how moral knowledge may function as a constraining rather than merely compelling or determining force.

Price's account of moral action offers a degree of promise for the elucidation of more interesting and complex types of moral action that is not possible on Kant's view. But the elucidation of such higher states of moral knowledge and action, as well as the elucidation of the role of free will in the acquisition of such states, is not essential to the thesis of the practicality of reason, indispensable as it may be for an adequate theory of the moral life. For, the thesis maintains only that moral knowledge constrains moral action and we claim it can do this on its simplest levels and even if determinism were true.

In any case, the adequate elucidation of higher states of moral cognition and action is grounded in what is simpler, and with respect to providing an adequate elucidation of such simpler cognitions and actions Price cannot take us much further than the general appeal to the intuitive distinction between absolute and relative virtue. For, he does not provide an adequate account of original moral intuitions, hence, he is not in a position to adequately elucidate subsequent or higher order moral apprehensions and actions founded thereon. But, then, with respect to the more interesting and controversial cases of moral action Price has no criterion of truth to appeal to other than his vague appeal to common sense or intuition. One person "sees" abortion is wrong; another that it is right, and Price can offer us no clear way to intuitively elucidate why one sees and the other does not, or how one can come to obtain the appropriate intuition for one's self. But in view of this failure and in conjunction with his appeal to an "active" power of mind which is responsible for rational ideas generally, and higher order rational ideas in particular, Price's claim that such intuitions constitute a discovery of independently existing moral objects, rather than a mere creation of them, may well appear factitious. The temptation to skepticism arises once again.

ii) The Constraint of Reason on Moral Action

Having presented Price's general account of moral action we are now in a position to more precisely articulate the relationship between moral knowledge and action in order to determine whether, or in what manner and to what extent, moral knowledge may justly be said to constitute a principle of action. For, nothing has been said so far that would exclude the possibility that moral ideas are intimately connected with some other principle of action, e.g., sense, will or grace, and that it is precisely this element alone that constitutes the power at root of intentional moral action.

a) Reason and Sense in Moral Action

That Price claims there is a necessary correlation between moral apprehension and some kind of feeling is abundantly clear:

> . . . excitement belongs to the very ideas of moral right and wrong, and is essentially inseparable from the apprehension of them. . . .[69] An affection or inclination to rectitude cannot be separated from the view of it.[70] . . . the perception of right and wrong does excite to action, and is alone a sufficient principle of action . . .[71]

What may not be clear is what he means by it. He may even appear, in the above statements, to be contradicting himself. For, in the latter statement, moral perception is claimed to be a sufficient principle of action, yet in the same sentence, as well as in the one preceding it, the motivating power may seem to be attributed to some principle other than reason, viz., to a sensible "affection," "excitement" or "inclination." It is, after all, one thing to know or cognize something and quite another to desire it or even feel approval or disapproval with respect to it.

In any case, we can see how such statements might support the common interpretation of Price, as well as other moral rationalists, to the effect that reason and "sense" necessarily cooperate in the impulse to virtuous conduct. Sidgwick, for example, states:

> While right and wrong, in Price's view, are "real objective qualities" of actions, moral "beauty and deformity" are subjective ideas; representing feelings which are partly the

> necessary effects of the perceptions of right and wrong in rational beings as such, partly due to *an "implanted sense" or varying emotional susceptibility. Thus, both reason and sense or instinct cooperate in the impulse to virtuous conduct, though the rational element is primary and paramount.*[72] [Italics mine.]

But, if these moral feelings that Price refers to are essentially subjective, i.e., "due to an "implanted sense" or varying emotional susceptibility"--even in part--then even if these feelings and desires necessarily follow moral insight, it would seem that the ultimate determining principle of action is essentially, at least in part, subjective or natural--not objective or rational. If so, then it would seem that moral approval and desire is no more objective than one's subjective desire or preference for certain foods or a certain sexual partner. One must, of course, see a woman to be drawn to her physically, but what really draws one to her, and the extent to which it does, is a biological or physiological desire rooted in the fabric of one's contingent nature and circumstances. Similarly, Mother Theresa may subjectively desire to help others more than most of us care to, but what really drives her to do this, as distinct from us, is merely a contingent difference in her biological or physiological chemistry. If this is true, then it appears, in a very real and crucial sense, not only that Price has failed to justify the claim of the practicality of reason--indeed, he has even contradicted himself!--but he has even failed to establish morality as a universal law or principle of conduct for all rational creatures as such. For, the conception of a moral obligation without either an objective constraint to practice it or the freedom to act in accordance with it is a patent contradiction.

In any case, we emphatically maintain that such an interpretation of Price's position is false. For, first of all, Price, like Kant, carefully distinguishes between rational motives or, as he calls them, "affections," and non-rational desires or "appetites":

> And this, perhaps, will afford us a good reason for distinguishing between affections and passions. The former, which we apply indiscriminately to all reasonable beings, may most properly signify the desires founded in the reasonable nature itself, and essential to it: such as self-love, benevolence, and the love of truth.--These, when strengthened by instinctive determinations, take the latter denomination; or are, properly, passions.--Those tendencies within us that are merely instinctive, such as hunger, thirst, &c, we

> commonly call appetites or passions indifferently, but seldom or never affections.[73]

Price claims, then, that rational affections, as founded in the rational nature itself, are essentially different in kind from instincts and passions. Instincts and passions are rooted in the non-rational, material fabric of our nature and manifest themselves as subjective desires correlated with the sensible apprehension of physical objects. Rational affections, however, can only be elicited by a rational apprehension of a non-sensuous or universal moral object--in Kant's language, The Moral Law.

Second, although such instincts or passions commonly--perhaps, even always--accompany rational affections they are not in any way essentially related to either the rational apprehension itself or its affections. They do not, therefore, function in any way as moral principles of action. In fact, just as we found in Kant's case, the extent to which one acts virtuously or viciously is determined by the extent to which one acts according to, or is governed by, one principle or the other.

> These observations to which might be added many more of the same kind are all very evident proofs of the truth of the conclusion I would establish; namely, 'that the virtue of an agent is always less in proportion to the degree in which natural temper and propensities fall in with his actions, instinctive principles operate, and rational reflexion on what is right to be done, is wanting.[74]

Finally, and again in accordance with Kant's view,[75] Price claims that the degree of strength or power of one's rational affections is directly proportional to the degree of clarity with which moral facts are apprehended. But given the aforementioned possibility of moral discovery, progress or advance in moral knowledge, the extent of the power of one's rational affection is directly proportional to the extent of one's intimate knowledge of, or acquaintance with, higher moral truths. The Power of God, as well as the power of a good man, far exceeds the moral power of those who are relatively ignorant of such truths. It is clear, therefore, that Price emphatically does not hold, as is alleged, that subjective sense ideas or contingent physiological factors essentially enter into the force or motivational efficacy associated with moral action.

To show that there is a difference in kind between such rational or moral affections and mere instincts or passions Price appeals both to "Experience, and the reason of the thing, . . ."[76] With respect to experience, Price claims that "It is in the power of everyone who will make the experiment to satisfy himself about this."[77] And, in conducting such intuitive experiments, he claims that "All men continually feel, that the perception of right and wrong excites to action; . . ."78 His point is that if we look attentively enough at concrete cases of moral value or rectitude we can observe, in precisely the same way as we did earlier with respect to the difference in kind between sense ideas and rational ideas, that there is a distinct kind of rational feeling or affection essentially or inseparably correlated with that apprehension. To help us see that this is so, Price offers a number of cases for our consideration, wherein we clearly experience such an affection and yet cannot attribute it to any instinct or passion. Once again, "For the truth of this, I appeal to every man's conscience. No words can make it plainer than it must appear by its own light."[79] One must actually carry out the demonstration and describe in detail what one sees, just as one would carry out a demonstration in a physics, chemistry or biology laboratory. For example, Price asks:

> How are we to account for a man's refraining from secret fraud, or his practising truth, sincerity, equity, justice, and honour, in many particular instances of their interfering, or seeming to interfere, with private and publick good, as well as with his strongest natural desires? . . . What could influence in such and many other like circumstances, besides a sense of duty and honesty?[80]

What we are to do in such cases, then, is to look attentively and carefully at concrete moral cases, as we did earlier, but now with a special regard to the motivational efficacy or constraint bound up with such cases. In proceeding in this manner Price is certain that we can come to verify that there are distinct features applicable to moral or rational affections which are inapplicable to mere sensible instincts or passions. We need to look at concrete cases, for example, of the affection for truth to determine whether we have a regard for it, or whether it influences us in any way, even in cases where we want nothing to do with it. And we need to look attentively at concrete cases of conscientious action to see if it is true that what essentially constitutes the virtuous quality of such action is indeed one's regard to, or affection for, such rectitude independently of--even against--the solicitations of sense. Price has no question what the result will be if the experiment is honestly carried out. One recalls to mind Kant's claim that the failure of previous moral accounts was due, almost wholly, to their failure to adequately pay attention to the pure principle of morality unmixed with any sensible elements. Price believes, therefore, as did Kant, that we can come to see not only that intuitive moral knowledge constrains moral action, but in the case of rigorously clear moral perceptions, compels it.

> Instincts, therefore, as before observed in other instances, are not necessary to the choice of ends. The intellectual nature is its own law. It has, within itself, a spring and guide of action which it cannot suppress or reject. Rectitude is itself an end, an ultimate end, an end superior to all other ends, governing, directing and limiting them, and whose existence and influence depend on nothing arbitrary. It presides over all. Every appetite and faculty, every instinct and will, and all nature are subjected to it.[81]

In addition to this appeal to experience, Price justifies his claim that moral affection is essentially distinct from mere natural sense, by an appeal to the reason of the thing.82 He means that in the nature of the case, i.e., in virtue of what moral ideas are, it is simply impossible to clearly and concisely conceive of moral value or obligation and be uninfluenced to practice it or be indifferent with respect to it. To see that one is obligated to do something--that something is right or fitting to do--essentially entails an influence to practice it.

Enough has been said to make clear that there is a general distinction that can be drawn between sense and reason as distinct types of principles of action, and that the passions correlated with the sensible apprehension of physical objects play essentially no part in what constitutes the constraining force on moral action. But beyond this general distinction Price cannot take us very far. For, without an adequate elucidation of moral intuition, in contrast to mere moral thought, Price cannot clearly show us how these rational or moral affections originate or emerge in moral consciousness. He cannot, therefore, give us an adequate account of why our moral apprehensions often seem so weak and languid; nor can he give us an adequate account of the distinction between types and degrees of constraint grounded on lower levels of moral intuition and action.

b) Reason and Will in Moral Action

In the familiar conflict between our sensual desires or passions and our rational apprehensions of obligation or moral right and wrong, Price has shown, by an intuitively based analysis, that reason functions as a sufficient principle of action. In the clear apprehension of moral rectitude a distinctly rational affection is necessarily elicited which constrains moral action in accordance with it, and if adequately present, even compels such action. If so, then Price has shown that the thesis of the practicality of reason is true. It does not matter whether there are other morally relevant principles of action, e.g., free Will or Divine Grace. For, in a world of Freedom and Grace, as well as in a mechanical world of blind necessity, the clear apprehension of good still constrains action and this is all we contend for. But to make this point clear as well as to curtail a major objection to Price's formulation of the thesis from another quarter than that of sense, we shall briefly consider the denial of the thesis on the basis of an appeal to free will.

That the thesis of the practicality of reason appears to be inconsistent with the claim that man is free (a claim, moreover, that both Price and the common moral consciousness maintain) is evident from our historical study. For, if knowledge alone constrains or compels action in accordance with it then free will together with responsibility seems excluded. But it is almost universally acknowledged that man is, or at least appears to be, free. Hence, it appears to follow that knowledge alone without the support of will must be powerless to constrain action in accordance with its dictates.

This appears, at least, to be the basis of a certain form of objection to the thesis of the practicality of reason. After presenting a brief exposition of Price's moral theory, James Martineau, in his Types of Ethical Theory, rejects Price's claim that reason functions as a sufficient principle of action, but, unlike sense theorists, he rejects it by appealing to a wholly distinct mental faculty or power, viz., "conscience-guided will." After describing Price's Platonic vision of the Good and its alleged supreme Power, for example, Martineau says:

> It leaves us with only one misgiving: whether its realisation is committed to an adequate power. Can Reason, which completes its function in seeing things as they are, transform them into what they had better be? Can its stately and placid neutrality command that wild inward world, and, like Neptune's head emerging from the deep, silence the winds and allay the waves by the look of an eye? As well might you commission an academy of sciences to quell a rebellion. Truth has no executive; and to achieve any readjustment of the affections, to expel a traitor, to free a captive, to chain a tyrant there, appeal must be made to a faculty that can *cause something*, instead of merely under-standing everything,--i.e., to conscience-guided will, with all the gradations and harmonies of reverence.[83]

The appeal to "conscience-guided will with all the gradations and harmonies of reverence" may sound reminiscent of Kant, but what, precisely, does he mean by such an appeal? What precisely does Will do? What is the appropriate description of how it functions? In view of his appeal to "conscience," we take him to mean, at the very least, that Will does not act in a vacuum--somehow blind or independent of the apprehension of rectitude--but, rather, it brings what one merely cognizes to be right into actuality.

> In determining the essence of morality we are not shut up to the alternative,--Sense or Understanding; when the first term fails us, we still have a choice; *the mind's power is not limited to intelligence, but enables us, in one function, to see the true, in another, to create the right.* It is impossible to resolve these two functions into one, under cover of a single term significant only of cognitive and thinking processes.[84] [Italics mine.]

It seems clear, then, that Martineau is appealing to a power which can, allegedly, dispel sensible motives or principles of action in cases of moral conflict or temptation, i.e., cases where one apprehends that what one ought to do is in conflict with what one may want or desire to do. We may, for example, apprehend an obligation to buy food for a poor and starving child and yet also feel a desire not to give in view of the possibility of using the money to buy something we very much want. Will, therefore, according to Martineau, presumably functions as an opposing principle of action to sense. It is not that knowledge is unnecessary for moral action, but that it is insufficient. A distinct act of will is necessary or indispensable to obtain the good in question.

Still, there is room for ambiguity. Does Will function in its relation to the understanding and to moral action in such a way as to literally and directly bring into being, an externally right action which one, however vaguely, apprehends to be right? Or, does Will function merely to bring into being the adequate moral insight which itself constrains moral action? Martineau's view is clearly and necessarily the former alternative. For, the appeal to the power of insight--even with the support of will--would be an explicit concession to a form of the thesis of the practicality of reason, which, of course, he explicitly denies. But, then, it follows from such an account that one may have the clearest of moral apprehensions, e.g., of someone raping, torturing, mutilating and murdering one's child and remain, in the nature of the case, indifferent. Such a conclusion, from the standpoint of Price's intuitively based analysis of moral consciousness above, is clearly absurd.

It may, no doubt, appear plausible to some, but Price would claim this is only so in virtue of an habitual moral blindness which is so rooted in our characters that we cannot bring ourselves to that insight which alone can dispel moral inertia and lead us to good action.

> . . . the most abandoned and detestable state of wickedness implies the greatest necessity of sinning, and the greatest degree of moral impotence. He is the most vicious man, who is most enslaved by evil habits, or in whom appetite has gained so far the ascendant, and the regard to virtue and duty is so far weakened, that we can, at any time, with certainty foretell, that he will do evil when tempted to it.[85]

Can such moral blindness constitute an argument against the inherent power of such apprehension? One would as much argue that there are no stars or sky above because a blind man can not see them or because one is too lazy or too crippled to look upward. But even in the worst of moral conditions Price maintains that the voice of reason can be heard and its power felt. For, if reason has no power, why do we shrink from immoral exposure? Why is "rationalization" of our actions--especially of our intentions--so common and so necessary? Why do we react rationally as well as emotionally in the hostile, defensive manner that we do when we are exposed in some course of wrong doing?

> So intimate to men is reason, that a deliberate resolution not to be governed by it, is scarcely possible; and that, even when urged by passion and appetite, they can seldom avowedly contradict it, or in any instance break loose from its guidance, without the help of dishonest art and sophistry; without many painful winkings at the light, and hard struggles to evade the force of conviction; without studiously searching for excuses and palliatives, and thus making some shift to throw a cloud before their eyes, to reconcile themselves to the guilty practice, hide its deformity, and deceive themselves into an opinion of its warrantableness or innocence in their circumstances. How plainly may we hence learn how great the force of reason is . . .[86]

Given that the thesis of the power of reason over action is true, it does not follow that there is no free will, or that will has no legitimate causal function in moral action. Nothing so far has been said of this rational power to deny that it may be resisted or function as a merely influencing or constraining causality rather than as a necessitating or determining one. We suggest, in fact, that if such a form of causality were adequately elucidated it would show that Will's primary function in moral action is precisely to bring into the forefront of consciousness the clear or clearer apprehension of rectitude which itself constrains action in accordance with it.

In any event, such a possibility may help us appreciate that there is no necessary inconsistency between the thesis of the practicality of reason and free will. But such considerations may also help us to appreciate that there is no necessary inconsistency between free will and necessity. For, what one can do or what one can will at any time is itself limited or determined by the necessities and possibilities imposed on the actualization of any end, especially more complex ones. The actualization of knowledge is essential to the acquisition of such ends and so the extent to which one can "deliberate" on possible moral ends or options will define the extent of one's freedom. Freedom, like reason, therefore, is subject to a process of development and, as such, is consistent with--in fact grounded on--necessity or law.

For Price, freedom within limits is not a contradiction, but an essential characteristic of freedom as such. And this, according to Price, is as true for God as for other persons. All are constrained or limited by their own natures. Even God cannot do evil and a good man, in proportion to the extent of his goodness, loses the power to commit certain types of evil actions; just as a bad man, in proportion to the extent of his wickedness, loses the power to do certain types of good actions. There are few of us who could now say in truth with Thomas More that we think none harm, and if one thinks otherwise one is asked to sincerely undertake the experiment. Freedom, therefore, is essentially a relative term--it is never absolute in the sense of being wholly unconditioned. When Price speaks of the prioricity or peculiar pre-eminence of reason over will, therefore, his point is that reason merely limits our choices because it determines some of them. This does not, however, entail that our choices are wholly determined or that we have no freedom at all.

The thesis of the practicality of reason, therefore, is in no way inconsistent with the claim that man is free, but nor is it incompatible with the claim that moral action is determined. Our thesis is that moral reason constrains action and we claim that this would be true in either case. It is not necessary, therefore, that we give an account of free will to defend this thesis. But, then, it should be equally clear that an account of the part God may play in moral action is equally unnecessary for our thesis. It may well be true, as Price maintains, that the ultimate origin of the power of moral reason is rooted in the Divine Nature. Moral knowledge, in this case, would constitute a form of access to this power, and the extent of that power over one's life would be determined by the extent to which we came into contact with it. In short, knowledge of rectitude or good action may constitute knowledge of a feature of reality, the moral universe or God Himself. But it does not follow from this that the knowledge of rectitude is an awareness of God or that one must have an explicit awareness of God to gain access to the constraining power of moral apprehension over action. The particular significance of religion and the Divine Nature, then, like the significance of free will, lies pre-eminently in the theory of the attainment of the moral life, i.e., of the attainment of higher order moral actions. Our thesis, however, aims merely at a partial contribution to such a theory and we maintain that even on the lowest levels intuitive moral reason constrains moral action.

In conclusion, let us review the central parts of Price's argument for the practicality of reason: First, we presented a general argument for the practicality of reason which included premise <p>, that some moral ideas constrain moral action, and premise <q>, that all moral ideas are rational ideas. Premise <p> was taken to be initially unobjectionable. Justification of premise <q> required an appeal to a further argument, which included premise <s>, that all moral ideas are either rational or sensible, and premise <t>, that no moral ideas are sensible.

Premise <s> was justified by an independent evaluation of its underlying claim <s'> that all ideas are either rational or sensible, i.e., by an intuitively based analysis of the nature and origin of our ideas in general. The result of the analysis of sense ideas and rational ideas was that sense ideas were essentially subjective or particular, and they did not imply independent existence and truth. Rational ideas, on the other hand, were essentially objective or universal, and did imply independent existence and truth.

Given premise <s> we turned to the justification of premise <t> that no moral ideas are sensible as well as to the independent verification of <q> by an intuitively based analysis of moral ideas. The intuitively based justification for the claim that moral ideas are rational ideas, i.e., simple or original ideas of the understanding, did not, however, show that moral reason was a principle of action. An independent examination, therefore, of moral action and the function of moral reason as a principle of action was necessary.

An elucidation of the distinction between absolute and relative virtue, i.e., between right action independent of belief and right action dependent on belief, was provided. This was indispensable for the elucidation of right action in the intentional sense and, above all, for the elucidation of the case where absolute and relative virtue coincide in moral knowledge. In other words, it provided the indispensable bridge between mere moral thought and rectitude independent of thought. In this way it provided the requisite foundation for higher order knowledge and action.

The intuitive analysis of the respective roles of sense and reason as principles of action showed that there was a class of rational or moral feelings distinct, but inseparable from, rational or moral apprehension. This analysis showed that moral reason was a sufficient principle of action and thus provided the justification for Price's formulation of the thesis of the practicality of reason.

To better illustrate the sufficiency of reason as a principle of action as well as to allay a major objection to Price's claim on the basis of an appeal to free will, we briefly discussed the respective roles of these mental functions in moral action. The conclusion reached was that there was no necessary inconsistency between the thesis and free will, nor even any necessary incompatibility between free will and necessity. In any case, we claimed that the consideration of other principles of action was not essential to our thesis, important as they undoubtedly are in other morally relevant respects.

In way of a general critique of Price's formulation of the thesis, we repeatedly showed that the weakness of his account consisted not so much in the plausibility or implausibility of his general claims but in not providing a sufficiently detailed or adequate account of precisely how one comes to obtain genuine moral intuitions, as opposed to mere moral intentions or thoughts; hence, how one comes to acquire the power associated therewith. What Price's account needs, therefore, to make it work is an adequate intuitive elucidation or phenomenology of intuition itself. The aim of the next chapter on Husserl will be to provide just such an account so that in our final chapter we can formulate a phenomenology of conscientious action as a basis for an adequate account of the thesis of the practicality of reason.

Notes: Chapter Three

1. Reference to R. Thomas, Richard Price, p.34, in W.D. Hudson, Reason and Right (San Francisco, California: Freeman, Cooper & Co., 1970), p.xiii.
2. C.D. Broad, "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society," (1944-1945), p.131, in D. Daiches Raphael ed., A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), p.v.
3. William Morgan, Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Richard Price (London: R. Hunter, 1815), pp. 16-9.
4. Richard Price, A Review of the Principle Questions in Morals (Oxford, 1948), D.Daiches Raphael ed., pp.186-7.
5. Price, Review, p.13.
6. Ibid., pp.17ff.
7. Ibid., p.16.
8. James Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Clarendon Press Series, 2 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1898), 2:476-8; Antonio S. Cua, Reason and Virtue (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966), p.48.
9. Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.48.
10. Martineau, Ethical Theory, pp.482-3.
11. Cua, Reason & Virtue, pp.12-3.
12. Price, Review, Preface to 1st Ed., p.3.
13. Abbott, Kant's Ethics, pp.19-20.
14. Price, Review, pp.9ff; for a discussion of the central issues revolving around "foundationalism" see: Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion and Williams, Groundless Belief.
15. Price, Review, p.39.
16. Butler, Works, p.25.
17. Price, Review, p.36.
18. As well as new classes of objects or actions correlated therewith.
19. Price, Review,p.38.
20. Ibid., p.19.
21. Ibid., pp.19-20.
22. Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.19 note 23; D.O. Thomas, The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p.43.
23. Price, Review, p. 19; see also Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.15.

24. Price, Review, pp.38-9.
25. Ibid., p.38.
26. Field, Science Without Numbers and private discussion.
27. Price, Review, p.19.
28. Ibid., p.19.
29. Ibid., pp.19-20.
30. Ibid., p.21.
31. Ibid., p.21-2.
32. Ibid., p.23.
33. Ibid., p.25.
34. Ibid., p.30.
35. Ibid., p.16.
36. Ibid., p.39.

37. Ibid., p.19-20.
38. Ibid., See appendix A, ch.5.
39. For "logical chemistry," see Price, Review, p.31.
40. Cua, Reason & Virtue, pp.45ff.

41. Price, Review, p.26. 42. Ibid., p.41; elsewhere he says, "The fitness of it is immediately perceived by the lowest as well as the highest understanding; . . ." (in his "Dissertation on the Nature of Prayer," in Richard Price, Four Dissertations (London: Harlow: Printed by Benjamin Flower. 1811), p.112. Cf. Kant, in Abbott, Kant's Ethics, p.20.

43. Abbott, Kant's Ethics, p.20; for further discussion of this point see note 1 on this page.
44. Price, Review, p.41.
45. Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.45.
46. Hudson, Reason & Right, p.168.
47. Price, Review, pp.42-3.
48. See note 41 above.
49. Price, Review, p.43.
50. Ibid., p.46.
51. Ibid., p.44.
52. Hudson, Reason & Right, p.168.
53. Price, Review, pp.46-7.
54. Ibid., p.47; Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.50; Thomas, Richard Price, p.59.
55. Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.51.
56. Hudson, Reason & Right, p.168.
57. Price, Review, p.47.
58. Ibid., pp.47-8.
59. Ibid., pp.49-50.
60. Cua, Reason & Virtue, p.52.
61. Price, Review, p.52.
62. Cua, Reason & Virtue, pp.52ff.
63. Price, Review, p.177.
64. Ibid., p.178.
65. Ibid., pp.50-1.
66. Ibid., p.18, 184.
67. Ibid., p.179.
68. Abbott, Kant's Ethics, p.193.

69. Price, Review, p.186.
70. Ibid., p.187.
71. Ibid., p.185.
72. Sidgwick, History of Ethics, pp.224-5.
73. Price, Review, p. 74.
74. Ibid., p.195.
75. Abbott, Kant's Ethics, p.61.
76. Price, Review, p.185.
77. Price, Four Dissertations, p.139.
78. Price, Review, p.185.
79. Price, Four Dissertations, p.113.
80. Price, Review, p.186.
81. Ibid., p.187.
82. Ibid., pp.185ff.

83. Martineau, Ethical Theory, pp.482-3.
84. Ibid., p.478.
85. Price, Review, p.210.
86. Ibid., pp.214-5.

IV

An Analysis of Intuition:
Husserl's Theory of "Evidenz" or Fulfillment

Section 1: General Introduction to the Problem

Section 1A: The Common-Sense Distinction Between Thought & Knowledge and its Main Problem

<i> The Common-Sense Distinction

There is a common-sense distinction between mere thought and knowledge. We can think of all kinds of things whether or not they exist and whether or not they are as we think them to be. Knowledge and perception, on the other hand, are generally regarded as types of consciousness that apprehend existing things or states of affairs as they really are. For example, there is a difference between a mere thought that one's car is missing and the actual apprehension that it is so. We can think of mermaids, witches, goblins and monsters as well as round squares--all of which do not exist. Thought, therefore, has this capacity to be "of" or "about" something, i.e., to refer to, or "aim" at something, without the object thought of existing or having the qualities under which it is conceived. Knowledge, or "intuition," on the other hand, presents itself as having a much closer relationship to existence and fact. If one knows that it is raining, then, at least on this common-sense level, it follows that it is raining.

<ii> The Main Problem Associated with this Distinction

The issue of knowledge and existence, however, is especially problematic, for it is not always clear whether or not we have knowledge in a particular case. Young children, for example, whose imaginations are quite vivid, frequently have experiences which they take to be veridical but which, in fact, are not. The objects presented to them seem alive. The ogre menacingly standing over them late at night certainly seems real. Such cases, however, do not occasion serious doubt on a common-sense or practical level. When our frightened children come running into our bedroom late at night, in terror because they believe they've seen an ogre in their room, we do not also scream in terror and jump out the window believing it is true. Rather, we calm them down with the assuring words, "it's just a dream, sweetie--look--see? There's nothing there." An appeal is made, therefore, to the parent's "insight" as well as to the child's actual, although underdeveloped, capacity to discriminate cases of veridical perception from merely apparent ones.

Such relatively simple cases do not elicit serious doubt, but the problem of determining when we do and when we do not have knowledge more fully reveals itself when we turn to more complex cases. We have little trouble with ogres and the like. These, we say, do not exist. We have no basis in experience for thinking that they do and the general rational consensus (outside of children) confirms this. But we have considerable trouble with cases such as the nature and existence of the mind or its ideas, psychical phenomenon, abstract entities such as numbers and, perhaps, above all, ethico-religious claims concerning the meaning and purpose of life. Here the consensus with respect to alleged experience, is not quite so universal. Well meaning and intelligent people claim, for example, that God exists or that abortion on demand is wrong, while others are incredulous with respect to such claims and can only attribute belief in them to some aberrant form of social conditioning rooted in one's childhood.[1]

These considerations suggest that the central common sense problem of knowledge at issue here is essentially a problem of verification. This is the problem of how we know, or of what procedures or processes one must go through to test some particular type of knowledge claim. In the complex cases mentioned above our problem is simply that we are unclear with respect to these particulars on what steps to take to confirm or disconfirm claims of experiential insight. If Moses claims to have seen God, how do we know he has or has not? If Gandhi or Martin Luther King claim that they see that passive or non-violent resistance alone can secure a true and lasting good for all, how do we know this is true?

We must be careful, however, even on this common sense level, not to confuse or conflate this problem of providing an adequate truth criterion for experiential justification with problems often intimately connected with it. For example, we must distinguish it from the irrational skepticism mentioned earlier or the despair correlated therewith. The failure to come to terms with some of these more complex or fundamental issues of life may lead to despair of resolving them; hence, to doubt whether there is truth to be found in their case. This, in turn, may tempt one to despair or doubt concerning whether or not there is truth to be found in any case. The irrationality of such a generalized doubt, however, immediately reveals itself when one observes that truth and an experiential criterion of justification are acknowledged in certain cases only to be arbitrarily denied in more complex ones. As an irrational form of skepticism, therefore, it is not something we need to contend with from the vantage point of a purely rational inquiry, although as a possible form of despair, it may be unavoidable from the vantage point of any moral investigation.

<iii> The Attempt to Meet this Problem by Appeal to the General Theory of Perception Or Sense-Experience

Even on this common-sense level one may quickly reply that the central problem of knowledge is the skeptical problem of whether we know, and this precisely because we are familiar with clear procedures of verification. In cases of ordinary macro-observable physical objects we verify knowledge claims by direct perceptual experience. We look to see if it is so. If someone claims to have seen a flying saucer, the Loch-Ness monster, Noah's Ark, etc., we can, do and should ask, "where did you see them?, what did they look like?," etc.. We should then proceed to confirm or disconfirm their claims by direct perceptual apprehension. If, in following their directions, we still find nothing there, and they still insist that such objects are there but that only they, not we, can see them, we may, perhaps with good justification, look at them with raised eyebrows or wonder whether or not they were on drugs or just escaped from some psychiatric ward.

<iv> Inadequacy of this Appeal

But, the attempt to limit the applicability of such perceptual verification procedures to macro-observable physical objects may now well appear futile. After careful analysis, nothing can literally be known by sense perception alone, and the elucidation of this verification procedure or method itself by "empirical" methods is questionable to the highest degree. We want to know what, precisely, constitutes this or any process of verification as such, and the mere appeal to sensible experience does not illuminate this. It does not illuminate how perception works and why it can be relied on in certain cases and not others.

When we turn our attention, therefore, to objects of generically different types, i.e., non-sensible objects, this problem becomes especially acute. If the persons in question were survivors of Dachau or Auschwitz, rape victims or abused children and they claimed to have had direct "perceptual" or experiential verification of evil we might accept their testimony as true (even if we, ourselves, had not had such experience). And, in this case too, one might attempt to verify one's claims of knowledge by "pointing to" the alleged "facts." For example, they might show others concrete cases of persons--Hitler, Manson, Jones, etc.--who had done certain types of "evil" actions. But the "looking" or pointing in such cases, although commonly assumed reliable, (especially in a court of law), is certainly different from the former cases of ordinary sense perception. As Moore said of the mental act, these objects appear to have a certain "diaphanous" or transparent quality about them. Yet many claim to know them nonetheless. According to Moore,

> . . . the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and see *what*, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element [i.e.,

> consciousness] is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it **can** be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for.[2]

Hence, if we turn our attention to even more "abstract" objects, such as the nature of Being or Reality itself or the nature of the most fundamental kinds of things that are (or exist), e.g., the ultimate meaning and purpose of life, the nature of personality, etc., our experiential or common-sense verification procedures seem overwhelmed. The issue may seem to pass over to "Metaphysicians" or Gurus, who promise by "mind power" to reveal to us the secrets of the ages and even promise to make us wealthy, healthy and wise.

Such cases may serve well to indicate the vagueness that ordinarily attends our understanding of the nature and limits of perception or the nature of the processes by which thought is experientially verified. In either type of case, whether or not the object is more or less "sensible," we generally have little more to appeal to in way of confirmation or disconfirmation then some vague "insight" or "perception." We are largely oblivious to the detailed explication of just what is involved in the process of coming to know by more or less direct presentations of the relevant objects. As a result we are vulnerable to precisely that irrational skepticism or despair that insinuates itself into rational controversy as if it were a legitimate form of rational doubt.

But, most importantly, such vagueness also provides the soil for doubt, legitimate or not, concerning our thesis of the power of rational insight over moral action and life. For, the type of reason or knowledge that we maintained was practical, or had power, was not mere thought, or even the conclusion of a ratiocinative process of reasoning, but precisely knowledge understood in a very strong sense: the direct perception or intuition of moral facts or realities themselves. Throughout the history of philosophy, we suggested, there has been a progressive working out of this problem. But at a certain phase in the historical process we saw that crucial assumptions concerning the nature of this process of perceptual verification led to another, seemingly far more serious, problem which called in question the very possibility of knowledge itself. It led to Humean skepticism. The problem of verification led back to the question of whether we know at all--not to doubt concerning specific cases of knowledge, but to a general doubt about the mere possibility of knowledge.

<v> The General Bearing of Husserl's Theory of Knowledge on this Problem

In a vitally important or relevant sense, then, Husserl's attempt to resolve the general epistemological problem of how we know or the problem of a correct description of perceptual or intuitive verification, may be correctly viewed as an attempt to provide an adequate foundation for the resolution of such crucial issues of human life. It was so viewed by Husserl himself. Far from being merely abstract or formal speculation, his epistemology, in contrast to many others of our day, may well constitute a prolegomena for any future metaphysics in general and any moral ontology and epistemology in particular. His concerns were at the same time intensely practical. He comments that:

> . . . the decisive influences, which drove me from mathematics to philosophy as my vocation, may lie in overpowering religious experiences and complete trans-formations. Indeed the powerful effect of the New Testament on a 23 year old gave rise to an impetus to discover the way to God and to a true life through a rigorous philosophical inquiry.[3]

Erazim Kohak observes that "Husserl's letter to Metzger suggests . . . [that] the fundamental impetus of Husserl's work was profoundly existential and moral, an urgent quest for a renewed moral orientation in a time of disintegrating values." And, again: ". . . what he himself [Husserl] had seen in transcendental philosophy [phenomenology] is precisely the bedrock of the essential structures of being human, on which authentic moral philosophy can be built."4 Willard also observes that Husserl stood in a long line of philosophers who never intended to separate the theoretical, formal or logical life from the practical. In referring to Sigwart, but to equally reveal the Husserlian spirit, Willard says:

> According to Sigwart . . . The question of what man ought to do reveals itself as "the

> highest and most urgent problem of thought," and the theoretical life accordingly stands under a moral imperative: "The voluntary thought presupposed in logic, when in its concrete form it is directed towards a definite end valid for all, is contained in the universal duty of mankind, and is a necessary aim of human activity." These words refer to very much the same thing as Husserl would later call the spiritual vocation of "European man"(PR 159ff), the "eternal work of humanity" which philosophy is to teach us how to perform.(PR 72f)[5]

Section 2: Husserl's Formulation of the Problem of Know-ledge & the General Form of His Resolution of It

Section 2A: The General Nature of Husserl's Account of the Distinction Between Thought and Knowledge and His Main Problem Associated Therewith

Our discussion of the common-sense distinction between thought and intuitive (or perceptual) knowledge should enable us to appreciate more fully Husserl's conception of the problem of knowledge. For, Husserl's problem, as with most of his predecessors, was not essentially or in the first instance the skeptical problem of whether we know, but the problem of how we know, or of providing an adequate description of intuitive verification. This is *the problem of elucidating the types of structures and processes involved in conscious acts where an object, of whatever type, is itself brought before consciousness.*[6]

More specifically, Husserl saw that the root of Hume's skeptical problem or the key assumption that led to it, was his false empiricism, i.e., the denial of the human capacity to apprehend non-sensible objects such as relations, as well as his dogmatic and apriori restriction of perception to atomistic sensations or sense impressions.[7]

> Simply to assert that all judgments admit of, indeed even demand, legitimation by experience without having previously submitted the essence of judgments to a study with respect [to] their fundamentally different species and without having, in so doing, considered whether that assertion is not ultimately countersensical: that is a "speculative construction a priori" made no better by the fact that it happens to issue from the empiricistic camp. Genuine science and its own genuine freedom from prejudice require, as the foundation of all proofs, immediately valid judgments which derive their validity from *originally presentive intuitions*. . . . The fundamental regions of object and, correlatively, the regional types of presentive intuitions, the relevant types of judgments, and finally the noetic norms that demand for the establishment of judgments belonging to a particular type just this and no other species of intuition: none of that can be postulated or decreed from on high. [8]

This denial of the intuition (perception) of non-sensible objects, as we saw earlier, was precisely why Hume and others felt compelled to argue for moral conclusions from non-moral (i.e., sensuous) premises. But if we have no knowledge of non-sensible objects such as relations, then we can have no knowledge of anything at all, i.e., of unity, since all knowledge involves judgment, an apprehension of distinct things in relation. This might reason-ably be regarded as the essence of Hume's problem with all knowledge.

But Husserl saw too that Kant could not offer a convincing alternative to Hume's account of knowledge precisely because he shared Hume's nominalism. Despite the appeal to transcendental argument, no such "argument" could, in the nature of the case, move beyond the sensible to the non-sensible realm. Kant lacked both a theory of universals as well as a theory of the knowledge of universals (or an account of a non-sensuous or categorial intuition of non-sensible objects). Like Hume, therefore, he lacked the wherewithal for an adequate theory of the nature or unity of anything at all; hence, he lacked an adequate theory of the nature or unity of knowledge as well. It was precisely this failure, in fact, that we claimed was in back of Kant's inability to provide an adequate account of the practicality of reason.

Husserl, then, deftly seizes upon this point in his (quite immodest) proclamation of the superiority of his "critique" of knowledge over that of Kant.[9] Unlike both Hume and Kant, Husserl sees no inherent problem with the existence and apprehension of universals and necessary connections; hence, he sees no inherent problem of unity. Husserl takes his departure from both Hume and Kant, then, precisely in his ontological and epistemological realism. In denying any inherent problem with the non-sensuous intuition of universals and necessary connections, however, we must hasten to add that this does not imply that such intuition of universals or "essences" is easy or easy to describe. Quite the contrary. Husserl always thought of "seeing" and seeing more clearly as one of the most, if not the most, difficult of activities and one in which he always saw himself as a perpetual beginner.[10] He found it necessary, therefore, to return continually to the things themselves (*an der Sache Selbst*) in order to penetrate more exactly and more deeply into their full nature and uncover thereby the deeply embedded structures contained therein.[11] In this respect he appears as a kindred spirit to philosophers and scientists of all ages, who, like their mentor, Socrates, saw the scientific enterprise in the same light. But, despite this apparent perpetual "shortcoming" or limitation, which may plausibly be construed as inherent in the progressive working out or acquisition of seemingly unlimited knowledge, there is still, according to Husserl, a point where doubt about "seeing" undermines itself as a rational posture. This is the point where one construes rational epistemic doubt or philosophical skepticism as essentially a completely general doubt about whether or not we know anything at all, rather than specific doubt with respect to an adequate elucidation of the details of the process involved in coming to know what we in fact do know.

With respect to the specific problem of the existence and nature of knowledge itself, therefore, Husserl has no doubt. Knowledge, after all, is something. His problem, rather, is to provide a clear and rigorous elucidation of the elements, i.e., parts, properties and relations, inherent in the complexity of the mental "act" or state. In the spirit of Richard Price, then, Husserl saw more acutely than either Hume or Kant the necessity of going back "to the things themselves" rather than accepting blindly deeply entrenched social conventions or traditional assumptions (or logical arguments therefrom) about what and how things can be known. In this case that meant to go back to the mental "act" (i.e., intentional state) itself--and to elucidate carefully what it is and how it works. Phenomenology, in this initial sense, therefore, may be characterized as a study of intentionality, i.e., the study of the knowing act and its intentional structures, both when the object is absent (i.e., when we have a mere concept) and when it is present (i.e., a genuine percept).[12]

Section 2B: Husserl's More Specific Problem

We have described Husserl's general problem in terms of the elucidation of intuitive (or perceptual) knowledge, and we have claimed that it is a mere unwarranted prejudice to deny at the outset the reality and intuitability of universal structures, whether intrinsic to or independent of the human mind and/or its acts. But having said this we still need to undertake a more specific delimitation of the specific form the problem of knowledge took for him as a problem, if we are to understand the main lines of his resolution of it. To this end there is no better way to proceed then by considering concrete cases of knowledge. For, it is by actually looking at such cases in the characteristically phenomenological manner to be described in this paper that we can alone, according to Husserl, expect to see or extract the essence or nature of what knowledge is.[13]

If we turn our attention to our experiences of objects in general it is clear that these experiences are, in some very real and important sense, subjective.[14] As I sit here in my room and write I immediately notice, for example, the sounds of birds singing and a plane flying nearby. I notice, too, books, papers and pens scattered on the floor. I look up and see a cloudy sky, and I watch the leaves of the trees outside my window move gently from the wind. I look "inward" and apprehend the discomfort of a cold and a certain melancholic mood possibly associated therewith. In reflecting, then, on this whole experience, I notice, for example, that the books, papers and pens on the floor were presented to me from different perspectives or "sides," and the colors and sounds were presented with specific shades or nuances. I notice, too, that the various objects experienced were presented within a certain temporal sequence or order. In virtue, therefore, of all these characteristics this whole experience of mine presents itself to me as unrepeatable--even within my own experience or life stream. No other experience that I have had is precisely the same as this one, nor does it appear possible for me or anyone else to have just this experience in just this way again, although they or I might have one very much like it.

But, if I carefully attend to such experiences, it seems equally evident that these subjective experiences have objective features as well. As I stand with my friend on a hillside in Santa Monica watching the sun set beyond the sea, there are certain general qualities or features that seem applicable to both our particular experiences, or to experiences I have had in the past, which seem to mark them off as the same. Both of our experiences are of a sunset--in fact, the same sunset--not of maggots in a garbage can or of a friend dying of A.I.D.S.. The object of my friend's experience and that of my own, then, is in some sense identical, which seems to provide the basis for inter-subjective communication as well as confirmation or disconfirmation between us with regard to just that object. We say to each other, "Isn't it beautiful?," and we presume at least we're talking about the same thing. Our subjective experiences, therefore, seem susceptible to a certain objective character of community with respect to what is thought of or cognized.

But, further, my experiences also present themselves to me as susceptible to a certain order, structure or lawfulness in their occurrence which seems to determine what can constitute an experience of one object over another. For example, I look up and see a hummingbird before me standing almost motionless in the air. It drops down briefly and then, darting to the left and to the right, it flies away. In reflecting on my experience of it I notice a number of features arranged in a very specific or orderly way. The hummingbird is presented with a certain range of colors, small size, long beak, etc.. Not just any arbitrary arrangement or conflation of these or other parts and properties would constitute for me, or apparently anyone else, an experience of a hummingbird. I cannot, for example, expect to experience (or even think of) a hummingbird, if instead of a beak there is conjoined an elephant's trunk or instead of a head with small eyes there is conjoined a wheel with spokes. Or, to consider a different type of case, my hearing of a melody on my radio is an experience in which the individual tones that constitute the melody are presented or heard in a very orderly temporal sequence. If I am to hear that melody I cannot arbitrarily conflate the order of these tones and expect to experience it, nor can I arbitrarily substitute an indefinite range of other object features, e.g., a color or shape, and expect to hear a melody at all.

Finally, I observe that my experiences present themselves as capable of not merely referring to the same object, or doing so in a rigorous or law governed manner, but of actually grasping hold of something in some sense independent of my experience of it. In Price's language, our experiences seem capable of the apprehension of "independent existence and truth." In Husserl's terminology, our experiences seem capable of a certain "transcendence" toward or in the object of experience.15 It is at least certain that objects present themselves to me as if they were there before I apprehended them and continue to exist after my experience of them. It is not as if they were presented as coming into being with my mere looking at them, nor as ceasing to exist when I momentarily turn away. My son walks in the room and I see him. I turn away to look at the clock on the wall and then turn again to speak with him. He is surely not presented to me as coming into being the moment I first saw him, nor of ceasing to be when I turned away. These three objective features, then, of community, law and transcendence appear to be generally conceded distinctions which do not, on this general level, appear to assert more than what is already implicit in the common sense distinction between thought and knowledge discussed above. But, it is precisely in terms of these features that Husserl defines his specific problem of knowledge, as well as what he takes to be the specific problem for any theory of knowledge. This is the problem of reconciling *these three objective features of knowledge with the subjectivity of the act or state of knowing*.[16]

Section 2C: Husserl's Early Concern with this Problem & the General Form of His Proposed Solution

For an adequate appreciation of Husserl's general solution to this problem of knowledge one need not look far beyond his earliest discussions of it. In one of his earliest works, Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic, Husserl attempted, by an intuitionally based analysis, to discern *certain general structures* inherent in the human mind or mental act. More specifically, he believed he had discovered: <a> in his first psychological study: "inspectable and necessary (though non-analytic) connections between certain abstract elements within whole cognitive acts . . . as well as between them and the correlative concrete wholes"; and, <b> in his second study: necessary connections (or "material apriori" structures) "between two or more whole cognitive acts of certain specific types."17 But, due to misinterpretations, or at least varying conceptions of Husserl's views, it is essential to emphasize *that he believed that what he had discovered was not a mere epistemological structure or set of distinctions pertaining to the nature or contents of knowledge alone, but an ontological or formal structure applicable to the nature or unity of anything at all.*[18]

This means that Husserl believed he had discovered it was possible to look at, examine or intuit objects of all types and come, thereby, to definite conclusions about them. This, he believed, was not the case merely with respect to our experiences of objects, but with respect to things or objects themselves when they are adequately present to us. We could, he believed, discern what they are or what their nature or essence is, *independently of presuppositions* or the "coloring" imposed on thought by social conventions or conditioning. In short, from the very beginning (and we believe to the very end) Husserl conceived of phenomenology as not merely an intuitive study of intentionality but as *a study of essences in general and their interrelations (Wesenschau).*[19] It is this fact that essentially aligns Husserl with the earlier (realist) phenomenologists such as Reinach, Pfander, etc., and dis-tinguishes him from the later (idealist) phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Ricoeur, etc..

> Immediate "seeing," not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational assertions.[20]

> . . . the principle of all principles . . . [is] that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its "personal" actuality) offered to us in "intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.[21]

> In phenomenology, then, which is to be nothing else but a theory of essences [presented] within pure intuition, we perform acts of seeing essences immediately in given examples of transcendentally pure consciousness and fix them conceptually and terminologically.[22]

> Transcendental phenomenology, as a descriptive science of essence, belongs however to a fundamental class of eidetic sciences totally different from the one to which the mathematical sciences belong.[23]

The general significance of this conception of phenomenology as Wesenschau lies in the fact that, for Husserl, one cannot provide an adequate critique of knowledge without at the same time providing an adequate formal ontology. In other words, in attempting to elucidate the nature or essence of knowledge it is apparent to him that knowledge constitutes a mere part of reality. Hence, to elucidate adequately the nature or essence of knowledge one must elucidate the formal or categorial features that qualify the nature or essence of anything at all. In attempting to provide a critique of knowledge, therefore, Husserl is always performing a two-fold task of "using" knowledge to elucidate its own nature as well as to elucidate the nature of Being or Reality in general. This is why Husserl so greatly emphasizes the significance of his critique of knowledge. He simply believes that his critique is the first to provide an adequate foundation for metaphysical or scientific research generally.

Husserl's discovery that the most general structures exemplified in the human mind or mental act, mentioned above, are also formal or ontological structures provides the foundation for Husserl's solution to the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. For, he came to see that the solution to the problem of knowledge could be achieved, and only achieved, in light of the existence and apprehendability of universals, which are not essentially mental or psychical, but precisely formal or ontological entities. Husserl saw, then, that the solution to the problem of community of knowledge could be achieved only in virtue of certain subclasses of these universals, i.e., complex sensory and intentional qualities (i.e., concepts and propositions).[24] Because they were precisely universals they could be instanced in concrete or subjective mental acts, i.e., in many minds or the same mind at different times and places (as no physical thing can), and thus could provide a solution to the problem of shared communication and inquiry. In this respect, therefore, Husserl thought the problem of knowledge was not essentially different, ontologically, from most other familiar types of objects, e.g., the color green in this and that leaf, the letter 'a' in this and that mark, the number two qualifying this or that group, etc..

Given the existence, nature and interconnections between such subclasses of universals, we can see how, Husserl believed, the law governed character of our minds and mental processes or acts might also be explicated.[25] For, essential or necessary relations can only exist between ideal or universal entities, and it is precisely in virtue of the fact that such ideal entities are instanced in concrete mental acts that they can prescribe necessities and possibilities for them. For example, the sensory universals present in one's concrete sensations give certain acts the nature of the seeing of an apple, and the perception of apples makes it possible for one to count them. If this is so, then we can see how "seeing," (and so, too, perhaps, moral seeing)--at least in the philosophically more interesting cases--may not be something that can be done simply by focusing on an immediately presentable object in some way. Rather, it may essentially involve a law governed process between whole mental acts of distinct kinds (note the second psychological study above). Certain objects or states of affairs, moral and otherwise, therefore, may well be more philosophically elusive than others with respect to intuitive verification precisely because knowledge of them essentially involves a complex process, and a rigorous elucidation of that process had not been given.

Finally, solution to the problem of transcendence--the problem with which we are primarily concerned--turns upon the solution to the problems of community and law above.26 That is, transcendence on Husserl's view is the realization of a concrete whole or unity in which consciousness is tangibly joined with the object itself, the object lying outside of it existentially. The existing object in this case is no literal part of the act which grasps it, but is only a part of the whole or unity of act + object which constitutes the knowledge relation. With respect to the act side of the relation, then, transcendence is an emergent or consequential quality of the mind "founded on" the possibility of concrete acts of the same type relating in such a way that subsequent acts epistemically "fill" prior, more "empty," acts and thereby make knowledge in the sense of fulfillment or verification possible.

This means that in virtue of the fact that we can think of the same object in repeated acts of thought, we can also apprehend that the same object merely thought of in a more or less vague sort of way is the self-same object that presents itself to us more clearly or vividly as actually being as it was thought to be. As one approaches an object with the intention of intuitively or perceptually verifying it, one gains clearer views of its parts and properties until one reaches a point where doubt with respect to it is no longer possible or intelligible. I apprehend vaguely a white blob in the street as my dead cat. As I proceed to verify whether or not this is the case, I enter into a process involving subsequent perceptions which terminates in the clear or vivid perception that my cat is in fact dead.

In sum, then, the mental act of thought, for Husserl, presents itself as a certain type of complex unity having necessary relations between its parts and properties as well as between itself and other complex intentional and transcendent wholes.27 It is this account of the mental act that provides the necessary framework for Husserl's solution to the problem of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment or verification, i.e., of how we come to know whatever it is we know. Our aim in what follows will be to elucidate in some detail this theory of the mental act and, especially, the act with respect to intuitive knowledge.

Section 3: Husserl's Theory of the Mental Act with Respect to both Thought and Knowledge & Their Interrelationship

Section 3A: The Main Aim of this Section to Elucidate the Mental Act with Respect to Knowledge. This Will Involve an Analysis of Its Parts and Properties

The primary aim of this section of our chapter is to present an exposition of Husserl's theory of the nature of the mental act of knowledge. This will involve an analysis of the parts or contents of the mental act (of thought) as such and especially those parts or contents most relevant to knowledge in the sense of intuitive fulfillment or perceptual verification. But, if we are to understand the novel character of Husserl's account, we must be careful not to conflate the literal parts or contents of the act of thought with the parts or contents of essentially related but distinct structures. That is to say, Husserl claims there are three interconnected essential structures which are present in every knowledge situation which have their own distinct parts or contents.28 First, there is a structure of experiences of knowing or the mental act; second, a structure of objective meanings which constitutes the logical structure in the content of a theory, and, finally, there is the structure of things known.

By the structure of experiences of knowing Husserl has in mind the realm of consciousness or the mental or psychical act (or state). These acts, as indicated above, instantiate sensory and intentional properties, and it is in virtue of this fact that they retain a certain universality of nature, which, Husserl contends, may be investigated distinct from the more particular and temporal circumstances in which such acts are found. It is this which distinguishes the conceptual or epistemological research of philosophy from the "empirical" research of psychology, and it is this which distinguishes Husserl's epistemology as non-psychologistic.[29] For, psychology deals primarily with concrete acts of thought in their concrete relations to concrete individuals in concrete sets of circumstances, while the philosophical elucidation of the mental acts or state deals primarily with essential or universal structures. In this case, philosophy deals with the structure of "intentionality" which provides the foundation for the elucidation of mental acts or experiences of essentially different kinds.

Husserl claims that it is only in virtue of the fact that concrete acts of thought or experience can instantiate such universal structures that we can be "conscious" of anything at all. Yet, despite the essential correlation between these specifically intentional properties and the act in which they are found embedded, Husserl claims we must not conflate these properties or objective meanings (and their contents) from the act (and its contents). On Husserl's view, the objective meanings (concepts and propositions), which make up the body of scientific theory and logic, are not essentially or in the first instance objects of experience, nor are they acts or experiences themselves. Rather, they comprise a distinct order or realm *of Being*.

In virtue of the fact that these meanings are not primarily, or in the first instance, objects of thought, we must also be careful not to conflate or identify these meanings, or the acts in which they are found, with the transcendent object of experience. It is true that it is in virtue of our capacity to instantiate such referential qualities or meanings in concrete mental acts that we can refer to objects that exist. But it is equally true that it is only in virtue of the fact that these meanings comprise a unique order or realm of existence distinct from the existing object of experience that we can refer to objects, which do not exist. In the case, then, where the existing objective correlates of our intentional experiences authentically present themselves, they do so in many instances as not only distinct but independent of our experiences as well. They present themselves, therefore, as "transcendent" to the experiences which intuitively grasp them. The fact, however, that there is a certain form of essential connection between the intentional act and its existing objective correlate in no way implies that the existing object is a literal part of experience--not even an intentional part. Husserl claims, therefore, that we must distinguish the realm of existing objectivities generally from the distinct or more particular realms of the mental act and meaning. These acts and meanings, of course, also exist and can be made the objects of an appropriate apprehension, but they are not to be confused, for example, with physical objects generally, nor with more formal or categorial entities which are instanced in existing objectivities of every type.[30]

With respect to the general elucidation of thought and knowledge, then, Husserl believes that a rigorous analysis of the nature and interrelations between these three realms of entities is essential for an adequate epistemology or account of the mental act. Without a theory of the act of thought, as in the case of Frege, we have no account of how meanings (e.g., propositions and logical relations) may be instanced in or apply to concrete acts of thought. We have, in short, no theory of mind. Without an adequate account of objective meanings, as in the case of empiricistic or positivistic accounts generally, we lack an adequate account of conceptualization or objective consciousness. Mere subjectivity or skepticism is the inevitable result. Finally, if we lack an adequate account of a reality distinct from the act of thought and meaning, which is the case with Kant and idealism generally, we have no way to break free of the "circle of ideas"--even with respect to the elucidation of those ideas themselves.

To provide an adequate account of the nature and interrelationships between these distinct provinces is, for Husserl, to provide an adequate epistemology. Our aim, therefore, in what follows will be to turn to the more exact analysis of the main parts or "contents" of the mental act and their various interconnections. Toward this end we shall, first, list the parts of the mental act most relevant to thought and knowledge and then, <i> attempt a general elucidation of the parts of the mental act most relevant to the elucidation of the mental act of thought, and <ii> attempt a more rigorous exposition of the parts of the mental act most relevant to the elucidation of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. In elucidating <i>, the mental act of thought, we shall particularly aim at elucidating Husserl's solution to the problems of community and law, and in the course of elucidating <ii>, the act of knowledge, we shall particularly aim at elucidating Husserl's solution to the problem of transcendence. The elucidation of these three objective features of knowledge and, above all, the feature of transcendence, will provide the key to unlock the door to the objectivity of knowledge, and of moral knowledge in particular.

The Parts of the Mental Act

<i> Parts of the Mental Act Most Relevant to *Thought*

[1] primary contents or sensate matter (in which sensory universals inhere);
[2] intentional role or the function sensa (or acts!) play in the apprehension of an object;
[3] the matter of an act or its referential quality (in which meanings or intentional qualities, i.e., concepts and propositions, inhere);
[4] the quality of an act or its propositional attitude;
[5] the intentional essence of an act (the intentional unity constituted by an act's matter and quality);

<ii> Parts of the Mental Act Most Relevant to *Knowledge*

[6] epistemic fullness or epistemic role
[7] relations between acts:
    {a} fulfillment;
    {b} frustration or conflict;
[8] transcendence or the relation between act and existing object

<i> Husserl's Account of the Mental Act of Thought

{a} Husserl's General Position with Respect to the Nature of the Mental Act of Thought and Its Bearing on Community and Law

Quite generally, it is Husserl's view that thought is a certain type of complex unity or intentional state, which instances sensory and intentional properties or universals. The intentional or referential aspects of thought are themselves complex relations or relation-like structures, the parts of which constitute references to correlative parts and properties attributed to their objects. There is, in this case, no assumption that the objects in question exist or have the parts and properties attributed to them, although Husserl contends that relations between specific types of these cognitive wholes or acts may determine acts of knowledge wherein the existence of their object is guaranteed.

We mentioned earlier that it is precisely in virtue of the universal character of these intentional properties (as well as the underlying sensory qualities which "found" them) that they can be instanced in many concrete or subjective mental acts at the same or different times. This no ordinary physical object can do, and it is this fact which provides, Husserl believes, the basis for the solution to the problem of how community of thought (and knowledge) can be possible. But Husserl also believes that the existence and interconnections between these subclasses of universals can provide the basis for a solution to the apparent law governed character of our mental processes or acts of thought. For, these sensory and intentional universals, qua universals, can prescribe absolute necessities and possibilities on what can and cannot constitute the unity of an act of thought in general as well as any particular type of act of thought. For example, they define what constitutes the nature of an act (or state) of thinking of an apple versus a unicorn. But, more importantly, on the foundation laid by the elucidation of the essence of certain simpler or lower order acts, more complex or higher order acts may be determined with equal necessity. That is, it is Husserl's contention that higher order mental acts, cognitions or ideas may emerge through intentional "processes," themselves essential, which "mediate" intentional (or intuitive) access to ideas and objects which are not presently or immediately accessible. For example, the presence of a certain set of sensory universals in one's concrete sensations gives a certain act the nature of a sensible apprehension or conception of a tree; the conception of trees makes it possible for one to count them and the counting of them makes it possible for one to represent or conceive of number itself or some specific number. To more precisely understand Husserl's account of thought, however, we need to turn to a more detailed elucidation of those parts and properties of the mental act most relevant thereto.

{b} Detailed Explication of the Mental Act of Thought via a Discussion of Those Parts of the Mental Act Most Relevant Thereto

[1] "Primary Contents" (also called "Sensa," "Sensate Matter," "Sense Contents" and Sensations)

Every act of thought, according to Husserl, contains some "sensa" element or content.31 These sensa, or "primary contents," as Husserl calls them, generally coincide with those empirical sensations all concede to be requisite for the sensible perception of ordinary macro-observable physical objects.[32] There are, for example, visual, tactile and acoustical sensations. They are called "primary" by Husserl because they are "ultimately foundational" parts or elements of consciousness.[33] Other "contents" emerge, immediately or mediately, in consciousness on the basis of or in reaction to them. They themselves, although foundational elements in consciousness, emerge as the last element of a commonly recognized three phase process which includes external physical stimuli and physical changes in the individual perceiver.[34]

Despite this acknowledged psycho-physical correlation, however, Husserl insists that these primary contents are not, nor do they present themselves to be, physical entities. Color sensations, for example, are not identical to the coloring of some physical body. The visual impression or sensation of red in this apple is not the red color of the apple itself; nor is it an attribute of one's eye (one's eye is not red) or one's brain.[35] Rather, primary contents are literal parts or "dependent moments" of consciousness (*erlebnisse*) while physical objects are transcendent to or independent of consciousness. Moreover, sensations, as well as their relations to physical objects, are not ordinarily attended to or seen, i.e., they do not ordinarily function as objects of thought,36 while the color of a physical body is. I look up and see that this tree is green, an experience quite familiar to us all. But the apprehension of my sensations of green, like my apprehension of thought generally, is not so familiar. In the usual case, therefore, Husserl claims that sensa are merely experienced, and often "apperceived" or "animated" to render an object present. This means that sensations are constituents of consciousness which, although not ordinarily focused upon or seen, nonetheless "function" or play an essential "role" in "giving" or "guiding" the mind or thought to its object. The fact that I have certain color sensations, for example, enables me to think of or see a sunset while my blind friend cannot.

If one is attentive enough, however, one can refer to or "see" these sensations in contradistinction from their objects. For example, the sensa correlated with this white paper exhibit a shade of gray at dusk yet we still see the paper as white. But, despite this possibility, the fact that such apprehension is not common and not easy should make it evident that we do not, in the ordinary case, first look at or refer to our sensations and then infer from them the existence of their objective correlates. In contrast to the Hume/Mill tradition, Husserl maintains that we do not, for example, look at our sensations of red, orange and yellow and then infer the conclusion, "this must be a sunset." Rather, when we look at a sunset, a house, etc., we see the sunset or house itself, and to have certain specific sensate and other experiences is just what it means to either think of an object of that kind or to have that object itself present or before us.[37]

If we attempt, then, to look at these sensa themselves as they present themselves to us in concrete cases, Husserl believes we can see that they have qualities and relations that are "similar"--even identical--to the qualities and relations that objects of ordinary sense perception appear to have.[38] They have, for example, color, tonal, spatial and temporal qualities. My sensations associated with my perception of these trees include green color sensations, and in enumerating the trees my sensations themselves (not the trees) exhibit a certain temporal order, etc..[39] But, sensations also exhibit properties and relations unique to them alone. For example, as psychical entities they always present themselves as being instanced in one or two dimensional manifolds in contrast to the three dimensional manifold characteristic of physical objects.[40] They also exhibit, as we shall see in detail shortly, essential connections to other constituents of thought or the mental act which determine the referential character of consciousness generally as well as the intuitive character of thought in particular.

In attempting to carry out the analysis of sensations themselves, Husserl claims that particular sensa always present themselves as embedded within certain sensate wholes or natural complex unities ("gestalt qualities" or "figural moments") of a certain kind.[41] They are found therein as distinct but inseparable elements.[42] Color sensations, for example, always present themselves as constituents within a unified visual sense field. When we "look" at these sensations embedded in these wholes, however, we can also observe that they are susceptible to further delimitation with respect to their concreteness or abstractability. On one hand, they present themselves with a certain particularity, which seems, as such, to limit or restrict their existence by their temporal locus or duration. For example, if I undertake to enumerate a number of trees in my yard the sensa correlative to each object enumerated as each object is "separately and specifically noticed" will exhibit a temporal order.[43] There are sensa that exist at T1 and sensa that exist at T2 and sensa that exist at T3, etc.. These particular sensa, therefore, appear to exist during a certain time only and cease to exist when they are no longer experienced. In this respect they seem to be on a par with, e.g., particular spoken sounds or particular letters on a blackboard. Once they are spoken or once they are erased they no longer exist.

Husserl claims that in carrying out analyses of this kind these particular or concrete sensa present themselves with the capacity to undergo a certain type of modification. They have the capacity to change on their own by the "active" character of the mind, or to be changed by the purposive exercise of the mind in the sense of being combined or decomposed, recombined or associated as well as abstracted in the formation of a "representation" (*vorstellung*) or "concept." In other words, concrete sensa present themselves as capable of being abstracted from their concrete or contingent circumstances so that they can function in the relatively free flow of conceptual activity. For example, in enumerating the trees after T1 has passed and the sensa associated with tree #1 cease to exist, I can still refer to tree #1 by re-experiencing the particular sensa associated therewith. But this is possible only in virtue of the fact that sensa have, and can be presented as having, a particular "essence" or universality which can be "seen" or distinguished from its concrete instantiations. In short, sensa can continue to exist and remain the same while undergoing change (in much the same way as, e.g., the words on this page can continue to exist even if I go back and correct certain spelling errors associated therewith), or they can cease to exist and yet still be referred to. In either case, they can do so only because they are and can be perceived to be, instantiations of sensory universals.[44] Hence, although it is true that no one else can have my particular sensations since they are a part of my subjective or concrete experience, one could have a sensa quite like it in virtue of the instantiation of similar sensory qualities.

Sensations, then, according to Husserl, are ultimate constituents of consciousness and, as mental or psychical entities, are to be distinguished from physical entities--even physical processes or stimuli within the individual himself. In fact, they are not only distinct in essence, but often separable as well. One may have sensations with no correlative physical stimuli and have physical stimuli with no correlative sensations. Neuropharmacology and neuropsychiatry, for example, are disciplines which primarily deal with classes of drugs, e.g., monoamine oxidase inhibitors {MAO's}, which "block," in various ways, the neurological transmitters which causally function to make an individual aware of various types of stimulations going on in one's body.[45] They induce various types of "non-reactive" states such as neuroleptanalgesia. Above all, they serve to block the conscious experience of pain. One may, therefore, undergo radical invasive surgical procedures which involve massive physical stimulation, e.g., in cases of radical masectomy, cardiac bypass, etc., and yet experience no sensations correlated therewith. Or, on the other hand, one may experience sensations of various kinds with no correlative physical stimulations. Dream states, for example, are cases of experience where images and thoughts occur with no correlative physical stimuli.

[2] "Intentional Role" (also called "Function," "Interpret-ation" and "Apperception")46

Although sensations are primary and necessary constituents of consciousness they are not sufficient, according to Husserl, to constitute the consciousness of anything at all. In addition to sensa there is what Husserl calls "intentional role." This is that part, dependent moment or real (reelle) constituent of consciousness that "animates" sensa and acts (as we shall see later) to render an object present to consciousness. That is, in virtue of the abstractability of sensa from their concrete surroundings or contingent circumstances, sensa can be "used" or function in the apprehension of an object--even of an object, which does not exist. Having instantiated, for example, green color sensations I can think not only of a green apple but of a green mermaid or martian. But, despite the fact that there is, according to Husserl, an essential relation between the sensation "used" or apperceived and the function that animates the sensation to acquire a representation or concept (i.e., a repeatable and shareable "thought") they are not identical. The mental or spiritual function is itself no sensation, modified or unmodified, although it is "founded" in such sensations.[47]

To make this point clear one need only reflect on the fact that every moment we are literally bombarded by stimuli; and, as a result, we experience a multitude of sensations with no necessary perceptions much less existing objective correlates of such perceptions. If we stop for a moment and attend to just a few of the multiplicity of possible objects of apprehension in our immediate surroundings correlated with such sensa, we can reflexively apprehend that prior to such explicit attention a multiplicity of sensations was experienced with no correlative perception. Even in cases where there is perception we can distinguish between the manner in which sensations may be "used" to "locate" a perceptual object, e.g., on the periphery or in the forefront of consciousness. I can hear now birds singing, an airplane flying overhead, a waterfall, a timer going off, children playing, tree limbs moving from the wind, a fan blowing, etc.. But despite the present and explicit attention given to these objects, it is not as if I did not have or experience the sensations correlated with these percepts before. When I turned to the explicit attention of certain objects over others, my sensations were still not referred to or seen. Rather, certain of them, viz., the acoustical ones, were "used" to "guide" my thought to various objects in my acoustical field. All things that are "in" consciousness are, therefore, not the same nor are they "in" consciousness in the same way. Sensations, in particular, may be "in" consciousness and, therefore, experienced, yet not focused upon or "used" to give an object to consciousness. They may, however, be apperceived by the mind which actively integrates them with other contents to render an object present. In such a case, sensations (and, sometimes, also the acts "interpreting" them) are experienced (erlebt) but do not appear as objects--they are not seen or heard, etc., while the objects are seen and heard, etc., yet not experienced.48 Apperception, then, is a giving or guiding relation of the mind which guides thought to its object whether or not that object exists.[49]

In speaking of this "integration" of sense contents, or the "using" of them in the conceptualization of "objects"--even non-existing objects, e.g., round squares or unicorns-it is of crucial importance to point out that it does not follow from this that the apprehension of an object is essentially a "making" or "creating." The experiential unification or integration of psychical contents in the perception of an object[50] is not necessarily voluntary and in any case is not identical to the unification or unifying relations binding the parts of the perceived objectivity itself.[51] It is necessary for the mind to integrate its contents appropriately to render an object present (one cannot expect to hear the air-conditioner blowing by looking with one's eyes), but it is not necessary, nor possible in the usual case, to integrate the contents of the existing objectivity itself. I cannot by "mind power" (at least not in the ordinary case) literally make or create a winning lottery ticket. At this stage one must at the very least distinguish between the parts and properties of the object of experience and the parts and properties of the experience of an object. For Husserl at least, the world is no literal part of our experiences or ideas.[52]

[3] The "Matter" of an Act

We said that as a result of the "activation" of sensa (and, as we shall see later, of acts as well) it is possible, according to Husserl, for one to think of or refer to objects of a seemingly limitless diversity of attributes. More specifically, on the foundation laid by sensation it is possible for one to instantiate complex intentional properties (concepts and propositions), which are distinct from sensa or even complexes of sensa. "A concept is not a sense content--even an abstract one."[53]

To more precisely elucidate this difference we must distinguish the descriptive, really immanent (*reelle*) content of the experience or act from its intentional content.[54] The descriptive content of an experience is the sum total of its concrete or abstract parts. These include the sensory qualities mentioned above as well as all the literal parts of the act to be discussed in this chapter.[55] The intentional content, however, is a distinct constituent of the act or experience in which a distinct realm of complex intentional or referential properties are found embedded or instantiated.[56] The matter of an act, then, is that part of the act that most essentially, but not exclusively, constitutes the act's referential character, i.e., the part in which intentional qualities (concepts, propositions, logical relations) inhere. Specifically, it is that part of the act that determines what is referred to and under what determinations. In virtue of this fact it may even loosely be said to constitute the meaning of the act.[57]

Although mental acts are the primary bearers of such referential qualities or objective meanings,[58] these intentional qualities themselves constitute, according to Husserl, an order of existence distinct both from that of the concrete mental act or experience itself and the factual world of independently existing transcendent objectivities. Meanings, that is, are neither essentially objects of thought nor are they essentially acts of thought, although they are essentially related to both of these. As properties or universals they exhibit a certain form of independence or transcendence with respect to the concrete mental act itself: they are objective or transpersonal in the sense that many people can instantiate the same concepts or meanings. But they display, too, in virtue of their character as mere meanings or referential properties, a certain independence of the world of independently existing objects. Instantiated concepts can refer to objects which do not even exist, and even if an object does exist its existence does not determine the nature of the concept that refers to it nor does it effect in any way the logical relations that may hold between judgments which contain such concepts as constituents. In virtue of this fact we can, for example, refer to fictitious objects such as unicorns, form propositions containing such concepts, e.g., 'All unicorns are things with one horn,' and explore logical relations between these propositions and others without first deciding whether or not such objects exist.

It is Husserl's view, then, that in every thought of an object of a distinct kind there is a certain identity or sameness that is not attributable to any existing objective correlate, but to the matter of the act, i.e., the nature of the meaning or reference contained therein. For example, in the case of one who imagines that Eddie has A.I.D.S., wonders whether Eddie has A.I.D.S., believes Eddie has A.I.D.S., etc., there is, of course, a certain sameness with respect to the intentional "objectivity," Eddie has A.I.D.S.. The intentional "objectivity," however, is not the matter of the act. For, the objectivity, in general, transcends the act.59 It may not even exist. The existence of the object, therefore, is irrelevant to the determina-tion of the nature of the act itself or even its meaning. That is, the meaning of the act is defined essentially (or, rather, primarily) in terms of its matter or referential character:

> The matter . . . is that peculiar side of an act's phenomenological content that not only determines that it grasps the object but also as what it grasps it, the properties, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it. It is the act's matter that makes its object count as this object and no other, it is *the objective, the interpretative sense (Sinn der gegenstandlichen Auffassung, Auffassungssinn)* which serves as basis for the act's quality . . .[60]

This view of meaning (or of concepts) as essentially qualities of mental acts, rather than objects of such acts, marks a central difference between Husserl's critique of the mental act and most other critiques (including most phenomenological critiques). For, most of these other views are essentially representationalist: thought must be of an existing object to be what it is; hence, if an object doesn't exist, then, on their views, one must redescribe thought or the idea itself. It cannot refer to or be of an object (i.e., represent it) since there is no object there. One concludes on these accounts that the concept must be of sensations or concepts. Husserl's response, however, is that for a concept to refer, or to be of an object, does not imply that the object exists and so the nature or essence of the act is the same whether the object exists or not.

> To say an object is merely intentional does not mean that it exists only in an intentional act or its parts or somewhere else. It means that the intention (the reference to an object as so and so qualified) exists, but that the object does not. If the intentional object exists then the intention does not exist by itself but the object does also.[61]

According to Husserl, there is, of course, some essential connection between concepts, which have genuine existing objective correlates and those existing objectivities themselves. This relation will be examined in more detail shortly. For an initial sense of the nature of this correlation, however, one must recall that the matter of the act in which the concept is instantiated involves two aspects (similar to Frege's sense and reference).[62] It involves, on one hand, what is referred to or which object is grasped; on the other hand, it involves how, or what sense or under what determinations it is grasped. In other words, the matter is "that moment in an objectifying act which makes the act present *just this object in just this manner*, i.e., in just these articulations and forms, and with special relation to just these properties or relationships."[63] To merely have a concept, then, is to have the capacity to think of or refer to an object as having certain properties or as having a certain nature or essence. But this does not entail there is something that has such properties and so exists. I may think of a woman as having the body of a fish and a woman (i.e., a mermaid), but there is nothing that has such properties. Hence, no such thing (or nature) exists. But a concept may not merely be had but may "apply to" an object. This is the capacity not merely to think of or refer to an object as having certain properties but actually to "transcend" or break through the alleged "circle of ideas" in grasping the object as it really is, i.e., the existing objectivity together with its properties. In this case not only does the concept exist but the object referred to does also.[64]

[4] The "Quality" of an Act

Although "matter," according to Husserl, is the element in our acts which serves as the basis for identification or meaning, the matter does not exhaust the intentional or referential character of the act. In every act, in addition to the matter and conjoined therewith is a quality or presentation element (also called a "propositional attitude"), e.g., hope, belief, surmise, judgment, etc.. That is to say, there is no act reference without some propositional attitude; nor is there a propositional attitude without some matter to which it is conjoined. For example, there is no belief without an object of belief--whether or not that object actually exists.65 One does not simply believe. One believes something, or one believes that something is or is not the case. The particular significance of the quality of the act for our concerns will become more apparent later on.

[5] The "Intentional Essence" of the Act

These two features of the act, i.e., its matter and quality, constitute, according to Husserl, the "intentional essence" (*noesis*) or intentional nexus of the mental act. This is that feature of the mental act that constitutes its intentionality, referentiality or thought character. Thought or intentionality, then, is simply the capacity of mind to think of or about objects of all kinds whether or not those objects exist. In all such cases there is a reference to an object under certain determinations (the matter of the act) as well as a certain attitude (quality) taken up with respect thereto. It is essential to keep in mind, however, that the intentional essence does not exhaust the act phenomenologically.66 There is more applicable to an act than its mere thought character or intentionality. More, for example, is needed than mere intentionality to elucidate knowledge in the sense of fulfillment.

[6] The "Semantic Essence" of the Act

What has been briefly articulated above is sufficient to provide a general elucidation of Husserl's view of the mental act of thought, but in view of modern day attempts to reduce thought to language it may be appropriate to briefly comment on Husserl's view of the role of language in thought, i.e., his account of the "semantic essence" of an act. The "semantic essence" of an act, for Husserl, is the intentional essence of an act accompanied by a certain type of linguistic experience. We can and commonly do draw a distinction between the mere thought of an object and the thought accompanied by certain linguistic experiences which associate the intentional object or meaning with a particular name or expression in a particular living language. Thus, the word 'p-e-o-p-l-e' in English and the word 'L-e-u-t-e-r' in German both mean the same thing. Such correlation, Husserl believes, is absolutely indispensable for knowledge acquisition generally. In logic and mathematics, for example, Husserl claims that certain objects or states of affairs simply cannot be "authentically intuited," although they can be "known." This is possible, he claims, in virtue of symbolic, mechanical or relatively "blind" methods or procedures involving formally articulated correlations between types of signs (symbolic essences), types of objectivities meant or referred to (intentional essences), and the existing correlates of these meanings. Inauthentic representations of certain objects, therefore, can be verified in virtue of more foundational correlations which can be authentically presented.[67] It is Husserl's view, for example, that only smaller numbers (up to the number 12) can be authentically intuited while larger numbers can only be inauthentically known by symbolic means.

For this reason (as well as because it is here where we most commonly or initially find intentional essences or meanings) "language analysis" is of considerable importance for epistemology. But this does not imply that thought is linguistic. It is phenomenologically naive to think so and it is evident from the standpoint of the most general intuition that one's experience of new objects or states of affairs precedes linguistic effability, describability or articulation. This is especially evident in cases where new found entities--especially in science--are linguistically tagged, or in cases of young children who reveal a magnitude of comprehension they are not as yet capable of expressing.

But, *even if we conceded that thought was linguistic, it is of no consequence for our thesis*. For, the central problems of thought and knowledge elucidated above and to follow remain the same regardless of whether or not one wishes to make an ultimate appeal to "linguistic entities." In such a case it is still incumbent upon the linguistic philosopher to clearly articulate what language is and precisely how it can, for example, resolve the problems of community, law and transcendence mentioned above. Quine, Sellars and Field, to name just a few, attempt to reduce thought to physicalist entities, i.e., empirical tokens. But it is clear that in their attempts to do so they find themselves either unable to reduce linguistic types to linguistic tokens or they ascribe to such tokens a range of properties or powers that are simply inapplicable to any physical object anyone is familiar with.

If we turn our attention to the specific issue of the practicality of reason, we also find the same traditional problems hidden under a linguistic guise. Hare, for example, in his *Language of Morals*, claims that if one holds a moral principle (interpreted linguistically), then one must act on it.[68] The appeal to language, therefore, has only as much strength as the rigor in which the detailed elucidation of linguistic thought or knowledge is carried out. One fears, moreover, that if one compares "the list" of the constituents of the mental act, e.g., of a Quine, Kripke or Sellars, etc., with Husserl's list one will find, despite their claim to being "empirical" or "scientific," vagueness where there ought to be rigorous exactitude, confusion where there ought to be clarity, and a mere muddle or conflation of necessities and possibilities where there ought to be distinction and consistency.[69]

<ii> Husserl's Account of the Mental Act of Knowledge in the Sense of Fulfillment

{a} The Aim of This Section: An Illuminating Critique of Husserl's 6th Logical Investigation

Husserl's maturest statement with respect to the critique of knowledge is found in his 6th Logical Investigation. It is here, more specifically, where he elucidates that general distinction between thought or "intention" and knowledge or "intuition" which we found to be so central to our moral investigations. Our attention in the remainder of this chapter, therefore, will be almost wholly confined to an exposition of Husserl's views of the mental act contained therein.

Toward this end we shall first briefly present an outline of the main parts of this investigation to show most generally what their partial contribution is to the whole, and, second, we shall then proceed to the exposition of Husserl's theory of the mental act that emerges from filling in some of the details of this outline.

[1] The Main Parts (Sections) of the 6th LI and Their Respective Partial Contributions to This End

(B) First Section: Objectifying Intentions and Their Fulfillments. Knowledge as a Synthesis of Fulfillment and Its Gradations

In the first section of the 6th LI, Husserl attempts to elucidate the distinction between thought and knowledge in general terms, i.e., without respect to the types of acts or the objects of such acts. More specifically, his aim in this section is: first, to delimit a particular class of thoughts, or "intentions," viz., objectifying ones, as those most uncontroversially subject to truth conditions (in contrast to, e.g., commands, questions, wishes, volitions, etc.); second, to elucidate perception or "intuition" as a form of verifiable knowledge, or, as he puts it, knowledge in the sense of "fulfillment" or a "synthesis of re-cognition." Phenomenological analysis reveals that this knowledge is a certain type of complex unity essentially involving a process in which certain objectifying intentions or acts, which are to some degree "empty" or merely intentional, are "filled" by subsequent acts directed on the same object. There are, he claims, two intimately related types of processes applicable to all such cases. On one hand, there is the process where we come to directly and authentically apprehend or re-cognize, and thus confirm, that things merely vaguely thought of before are actually as they appeared to be. This is the process of fulfillment or verification. On the other hand, an object may be apprehended to be "other than" it was originally thought to be and is, thereby, disconfirmed by a correlative experience or process of "frustration." This analysis of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, then, provides the basis for Husserl's final solution to the problem of how (not whether) thought can reach beyond its own immanent contents and grasp things as they are "in-themselves."

(B) Second Section: Sense and Understanding

In the second section of the 6th LI, Husserl aims at a more exact analysis of the process of fulfillment via the elucidation of the two primary types of intuitive "acts," viz., temporally immediate, primary or straightforward acts of "perception" (in the narrower sense) and direct, but temporally mediate and secondary (or "higher order") acts of "categorial intuition." Direct or immediate acts (lower order acts) are acts through which we grasp the concrete or real objects of ordinary sense perception. Categorial acts, on the other hand, are higher order acts which "use" or, rather, apperceive the lower order acts to render a higher order objectivity present. In other words, categorial intuitions are requisite for the apprehension of universals or essences, i.e., ideal unities or entities, in contrast to mere particulars.

In elucidating this distinction between types of intuitions Husserl's aim is to carry the analysis of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment (discussed in the first section) to a level of sufficient depth or specificity to clearly show that the act of categorial intuition is central to all knowledge. He holds, that is, that intuition or knowledge in the sense of fulfillment is inexplicable without such a doctrine of categorial intuition. This is so because every fulfillment essentially consists in a unity of primary (or straightforward) and founded (or higher order) acts; hence, there is but one type of fulfillment, although there are two types of intuitive acts. Knowledge, then, emerges as a certain type of complex or synthetic unity essentially "constituted" by higher order or categorial acts of knowledge, and the analysis of the latter provides the key concept requisite for an adequate account of how we know anything at all. The doctrine of categorial intuition emerges, therefore, as the most important (as well as most misunderstood) of all his investigations. It is simply the heart of his epistemology. As such, it is central for any adequate theory of the practicality of reason.

(C) Third Section: Clarification of Our Introductory Problem

In the third and last section, Husserl returns to his introductory discussion or problem of the specific status of "non-objectifying" acts or acts that appear to lack objectifying content, e.g., commands, wishes, volitions, questions, etc., and he proceeds to briefly analyze them in light of his "completed" phenomenological elucidation of knowledge. Against traditional assumptions and objections Husserl contends that these acts are, in fact, also objectifying acts although there is a shift of objective reference that must be carefully attended to or their actual character may be misunderstood.

Having thus given an outline of the 6th LI or an outline of how Husserl intends to elucidate the character of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, our intention now is to turn to the exposition of Husserl's theory of the mental act that emerges from filling in some of the details of this outline. Specifically, we intend to carry out the analysis of: [1] fulfillment, [2] categorial intuition and [3] transcendence.

{b} Exposition of Husserl's Theory of the Mental Act that Emerges from Filling in Some of the Details of This Outline

[1] Fulfillment

(B) The Aim of This Section to Elucidate What Knowledge in the Sense of Fulfillment is for Husserl

Our primary aim has been to elucidate the difference between merely thinking of an object and actually perceiving an object, which exists. Toward this end we have presented a brief account or outline of some of the parts of the mental act relevant to mere thought or intentionality. But the elucidation of thought or intentionality is insufficient for the elucidation of knowledge. For, the elucidation of what a mental act is merely provides an account of what its essential parts and properties are; hence, it does not provide us with an elucidation of its truth, i.e., of whether or not what it refers to actually exists or has the parts and properties attributed to it. This is especially evident in the case of non-existent objects, e.g., unicorns, round-squares, etc.. For, in such cases, although there are ideal or law governed strictures on what constitutes a thought of an object of this kind, there is clearly no transcendence or existing objectivity. We must, therefore, go beyond mere thought (and the objective features of community and law) to elucidate that third and most important feature of the objectivity of knowledge, viz., transcendence.

Most central to the elucidation of transcendence or knowledge, however, is the relation of "fulfillment" or perceptual (intuitive) verification which holds between a more or less empty thought or intention and an appropriately filled intuition of the same object. More specifically, the elucidation of perceptual or intuitive knowledge rests on the elucidation of a process of fulfillment, which, in turn, rests on the elucidation of intuition or a certain fullness quality *(Fulle*) that is applicable to certain types of mental acts. Our aim in this section, therefore, is to examine the nature of this fullness quality as well as the correlative process of fulfillment that leads to intuitive knowledge. This will essentially involve a more detailed specification of the parts of the mental act and especially those ideal law connections holding between the various subclasses of universals (concepts, propositions, etc.) mentioned earlier. Husserl's account of community and law, then, will provide the necessary basis for the elucidation of fulfillment which, in turn, will provide the basis for the elucidation of that form of transcendence wherein the act of thought transcends itself in the knowing grasp of an existing objectivity, i.e., a real relation to the thing itself is achieved.

(B) Concrete Case to Initially Explicate Knowledge in the Sense of Fulfillment

Husserl's ultimate appeal or justification with respect to the nature or essence of fulfillment, as in the case with the nature of anything at all, is an appeal to the rigorous analysis of the essence of that object itself. But, in order to discern the essence of fulfillment one must extract that essence from concrete cases in which it lies embedded. In this way only can one "see" whether and to what extent Husserl's claims are true. We must begin, therefore, by considering such familiar cases as the following: Someone tells me it is raining outside, so I go to the window and look. I then find that it is, indeed, raining. My cat is not around the house, and I think that, perhaps, she has been hit by a car and is dead. I go out into the street and look. I find that my cat has been hit by a car and is, in fact, dead. *In such cases Husserl claims that there is, and can be perceived, an essential structure that is common to them all and which can be elucidated*. Specifically, what they all share is a process of coming to know or a process of verification in which something merely thought of, or merely believed, is actually found to be as it was merely thought before. In short, what requires elucidation in all such cases is the relation or process of fulfillment between a mere thought or relatively empty intention on one hand and a correlatively filled intuition on the other.

(C) More Detailed Analysis of Fulfillment by an Analysis of the Difference Between the Fullness Quality of a Mere Intention and an Intuition

It is evident from the concrete cases above that there is some difference between the mere thought of an object and the thought of an object that constitutes perceptual or intuitive knowledge of it. What we need to examine more closely now is what this difference consists in, i.e., what more is required to characterize a thought as not merely intentional but intuitive as well. Most generally, Husserl claims that it is a characteristic of mental acts that they have over and above their intentional essence an "epistemic essence" which consists of precisely those parts or features that distinguish a knowing or intuitive act from a mere thought or intention. The central element of this epistemic essence is a certain fullness quality, which the intuition has and the mere intention lacks. Thus, what has to be added to the intentional essence of an act for it to become a verified thought or an act of knowledge, is simply intuitive fullness.

To provide an account of this fullness quality will require a more in depth analysis of the sensa properties discussed earlier with respect to the mental act. With respect to that earlier analysis we saw that some sensa element is necessary to "found" every act even if the properties of the sensa are wholly indifferent to the properties of the object thought of by means of them. For example, the sensa correlated with the perception of the physical marks `u-n-i-c-o-r-n' may be "used" or animated to think of the mythical entity, unicorn; or, the sensa correlated with a group of trees may be "used" to think of number. Psycho-physical organisms, then, require sensible support for their ideas even if those ideas or thoughts are not identical or reducible to the sensa which are necessary but insufficient conditions for their actualization. It is evident, therefore, that there is an intimate connection between sensa and our ideas in general. But this connection may also have a bearing on our intuitive ideas. For, as mentioned earlier, certain sensate experiences also seem indispensable for the perception of certain types of objects. A man born blind simply cannot even think of a colored body while a sighted person sleeping can, but only sighted persons with adequate sense impressions can perceive, e.g., this brightly colored Tiffany lamp. There is some relation or connection, then, between the properties of our sensa and the properties ascribed to an object in an intentional act.

More specifically, we characterized the matter of an act as that part of the intentional essence of the act that presents just this object under just these determinations. It is the act's intentional directedness upon a specific object, whether or not that object exists. It is Husserl's view that the sensory qualities or experienced contents "animated" or "apperceived" in this intentional directed-ness exhibit varying degrees of fullness, force or vivacity which indicate or "found" an authentic presence of an existing object in contrast to the mere thought of it. The intentional essence, therefore, of the act (its matter and quality) can remain the same while the epistemic essence or the vivacity of the sensa may differ.70 Multiple thoughts can be the same with respect to what they are of and yet differ with respect to this fullness. One can, for example, merely think of a leaf under various senses or determinations, e.g., as green, heart shaped, having a glossy surface, etc., or, one can do so with more or less vagueness or distinctness. In the latter case there comes a point where the vivacity of the sense contents constitute an actual perception of an existing object. The leaf is perceived to have such and such determinations. This difference, Husserl claims, consists precisely in the fullness or vivacity of the sense contents (sensory matter) associated with perception in contrast to mere thought or even imagination.[71]

Husserl contends that the evident relative character of the fullness or vivacity of sense contents provides us with the wherewithal to distinguish two ideal limiting or extreme cases as well as one mixed case. First, the properties of the sensa, which "found" an act may be completely different from the inherent characteristics of the object in question. This is especially evident in the case of what Husserl calls a purely "signitive act."[72] This is the case with a series of empty intentions where nothing of the object's real properties are imported into the thought itself. One thinks of the object but does not perceive or intuit it. One sees, for example, the letters 'm-e-r-m-a-i-d' and thinks of a woman having the body of a fish, but these properties are not sensibly "experienced." That is to say, one has, in such cases, no vivid fish or woman like sensations, but only, perhaps, vivid sensations correlated with letters on a printed page. It is worth noting, too, that this is also most commonly (although not necessarily) the case with the entities dealt with in logic and mathematics. One speaks of propositions, logical relations, numbers and numerical relations but apprehends nothing of their real or actual content. But it does not follow in this latter case that these objects do not exist or are not presentable in authentic intuitions or perceptions.

Second, on the opposite extreme we have what Husserl calls a "purely intuitive act."[73] In such cases every property of the object intended by the act is matched by some corresponding intuitive (in this case sensa) element in the act. In the case of macro-observable physical objects, e.g., the leaf mentioned above, this would mean that every feature of the leaf is matched 1:1 by some sensa element which by its vivacity presents the object fully and precisely as it is in itself. One cannot, however, according to Husserl, give examples of such cases--at least not with respect to physical objects. For, physical objects always present aspects, perspectives and sides which are not immediately sensibly accessible. This book, for example, has an indefinite range of parts and properties, which present themselves only as possibilities for further inquiry or perception, but for the most part are not and, perhaps, cannot be "seen." I see this paper lying under that one and I "know" that the part hidden is there, yet it is not fully, i.e., sensibly, presented to me. Moreover, the contingent circumstances in which one is placed will invariably present the object with certain inauthenticities with respect to its properties. In this lighting my sensa present the paper as gray although I perceive the paper to be white. As we shall see later, the case of physical objects stands in sharp contrast to that of ideal objects, and for the most part psychical objects as well. In their case ideal *Adequation*, the adequation of thought to object in which pure intuition *(Anschauung)* or *Evidenz* is attained, such a perfect correspondence is attainable or at the very least approachable.[74] I may not be able to attain *Evidenz* in the case of this book, but I can with respect to my concept of this book. In such a case my reference to the book as having such and such properties (white paper, so and so size, etc.) can be fully seen to be precisely a reference to the book as having such and such properties.

Most cases, however, are mixed. At least this is so with respect to the physical world and, to a lesser degree, the psychical world of experience.[75] That is, between the two extremes mentioned above lie acts of more or less "filled" intentions. The sensa or the intuitive representing con-tents of the act correlated with various existing objectivities authentically present only certain parts or properties of their objects while others function as mere representations or indicators with respect to the remaining constituents. At dusk my sensa present this book as having a certain shape, color, sequence of marks, etc.. Some of the qualities of my sensa more precisely correspond to the book's actual features, e.g., the marks or words. Others, however, do not so correspond, e.g., at dusk my sensa present the white paper as gray, although I nonetheless perceive it to be white. The gray sensa in such a case are "apperceived" as mere indicators or representatives for whiteness. In short, mixed acts represent signitively and intuitively at the same time.

(D) Elucidation of the Process Involved in Fulfillment as a Relation Between Acts which are Relatively Empty and Acts which are More Filled

We have focused our attention on what it is that essentially distinguishes intuitive acts from mere acts of thought or intentionality. But Husserl claims that knowledge in the sense of fulfillment or verification is essentially a certain type of process or relation--not a mere isolated act, nor even a mere conjunction of acts, of intuition. In fact, given that most acts are mixed acts they all involve some intuitive elements; thus, the mere fact that an act intuits something or imports something of the thing itself into the act is insufficient to elucidate knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. As I write, for example, there are many things that I experience, or many things that pass before my mind: I recall a movie I watched the other night, a spelling error I just made, books on my table, etc.. Some of these thoughts are more, and others less, intuitively filled; yet in no case has there been any verification or fulfillment of one thought by another. There would be, however, if I considered the sound I just heard outside my door and wondered, "Is that a squirrel?," and, then, went outside, looked and came to see a squirrel sitting on a branch of a tree chewing an acorn. In such a case the latter, relatively filled thought, would fulfill or verify the more empty thought of it I had earlier. Fulfillment, therefore, presents itself as a certain type of relation between acts of thought, which are more or less filled. In other words, fulfillment is "a quite complex relationship between a thought or mere meaning, on the one hand, and a correlative experience (or sequence of experiences) in which the object thought of or referred to is more closely examined and, in the ideal case, found totally to be what it was thought of as being."[76]

To more clearly elucidate the nature of this process or relation we may best proceed by comparing it with certain other relations possibly confused with it. In doing so, perhaps the single most important fact to keep in mind is that fulfillment is essentially a process involving, or holding between acts of thought, not non-acts. It is this that essentially distinguishes fulfillment from the processes or relations involved in the mere acquisition of a single act or thought. That is, we mentioned earlier, first, the process or relation holding between physical objects in the external world (or in the psycho-physical perceiving organism) and sensible contents; and, second, the process or relation holding between these sensa and the acts which "interpret" or apperceive them in the formation of a percept directed on an object. Neither of these processes or relations, however, are identical to the relation of fulfillment, since physical objects and sensa, at least, are not acts.

i. The Relation of Fulfillment and Logical Relations or an Inferential Process

If the relation of fulfillment is essentially a relation holding between acts, it cannot be essentially a logical relation, i.e., a relation holding between those intentional universals, abstract entities or meanings (concepts, propositions) mentioned above. Logical relations hold essentially between these propositions; hence, they can be considered to hold independently of any instantiations in acts that they are capable of, as well as independent of the existence of their objective correlates. That 'All Unicorns are things with one horn' is the contradictory of

'Some Unicorns are not things with one horn' is a relation that holds regardless of whether or not that relation is instantiated in this or any case. This, however, is in direct contrast to fulfillment wherein the fullness of an act, i.e., the relative degree of presence of its objective correlate, has a direct bearing on whether or not a mere thought of that object is fulfilled or verified.

It is true that logical relations are instantiated in concrete acts of inference or logical reasoning. Fulfillment, however, cannot be reduced to, or identified with such an inferential act (or process which essentially involves logical relations)--not even an unconscious one. The appeal, in the case of fulfillment, to a process of "reasoning" or a process of "verification" may, no doubt, conjure up in the minds of many an essentially logical process or process of inference. The object of thought may be supposed to be inferred from what we know with regard to our own intentional states, representations, concepts or even sensations. This, at least, is the prevailing outlook. Husserl, however, denies that the process of fulfillment is a process of inference. To clearly see that this is so one need only attend to concrete cases of intuitive fulfillment, such as those mentioned above, to see that we can have fulfillment without any correlative process of inference. In the fulfillment of my thought that there was a squirrel outside my room, for example, there was no "conscious" inferential process involved. But to more precisely elucidate this difference let us compare such cases of fulfillment with concrete cases of inference.

I was helping a friend build a roof the other day and he wanted the roof joists to be 24" on center. He asked me, therefore, to measure the distance between them. I responded, "Why?, the distance must be 22 1/2"." He asked me how I knew that. I responded, "If the joists are 24" on center, and if from the center to the adjacent side of each joist is 3/4", then the distance between them must be 22 1/2"." In this case, therefore, as well as in multitudes of similar cases with which we are all familiar, there is a conscious process of inference or reasoning involved which can be (and, in this case, was) reflected upon. If we compare, then, such concrete cases of logical inference with cases of intuitive fulfillment we can see immediately that they differ with respect to the intuitability of the latter term of the relations. In the logical case, there was a step by step deductive process of inferring or reasoning to a necessary conclusion or state of affairs which was not actually "seen" (I did not intuitively "see" the 22 1/2" distance). No doubt, such inferential processes typically involve a number of intuitive apprehensions--even, perhaps, fulfillments, e.g., I intuitively perceived several joists on a wall as well as certain relations between them. I noticed, for example, that this joist was to the left of that one, that one over there was longer than the one beside it, etc.. But, in the logical or inferential case, intuition or the fullness of the acts is irrelevant or inessential. It is, for example, irrelevant for the determination of the validity of the argument, although it is relevant to its soundness.

Since Kant, "consistency" has been the hallmark of philosophical investigation and scientific theory construction, and all seem to concede that to this end "intuition" may well be dispensed with. Even computers or calculating machines (which we have no reason to believe have the capacity to intuit) can be used or programmed to perform complex mechanical operations, which may lead to genuine truth. According to Husserl, however, all this means is that in virtue of the fact that ideal contents or meanings of acts constitute a distinct order of existence, they can be considered independently of the concrete intuitive acts in which they are often found embedded. Essential correlations between meanings and physicalistic tokens (of certain types) can be used, therefore, in complex calculations, which dispense with both intuition and existence. But this does not at all imply that intuition can be altogether dispensed with. For, it is intuition alone that can elucidate the nature and limits of such methods themselves. And, it is intuition alone that can provide the bridge between the realm of meaning and the realm of existence; hence, the foundation for mere theory construction and theory, which constitutes a genuine conception of the way things are. We cannot take the time here to develop this point further, but enough, perhaps, has been said to elucidate the difference between the two processes or relations. In the case of fulfillment, insight is essential, while in the case of inference it is merely an aim or goal. Moreover, the success of that goal always presupposes, as a necessary condition, precisely clear insight with respect to one's ultimate premises.

One may object that although we are not conscious of any such logical process there is one, nonetheless, going on unconsciously. One can, however, draw a distinction between processes that are in principle unconscious and processes which are merely factually unconscious or not immediately or centrally present to consciousness.77 For Husserl, as well as for Brentano and a host of others of their time, there is nothing that is conscious which is in principle unconscious. Otherwise there would simply be a contradiction in terms. He does contend, however, that things may be "factually" unconscious on the basis of the fact that things may be "in" consciousness in different ways. As I sit in my study and sensibly notice or perceive my surroundings, there are a multitude of things that I experience. There are visual experiences of trees, people, flowers; acoustical experiences of birds singing, a plane flying overhead; experiences of past experiences; sensate experiences of a chill or draft, etc.. All of these conscious experiences, however, are not present "in" my consciousness in the same way. Some of them, e.g., sensations of various kinds, are experienced yet do not appear as objects at all, while others are in the center of forefront of consciousness in contrast to still others which remain in the background or on the periphery of awareness. As I now watch this hummingbird darting back and forth before me, I do not notice in an explicit sort of way, the background of trees, mountains and sky, etc.. But, this background does not cease to exist, nor cease to be consciously present to me, in spite of its relative distance. It is not as if this background disappeared, ceased to exist or turned white or black with the hummingbird standing in relief. To verify this for one's self one need only "live through" a concrete case and consider what one's experience would be like if the background suddenly went black or really disappeared. Objects, then, which are not immediately present to consciousness may, in some sense, be considered unconscious, but they are not so in principle. And, if arguing in this way were valid, then one could literally "prove" anything at all.

One might also object that such an account implies that we are aware of everything in this marginal sort of way. But this is not so. We are not suggesting, for example, that in the case above one is aware of a mongoose in Australia. There are, according to Husserl, perceptual or experiential horizons which limit or delimit the actual and possible experiential fields of awareness in which we are "subjectively" involved.78 The actual presence of such a field may well dictate necessities and possibilities on subsequent experiences of various types. In virtue of the fact that I have instanced certain color sensations I can think of a multitude of objects, which are colored, which is not a possibility within the present experiential horizon of a blind man. But, even with respect to present "possibilities" of experience, i.e., phenomena which are unconscious in that they are not present to experience (they may even be "lost" or forgotten, perhaps forever), they are emphatically not unconscious in principle, i.e., an alleged "conscious" process effecting behavior which one could never, in principle, consciously observe.

ii. The Relation of Fulfillment and the Relation of Identity

Not only is the relation of fulfillment not a logical or inferential relation, it is not a relation of identity. There is no strict identity between the mere act of intention, meaning or thought of an object and the act of intuitive fulfillment, knowledge or verification. Rather, Husserl claims, there is merely an essential connection, i.e., a necessary truth or law about thoughts or intentions that they determine the appropriate means of verification.[79] This may already appear evident from what has been said, but it stands in sharp contrast to empiricistic, and especially positivistic, accounts of knowledge which attempt to identify meaning with its process of verification. It is important, therefore, to briefly consider this contrast.

Empiricistic or positivistic views tend to reduce the complexity of the knowing act to some one or other of its underlying constituents. One recalls, for example, the famous positivist slogan that "the meaning of a term is (identical to) its method or procedure of verification."80 In keeping with such views, knowledge in the sense of fulfillment is reduced to meaning, meaning is reduced to language, language is reduced to certain physical habits, customs or social conventions, and these, in turn, are reduced to certain sensible experiences. Thus, if one can not have the "appropriate" sort of sensate "experiences," one can not know the thing in question. In fact, one can not even "think" or talk about it, or such thought or talk must be meaningless. Thought or talk, therefore, of truth, existence, unity, number, substance, rectitude, quality, etc., must be construed as meaningless.

As is now well known, the upshot or implication of the positivist criterion of meaning and truth is to render the positivist's own criterion meaningless precisely because it, too, is not the sort of thing that can be verified in the appropriate manner. (One might well add: "linguistic types," (or enduring tokens), "linguistic functions," "numerals" or the "nature" of anything at all.)81 It is now generally conceded, therefore, that the meaning of a statement can not literally be taken to be identical to its method of verification. This is to be expected. For, surely, the mere fact that one can think of something does not entail that the object thought of exists or that one knows that it exists.

In contrast to such views, it is Husserl's position that although there is an essential connection between the act of meaning or intentionality and the act of verification, this connection is not reducible to a relation of identity. One must have some idea in mind--some thought or intention of an object or state of affairs (whether or not that object exists)--in order to know what types of procedures or experiences would be relevant to its verification or confirmation. But, the procedure of verification or the verifying experiences themselves are not to be confused with the mere act of meaning. The belief that mermaids exist dictates that I should look for them in the water, not in the desert; and a belief concerning an odd species of bird dictates that I should not look for it in my wallet, although I might look for money there. In neither of these cases, however, would one affirm that the thought was identical to the correlative process or experience of verification. There is something about the character of the act of thought, then, that dictates relevant types of procedures or experiences that would confirm it as true. "A cognitive experience does not merely refer to or pick out some determinate object but it also inherently picks out other experiences (and sequences thereof) which have a bearing on certification of its existence and properties of its object as intended and hence upon certification of its truth."[82]

Despite this difference, it should also be apparent that the essential connection between an intention and its correlative process of fulfillment necessarily involves an identification or sameness of acts. No doubt it is this which provides the intuitive basis behind the positivist's contention of a literal identity between meaning and fulfillment. That is, for Husserl, it is in virtue of the fact that acts of meaning are instantiations of universals that they are capable of repetition in or through sequences of acts.83 Such repetition or sameness of "intentional essence" is essential to the process or "synthesis" by which multiple acts with different degrees of "fullness" (different "epistemic essences") can be brought together to constitute a single complex over arching act of fulfillment. Not just any combination of acts, therefore, can constitute fulfillment or the synthesis of knowing (recognition or *erkennen*). As I think to myself, "Where is my cat?, has she has been hit by a car?," I cannot verify that thought by subsequently thinking of puppies or goldfish at a pet store. Rather, the acts must be of the same thing. There must be repeated acts about precisely my cat, e.g., "maybe she's out back or maybe she's in the street, maybe she's hiding under the furniture, etc.." The same thing thought of--the matter of the act-- must be the same thing found to be so. The synthesis, in short, must be a "synthesis of identification." One and the same thing is thought of in order to provide the basis for the verification of my thought that my cat is dead. This does not mean, of course, that one cannot think of other things within this process of verification. For example, as I'm looking around the house for my cat, the telephone rings and I recall a business appointment. It only means that there must be some repetitive reference to the same object in order for that initial thought to be verified or fulfilled.

iii. More Precise Characterization of Fulfillment

The mere repetition of the same thought, although necessary, is insufficient to constitute fulfillment or an advance in knowledge. This is because a mere synthesis of identification--a mere repetition of thought of the same object--can occur without fulfillment. For example, one may wonder if God exists--especially in the manner in which He is sometimes characterized, e.g., as just and yet, at the same time, self-sacrificingly loving and merciful. But one could think that thought repeatedly and yet never come any closer to verifying it. One might may say to oneself, "That's just one of those questions that is not resolvable"; and, thereby, put the issue aside for life. There is, then, something more in the complex act of fulfillment than a mere identification.

Above all, Husserl claims there is in every fulfillment a certain felt closure or consciousness of increase, a certain felt sense of advance between the mere thought of an object and its fulfillment.[84] *This means that in the complex act of fulfillment there is a marginal or apperceptive grasp of the relation between acts which are more signitive and acts which are more intuitive or filled.* There is an experience or apperceptive "awareness"--even if marginal--of a fulfilled intention. This advance, however, cannot be characterized adequately by such an increase in intuitive content. Rather, it must be an increase, which is self-conscious and purposive. The acts or thoughts involved in fulfillment cannot be the acts or thoughts of different people, nor can the fullness be merely arbitrary. Your awareness that my cat is dead cannot verify my thought that she is dead. And, in order for me to intuitively verify that she is dead, I must aim at such confirmation or disconfirmation in order to find out whether or not it is so. This simply follows from the fact that all fulfillments essentially involve an apperceptive grasp or experience of distinct acts in relation, i.e., of acts being filled, and from the fact that such higher order acts are not necessitated by their underlying constituents, but only "founded."

The key contrast essentially involved in every fulfillment, then, is that which holds between acts which are intuitive and those which to some degree are not. There is a self conscious inequality of worth or fullness between the acts of the synthesis, and a purposive realization or fulfillment in the case of the fulfilling act which has a certain fullness feature that the mere intention lacks. In other words, there is something of the thing itself, i.e., of its actual properties, that is imported into, or enters into relation with, the judging mind or the fulfilling act, or it leads more directly to this type of experience.

iv. Proximate Versus Ultimate Fulfillments

The relative notion of a fulfillment "leading more directly" to a completely fulfilling experience is of crucial significance for Husserl's epistemological concerns, as well as for our moral concerns. For, Husserl claims that all fulfillments are not immediately accessible. All intuitive knowledge (and so, too, intuitive moral knowledge) is not knowledge we can just up and have by mere looking. This is because in the usual case, a thought or representation does not directly lead over into a full intuition of the object, but to another representation with more fullness or intentional content than its predecessors. In many cases full intuitions may even be impossible. Proximate fulfillment, therefore, indicates the nearest phenomena to the representation, i.e., the intuition that, relative to the one preceding it, is of greater fullness. Ultimate fulfillment, on the other hand, indicates the intuition proper to an intention or thought of that kind, i.e., the pure intuition or *adequatio et intellectus*[85] that presents the object fully as it really is. For example, I am awakened by the sound of a cat screaming. I fear it may be my cat being killed by a coyote. I rush outside and in the dark of night I see a whitish blob lying in the street, which I take to be my cat. This discovery, then, may be considered a proximate fulfillment relative to my original intention. My thought of my cat being killed by the coyote has increased in fulfillment. As I approach the object on the street from a distance I see it is an animal and so the synthesis of fulfillment is more complete than before, but is still far from being perfected. As I find my cat lying there the features that distinguish my cat from other cats are clearly presented to me. I see her unique markings, I feel the stiffness of her body, etc.. In short, I come to the place where my experience is maximally fulfilling for an object of this type and further experience is no longer necessary for adequate experiential verification.

Cases of this kind, then, may well illustrate the advance in epistemological superiority, or the advance in fullness or clarity characteristic of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. Prior to such fulfillment there is a more symbolic or vague conception, i.e., a more distant manner of engagement with the object. But, as one proceeds in the course of verification, certain aspects or properties attributable to the object of one's thoughts are fulfilled, others frustrated or disconfirmed, until a gradual "adjustment" in our thoughts takes place as we come to see the object as it is in itself. Such cases also illustrate that all objects (and, perhaps, too, all ends) may not be capable of fulfillment in acts of this relatively immediate kind. Acts may be of higher as well as lower order and may, therefore, essentially involve mediating processes which make their fulfillments possible only through a series or chain of relatively lower order fulfillments. To make this latter point clear, and thus to more fully elucidate the nature of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, we must examine Husserl's account of the distinction between direct or immediate acts and mediate or categorial acts of intuition.

[2] Categorial Intuition

(E) What "Categorial Intuition" is for Husserl and Its Significance for His Epistemology and Our Thesis

The main aim of this section is to analyze more explicitly the nature of fulfillment by the elucidation of the distinctive nature of categorial or mediate intuitive acts in contrast to sensuous or immediate acts.[86] Husserl's general claim is that in the case of universal (ideal) entities we can also have intuitions, i.e., inadequate representations which can be more or less filled through an adequate process of fulfillment.[87] The general epistemological significance of this claim, according to Husserl, lies in the fact that all knowledge in the sense of fulfillment takes place in such "higher order" or mediate categorial acts, i.e., acts which require other acts for their foundation. A doctrine of categorial intuition, therefore, is simply essential for any adequate epistemology. The significance of this account for our thesis lies in the fact that moral or valuational qualities are generally regarded as non-sensuous objects or states of affairs; hence, a doctrine of categorial intuition is essential for an adequate elucidation of our experiential or intuitive knowledge of them. It is especially necessary in view of the fact that we have claimed that the moral knowledge that constrains action is precisely experiential or intuitive knowledge.

(F) The Central Problem with the Phenomenological Elucidation of Categorial Intuitions

In the case of "first order," immediate acts of sensuous intuition (perception) the vivacity or fullness character of the sensa apperceived in the act of perceiving an independently existing object serve as the epistemic "representing content" for the "leap" into the transcendent world of realities. That is, the vivacity of the properties of the sensate matter of the act correspond 1:1 with the contents or properties inherent in the existing objectivity itself. For example, vivid green color sensations and heart shaped impressions corresponding to correlative features of this leaf "found" (but do not, as we have seen, guarantee or necessitate) a veridical perception of it. But, in the case of the ideal or universal features in the existing objects apprehended, e.g., the "is" in the object unity, this leaf is green or the "and" in the object unity, this leaf and that branch, there is no such correspondence of the formal or categorial features with sensa or sensa elements. There is no "is" sensa corresponding to the "is" in the objectivity, which is why such objects have proven to be so epistemologically problematic. What, then, in the "higher order act" of fulfillment can serve as "representing con-tent," or the fullness quality, for the categorial aspects in the objectivity?[88] What, precisely, in these acts can be apperceived or animated to insure that those acts actually intuit or grasp existing objects in contrast to, for example, the mere thought of them or the mere thought of something fictitious, e.g., a unicorn, round square, etc.?

To appreciate adequately the nature of this problem as well as to understand Husserl's solution to it we must articulate more explicitly what Husserl means by foundation and acts (as well as objects) of lower and higher order.[89] By foundation Husserl is referring to how an act can emerge out of other elements or contents of consciousness without being reducible to them. In very rough terms, in much the same way as water (H20) can be qualitatively distinct from, and emerge out of its contents or constituents, hydrogen and oxygen; so, too, Husserl claims, a qualitatively distinct mental act can emerge out of not merely its sensory contents, but out of underlying acts themselves. A qualitatively distinct "higher order" act, therefore, may emerge out of "lower order" acts which are "apperceived" (not seen) to render a higher order objectivity present, precisely as sensa were apperceived in the formation of lower order acts directed on lower order objectivities. In such cases the sensa and the various levels of lower order acts serve as the foundational support for the higher order act in which the higher order objectivity is given or intuited. When Husserl refers to immediate or first order acts of sensuous intuition, therefore, he does not mean the higher order act of intuitive fulfillment. We do not "know" (in the sense of fulfillment) anything in such acts--not in the ideal, psychical or even physical domains. I look up and see immediately, at one glance, this tree, but what this tree is, is not in and of itself given to me by such immediate acts alone. These first order acts of sense perception merely serve as the primary or ultimate foundations qua acts for all such higher order acts. In every case of fulfillment there is, precisely, a unity or synthesis of acts, which constitutes a single or unified, but higher order complex act directed on a higher order objectivity.

(C) Husserl's General Account of the Fullness Feature in Such Acts

With this preliminary account of foundation and acts and objectivities of lower and higher order in view, we may formulate Husserl's most general response to the problem above as follows: the formal or ontological "containment" or instantiation of universals in particulars is structurally analogous to, or mirrored in, the case of acts themselves so that the higher order act of intuition is "contained in," and so abstractable from the lower order acts of intuition.90 The first order or direct acts of sense perception, then, actually give something of the existing object itself to the act of intuition which apprehends it. The real or "first order" aspects of the objectivity, however, are not separated from the object's ideal, universal or higher order "contents" or features. Nor, Husserl claims, is the ideal or categorial act separated from the real or first order acts on which it is founded. Hence, the "abstraction" or "extraction" of the higher order act from its lower order contents or acts is an act which "lifts out" or presents to a higher order fulfilling intuition the existing universal contents in the existing objectivity itself.

For example, the "is" in the object unity, this leaf is green, is not separate from the leaf and its greenness. Nor is the ideal or categorial act of intuition which authentically grasps the being of this leaf and its color separated from the lower order acts of sense perception on which it is founded. More specifically, the higher order categorial act of intuition "uses," animates or apperceives the relation of fulfillment between more or less empty acts and subsequently filled acts in the veridical apprehension of a higher order objectivity.[91] That is, *in the case of the intuition of higher order objectivities there is a further epistemically relevant element in the complex fulfilling mental act besides matter, quality and sensa, viz., the relations between the sensate matters of the subordinate acts which play a role in the higher order act analogous to the role played by sensa in direct acts of sense perception.*

> That percepts in the one case, and judgments (judgmental intuitions, percepts or states of affairs) in the other, must be experienced, in order that each act of abstraction should get started, goes without saying, but to be experienced is not to be made objective. . . . Not in reflection upon judgments, nor even upon fulfillments of judgments, but in fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question.[92]

The special significance of this apperception (not perception) of the fulfilling relation between acts, then, is that knowledge in the sense of fulfillment takes place only in categorial acts with respect to any kind of object. Every fulfillment essentially involves categorial or non-sensuous intuition in which lower order acts and their epistemically relevant relations are "experienced" even if not made the objects of presentation.

> Knowledge as the unity of fulfillment is not achieved on a mere basis of straightforward acts, but in general, on a basis of categorial acts: when, accordingly, we oppose intuition to thought (as meaning), we cannot mean by 'intuition' merely sensuous intuition.
>
> The conception of categorial acts as intuitions, first brings true perspicuity into the relation of thought to intuition--a relation that no previous critique of knowledge has made tolerably clear: it is the first to render knowledge itself intelligible, in its essence and its achievement.[93]

The elucidation of knowledge in terms of a non-sensuous or categorial intuition of ideal entities, therefore, is no different from the standpoint of formal ontology than the elucidation of any object whatsoever. As ideal properties like the color green are embedded or instanced in concrete existents like trees so, too, higher order intuitive acts can be contained or lie embedded in lower order intuitive acts.

(G) More Detailed Elucidation of Categorial Intuition

i. Elucidation of Straightforward, Immediate or Direct Acts of Sense Perception and Their Correlative "Real" (as Contrasted with "Ideal") Objects

What essentially distinguishes immediate acts of sensuous intuition from mediate or categorial acts is that acts of sensuous intuition present "real" objects, i.e., it "terminates upon individual, and so upon temporal being,"94 while categorial acts are mediate acts which present ideal or universal objects. By "immediate" what is meant is that such acts are ultimate or primary first order acts and as such are not founded upon other acts.

> The object is also an immediately given object in the sense that, as this object perceived with this definite objective content, it is not constituted in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, acts founded on other acts which bring other objects to perception.[95]

In the case of such immediate acts, then, no other acts are animated or "used" as the necessary condition or foundational support for the act or apprehension itself. One "sees," immediately, at one blow, the book lying on the table, the computer, the trees outside, etc..[96] By "real" objects what is meant is that in such cases one apprehends unities of a sort, i.e., particular or concrete temporal wholes.[97] This is so even in the case of "extended acts" where one looks at, e.g., this book from many angles. But an extended act is not a founded act, (nor even is a unity of identification an act of identification where the relation of identity itself is made objective). For, in none of these cases are acts themselves animated or "used" to apprehend a distinctively novel type of entity or objectivity. One does not, for example, come to apprehend what a book is or that self-same unity that is applicable to any and all books in any mere extended act. One merely notices the green color, the marks on the page, the size and shape, etc., but one does not advance, in a mere extended act, to a new qualitatively distinct act of a new qualitatively distinct objectivity. In all such cases we remain within the realm of real or particular temporal being.[98]

ii. More Detailed Elucidation of Acts of Higher Order as well as Their Correlative "Ideal" Objects

We said that first order acts of sensuous intuition do not necessitate but "found" a range of ontologically possible higher order acts. This means that there are a number of features of or in the whole object initially apprehended which are not immediately given; nor can they be given, in those first order acts alone.[99] These features remain as mere possibilities for a higher order apprehension or intuition which can abstract the distinct but inseparable contents from the concrete whole in which they inhere. For example, the formal or categorial features, "is" and "and" that bind the object to its properties, are not and cannot "at one glance" be seen in any immediate act of sensuous intuition. Nor can they be seen in any mere repetition or conjunction of such acts. As I look up and immediately see the book lying on the table, if I then ask what the being of a book is, etc., I find experientially that these features are initially diaphanous--they do not immediately appear. It is Husserl's contention that in such cases we are asking about a distinct realm of objects or region of being, i.e., universal or ideal objects, and that such objects have a distinct type of presence which requires a distinct type of complex higher order act for their realization or acquisition.

> Each straightforward act of perception, by itself or together with other acts, can serve as a basic act for new acts which . . . bring to maturity *a new awareness of objects which essentially presupposes the old. . . .* What we have here are acts which, as we said, set up

> new objects, acts in which something appears as actual and self-given, which was not given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be, in these foundational acts alone. On the other hand, the new objects are based on the older ones, they are related to what appears in the basic acts. Their manner of appearance is essentially determined by this relation. We are here dealing with a sphere of objects, *which can only show themselves 'in person' in such founded acts*.[100]

iii. A Central Problem in Husserl Interpretation with Respect to Categorial Intuition

In the process of elucidating the nature of this categorial act which intuits existing, yet ideal, entities, Husserl speaks of a categorial "structuring" or "forming"; "shaping" or "combining."[101] He also repeatedly speaks of the "constitution" of an object.102 Such expressions, however, have given rise to what Willard calls, "one of the most difficult questions of Husserl interpretation."[103] For, the question arises whether Husserl means by such expressions that one "forms" or "constitutes" the objectivity itself or merely its acts, and one's answer to this question will determine whether or not one views him as an idealist or a realist. For example, in Findlay's translation of Husserl on p. 795 of the Logical Investigations we have: "in constituting the latter forms, *we bring new objects into being*, objects belonging to the class of 'states of affairs, which includes none but 'objects of higher order.'" Given such an interpretation, the shaping or structuring may, with some justification, be taken to mean a shaping or structuring of the object of knowledge. The mind or its acts makes, shapes, structures, creates, produces or modifies the objectivity by its entering into relation with it. On this interpretation, Therefore, one can see how Husserl might be construed as an idealist. One may also see here the origin of later phenomenology, which is predominantly idealistic.

But if this were so, it seems that there would be no sense in which the object may consistently be said to present itself as it is in itself independently of the act which apprehends it. This seems to us opposed to the whole tenor of Husserl's view of knowledge and the vast number of descriptions used in support of it. For Willard, then, the question arises, "Does the mind produce the objectivity which it beholds in categorial intuition, or does it only produce the acts--including the crowning higher order act--in which those objectivities can alone appear?"[104] It is Willard's view, and a view which we share, that Husserl holds the latter view--the view which we have been attempting to articulate and defend in this paper.[105] Willard, therefore, in contrast to Findlay above, trans-lates the crucial Husserlian statement on LI 795 as: "in constituting the latter forms, *new objectivities arise, (neue Gegenstande erwachsen),* objects belonging to the class of 'states of affairs,' which includes none but 'objects of higher order.'"[106] The mind, on this interpretation, does not create, etc., the objectivity but integrates, "forms" or "constitutes" the acts as well as the higher order or crowning act in which alone the objectivity can appear. "Constitution" or "structuring," on this view, merely indicates the process of fulfillment by which an object--distinct from and often independent of the mind and its acts--is apprehended or made present to the mind.

On this latter interpretation, if an objectivity is to be known it is necessary for an appropriate act to be produced, i.e., to have certain types of experiences over others so that the object and its properties may be brought clearly into view. As we have seen this is necessary even to think of one object over another. But this does not mean that the acts themselves are made--or made objective, i.e., seen. It only means that they are "experienced" or apperceived to render the higher order objectivity present. For Husserl, then, truth or existence is independent of minds but knowledge is not independent of truth.[107] The world of realities exists whether or not it is known, but the act of knowledge has an essential connection to reality so that while it does not create or modify it by entering into relation with it, it can, nonetheless, know it as it is in itself independent of, or transcendent to the act which grasps it. As we shall see shortly, a more exact analysis of transcendence is requisite to complete our general exposition of Husserl's account of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, but we need now, especially for our moral concerns, to provide a concrete illustration of categorial intuition. More specifically, we need to see precisely how an ideal entity can be brought to intuitive fulfillment, and how this may differ from the mere thought or conception of such an object.

(E) An Illustration of Categorial Intuition by a Conceptually Based Analysis of the Authentic Presence of Number[108]

i. Presentative Stage

First, we should recall that lower order acts do not necessitate, but merely "found" higher order acts based thereon. This means that "in" lower order acts there is a motivational tendency (to be discussed in detail in the last section of this chapter) inherent in intentions as such to pass over into correlative types of possible intuitions. More specifically, an intention or apprehension of a specific type of object determines or motivates not only an appropriate form of verification procedure for it, but it also determines or motivates an horizon, field or range of possible objects or fulfillments based thereon. The mere fact that we have a multiplicity of sensate experiences, therefore, can motivate a certain numerical interest or intention and motivate, too, as a result, an appropriate procedure of verification grounded in the matter of a "concept" of that type. We begin, then, with a more or less vague concept of number, which we intend to fulfill.

To acquire the "authentic concept" of the ideal object number (or some specific number, e.g., the number two), one must begin with the presentation or apprehension of some concrete group or multiplicity of existing objects, e.g., trees outside my window.[109] More specifically, one must undertake a purposive enumeration of the objects in one's experiential field. In this case, trees are "separately and specifically noticed"[110] in direct or immediate acts of sensuous intuition, which, although distinct, are unified and ordered by a characteristic enumerative interest or purpose. There is this tree and that tree and that tree over there, etc.. In such a case there will be sensa or primary contents associated with each tree enumerated, and the parts and properties of the sensa "used" will be more or less "full" or intuitive and thus correspond to correlative parts and properties of the trees seen. It is this which will initially distinguish the concrete case as intuitive rather than merely intentional or representative. For example, in the case of fictitious objects, e.g., unicorns, there is no concrete case of this kind from which we can "lift out" or abstract the "essence" or nature of such an object as a unicorn; thus, there can be no authentic presence or intuition of such objects. In the acquisition of the authentic concept of number, therefore, there will be first order intuitive acts of sense perception directed on, in this case, trees. The primary contents will be modified[111] and the individual perceptual acts in which each tree is separately and specifically noticed will be "used" or apperceived in the acquisition of a single unified apprehension of an objectively real multiplicity or totality. There is first this tree, now that one, now that one over there, etc., and as we count we begin to see a unity or whole forming which separates itself from the trees and other objects in our field of vision not counted.

ii. The Abstractive Stage

No such concrete multiplicity, however, is number or any specific number. To acquire the authentic concept of number it is necessary for us to abstract, extract or "lift out" from this existing concrete group or multiplicity a quite definite essential feature contained therein. This will entail the animation or apperception not of sensa alone, but of the intuitive or perceptual acts themselves! This is of crucial importance. For what distinguishes merely empty, fictitious or inauthentic intentions (representations) from authentic ones is the fact that *in the authentic case there is something present which is lacking in the case of a mere representation or concept*. This is, as we have seen, that property of fullness, which belongs to the matters of the underlying perceptual acts, and, in the present case of a higher order intuitive or categorial act. More specifically, it is the relations holding between relatively empty acts and correlative filled ones, which "found" the overarching act of categorial intuition.

To acquire the authentic concept of number we must abstract out the essence of number present in the concrete multiplicity. This requires that we disregard everything in the concrete multiplicity that is irrelevant to the multiplicity as such, i.e., we disregard everything unnecessary for the acquisition of the authentic concept of number. To "disregard," in this context, emphatically does not mean that those aspects of the concrete totality not regarded cease to exist, or that they are not experienced. Rather, they are merely pushed off into the periphery or margins of our consciousness so that other elements or features of the objectivity can become more centralized.[112] In this case, therefore, since our goal or aim is to acquire the authentic concept of number--to see number itself--the more specific features of the trees before us are irrelevant. They can, therefore, be disregarded. We disregard, then, all of the more specific determinations or features of the members of the concrete totality or multiplicity of trees before us, and retain the higher (2nd) order veridical intuition of the *elements of the totality as mere "somethings"* or mere "ones." These are abstract or dependent features of or in this concrete multiplicity itself. They are not created.[113]

Next, we disregard all the more familiar or specific types of relations that exist between the elements of the concrete totality in question, e.g., the spatial relation of this tree being to the left of that one, this tree being more or less similar to the tree over there, etc.. Instead, we focus our attention on the formal or objective relation, which unites the members of that group as mere somethings. By a "formal or objective relation," we mean that relation actually uniting members of that multiplicity which is so non-specific that it binds together the elements merely as somethings, ones or units and so, is applicable to any concrete multiplicity as such. This relation is the combinatorial relation signified by the syncategorematic term "and." It is emphatically not a psychical relation.

In this abstractive stage, therefore, lower order acts of intuition are apperceived (not seen) to apprehend in a higher (3rd) order veridical intuition a formal or ideal structure actually instanced in a specific or concrete multiplicity, i.e., the structure of a totality as such, viz., "somethings" and "ands," or "somethings" united into formal wholes by collective combinations. In other words, "the categorial relation of collective combination along with the categorial relative attribute of being a 'something' or 'one'"[114] are united to form the synthetic apriori structure of number. Number or numerosity, therefore, is, and is authentically perceived to be, "a generic structure (like color) of ands and somethings which may be instanced in many totalities, concrete and otherwise."[115] The specific numbers, e.g., two, three, four, etc., are, like species generally, (like the specific colors, red, green, etc.) specific determinations of this generic structure.[116] Having attained the authentic concept of number one can see easily how one may obtain authentic cognitions of at least the smaller numbers instanced in various concrete groups or multiplicities.

We say, "smaller numbers," for, it is of fundamental importance to Husserl's theory of knowledge to stress, although it is not something that we can or need to elaborate on here, that *Husserl does not believe that such authentic intuitions are possible in all cases*, and especially not with respect to all specific numbers.[117] He claims, in fact, that extensive phenomenological investigations show that the human capacity for such intuition reaches a limit at about the number twelve. It is not possible, therefore, to have authentic presentations of these higher order objectivities. This does not mean for him, however, that they cannot be genuinely verified. In their case the correspondence established between the authentic concept of number and number itself as well as between the authentic concept of smaller numbers and those numbers themselves provides the foundation for the "inauthentic presence" of an infinitude of existing (ideal) numbers.

[3] Transcendence

(A) Initial Statement of What Transcendence is for Husserl & Its Significance for Epistemology Generally and Our Thesis in Particular

i. What Transcendence is

Knowledge in the sense of fulfillment has been generally characterized as a real relation between a certain type of mental act, viz., a higher order categorial act of fulfillment and an existing object or state of affairs. All we have presented so far, however, is a doctrine of fulfillment, and fulfillment, on Husserl's view, is simply not transcendence. This is because fulfillment, as we have seen, is essentially a relation between thoughts or acts of thought (thought and its fulfilling intuition) while transcendence is essentially a relation between a complex act of knowledge and its corresponding existing object.[118] The terms of the relation, therefore, differ. In other words, transcendence or "the perfection of the adequation of thought to thing"119 essentially involves two types of relations: <a> the relation, adequation or "the perfection of the adaptation [of thought (signitive intention)] to intuition," and <b> the relation or "the perfection of final fulfillment (presupposing <a>) which is an adequation with the 'thing itself.'"120 The aim of this section, therefore, is to focus our attention on this latter relation towards the final solution to the problem of knowledge.

ii. General Epistemological Significance of Transcendence & Significance for Our Thesis

The general epistemological significance of an account of transcendence lies in the fact that a detailed elucidation of what a mental act or thought is--even a fulfilled act--is insufficient to provide us with an elucidation of its truth, i.e., of whether or not what an act refers to actually exists. Without such an account one is vulnerable to the Cartesian dualism, or idealistic dualisms generally, which tend to separate thought and reality.[121] More specifically, one is susceptible not only to Humean atomistic Empiricisms which reduce knowledge to sense impressions or Kantian Idealisms which reduce knowledge to the knowledge of mere conceptions, but to skepticism generally which cannot break free of "the circle of ideas." An account of transcendence, therefore, is necessary to complete our elucidation of how, not whether, thought relates to its existing objective correlate.

An account of transcendence, however, is also of particular significance for our thesis. For, it has been our contention that the practical force or power of one's moral beliefs or intentions lies in the nature or essence of its object and that this force in the case of moral knowledge is characteristically different from the force or power associated with either a mere moral belief or relatively empty or unfulfilled intention alone. If one believes on the basis of experiential evidence, e.g., the sound of screeching tires, of one object hitting another, a child screaming, etc., that one's child has just been hit by a car, the character of that belief and the "force" associated therewith is significantly different from the character and force of the comparatively empty intention or belief which lacks such experiential evidence. In the latter case, for example, the mere thought that it is "possible" one's child has been hit by a car is more susceptible to being treated as unjustified anxiety which elicits a significantly weaker motivation. Knowledge, therefore, may constrain action in a way that mere conception cannot. A more exact analysis of transcendence, then, is requisite to provide a basis for our later elucidation of moral motivation with respect to different types of moral intentions.

(B) More Exact Elucidation of the Relation of Transcendence

i. Initial Objection Considered

In attempting now to gain a clearer apprehension of "transcendence," we must recall that despite the mysterious or ethereal sound of the word what we have in mind is something quite commonsensical. We are concerned with elucidating what it is about experience, which allows us to apprehend objects which are not essentially dependent on our apprehensions or conceptions of them. These objects retain a certain form of independence or indifference in relation to the acts which cognize them. This paper, for example, presents itself to me as something that was there before, and remains after, I see it. It does not present itself as created or destroyed by my mere apprehension of it. We have in mind, therefore, a relation that does not modify its terms by their relationship.[122]

Such a view, however, despite its initial common sense plausibility, is at variance with the prevailing philosophical outlook which construes the knowing relation as akin to a causal relation and as such, a relation which essentially changes its terms by their relationship. The fact that some relationships do modify their terms may well make such a view initially attractive. For example, when someone gets hit by a car or when a ball hits a window pane, the terms of the relation are certainly modified. One might, therefore, be tempted to believe that knowledge, too, is a relation of this kind. If so, our apprehensions of the world are modified or changed as a result of objects "striking us" and so involve, like causal relations generally, an essential alteration in their effects. Conceptions, it may thus be alleged, do not objectively represent or correspond to reality or things-in-themselves. How things appear is not how they are.

For Husserl, however, the mere fact that one can only know something in the act of knowing doesn't imply that one cannot know something as it is in itself "apart from" the act of knowledge. It does not imply that knowledge is a relation that modifies its terms by its relation or involvement with them. The fact that there is reason to believe there are a great many other types of relations of this kind may also provide initial plausibility for Husserl's claim. In the case of logical relations, for example, the propositional form 'All S is P,' in Syllogistic Logic, instantiates the logical relation of contradiction with respect to the propositional form 'Some S is not P.' This relation, however, certainly does not modify its terms. It does not, for example, turn the 'All,' in 'All S is P,' to a 'Some.' If one denies that knowledge is a relation of this generic kind, therefore, one need only consider concrete cases of the two types of relations to demonstrate its absurdity. For example, if mere looking must change its object then the letters on this page must change their nature as I turn around. Perhaps, if I do it sufficiently I may "create" a work of art.

There is, however, another sense in which one may take this objection which is, I think, more plausible. It is a quite familiar experience for us to find physical things generally, and especially physical signs or symbols (marks or sounds), presented to us as "clothed" with, or "colored" by, certain intentions, i.e., thoughts or meanings. For example, in linguistic contexts, one sees the marks 'm-e-r-m-a-i-d' and thinks of a woman with a fish tail. Or, in non-linguistic contexts, one sees the sun setting or looks at Durer's painting, Knight, Death and the Devil, which bring to mind a specific range of thoughts or intentions and feelings of various kinds. In view of this fact, it may even seem true that physical objects are never seen without some such "coloring." Thoughts or meanings, therefore, may appear to be literal parts of "phenomena" or objects as they are apprehended. One might conclude, that we cannot really apprehend an object "as it is in itself" or "independent" of deep rooted social conventions, intentions or subjective experiences with respect to it.

But, although Husserl concedes that there are very important and even essential connections between, e.g., concrete or subjective acts of thought, objective meanings and things-in-themselves, the nature of these entities and their various types of contingent and essential connections must not be confused or conflated with one another. Moreover, it is Husserl's belief that if we fail to clearly articulate the nature of these entities distinct from one another we cannot possibly hope to apprehend the nature of reality generally; nor of each of these specific domains of reality in particular. This is so regardless of whether the failure issues from the empiricistic, idealistic or phenomenological camp. We must, then, at the very least distinguish the object of experience from its intentional coloring and either or both of these from the experience of the object (or of its coloring). In some contexts, for example, we wish to refer merely to an object independent of any such meaning intentions or experiences, e.g., the mere event of the sun setting, which may be important to a scientist measuring the temperature of the sun's rays at different times of the day. In other contexts we may wish to refer to the object clothed with, or colored by, certain types of meanings, e.g., in Durer's painting we may wish to consider the moral significance of death lingering at our heels and the Devil or Evil always tempting us in our walk through life. Sartre's picturesque description of life may well invoke a certain intended Nausea and the apprehension of a deserted beach with a single sea gull walking on the sand may invoke apprehensions of loneliness or isolation. In such cases, therefore, if one is an artist, poet or merely a lonely person wishing to be "understood," the "colored" object or some quite specific subjective experience may well constitute an immanent part if not the whole of one's "objective reference."

Such examples may serve well to illustrate that it is not essential for an object of thought to be "clothed" with or "colored" by certain intentions, i.e., thoughts or meanings; nor are such objects essentially subjective. In fact the capacity to apprehend objects as colored presupposes the capacity to apprehend objects without such coloring. For, otherwise, we would require a colored apprehension of a colored object which would require a colored apprehension of a colored apprehension of a colored object, etc.. But it is simply not the primary or sole function of language to color objects in this way. Subjective experiences, objective meanings and their correlative objects all can be, and commonly are, distinguished and these differences find expression in language. The mere contingent fact, therefore, that a physical object generally, or a mark or sound in particular, is habitually or generally associated with a certain meaning, intention or thought does not imply that the object itself has such thoughts or meanings as literal parts. In all these cases, therefore, there is a certain form of independence or transcendence of the object retained and which can be known.

ii. A More Precise Elucidation of Transcendence

Our discussion above may help us see that transcendence is applicable to objects of all kinds and is not restricted merely to, e.g., physical objects which, unlike sensa, concepts, propositions and their contents, are not nor can be literal parts or properties of mental acts. More specifically, we have distinguished the ontological regions of the psychical, physical and the realm of objective meaning in terms of the more fundamental or formal particular/universal (real/ideal) distinction applicable to them all. And, although it is true that physical objects manifest a certain distinct form of independence or transcendence in that they are not essentially parts of acts or meanings, transcendence is by no means limited to such objects.123 We may, therefore, generally define transcendence as:

> . . . transcendence of a by b is . . . not mere otherness, and not mere relation, between b and a. This book is other than that one, and is related to it in numerous ways; but it is not intimately enough involved with it to be described as transcending it. Rather, b transcends a provided that b is (in some fashion) essential to a but not conversely. Thus b enters into the esse or 'being' of a, but in its own esse is indifferent to that of a . . . the object which is an sich, but also is fully given, transcends the act in which it is grasped, according to Husserl; and conversely the act may be said to transcend itself toward or in the object.[124]

The definition states that an existing objectivity or state of affairs is indifferent in its existence but not in its nature or essence to the act which apprehends it. By the "nature" or "essence" of an object we take this to mean a synthetic quality or consequential attribute which may or may not be instantiated in a concrete existing object or state of affairs. For example, the essence, unicorn, is not instantiated in the case of unicorns, while the essence of personality is in the case of persons. Thus, in the higher order fulfilling act which grasps the existing nature or essence of personality in some concrete instantiation, that existing essence of personality enters into an essential connection with the essence of the concrete act which grasps it. There is established, thereby, an ideal correspondence or relation which does not essentially change or modify either the object or the act, nor is the unity established effected by the mere contingent fact that the instantiated act + object unity ceases to be, e.g., when the object is no longer immediately present.

More specifically, we must distinguish the mere intention or representation of an object as having an essence or certain properties from the existing essence of the object. When one thinks of or refers to a non-existing object, e.g., a unicorn, there is, of course, an intention directed on an object. But, in this case there is no concrete existing case of a unicorn; hence no instantiation of such an essence. The object, therefore, does not transcend the act in which it is grasped. In the case of actually existing objects, however, in the process of fulfillment subsequent acts "fill" or complete preceding, relatively empty, acts in the "formation" of the complex "higher order" act of fulfillment. It is Husserl's view that when and in so far as this happens the concrete higher order fulfilling act more fully enters into relation with the existing object itself. This means that the parts and properties of the act, e.g., the concepts instanced in the acts "matter," more fully match, or correspond (1:1), to the parts and properties of the existing object. The object is now seen to be as it was before merely thought to be. The existing object transcends the act in which it is grasped and yet enters into or becomes immanent in the fulfilling act which grasps it. That is, when, or in so far as, fulfillment takes place a new relation is established which essentially involves not merely fulfillment or the adequation of mere thought to fulfilling intuition, but *a new unity or whole of fulfilling act + object*, an adequation to the thing itself is achieved. The existing object merely thought of before now is an immanent or inherent part, not of the mere act, but of the new unity or whole of act + object. In this way the essence of the existing objectivity and the essence of the act which grasps it enter into relation and transcendence is achieved. Transcendence and immanence, therefore, are elucidated by Husserl as compatible--not contradictory--predicates. The New Realists put it this way:

> The same entity possesses both immanence, by virtue of its membership in one class, and also transcendence, by virtue of the fact that it may belong also to indefinitely many

> other classes. In other words, immanence and transcendence are compatible and not contradictory predicates.[125]
>
> Ralph Barton Perry

> . . . as the term may enter into or go out of a particular relation, without thereby being changed essentially or destroyed, so too can an object of knowledge exist prior to and after its entrance into or removal from the knowledge relation. Transcendence thus means, in the first place, distinctness and, in the second place, functional independence.[126]
>
> Walter B. Pitkin

As the color red, therefore, can be transcendent to its particular instances yet be immanent in them, so too the essence of an existing object (or the act which apprehends it) can be transcendent to the act that grasps it yet immanent in it. Hence, truth itself--in the sense at least of the relation of correspondence, can be transcendent to the concrete act + object unity of knowledge which instantiates it yet be immanent therein.

(C) Further Detail: Fulfillment, Transcendence and the Nature of Truth

Husserl describes the transcending relationship as essentially an emerging one. This means that the relation is no "real" relation but a categorial one, i.e., there is a marginal reflexive awareness or "felt" congruence between the sense of the thought and that of the intuition which "founds" the relation to the object itself.127 In the process of verification or fulfillment, then, there is a reflexive or apperceptive awareness of a movement from, or relation between, acts or intentions which are more or less empty and acts which are to a greater degree filled. On Husserl's view, this reflexive or marginal apperceptive awareness or experience "founds," or serves as support for, the transcending relation or "reach" into the world of objectivities. But it is not as if in this case we apperceived lower order acts in the perception of the fulfilling act. Rather, the higher order fulfilling act itself as a complex synthetic unity or whole is apperceived (not perceived or seen) so that *only the objectivity itself is referred to or literally seen*.

If we look at the unity of knowledge or the fulfilling act and transcendent object from each side of the relation we may better understand how truth itself may be seen to be a complex unity the aspects of which present themselves from different sides. On one hand, there is the correlative existing object or state of affairs; on the other hand, there is the act of self-evidence (Evidenz), and, finally, there is the transcending relation or correspondence holding between the higher order act of self-evidence and the existing object. The significance of such an account of truth for both epistemology and our thesis may be illustrated by a brief comparison of Husserl's manner of dealing with truth and Hume's. In Husserl's case, in the process of fulfillment there comes a point, especially in the ideal case where Evidenz is achieved, where it is no longer possible to entertain doubt. Knowledge necessarily implies the existence of its object. If I know that it is raining outside, or I know that butchering a child is wrong, then it necessarily follows that it is raining outside and butchering a child is wrong. It is not, however, the knowing relation which makes these states of affairs true. For, they remain true (from the side of the object, or the existing states of affairs themselves) whether or not anyone ever knows them. Rather, the point is simply that doubt given such a relation is, for Husserl, absurd.

But in Hume's case, as we have seen, there is always room for such doubt. This is because *Evidenz* or the act of fulfillment (i.e., intentionality or belief) is interpreted as a mere subjective feeling or passion (even if it is the subjective feeling of vivacity) contingently attaching to the concrete act of judgment--a feeling contingently imparting to that act of judgment the features we assess as true and false. Hence, we can never be certain that any concrete claim is true. On Husserl's account, however, such skepticism is circumvented and common sense restored in view of his account of truth and falsehood as categorial features attaching to the essences of knowing acts in their relation to the existing essences of objects. That is to say, Husserl provides an account of knowledge as a relation between a complex act of thought and an existing object which retains its essential character as knowledge even when one is not now presently, concretely or temporally instantiating that relation. Having experienced the concrete fact, for example, "that Jim lied to his wife," that truth remains true forever regardless of whether or not Jim now has it vividly before him, tries to rationalize it away or whether or not he or we do or experience anything at all. Hume's failure, therefore, consisted in his nominalism, which excluded the knowledge of essences and essential connections. He was forced to reduce the unity of act + object to one side, viz., to the act and the act to one side, viz., its subjective aspect. Finally, he was forced to reduce even this to feelings--even particular feelings or impressions somehow correlated with the thoughts that elicit them or that they themselves "cause."

Clearly, Husserl's account of truth marks a sharp departure from the prevailing point of view, which is of special importance for our thesis. For, it shows, first of all, how we can have non-sensuous knowledge of moral qualities that are not reducible to either the physical parts or properties of an object, action or state of affairs; nor reducible to mere subjective (or objective) feelings or passions. It illuminates, therefore, how moral knowledge or awareness can be possible. But in doing so it also illuminates how one can really see a moral truth, which exists in essence but which is not instantiated in some immediately present concrete state of affairs. For example, many moral actions present themselves as mere "possibilities" for subsequent choice, i.e., things (act-ions) one ought to do, but one has not done. One can, nonetheless, on Husserl's view, know that one type of action is right and another wrong in essence or in the nature of the case, i.e., in virtue of what it is, even if not realized or instantiated in this particular case. But, then, it may also be the case that the essence of moral motivation or desire is essentially tied to the existing essences of certain types of moral facts or states of affairs so that its power (in any concrete case) is directly proportional to the extent to which one gains access to higher order moral truths. In short, Husserl's account of knowledge may provide the basis for an elucidation of how or in what sense Socrates' claim that knowledge is virtue and ignorance is vice is true.

Section 4: Motivation[128]

Section 4A: General Statement of Husserl's Claim about Motivation and Its Significance for His Epistemology Generally, His Doctrine of Intuition in Particular and to Our Thesis

We referred earlier to a motivational structure as a constituent in the process of fulfillment. Husserl claims that this constituent is central to intentionality generally and to the process of fulfillment in particular. It is central to intentionality in that it is what lawfully binds our experiences together to form complex wholes or unities of meaning.[129] It is central to fulfillment because our intuitive experiences also do not come together without it.[130] It is no wonder, then, that Husserl describes motivation as "*the Fundamental Law Form (Gesetzlichkeit) in the Mental (geistigen) Life.*"[131] For, "constitution," or the unification of mental contents to render an object present, takes place only on the basis of such motivational structures.

The manner in which motivation functions to bring about such unified experiences may be initially and most generally characterized as an inherent tendency to more fully grasp truth or reality. It is Husserl's contention that inherent in intentions as such is not merely a pointing or referring to objects, but an inherent teleological tendency toward greater fullness with respect to truth. In more common sense terms, it seems undeniable that Man has an inherent tendency or desire to know and to know more fully or clearly.[132] It is this, moreover, which may well have been the intuitive basis for the traditional (and we believe false) assumption that Man must seek the truth when seen. The significance of such an experience feature for our moral investigations may be immediately apparent. For, motivational structures constitute precisely those principles of rational desire or affection that we claimed constrain, and sometimes even compel, moral action. Our aim in this section, therefore, shall be to examine more closely the distinctive character of motivation especially within the general context of knowledge acquisition in the sense of fulfillment.

<i> Initial Elucidation of Motivation in Terms of the Analysis of Intentionality Generally and a Certain Class of Intentions in Particular

In the first through fourth subsections of the first chapter of the 1st Logical Investigation Husserl analyzes the essence of a certain class of intentions he calls "indicators." He would have us focus our attention here on concrete cases of indicating intentions in order to "see" what is essential to them as indicators. Such essence analysis reveals, Husserl claims, that in all such cases certain relatively empty (or, correlatively, partially filled) "intentions" of certain objects or states of affairs "indicate," point to, or aim at the possible reality or existence of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that one's "belief in the reality of the one is experienced as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other."[133] It is clear, moreover, that although Husserl's primary aim in the analysis of these indicating intentions is to elucidate the motivational structure inherent in logical judgments,[134] Husserl believes the motivational quality or feature of such intentions is applicable to intentionality generally or to "experience-acts" of all types.[135]

More specifically, it is generally recognized that experiences of the same object often can be arranged in an order according to the degree in which that object is more or less clearly and fully grasped. It is Husserl's contention that the more "empty" intentions have an inherent tendency to pass over into other experiences of the same object that "fulfill" or complete them.[136] In short, it is a feature of experienced intentions that they do not merely point or refer to objects, but they also tend toward possible experiences of fulfillments with varying degrees of force. In Husserl's words, "certain things may or must exist, (or may be given to thought) since others things have been given."[137] Or, from Pfander's analysis, "Among its [striving's] essential characteristics we find the act of intending (*Meinen*) of something absent which is considered to be a goal."[138] For example, I am walking down the stairs in my home and notice an object in the periphery of my visual field, which startles and frightens me (I vaguely and spontaneously take the object to be a stranger in my home). I am motivated to look more closely and find it is merely the loom of my cat's shadow on the wall.

It seems, therefore, that motivation presents itself with two essential distinguishing features, viz., "the act of intending of something absent" and "the feeling of a pressing or tending toward."[139] More specifically, certain objects of thought via the matters of the acts arouse in persons certain (pre-volitional) "strivings" or counter strivings (the quality of the act), e.g., "wishing, hoping, longing, desiring, fearing, despising,"[140] which are forms of an inherent "tendency" of intentions to pass over into correlative intuitions.[141] The matter of the act, then, appears to have a specific type of relationship to the quality of the act. As we saw before, the matter of the act--not the quality--determines the fullness feature of the act. But that fullness feature determines a range of possible attitudes or strivings one can take up in relation to just this object under just these determinations and with just this degree of fullness. For example, if we think of an object such as the Loch Ness monster, the object will initially present itself to us as having certain properties, e.g., enormous size, dinosaur like appearance, etc.. This intentional object will also present itself to us with some degree of fullness, e.g., perhaps we have seen a photograph of the alleged creature or caught a glimpse of it (or what we take to be it) on a visit to Loch Ness. The intentional object via the matter of the act, then, will motivate a certain propositional attitude (or range of such attitudes), e.g., belief in the object. In short, we may actually believe that "Nessie" may exist. If so, then there will be a motivational tendency grounded in both the intentional and epistemic nexus of the act as a whole to seek to confirm the existence and nature of that object. In this case, the macro-observable physical nature of the object in question will motivate a determinate sequence of sensible experiences (percepts) leading to its confirmation or disconfirmation. We would not look for "Nessie" using a microscope as we might in the case of A.I.D.S., nor would we reflect on the images of our mental states. And, if this were not the case, i.e., if there was no such motivational impulse intimately bound up with our intentional experiences, then it seems there would be no rational explanation why one would think of, much less fulfill, one thought of an object over another.

With respect to the degree of force of the motivational tendency rooted in the intentional nexus of the act as such, we may, most generally, compare the motivations of concrete cases of relatively empty (merely signitive) intentions with little or no presented possibility of confirmation on one hand, with concrete cases of relatively empty intentions with some degree of possible confirmation on the other hand. The former exert little motivational tendency or "force" toward confirmation, while the latter exert a force proportional to the degree to which such confirmation appears possible. This is not to say that this is all that is relevant to this force, but it appears to be a basic phenomenological fact. If we think, for example, of an object as not existing, e.g., a unicorn or round square, we find that such thoughts or intentions elicit little if any motivational force or tendency toward confirming them, though even they provide direction (or some degree of force) on how to go about thinking of the same object. That is, all intentions qua intentions essentially involve motivational structures even if this is merely the motivation for reduplication or repetition of the same thought. But objects which are presented as capable of some degree of fulfillment motivate to a much greater degree. Specifically, they present the possibility of fulfillment in a way other intentions may not. If we turn our atten-tion, for example, to other types of objects (and their varying degrees of fullness), e.g., the possibility of a good or happy life, a cure for A.I.D.S., success in one's marriage or vocation etc., we find that there is a considerably greater tendency of such intentional objects to point to correlative procedures of verification. The significance of this point to epistemology generally and to our moral investigations in particular cannot be over-emphasized. For, it may well indicate that Truth or Reality itself is the ultimate or abstractive origin of the motivational tendency.

Undoubtedly, if one believes, for example, that a good life is not possible, that a cure or even prolongation of life in the case of A.I.D.S., etc., is not possible this motivational force will be significantly weakened, but this is precisely because in such particular cases the quality of the intentional nexus of the act as a whole is such to prevent it. That is, even here truth governs the motivational character of the act as presented. In such cases it is, no doubt, quite possible as well as quite consistent with our view that there is a certain freedom or latitude with respect to the propositional attitude or quality one may take up in relation to the object of the act. But there are necessary constraints built in even here. We must, for example, distinguish in such cases--at the very least--the "act" of will or the act of the ego in response to certain objects together with their inherent motivational tendencies and these objects with their motivational tendencies themselves. It is Husserl's view that these motivational tendencies or strivings are essential preconditions for, and so exist prior to, any explicit act of the ego. One must think of an object in order to desire it or choose to act in accordance with it. We must distinguish, then, between the force imposed by the matter of the act, or the intentional nexus as a whole, on the ego and the position or attitude the ego may take in response.

The ego or will may function in all sorts of ways in response to such initial motivational structures. It may even, for example, function to undermine the presentation characteristics of an intentional object so that its fullness does not appear or appear with respect to all the features of the presented objectivity. It may also be the case that acts of will may themselves set up new motivational structures. But all this is quite distinct from the inherent and original motivational features of the intentional act itself. In short, although there are all kinds of more specific ways in which, e.g., perceptions motivate judgments, "judgments legitimate and correct them-selves through experiences," etc., the motivations in all such more specific cases presuppose certain "absolute motivations" elicited by the original acts themselves.142 To appreciate adequately this general point, then, one should simply focus one's attention on concrete cases where one believes something is possible in contrast to cases where one does not. If one does so one may verify for one's self that the strength of the motivational tendency is more particularly bound up with the class of intentions that are presented as capable of fulfillment, (authentic or inauthentic), and less so for intentions not so presented.

It is Husserl's contention, therefore, that prior to any voluntary integration or unification of experienced con-tents to render an object present there are more "absolute" or primitive motivations rooted in the particular concrete experiences of objects "seen" at one glance, i.e., rooted in straightforward or direct acts of sense perception of some particularly given "one" or unity. There are motivations, in other words, which function "regardless of whether reason controls within the motivation or not."143 What more one can or actually apprehends of the object(s) in one's present field or horizon of experience is deter-mined by one's subsequent experiences or fulfillments. One can change nothing with respect to these original pheno-menal unities and their inherent motivational structures.

<ii> Types of Motivations: Rational and Irrational

{a} Rational Motivations

On the basis of such primitive or absolute motivations Husserl claims that motivations can be further, but still generally, distinguished as "rational" or "irrational." With respect to rational motivation he distinguishes two senses, i.e., pure or absolute and relative. Pure or absolute rational motivation is motivation founded on Evidenz or insight, i.e., when we genuinely or authentically intuit or see something and are motivated on the basis of this intuition to fulfill it.[144] This is the case where such motivations are in complete control and produce ("constitute") act unities of higher order or intuitions which have as their objective correlates, objectivities of higher order. In short, this is the case where knowledge in the sense of fulfillment or transcendence is achieved. We are motivated on the basis of clear and insightful evidence toward new facts or conclusions based thereon. Such a case, therefore, is applicable to both logically sound inferences and intuitive fulfillments. "I yield my thetic support to the conclusion of my argument because I have asserted such and such in the premises, have given my thesis over to them."[145] Or, I may see or know, for example, that there really is a God (or, less controversially, a good life) and be motivated, as a result, to know Him more fully or clearly (or to see more clearly the precise nature of a truly good life). Clearly, then, the concept of rational motivation is of paramount significance for our moral thesis.

Relative rational motivation, on the other hand, is the case where we merely believe or assume something is the case or is true, and are motivated on the basis of this intention towards relevant procedures of verification or fulfillment. "But if I take something to be true, or a requirement to be moral, and thus to issue from an appropriate value, and if I freely follow the presumed truth, the presumed moral good, then I am rational--but only relatively so, insofar as I can be in error in this."[146] In other words, in this case one carries out an appropriate procedure of verification or fulfillment for an object as cognized, whether the process is logical or purely intuit-ive, but one may well be in error with respect to one's original belief or intention. One may, for example, merely be following a blind hunch. In such cases, then, reason is still in control--one is sincerely, yet merely, convinced that one's intention is verifiable and one proceeds in a rational manner to verify that intention. The difference between these two types of rational motivations, then, lies in the fact that in the latter case the motivational tendency is grounded essentially in the intentional essence of the act, while in the former case it is essentially grounded in the epistemic essence of the act. In either case, however, one can see immediately the significance of such an account for ethics generally and for our thesis in particular. As Husserl puts it, ". . . we come here upon the basic questions of ethics in the widest sense, which has as its object the rational behavior of individuals."147 One can see, for example, how such an account might elucidate a sense of moral rationality or conscientiousness in following presumed but unverified moral claims of truth and how such a sense of merely intentional conscientious-ness must be sharply distinguished from conscientiousness grounded in the veridical apprehension of truth.

{b} Irrational Motivations

What is common in both types of rational motivations is the presence of some intentional object, which serves as the rational ground for some explicit act of the ego in rel-ation to it. There is an explicit intentionality together with its motivational force, i.e., one has in mind or before one's view an object, which motivates. It is this characteristic, however, which is lacking in the case of irrational motivations. In their case motivation is, of course, also present, which means that some object or objects are experienced to elicit the motivational force. But, to be experienced does not imply that something is perceived (or made objective). In this case, then, the mot-ivation is not rooted in any explicit intention. Rather, it has its "psychical ground" in "the dark depths" of the ego or one's life stream. Irrational motivations may, there-fore, have their origins in non-rational experiences of all sorts, e.g., in mere "sense perception, the impulses, givens, and drives in the sphere of passivity."[148] In other words, there are in such cases motivations originating in the matter of acts or experiences of all kinds within consciousness, but they are "hidden" motivations--unnoticed or imperceptible and so, in this sense, unconscious. The most rigorous and lengthy psychoanalysis may even fail to bring such motivations to light. To more clearly elucidate the nature of these irrational or non-rational motivations we need now to examine more closely what Husserl calls "association motivations" or the "association of ideas."

<iii> Further Analysis of Irrational Motivation by an Examination of the Association of Ideas

Husserl places motivation within the general class of relations or facts traditionally designated as the 'association of ideas.'[149] But he intends by this only to indicate that such relations have generic features that distinguish them as a class from necessary relations generally and logical relations in particular, not that all such "association" relations can or must be reduced to what, e.g., Hume calls "the association of ideas." With respect to this general class of relations between ideas, Husserl distinguishes two main types, viz., <a> "facts which concern the 'accompaniment' and 'reactivation' of ideas stated in the laws of association," and <b> "facts in which association operates creatively, and produces peculiar descriptive characters and forms of unity."[150]

With respect to <a>, Husserl's view appears to partially coincide with generally conceded notions with respect to association. The mere co-presence, accompaniment or unification of certain mental contents can set up a new motivational tendency with respect to similar such contents in the future which is greater than the motivational tendency elicited by the matters of the distinct contents alone.[151] In the case of the unity of visual contents in a visual sense field, for example, there is a natural or "passive" unification of visual contents prior to any motivational tendency and prior to any willful or volitional control.[152] There will be, however, certain motivational structures grounded in the matter of the acts correlated with such experience. But, as a result of particular correlations between sense experiences of the same or different types, new motivational or associative tendencies may insinuate themselves into subsequent experiences of the same type.[153]

> When once a certain correlation shows up within a stream of consciousness, there persists within that same stream the tendency for any newly beginning correlation, which is similar to one of the terms of the earlier correlation, to strive to fill itself out, according to the sense of the similarity, as a complete correlation similar to the earlier one.[154]

The mere contingent correlation or finding together of contents of whatever types may, therefore, set up new motivational tendencies. Hume's elucidation of cause and effect may be considered an example of such associative tendencies. For example, one releases one's hold on a pen in one's hand and it is seen to fall. This sets up a motivational tendency to expect, on the next occasion of the presentation of one term of the relation, for the other term to follow. It is to be noted, however, that on Husserl's view this can only be possible in virtue of the similarity, i.e., strict identity, of sensory universals inherent in such distinct acts. A coin is flipped and it turns up heads on several occasions which sets up a certain motivational tendency greater than the original toss that the next time the coin is tossed it will turn up heads. A dog is punished each time it wets in the house, and, so, on the next occasion when it wets it runs in fear of being hit. A young German child is taught that Jews eat little children; as a result, when the child sees what he takes to be a Jew he runs in fear of being eaten.

To consider a case in more detail, one may simply find oneself suspicious--even angry or afraid--of a black man standing by one's car. One may also be oblivious to the origins of this suspicion, which may characterize the motivational structure as irrational. That is, in such cases there may well be relatively "unconscious" or irrational motivations added to the motivations tied to the mere immediate object of intentionality alone. Specific-ally, if one has experienced in the past repeated correlations between black men and certain violent actions, then, on some future occasion of being confronted with a black man, something new may well insinuate itself into the motivation rooted in the matter of the immediate intention alone, viz., a "force of habit"155 (or custom) independent of one's awareness of this fact. In short, habits of association manifest motivational tendencies, which are over and above the motivational tendencies inherent in the matters of the acts themselves.

It is no wonder, therefore, that Hume praised "habit" or "custom" to the extent that he did. It is indeed an essential motivational structure in all thought and experience. It also forms a key constituent in what constitutes much of the evidence we have for many of our beliefs. But, Husserl's elucidation of irrational motivation in terms of his doctrine of the mental act may, more precisely, show that such motivations are responsible for the idealist's "coloring" we mentioned earlier, i.e., the tendency to apprehend objects under certain determinations whether the objects in question have the features ascribed to them or not.

> Certainly there are hidden motivations. And when we do not explicitly carry out belief acts, they can be involved in motivations. Examples of this abound through-out the range of experience, the endless field of motivations, such as are involved in every external perception, every remembering . . . The grasping of material objects and of material object relationships are "motivation fabrics": they are woven throughout of intentional strands, which point this way and that.[156]

More specifically, social conventions (or conditioned habits of thought), which many philosophers today take to be the literal nature or essence of thought, may simply be, in virtue of Husserl's analysis of the mental act, a mere form of irrationality. One goes into the army and is conditioned to kill on command; another sees a person dressed poorly and immediately assumes the person is a slob; and still another hears the word "intuition" or "meaning" which conjures up thoughts of irrational mysticism, emotionalism or myth. In all such cases the non-rationality of the motivational structure, or the association between the ideas, is indicated by the passivity or spontaneity of the reaction or the lack of explicit and intuitive clarity with respect to the things or matters themselves. One does not, for example, "see" that intuition is unjustified, one merely assumes that it is. Moreover, in all such cases where the association is irrational, or, perhaps, antirational, this, too, is indicated by the unphilosophical reliance on such presuppositions or biases-despite intuitive and logical evidence to the contrary. Perhaps, the clearest illustration of the control such irrational social conditioning may have on the minds of philosophers today is the age old sophism or fallacy which assumes as truth the socially rooted or conditioned dogma that we cannot see or know any truth at all.

Husserl would take us beyond such irrationalism. In fact, the distinctive character of Husserl's account of motivation lies, above all, in his contention that motivational tendencies are not restricted to the mere re-activation of ideas and correlations between them. Rather, <b>, (the second main type of association relation), intentions with their characteristic "lack" or emptiness, may "motivate" the production of new ideas correlated with distinctively novel objectivities. This simply refers to the motivational tendency toward fulfillment discussed at length above. There is a motivational tendency rooted in lower order acts toward acts of higher order, which reveal or bring into view objectivities of higher order. Motivation, then, simply functions to direct us to higher--in fact the highest--order objects, ends or goods, which we are capable of apprehending, and in virtue of that capacity one may not merely apprehend, but in so doing, lay hold of, such goods for one's self. But, from our study of fulfillment it should also be clear that such novel apprehensions are not necessitated or compelled, but precisely motivated or constrained on the basis of primarily experienced contents. As we have shown, this does not mean that the objectivity itself is formed or created out of these contents, but only that the new idea must be appropriately formed or produced to "see" the new objectivity--to bring it rather than some other possible objectivity into view or into relation with the knowing mind. Motivation, therefore, presents itself as a literal part of the act character, or intentional nexus of the act. It consists in an inherent tendency of intentions of all types to pass over into correlative types of intuitions, which bring new types of existing objectivities or truths into view. "Everything here is 'motivated'; every new positing or every phase of the unified positing-complex and every new partial positing which might possibly be brought to the surface but which does not have to be brought to the surface."[157]

Section 4B: The Final Elucidation of Motivation by Comparison with Some Relations Possibly Confused with It

With this general account of the relation of motivation before us, all that remains is for us to reinforce our conclusions by comparing or contrasting motivation with certain other relations possibly confused with it. We shall briefly focus our attention on two such relations, viz., logical and causal relations.

<i> Motivation and Logical Relations

We have already characterized logical relations as relations, which essentially hold between intentional or referential qualities (concepts and propositions) which are instanced in concrete mental acts. Motivation, like fulfillment, however, is a relation, which primarily or essentially holds between acts of thought or knowledge.[158] Logical relations and the relation of motivation, there-fore, are different. The fact that they are different may be best illustrated by the fact that we can refer to each of them independently of the other. For example, one may refer to the logical relation of contradiction, which holds between the propositions 'All Unicorns are things with horns' and 'Some Unicorns are not things with horns,' without referring to any motivational connection (or any acts) whatsoever. On the other hand, one may refer to a motivational connection without referring to any logical relation. For example, in thinking about my car keys I am motivated to look for them on the hall-tree where I usually leave them and yet in this case there is no logical relation (or logical inference) referred to whatsoever.

Second, in the case of logical relations both terms of the relation may be known with insight, while this is what is precisely lacking in the case of motivation. For example, in the instance above of the formal relation of contradiction, 'All unicorns are things with horns' and 'Some unicorns are not things with horns,' the propositions are known with *Evidenz* or insight, while the objective correlates of these propositions, i.e., unicorns, are not known at all. But, in the case of the motivational relation, insight into the latter term of the relation is precisely what is lacking. There is no case where a correlative intention or possible fulfillment is not merely indicated or aimed at.[159] When a research scientist, for example, thinks of A.I.D.S. and, in view of this intention, is motivated to discover more precisely what it is, he is not necessitated to think of what it is, nor does he see with insight what it is. Rather, it is merely presented as one of several possibilities for future experience.

Third, it follows from the fact that logical relations are essentially applicable to propositions, while motivational relations are essentially applicable to acts of thought, that the two relations differ with respect to their range of application. In the case of motivation, there is no restriction on the types of acts, which can be subject to motivational tendencies; whereas, in the case of logical relations, which are instantiated in complex acts of inference, the relevant act form is restricted to acts of judgment. The motivation relation, therefore, in contradistinction with logical relations, can hold between, e.g., emotional, perceptual, volitional, etc., as well as judgmental states or acts of mind. In this way it may also be apparent how Husserl's doctrine of fulfillment may be extended beyond the mere "objectifying acts" he is primarily interested in for the foundations of logic to "acts" and objects of all kinds.

We may, perhaps, now see why Husserl claims the motivation relation is so central to cognition. For, it is broader even than the relation of fulfillment. It is essential not only to fulfillment but to all logical inference or verification as well. I cannot and do not verify that the apple before me is red by any logical inference but only by perception, i.e., a process of fulfillment; and, in all fulfillments there is a motivational structure. But all inference or argument, in so far as it is a concrete process involved in the acquisition of knowledge, also contains essential motivating structures. It is because I posit some fact or state of affairs as my premise that I am prompted or motivated to draw a conclusion (or range of conclusions) from that (or those) premises, even in the case where the conclusion is not something I have or can bring to intuitive fulfillment. In every case of logical inference or argument, therefore, there is a motivational structure which is not identical to the logical relation(s) instanced therein.[160] Motivational relations and logical relations, therefore, although essentially connected in the concrete act of inference, are distinct in essence. Motivation is necessary to logical judgment and inference, but not conversely.[161]

Finally, in view of the fact that motivation essentially involves a mere pointing to, or aiming at, a range of possible intentions, it is evident that it implies no objectively necessary connection between two acts of thought, e.g., between an intention and its fulfilling intuition or between a premise and conclusion of a logical argument.[162] For this reason, too, it cannot be the same as a logical relation. For example, a child may be motivated to expect that all times he tosses a coin will turn up heads because all other times he has tossed a coin have turned up heads, but this is clearly not necessary. Expectation is simply not necessity.

{a} The Significance of This Contrast for Our Thesis

The fact that motivation is not a necessary relation and that, therefore, premises in a logical inference do not necessitate the drawing of a certain conclusion is of considerable importance for our thesis.163 For, it elucidates for the first time the notion of an "influencing" versus a determining or necessitating causality. It may elucidate for the first time, therefore, how Rationality or Truth may essentially influence, constrain or motivate a rational creature with the capacity for such rationality, without determining, compelling or necessitating him. To illustrate this point we may recall our brief analysis of Aristotle's account of moral weakness and vice in terms of his doctrine of the practical syllogism. We saw that moral "causation" was to all intents and purposes taken to be equivalent to logical "causation" or necessitation. That is, moral "ignorance" or vice was construed as ignorance either of the major premise (vice proper) or the minor premise (moral weakness) in the practical syllogism. If one has knowledge of both these premises then one is, according to Aristotle, literally compelled or necessitated (i.e., "bound") to both affirm the appropriate practical conclusion and to act at once on the basis thereof. But, in view of our analysis above, there is a clear sense in which this is not so. One can "know" both the major and minor premises of a moral argument and still not strictly be necessitated to draw the appropriate conclusion or to act on the basis thereof. We must add, however, although it is a point we shall discuss in detail in our last chapter, that there is also a sense in which Aristotle was right. This is the sense in which an adequately filled intuition may not only constrain, but, in some cases, even compel, with or without the presence of any logical inference.

{b} The Non-Necessary or "Contingent" Character of Motivation

Given that the motivation relation is not a necessary relation the question naturally arises whether or not it is a contingent relation or relation of probability. Husserl concedes that in some sense it is, but only in the most general sense indicated earlier that it points to a state of affairs that may not exist or may not be true.[164] This is why Husserl places the motivation relation within the generic class of association relations. But the lack of logical certainty or necessity with respect to the terms of the motivation relation does not imply that there are no essential connections or definite possibilities attributable to that relation with respect to its acts. There are different types of certainty or necessity and possibility. All certainty is not logical certainty. The fact that it is logically "possible" for there to be "brains [or personalities] in vats," or that unicorns "may" exist, doesn't imply that such objects present any degree of experiential (in this case, empirical) probability with respect to their verifiability. Nor does it imply that all claims of experience are on a par with respect to such possibility or that there is no clear sense of necessity applicable to experiential verification. The intuitive knowledge in the sense of fulfillment that I am sitting here typing necessitates that I am in fact here typing. To know X necessarily entails that X exists. Possibilities and necessities, therefore, are not restricted to mere logical necessities and possibilities.

<ii> Motivation and Natural Causal Relations

The account of intentionality and motivation above should already make it apparent that motivation cannot be identified with any form of natural causal relation. "The "because--therefore" of motivation has an entirely differ-ent sense from causality in the sense of natural causality."165 This is so, above all, because in the case of natural causal relations the terms are particular physical objects while in the case of the motivation relation the terms are mental acts. It is true, as we have seen, that Husserl concedes that physiological processes underlie psycho-physical states or constitute, in some sense, the "origins" of primary contents or sensations. But, as we have also seen, the mere fact that physiological processes have essential connections to psychical or conscious states does not entail an identity between them. Above all, it does not imply that anything non-conscious or imperceptible (at least nothing in principle imperceptible or non-intentional) can motivate an ego. What one does not know mentally or cannot think mentally can, by no means, "motivate" or determine one mentally.

> But physiological processes in the sense organs, in nerve and ganglion cells, do not motivate me when they cause, psycho-physiologically, the occurrence of sense-data, apprehensions, mental experiences in my con-sciousness. What I do not "know," that in my exper-ience, imagination, thought, action, which does not stand over against me as presented, as perceived, remembered, thought, etc., does not "determine" me mentally. And whatever is not intentionally resolved in my experience, including that which is unobserved or implicit, does not motivate me, not even in a subconscious manner.[166]

More specifically, in the case of motivation a present intention or range of intentions motivates or directs the ego, with varying degrees of force, toward other intentions some of which may constitute possible fulfillments of the original intention(s). Such intentions do not essentially, or in the ordinary case, determine, compel or necessitate the ego to act or to choose to act with respect to subsequent thought or experience. As I sit here typing I am conscious of the fact that I can think of any number of things, e.g., I can turn my attention to the physical objects outside my study and consider any one or number of them in more or less detail. I look at that green tree and notice that there is a slight breeze by the movement of its branches; I look at the mountains and notice that it is a clear day. I may even decide to count the objects in my experiential field in order to obtain the authentic conception of number. In the case of causal relations, however, the situation is quite different. If I release my pen it does not just happen to fall, but necessarily falls when dropped. If I decide to strike this thin glass window with my fist, it will not just happen to break but will necessarily break when struck.

> In the natural sciences, natural causality has its correlate in the laws of nature, according to which it is to be precisely determined (at least in the domain of physical nature) what must follow under precisely determinate conditions. In contrast, when it is said in the domain of the social and human sciences that the historian . . . seeks to "explain" social-scientific facts, this means that he wants to elucidate motivations, he wants to make it understandable how the relevant human beings "came to the point of" behaving in such and such a manner, which influences they have experienced and acted on, what has had a determining influence on them from within the entire community of effective influences... the "causalities" which are in question here . . . are the farthest thing from natural causalities.[167]

It should be clear from the foregoing that there are various senses in which we may legitimately speak of necessitation or determination with respect to intentionality or thought. There are absolutely necessary conditions, which determine whether or not we can even think of an object of some determinate kind. For example, color sensation was shown to be absolutely necessary for the mere thought of a colored body. There are necessary conditions, too, which determine whether or not we have knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. No mere thought or repetition of thoughts, for example, can constitute fulfillment; and, in virtue of earlier thoughts and fulfillments, there may also be absolute necessities imposed on what we can and cannot think and do (or even "will" to do) at any particular point in time. I remember, for example, how "powerless" or out of control I once felt when a doctor drew blood from my vein too quickly and I watched myself fall to the ground. I had believed before that time that I was in control of myself--at least, in control of my thoughts. But, I found in this case that I simply and necessarily fell and there was nothing I could do about it. Certain physiological antecedents, then, may literally determine what we can and cannot at any moment think or experience. But the mere fact that we are determined with respect to certain possibilities of experience or that there are necessary laws governing experience which dictate what we can and cannot do, does not in any way at all contradict the claim that we may also be free, undetermined or merely motivated in other respects.

<iii> Conclusion

With this detailed account of the nature or structure of the mental act before us, we hope now to be in a position to elucidate how intuitive moral knowledge may be possible and how such knowledge may be understood to constrain action. Our claim is that intuitive moral knowledge is to be conceived as essentially involving a complex process of fulfillment in which we more closely approach an existing moral objectivity and obtain, thereby, a more exact apprehension of its true nature. This "closer look," as Price maintained, can--in virtue of inherent motivational structures--constrain or "govern" subsequent thoughts or intentions and, thereby, actions in a way mere intentions can not. It is, moreover, because of the proportionally greater constraint imposed by clearer intuitions of the full nature of moral objectivities that in every case of evil action one must turn away from moral truth. For, the power of such apprehension conflicts with and prevents the solicitations of other, more immediate, ends or goals.

Our hope is that an account of moral intuition and motivation may elucidate the philosophical thesis of the practicality of reason. More specifically, it may illuminate the common-sense experience of the various ways in which we can "know" what is good or right for us to do and still act contrary to it. With respect to this elucidation, it is our contention that Morality or Goodness is sufficiently complex to allow for inadequate representations of it. Hence, if one has partially confused or inaccurate apprehensions of Goodness or Rectitude, that apprehension will insinuate itself into every particular or concrete moral intention, volition and action. One's action will be "determined" by one's particular apprehension of Goodness, which, in turn, is inseparable from what one takes to be the nature or essence of Goodness itself. The powerlessness attributed to Goodness or to moral reason (i.e., one's apprehension of Goodness), therefore, may well be due to false views of the nature or characteristics of The Good precisely as Socrates maintained. This may also be so regardless of whether or not the origin of such false views is attributable to willful evasion of moral truth or to deep rooted social conventions which insinuate themselves into the motivational fabric of one's lived experience or life stream before one even comes to the age of rational self-control. These false views, we contend, may be overturned and goodness of character or soul restored (or realized) by moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. This is the process in which the true nature of The Good is brought into the knowing or transcendent relation with the mind or the higher order crowning act of moral intuition.

Notes: Chapter Four

1. We may recall, for example, Russell's criticism of Kant on p.11 of his, Why I am not a Christian: "He was like many people: in intellectual matters he was skeptical, but in moral matters he believed implicitly in the maxims that he had imbibed at his mother's knee."

2. G.E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in Philosophical Studies (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), p.25, quoted in Willard's, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge [hereafter,LOK], pp.55-6; see also Willard, LOK, p.83, note #66, for reference to Brentano and further discussion on this point.

3. Edmund Husserl, "Correspondence to Arnold Metzger," (9/4/19), in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, ed., Husserl: Shorter Works [hereafter, HSW] (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p.360; see also p.359.

4. Ibid., pp.357, 359; see also pp. 17, 351, 356.

5. Willard, LOK, p.258; see also p.271, no.13; see also Edmund Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science [hereafter, PR], trans. Q. Lauer, in Q. Lauer, ed. Phenomenology and the Crises of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 72ff, 159ff.

6. See, for example, Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N.Findlay, 2 vols. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1970), pp.135ff; Edmund Husserl, Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp.25ff; Edmund Husserl, Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic [hereafter, PS], trans. Dallas Willard, The Personalist LVIII, October 1977, pp.297-320, esp. p.316; Willard, LOK, pp.5,8,19 no.7.

7. For example, see Husserl, LI, pp.115ff: "Extreme empiricism is as absurd a theory of knowledge as extreme skepticism. It destroys the possibility of the rational justification of mediate knowledge, and so destroys its own possibility as a scientifically proven theory." See also Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, first book [hereafter, Ideas I], trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), pp.35ff.

8. Kersten, Ideas I, p.36.

9. Husserl, LI, p.833.

10. Husserl, HSW, p.16; Kersten, Ideas I, p.xix.

11. Dallas Willard, "Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Phenomenology" (N.P.,1988), p.15.; see also Willard, LOK, p.197 no.16, 216, 241-7; Husserl, LI, p.720, Husserl, HSW, p.15.

12. See Willard, LOK, p.37; Kersten, Ideas I, p.349.

13. See, for example, Husserl, HSW, p.88, 96. We cannot take the time in this paper to discuss many of the important features of Husserl's methodology. It may, however, be helpful to initially point out that it is our contention that the aim of the famous phenomenological "epoche," bracketing of existence, or phenomenological reduction is not a Cartesian or idealistic separation of knowledge from reality, but a methodological attempt to have us look at "the things themselves" as they give themselves to us rather than assuming various metaphysical presuppositions about them. It is his position, then, that intuition would ultimately provide the illumination necessary to elucidate the truth with respect to any domain of object.

14. For the following, see Willard, LOK, pp.1-3.

15. For example, see Husserl, HSW, p.13; Husserl, LI, pp.594-6.

16. Willard, LOK, p.3.

17. Ibid., p.14; Husserl, PS, p.320.

18. Husserl, HSW, p.120, esp. p.121.; see also Willard, LOK pp.12ff.

19. For Wesenschau: "the principle of all principles," see Willard, LOK, p.263, 12; see also Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), p.92; Kersten, Ideas I, pp.44ff, 151, 167ff, esp. pp.169-70.

20. Kersten, Ideas I, p.36.

21. Ibid., p.44.

22. Ibid., p.151. Kersten has <produced> where Willard prefers <presented>.

23. Ibid., pp.169-70.

24. Husserl, LI, p.463; Willard, LOK, p.216.

25. Willard, LOK, p.216.

26. Ibid., pp.217ff, 241ff, esp. p.243.

27. Ibid., p.217.

28. Ibid., p.169.

29. Ibid., pp.143-66; Husserl, LI, pp.90ff.

30. Willard, LOK, p.247.

31. Ibid., p.19 no.9-10; Husserl, LI, pp.438, 741.

32. Willard, LOK, p.36.

33. Husserl, LI, p.815.

34. Willard, LOK, p.36.

35. Ibid., p.230; Husserl, LI, pp.734, 714, 860ff, 356, 851-2.

36. Husserl, LI, pp.309-10.

37. Husserl, LI, pp.265, 718, 830.

38. Willard, LOK, p.36.

39. Edmund Husserl, Philosophie Der Arithmetik [hereafter, PA], 2nd. ed. L. Eley, in Husserliana XII (1970), pp.31f; Edmund Husserl, On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses [hereafter, CN], trans. D. Willard, Philosophia Mathematica IX (Summer 1972),pp.51ff.

40. Willard, LOK, p.37.

41. Husserl, LI, p.799; Husserl, PA, ch.XI; cf. Ehrenfels, UberGestalt-qualitaten, Viertel j.f. wiss. Philosophie, 1890; Willard, LOK p.64.

42. Husserl, LI, pp.453-4.

43. Willard, LOK, p.52. 44. Ibid., p.217.

45. Introduction to Psychopharmacology (Upjohn, 1980), pp.12,24, 56-7.

46. For the relation between sensa and intentional role see esp. Husserl, 1st LI s23; 5th LI s4; see also LI pp. 537, 539, 565, 567, 860.

47. Willard, LOK, p.37.

48. Ibid., p. 230; Husserl, LI, pp. 567, 328, 537ff, 559.

49. Willard, LOK, p.31.

50. Willard, LOK, pp.80-1.

51. Ibid., p.32.

52. Ibid., p.220.

53. Willard, LOK, p.14; Husserl, LI, pp.218, 252; 564-8.

54. Willard, LOK, p. 220.

55. Husserl, LI, pp.552ff, 556.

56. Ibid., pp.576-80, 555.

57. Ibid., p.737.

58. Willard, LOK, pp.25ff.

59. Husserl, LI, p.587.

60. Ibid., p.589.

61. Willard, LOK, p. 221.

62. Husserl, LI, p.26.

63. Ibid., pp.737-8; see also p.598.

64. Willard, LOK, p. 26. Husserl claims that a satisfactory criterion of existence is not independence, but the being or having of properties. If something has properties then it exists. But to merely refer to something as having properties does not entail that it has those properties and so exists.

65. Ibid., pp.221-3, 226. 66. Husserl, LI, pp.590-1.

67. Husserl, PS, p.140. This issue is of utmost importance for logic and epistemology generally. It carries over, too, to ethics with respect to its more complex manifestations. It is not an issue, however, that we need or can take up here at any length.

68. R.M Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp.65ff.

69. For a discussion of "the myth of the sentence," especially with respect to the views of Sellars, see Willard, LOK, pp.208ff.

70. Ibid., p.224.

71. This is a point that even Hume would apparently concede, although with respect to a far more restricted range of objects. For a modern Humean application of this "vivacity" see, for example, David Kaplan's "vivid names" in his "Quantifying In" in L. Linsky, ed. Reference and Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.131ff.

72. Husserl, LI, pp. 710-12, 715-18, 723-4, 727-9, 731ff, 807-8, 832.

73. Ibid., pp.731ff.

74. Ibid., pp. 187-96, 266, esp. 412, 670, 765, 777.

75. Willard, LOK, p.253 no.56, Kersten, Ideas I, pp.209ff.

76. Husserl, LI, pp. 698ff, Willard, LOK, p.206.

77. Husserl, PA, p.59; Willard, LOK, pp. 50-1.

78. Kersten, Ideas I, pp.51ff.

79. Willard, LOK, pp. 205ff.

80. R. Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language, trans., A. Pap, in Ayer, Logical Positivism, pp. 63, 76; see also M. Schlick, Pos-itivism and Realism, trans., D. Rynin, in Ayer, pp. 86-7.

81. Kersten, Ideas I, pp.37-9.

82. Willard, LOK, p.207.

83. Ibid., p.231. 84. Ibid., p.226.

85. Husserl, LI, p.762.

86. Ibid., p.787.

87. Ibid., p.725; Willard, LOK, p.229.

88. Husserl, LI, pp.773-8.

89. Ibid., p.778.

90. Ibid., p.784.

91. Ibid., p.782.

92. Ibid., pp.783-4.

93. Ibid., pp.803-4.

94. Ibid., p.786.

95. Ibid., p.787.

96. Ibid., pp. 787-8.

97. Ibid., p.789.

98. Ibid., pp.782, 786.

99. Ibid., p.787.

100. Ibid., pp.787-8.

101. Ibid., p.819; Willard, LOK, p.236.

102. Ibid., p.80 no.43.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., p.236; Husserl, LI, pp.788,803.

105. Husserl, LI, pp.788, 810, 814, 791.

106. Willard, LOK, p.236.

107. Ibid., p.237.

108. Husserl, HSW, pp.86-119; Willard, LOK, pp.21-86.

109. Husserl, HSW, p.97. 110. Willard, LOK, p.52; Husserl, PA, p.31.

111. Willard, LOK, pp.52-3; Husserl, PA, pp.31ff; Husserl, CN, pp.51ff.

112. Willard, LOK, pp.61-2.

113. Husserl, PA, pp.80ff; Willard, LOK, pp.61-2. The temptation to identify such formal constituents as psychical pervades not only non-phenomenological but most phenomenological accounts as well.

114. Willard, LOK, p.63.

115. Ibid., p.63.

116. Husserl, PA, p.81; Husserl, HSW, pp.116-7.

117. Husserl, PS, p.140.

118. Willard, LOK, p.242; Husserl, LI p.762.

119. Husserl, LI, p.762.

120. Ibid., p.763.

121. The Program and First Platform of Six Realists, rep. in H.W. Schneider, Sources of Contemporary Philosophical Realism in America (Bobbs-Merrill 1964), p.40.

122. Ibid., pp.40-5.

123. Willard, LOK, p.205.

124. Ibid.

125. The Program &c.., p.41.

126. Ibid., p.43.

127. Willard, LOK, p. 243.

128. See esp. Husserl, 1st LI ch.1, s.2-4, pp.269-71; Paul Haanstaadt, trans., Husserliana IV, Ideen II,s.56 (N.P., N.D.), pp.220-31; A.Pfander's, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation [hereafter, PWM], trans. H. Spiegelberg (North-western Univ. Press 1967).

129. Personal correspondence with P. Haanstadt; see also E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, sec.37.

130. Husserl, Ideen II, p.220; see also Willard, LOK, pp.227-8, 253 no's 52,54,55.

131. Ibid., p.220.

132. Willard, LOK, pp.227,253 no's. 53, 55; Husserl, LI, pp.718,722.

133. Husserl, LI, p.270.

134. Haanstadt letter.

135. Ibid.; Husserl, Ideen II, p.227.

136. Willard, LOK, p.253 no.50 on Sartre; no.51 on Frege.

137. Husserl, LI, p.270.

138. Pfander, PWM, p.3. For Pfander a motivation and a striving are not strictly identical, but for our purposes the difference between them does not seem significant. See p.18.

139. Ibid., p.3.

140. Ibid.

141. Willard, LOK, p.227.

142. Husserl, Ideen II, p.220.

143. Ibid., p.220; Husserl, LI, pp.227-8.

144. Husserl, Ideen II, p.221.

145. Ibid., p.221.

146. Ibid., pp.221-2.

147. Ibid., p.222.

148. Ibid.

149. Husserl, LI, p.273.

150. Ibid., p.273.

151. Ibid., pp.273-4.
152. Husserl, Ideen II, p.223.
153. Ibid., pp.223-4.
154. Ibid., p.223.
155. Ibid., p.224.
156. Ibid., p.225.
157. Ibid.
158. Willard, LOK, p.225.
159. Husserl, LI, p.271.
160. Husserl, Ideen II, p.220.
161. Husserl, LI, pp.271-3.
162. Ibid., p.272.
163. Husserl, Ideen II, pp.229-30.
164. Husserl, LI, p.272.
165. Husserl, Ideen II, p.229.
166. Ibid., p.231.
167. Ibid., p.229.

Section 1A: Restatement of Our Central Claim Concerning the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason & What It Means in View of Our Analysis so Far

Our central claim has been that the thesis of the practicality of reason is true, although we think it must be carefully qualified in order for us to see how even Hume may reasonably be included among its adherents. The thesis of the practicality of reason, we may recall, is the claim that knowledge of the appropriate kind constrains moral action. If one wishes to be or to do good one needs to place one's self appropriately before Goodness, or the relevant moral facts themselves, in order to obtain access to the power necessary to constrain right action. In view of our analysis so far, and especially in view of Husserl's account of the mental act, this means that the knowledge that constrains is, above all, intuitive knowledge of independently existing moral truth.

We have shown that this thesis may be understood in a way which is clearly opposed to the empiricism (and correlative materialism) as well as idealism of our day. The former denies the knowledge of independently existing moral states of affairs; hence, it denies any alleged power associated therewith.[1] The latter denies any non-sensuous intuitive knowledge of such states of affairs; hence, it too is forced to deny to such knowledge its power. Despite such opposition, we have claimed that if understood correctly and elucidated rigorously, the thesis of the practicality of reason may be seen to conform not only to the most fundamental and enduring insights of the whole history of philosophy, but even to the deepest convictions of both Hume and Kant, the fathers of modern empiricism and idealism respectively. The central problem for all these earlier accounts of moral knowledge and its practicality revolved around the need for an adequate elucidation of knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, i.e., an "intuitive process," by means of which "higher order" ideas and correlative existing objectivities might be elucidated. It is precisely this, however, which Husserl has now provided us with. We have, therefore, an adequate foundation for a prolegomena to a phenomenological elucidation of the thesis of the practicality of reason.

As we turn now to the application of Husserl's account to the moral realm, it is our contention that moral thought also is susceptible to a process of fulfillment wherein one may (but need not) come to "see," and to see more clearly, the moral character of reality and one's "appropriate" place in it. At some point in this process one may attain a "beatific vision" wherein one authentically apprehends the true nature or essence of Goodness itself. In the presence of this Goodness one experiences a new found power over vicious action and a vicious life. In terms of such an account, we claim that the force or strength of one's moral intuition is directly proportional to its clarity, not merely with respect to what one can more or less immediately apprehend of the good in some particular case or action, but with respect to one's capacity, through an adequately filled process, to more fully apprehend the true nature of the Good in its highest form(s). In short, Goodness itself may correctly be said to constitute the ultimate origin of this power, and we gain access to it by our "acquaintance" with it. A pure or full apprehension of the Good, i.e., one where moral *Evidenz* may plausibly be said to obtain, may even make it *impossible* to act contrary to it.

If the power of Goodness, when adequately present, is greater than any other motivating force or influence that might possibly engage an individual, then Socrates must have been right when he claimed that in all cases of wrong doing the knowledge of the true nature of the Good is, in some manner or to some degree, absent. The notion of a "cognitive process," however, provides the key for an adequate elucidation of this vicious ignorance. For, through such a process one may be invariably led to deeper levels of moral ignorance and corruption. This may explain how some people can do certain morally vicious acts which others find so difficult even to think of. If these claims are true, then if one wants to do or be good one needs, above all else, to trust in the possibility of such a Good sufficiently to undertake the requisite process of fulfillment in which alone its nature and its power may be revealed.

Section 1B: The General Form of the "Argument" for This Claim in Terms of Husserl's Account of Intuition

It should be clear at this juncture that the central "argument" for such a claim must proceed by way of experiential clarification rather than logical argument based thereon. The "proof" of the claim that reason constrains action, then, would essentially involve an elucidation of each of the main parts of the claim as well as their most relevant connections, viz., reason, moral action and the constraint of moral reason on moral action.

<i> Reason

With respect to "reason," we have shown that reason or thought is to be essentially defined in terms of intentionality or complex intentional structures. All apprehension, perception or "experience," therefore, may plausibly be construed as rational. In view of this claim, the 18th century debate over which faculty "perceives" moral distinctions may be partially confused. Although the empiricist quite liberally attempts to reduce all knowledge or "experience" to sensation and even attempts to treat sensations as if they were the primary or exclusive objects of reference (especially moral reference),[2] our elucidation of intentionality makes it quite apparent that sensations almost never constitute objects of reference. Sensa, as well as the underlying or lower order "acts" of perception founded thereon, are necessary or indispensable constituents of consciousness, but nothing can be perceived or "known" by such sensa (or lower order acts) alone. We can, as we have seen, draw a distinction between sensuous (lower order) and non-sensuous (higher order) mental acts (states) together with their lower and higher order objectivities. But this distinction does not essentially involve any reference to sensation. In the ordinary case, sensa are "experienced" and function as apperceived contents to render an object present, but they are not made objective, perceived or known. Liberal empirical talk of "moral apprehension" as having essential reference to sensation, therefore, is conceptually confused and certainly unwarranted in the first instance. The attempt to identify or reduce the object of reference to the act which refers, and the intentional act itself to one of its underlying or foundational constituents, succeeds only when such distinctions are not adequately clarified or attended to.

But we also showed that reason or thought is susceptible to intuitive capacities by which it may grasp existing objectivities or states of affairs as they are "in-themselves" or independently of the knowing mind. This means that the existing objectivities may present them-selves with their actual properties without being changed or modified by our cognitive grasp or knowing relation with them. These objectivities themselves, however, as well as the intuitive acts which render them present, may be of lower and higher order. This means that on the foundation of lower order intuitive knowledge, higher order authentic concepts may be obtained which present higher order objectivities. In terms of such an account, we intend to show that moral thought also is susceptible to a process of fulfillment and may even be susceptible to lower and higher order fulfillments in which reality itself is presented with a characteristic moral value.

<ii> Moral Action

It is our contention that moral value may plausibly be construed as a consequential attribute of reality itself as well as of all the things that are. If so, there may be a sense of moral action which is applicable to physical existence and sentient life independent of personality altogether as a principle of law, order or unity. Such a possibility is significant. For, we intend to show that in the case of personality moral action takes two forms: it is either independent of consciousness and volition or it is dependent on (relative to) such consciousness and volition. In both cases we claim there is a distinct moral value applicable to the act. The latter form of moral action, however, is of primary concern to us, for it is this form, which we primarily (but not exclusively) mean when we speak of the constraint of reason on moral action, i.e., "conscientious action." Given the possibility of moral knowledge, however, the two forms of rectitude may coincide. Hence, an adequate elucidation of conscientious action will involve an elucidation of moral action in both senses.

The interplay between these two forms of rectitude may help us to conceive of the possibility of a value for personality, or of personality, that may function as an "appropriate" ultimate end of action for man which may, nonetheless, fail to be known. That is to say, the mere possibility of moral fulfillment allows for the possibility of moral ignorance, and the possibility of more or less proximate or ultimate ends of action allows for the possibility of intuitive moral clarity with respect to some aspects of moral reality without a "full" or insightful apprehension of the moral character of reality as a whole.

<iii> Constraint

In view of the elucidation of apprehension in terms of intentionality, it may be apparent that all "desire" essentially involves intentional or referential structures. After all, desire is desire for something, i.e., it has a reference, whether or not the object desired or referred to is explicitly perceived or whether or not it even exists. Undoubtedly an amoeba may be said to respond in some manner to stimuli and this response may be elucidated without reference to an intentional "object," i.e., in terms of mere sensations. But it takes a lot of argument to reduce "desire" to simple sensation of this kind. In any case, our elucidation of intentionality also showed that all thought essentially involves inherent motivational tendencies or structures, i.e., all thought "points to" further intentions and possible fulfillments with varying degrees of force. In fact, we suggested that thought or intentionality itself might even be construed as a complex intentional-motivational structure in virtue of the fact that motivational structures play an essential role in the unity that constitutes thought and knowledge. As Husserl put it, motivation is "the fundamental law form of the mental life." But in saying this we must be quick to add that it does not follow from this, as we also have seen, that thought is reducible to the motivation it elicits or that motivation can itself be reduced, in empiricistic fashion, to "natural," "physical" or causal relations holding between physical entities; nor even (as we shall see) to "irrational motivations," i.e., mere habits or customs rooted in the "association of ideas." Rather, as we have already shown, motivation is an essential feature of "acts" of thought or intentions--specifically of the "matters" of such acts--which are not physical entities, although they may have reference to, or have various types of relations with, such entities.

All intentional-motivational structures, however, do not constrain equally. The same epistemologically relevant aspects of the mental act that determine truth, have a bearing on the force of the intention itself, precisely as Hume himself concedes. Motivations, in other words, are the essential tendencies of intentions to pass over into fulfillments. They are tendencies toward the apprehension of truth or reality. This is so whether the knowledge at issue is knowledge in the sense of fulfillment or knowledge in the sense of the conclusion of a logical or mathematical process of reasoning. But it is especially the case with knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. For, existing objectivities in so far as they are apprehended, and to the degree that they are apprehended, motivate further experiences as mere empty intentions of "objects" do not. All that presents itself as true or real "constrains" or motivates thought and action in accordance with it, while all that presents itself as false, non-existent or unfulfillable lacks motivational efficacy in comparison. Even mere empty intentions, however, motivate to some degree. Correlations between them set up (as we shall see) habits of thought with varying degrees of force; they also provide direction with respect to further intentions or relevant types of fulfillments for an object of that type. Believing as I do that mermaids do not exist I do not find myself highly motivated to seek them out; yet, in view of the qualities attributed to such an object, if mermaids did exist they would be the type of thing I could verify through a process involving, for example, visual perception rather than, e.g., introspection.

In terms of such an account, then, we can see how moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment must have greater motivational efficacy than mere moral thought. Its degree of strength, moreover, would depend upon the degree of fullness possible with respect to moral knowledge. Moral objectivities or states of affairs that present themselves as possibilities for fulfillment or actualization, there-fore, motivate to a much greater degree than those presented as impossible, unattainable or unfulfillable. Moral power, therefore, is grounded in the extent of one's moral vision. What one can or cannot do morally will depend on one's apprehension of the moral character of reality as a whole. The "powerlessness" ordinarily attributed to reason may, in terms of the elucidation provided, be attributed to a pervasive moral skepticism or ignorance which insinuates itself as a "hidden" intentional-motivational tendency in all our moral habits and actions precisely as Socrates and all the great philosophers maintained.

Section 1C: The Aim of This Chapter to Prove the Weaker Historical Thesis as an Aid in Proving the Thesis of the Practicality of Reason; the Steps to be Taken to Accomplish this End

An adequate proof of the thesis of the practicality of reason cannot be expected in a work of this length. Toward providing such a proof our goal has been to prove the weaker historical thesis that there is a way of understanding moral knowledge, in terms of Husserl's theory of the fulfillment of consciousness, which may serve to unify the main types of views that have been held with respect to this thesis. Hume and Kant as well as Price and the tradition may, in terms of such an account, reasonably be included among the adherents of the thesis of the practicality of reason. These views and Husserl's theory of fulfillment have already been elucidated at great length. Specifically, we have shown that the philosophical tradition concedes the truth of the thesis of the practicality of reason. We have also shown that the three main types of views held with respect to the thesis, i.e., the traditional or Pricean intuitionist, the Humean empiricist and the Kantian idealist, also concede its truth despite fundamental differences in their accounts of it. In Hume's case, the attribution of intentional features to passion allows for a reasonable interpretation of his view as at least consistent with, if not a concession to, a modified version of the thesis of the practicality of reason. In Kant's case, the explicit and repeated, although unclarified, appeal to moral experience and its power over action is also in accord with our claims. In either case, however, the ultimate appeal is made to "experience" or "intuition." This truly "empirical" appeal to authentic moral experience alone, we claimed, can effectively meet Hume's skeptical challenge. It alone can allow for moral facts themselves to constrain us in the manner in which Kant, for example, asserts they do. This appeal was made explicit in the case of the moral intuitionism of Richard Price. But, although we believe Price saw more deeply than both Hume and Kant the need for a rigorously clear account of intuition, he, too, lacked the wherewithal to provide an adequate account of intuition. We concluded, therefore, that all these views shared a common epistemological, as well as moral need, viz., an adequately clear account of intuitive fulfillment. This we attempted to meet in chapter four by presenting an exposition of Husserl's theory of intuition or intuitive fulfillment.

In a sense, therefore, everything discussed so far may be likened to the clearing of a field before erecting a building thereon. For, the aim of this chapter is to elucidate moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment as a foundation for the framing of a phenomenology of conscientious action which in turn will provide the structure necessary for a completed theory of the practicality of reason. To realize this aim in this chapter my intention will be, first of all, to provide an account of moral reason on the basis of Husserl's theory of the mental act. We shall show that all concede a common sense distinction between moral thought and knowledge. All do not, however, concede that there actually is moral knowledge. But we shall show that the philosophical basis of this denial is no different in principle than the completely general epistemological problem of providing an account of categorial or non-sensuous intuition. It is incumbent upon all, therefore, to show why the distinction holds in the non-moral, but not in the moral realm. This, we claim, cannot be done. But, turning to the elucidation of moral thought via Husserl's analysis of intentionality, we shall illuminate such thought as a reference to a non-natural or non-sensible consequential value attribute of various types of unities or wholes. This reference, we shall show, cannot be identified with, or reduced to, sensation.

We shall then fix our attention on moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment as that special type of thought or knowledge which, we claim, constrains moral action. Here our primary intent will be to show, via the examination of concrete cases, that moral thought also is subject to inadequate representations, which may be "filled" through an adequate intuitive process of fulfillment. The general three-fold distinction between empty, full and mixed intentions is found to be equally applicable to the moral domain. "Independent" or transcendent moral truth or states of affairs, therefore, may be grasped by the knowing mind in more or less adequate intuitive processes which import various aspects of the complex moral objectivity into the knowing act itself.

Following this, we shall attempt to provide a general account of moral action by distinguishing moral goodness or moral value "absolutely" or independently of our apprehensions of it and "relatively" or in terms of our conceptions of it. Our contention is that moral value presents itself as a quality particularly applicable to actions and motivations, yet it has clear application also to the material world, sentient life other than man and to reality itself. Moral value may, in view of this application, more clearly be seen to have a sense independent of a particular entity's capacity to apprehend it. But, in virtue of man's unique capacity to not merely think or conceive of, but to know this reality or truth, man can also know what it is that is of value above all things, i.e., that which is most desirable, beautiful, approvable, etc.. Surely this must constitute Man's own chief good. Such knowledge, however, especially with respect to the higher forms of good is not necessitated (as the ancients believed, lacking as they did the wherewithal for an account of a merely influencing versus necessitating causality), but functions merely as a possible end for thought and action. In view of the hierarchy of knowledge with respect to such higher order objects or ends, we can readily see how one's relative lack of clarity with respect to the moral character of reality as a whole can allow for a sense of goodness relative to one's past and present moral cognitions and actions.

In presenting this general elucidation of the field of moral action--even conscientious action--we hope to show how complex or heterogeneous the moral act presents itself to be. Such complexity need not lead to despair or skepticism with respect to the possibility of our coming to terms with it. It may, however, lead us to better appreciate the possibility that man's fundamental problem lies precisely in his ignorance of his true good. The special significance of such moral knowledge or wisdom lies in the fact that one's belief or apprehension with respect to what constitutes one's ultimate end or good determines all else that one can do. Whether or not one accurately apprehends the value of such ultimate ends they have a kind of presence in all of one's particular moral actions--even one's habitual actions--that constrains or limits thought and action accordingly. In view of this fact, we claim that individual and social ignorance of this highest good is, at bottom, the origin of man's weakness, powerlessness or inability to live a good life. In spite of this conviction, important as it clearly is, we claim that the elucidation of these higher forms of moral knowledge and action is not necessary to substantiate our weaker thesis. For, we claim that the constraining power of moral knowledge over action can be experienced and elucidated even on its simplest levels. Our intention, therefore, is to turn to the more specific elucidation of conscientious action. Even here, however, our elucidation will be confined to an examination of only certain aspects of this complex whole. Our hope is that the elucidation of this class of moral actions may provide the foundation for the elucidation of the power of reason over action on higher levels.

Toward this end we shall first distinguish the main aspects of any moral or conscientious action as such. Of these constituents we shall simply list and briefly comment on the following:

The Main Parts of Conscientious Action

- <a> moral thoughts or intentions
- <b> moral intuitions and more complex "acts" of moral know-ledge
- <c> moral strivings
- <d> moral motivations:
  - <i> irrational moral motivations
  - <ii> rational moral motivations
- <e> moral acts of will or volition (as a complex unity essentially involving all of the above)
- <f> external moral action (in the sense of a complex unity essentially involving all of the above with the addition of various psycho-physiological processes)
  - <i> the moral quality of this action (or the mere volitional complex) considered "relatively"
  - <ii> the moral quality of this action considered "absolutely"

Having isolated the sense of moral reason and action most relevant to our central claims we shall focus our attention on moral intentional-motivational structures as most essential for the elucidation of the constraint that reason imposes on conscientious moral action. To this end we shall distinguish and elucidate both irrational and rational moral motivations. We shall show that in either case such motivations essentially tend toward moral truth. This is so even in the case of evil or vicious motivations in view of the fact that the intuitive presence of moral truth tends to weaken and finally overcome the "power" of such illicit motivational tendencies. Goodness itself, therefore, may correctly be viewed as the ultimate ground or origin of the power of moral reason over action. In terms of this account, we hope to show how such moral thought and knowledge may plausibly be said to constrain--even in some cases compel--moral action. In closing we shall return to the consideration of more complex cases of moral action with some remarks on how they may, at least in principle, be resolved and how moral reason on higher levels may provide the key to good action and a good life.

Section 2: The Distinction Between Moral Thought and Knowledge

Section 2A: Introduction

That there is a common-sense distinction between moral thought and knowledge is, perhaps, as relatively uncontroversial as the distinction between thought and knowledge generally. One can think of a multitude of different types of moral states of affairs whether or not they are as we think them to be. Moral knowledge or perception, on the other hand, are generally regarded as types of consciousness that apprehend moral states of affairs as they really are. For example, there is a difference between the mere thought that a person is benevolent (or malevolent) and the actual apprehension that it is so. We may think of a fictitious character, e.g., Jonathan Smith, the angel in the television series Highway to Heaven, as being genuinely altruistic or benevolent despite the fact that no such person exists. Moral thought, therefore, has this capacity to be "of" or "about" a moral "object" or state of affairs without that object existing or having the moral qualities under which it is conceived. Moral knowledge or "intuition," on the other hand, presents itself as having a much closer relationship to existence and fact. If one knows that Stephen loved his Jewish brethren while they stoned him or that Hitler was the architect for the Nazi mass murder of millions, then it follows that these moral states of affairs are true.

It is true that we often have serious difficulty in determining whether or not we have moral knowledge in a particular case. We easily speak of people "having a conscience" by which we mean they have some "consciousness of right and wrong" or some awareness of a moral quality applicable to, e.g., one's motives and actions. We equally speak of people "lacking a conscience" by which we mean they lack such consciousness. The conscientious person appears to us morally sensitive or warm hearted, while the unconscientious person appears morally insensitive, cold or hard hearted--even, perhaps, morally dead. But despite such an apparently clear cut distinction, when we actually turn our attention to what is commonly taken for moral knowledge we seem too often confronted with mere opinion or convention, i.e., what we may with justification call a mere cultural or social morality, the farthest thing from what we seem to find in rational or scientific inquiry. When we turn our attention, by contrast, to especially extreme cases of alleged immoral or evil action there is a sense in which it seems inconceivable that the persons who do such acts can even think of them as evil much less know that they are. A man takes a small child and, holding her legs in his hands, smashes her brains out against a wall.[3] A woman "rips open pregnant women and devours the infants."4 Certainly moral ignorance seems applicable to such cases. But, if so, we may seem hard pressed to justify the contention that such acts are intentionally wrong or evil at all.

Despite the initial plausibility of the common-sense distinction between moral thought and knowledge, therefore, the consideration of such cases may make one suspicious with respect to whether one can draw a clear line between them. Such doubt may also increase when we discover that prevalent philosophical views also deny moral knowledge, although they do so on epistemological grounds. In either case, the crucial problem revolves around the fact that there is a clear sense in which there is a "concreteness" applicable to the presence of certain clearly existing objects or states of affairs that may often seem lacking in the moral case. Trees, musical tones, the scent of flowers, etc., are things we can see, hear, smell, etc.. But alleged moral "objects" are not things we can see, hear, smell, etc.. Hence, one is tempted to conclude that such things cannot be known or do not exist. From the standpoint of "empirical" evidence, moral "objects" may seem no different than any other class of fictitious objects, e.g., the Easter Bunny, Pinnochio, Santa Claus and the like. One argues that despite the fact we have strong feelings or sentiments with regard to these various objects, the issue of truth is irrelevant--there is no such independent existing state of affairs. There is only one's subjective or culturally relative emotions.

Despite this denial of moral truth and knowledge many--even of the most tenacious--empiricistic and materialistic philosophers resist this conclusion. It was resisted, we claimed, by Hume himself. But, why do such philosophers seem so compelled to resist the conclusion that moral "objects" or states of affairs are fictitious? If we are willing to give up Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny, why not morality as well? *We believe it is simply because such moral experiences present themselves to the most penetrating minds as veridical as anything else we can justly be said to know.* But even Hume concedes this. All concede the more general distinction between thought and knowledge, and all concede at least the appearance of the same distinction in the case of moral right and wrong. This is simply not the case with Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny and the like. The skeptical problem of whether we know in the moral realm, then, is no different on grounds of principle than the skeptical problem of whether we know on general epistemological grounds. It shares, therefore, the same absurdity.

In light of the foregoing, and especially in light of well conceded positivistic failures, one might think that doubt with respect to an independently existing moral state of affairs would be resisted. But this is not so. Instead we find, for example, in a most recent account, the curious phenomenon of a materialistic denial of the reality of independent moral truth together with an attempt to retain for it some genuine and enduring meaning or significance for human life. According to such a view morality is but a species of "matter in motion" or "fantastic perturbations of space-time."[5] But, it is one thing to legitimately speak of meaning in the merely intentional sense and quite another to speak of meaning in the context of human life where what is precisely at issue is whether or not meaning coincides with some real and enduring value to life and reality as a whole, hence to one's own life in relation to it. That is to say, what is at issue is precisely whether there is a value independent of our mere feelings or thoughts with respect to it. When men slaughter thousands of helpless children, we want to know whether such acts are truly evil, or more likely, whether there is truly some Good in reality that can be discerned despite such acts. How those who committed such acts happen to feel or think is, in a very real sense, irrelevant. Let these philosophers, therefore, make it clear that on their principles morality is without genuine ontological and epistemological, versus merely intentional, significance and these new forms of moral skepticism will, we believe, follow the way of the old.

No doubt the modern empiricist may reply that he does not deny the common-sense distinction between moral thought and knowledge, i.e., he does not deny--in some sense--moral truth. He concedes too that objects or actions initially present themselves to thought as if those actions them-selves had moral properties in much the same way as color initially presents itself as a quality in bodies them-selves. But, as in the case with color, he only denies that such an appearance has any basis in scientific fact, i.e., that there is any independently existing correlate of such thought other than one's sensations themselves.

If this is his view, it is still clearly incumbent upon him to provide an adequate account of this evident distinction between moral thought and knowledge and to clearly show why, or on what grounds, the general distinction between thought and knowledge (which admittedly is applicable to independently existing states of affairs) is inapplicable to the moral domain. Our claim is, and has been, that this simply cannot be done precisely because they rest on the same foundation. No clear, adequate or consistent account of thought and knowledge can maintain the reality of truth and knowledge and not maintain the reality of moral truth and knowledge. To accept so-called "empirical knowledge" and not accept "moral knowledge" is a mere prejudice. The choice, then, with respect to whether or not there is moral knowledge is clear: one must yield to extreme skepticism which denies the possibility of any knowledge (including even the knowledge claim that one cannot know); or one must concede the possibility of knowledge, and if consistent, the possibility of moral knowledge on the same foundation. What this suggests is that the crucial problem of the status of moral knowledge, just like the problem of the status of knowledge generally, is not essentially or in the first instance the problem of whether or not there is such knowledge, but the problem of verification. This is the problem of providing an adequate elucidation of the entities and processes involved in the moral "act" of knowledge. Hence, on the basis of Husserl's critique of such knowledge, we intend now to phenomenologically illuminate the moral act (state) of thought (i.e., moral intentionality) and the act (state) of moral knowledge.

<i> Moral Thought or Intentionality

We defined thought generally as a complex intentional state instancing referential properties or objective meanings (e.g., concepts and propositions) which refer to, or aim at, correlative parts and properties attributed to their objects. Moral thought, therefore, must be a complex intentional state having referential constituents, which refer to, or aim at, various types of distinctively moral objects or states of affairs, e.g., motives and actions, as having distinctively moral qualities without any assumption that those states of affairs exist or have such qualities.

To elucidate the distinctive character of such moral thought, and especially to distinguish it from sensuous thought, or the thought most closely associated with the apprehension of physical objects, let us begin by the examination of a concrete case. For, it is by appealing to such cases alone that we can bring the relevant concepts themselves before us to distinguish them. Let us, then, consider the case of the rape, mutilation and murder of a two year old child. A child is kidnaped from a swap meet when her parents are momentarily distracted by a sales-person. She is taken to a deserted shack in an isolated field where she is systematically tortured by driving spikes under her finger nails, slowly raped while being sexually mutilated and butchered over a period of several hours. All this while she is crying out in agony, "Daddy, mommy where are you? . . . help me . . . help me." Let us assume, further, that the person doing this act feels nothing at all or actually enjoys it. He even films it to sell to an underground film distributor for the entertainment of others.

It is our contention that such an action initially presents itself to an unbiased mind as having a certain moral value quality, whether or not that action has actually taken place and whether or not, therefore, it actually has such a property. The more detailed elucidation of the process by which we come to actually apprehend this moral quality will be provided when we turn to our discussion of moral knowledge. Here our aim will merely be to draw more general distinctions and comparisons in order to defer some more common misdescriptions of the phenomena as it is initially presented.

First, one must be wary of altering the presented circumstances and conditions, i.e., features or properties, of the case at hand. For in doing so one simply changes, by changing the properties, the essential nature of the facts themselves. In Hume's case, for example, when he "looked" (in his characteristically sensuous manner) at a concrete case of parricide (the murder of one's parent) he found no sensuous impression corresponding to the alleged "moral constituent" of the objectivity.6 He believed himself justified, therefore, in drawing a logical analogy between such a case and the case of a seedling uprooting, and thereby destroying, the tree from whence it came. But the mere fact that the objectivity in question is not apprehendable in the manner preferred by Hume does not imply that it does not exist or that it may not be presented in some other way. If we are to be truly empirical, we must initially fix our attention on "the facts themselves" as they are presented to us and not shift our reference before giving them a fair hearing. Parricide generally presents itself to unbiased minds as an immoral or vicious action, while the action of a seedling uprooting and destroying the tree from whence it came does not. They initially present themselves, therefore, under different determinations, hence as distinct in nature or essence. This Hume well knows since his aim is precisely to reduce the former (the apparent moral case) to the latter (the apparent non-moral case) by logical analogy, i.e., to reject the claim that moral qualities are inherent in the things themselves. But a similarity in some respect by no means constitutes an identity and, from our Husserlian standpoint, Hume's move amounts to the claim that there is no moral quality in the former case because we find none in the latter. If this is his argument, then one might equally be justified in claiming that there this is no "quality" of existence applicable to objects because we know of cases of "objects" which do not exist and thus lack this property.

Second, we must equally be wary of the temptation to construe the "abstraction" by which we bring the morally relevant aspects of the moral state of affairs before us as a separation of independently existing objects. That is, in the moral case we must not attempt to get rid of or to make disappear or non-existent the underlying concrete, physical or sensuously discerned aspects of the whole moral objectivity. As we saw earlier, this is what Frege apparently did in response to Husserl's analysis of the authentic presence of number. To "get rid of," for example, the physically relevant aspects of the rape, butchering and murder of the two-year old child and then to ask where the moral quality is, is not to make the moral quality "diaphanous," but to make it non-existent. For, in separating (as compared with distinguishing) the moral quality from the physically relevant constituents of the concrete act in which it is found embedded, we remove the underlying foundations upon which alone the "supervenient" moral quality can stand. It is like removing the foundation of a house and then asking where the house is. Let us not, then, shift or change the object of reference by an unjustified move from whole to part or an unjustified "abstraction" which consists in getting rid of constituents essential to moral action as a whole.

We must also be careful not to confound clear moral cases with unclear or borderline cases. That is, we must be on guard lest we fall into the logically fallacious Cartesian trap of concluding that we can never be certain of clear moral cases in view of other cases where we may be unclear. For example, in attempting to elucidate the concept of evil inherent in deceit we may appeal to clear cases where an individual lies "with malicious intent," e.g., in the case above let us assume the kidnaper tells the mother of the two year old child that he will let the child go if she agrees to meet with him alone. He has no intention, however, of releasing the child, but fully intends to abuse and kill them both. But when one attends to similar, yet unclear or borderline cases, one may be tempted to question one's ability to be certain of knowledge in any case. The "deceit" or "lie" of the homeowner hiding Jews from the Nazi's is a well known case.

Such cases allegedly function as counterexamples to claims of certainty. We are, allegedly, to conclude from our lack of clarity in the borderline case that we cannot know with certainty whether we have a lie in any case. Worse still, we are to conclude that there are no lies, but only subjective (or culturally relative) "attitudes," "feelings" or "emotions" that one may happen to have or take up in response to cases of "not telling the truth." If one, therefore, lacks the appropriate emotion (or if the society of which one is a part lacks the emotion), then there is no lie, i.e., no "truth of the matter" with respect to the essential moral character of lying. But, putting aside the plausible contention that mere "not telling the truth" is as much a lie as a seedling uprooting the tree from whence it came is a case of parricide, we have shown that such an inference is clearly invalid in general and so equally invalid in the moral case. It is logically analogous to the "proof" that one has no cheek or nose because it may be unclear where one ends and the other begins, or that there is no difference between men and women because there may be cases of hermaphrodites who are neither or both.

But, further, if one looks carefully at such borderline or unclear cases one can see that they often presuppose or are founded on relatively clear cases. At least this is so generally if not in every particular instance. For, it is relative clarity with respect to some cases which alone can raise doubt, and illuminate the cause for doubt, in the borderline ones. Clarity is even essential for clarity with respect to doubt itself. In the particular case of deceit, therefore, it is plausible that our confusion or unclarity in the borderline case is founded on our acquaintance with cases where lying or deception is clearly wrong. In this respect the moral case is no different from the non-moral case. We know more or less clearly what a man and woman is, hence when we are confronted with an hermaphrodite we are confused. But why should such confusion entail anything other than that we are justly unclear in this particular case what category to place such a person in. Such a person may not have the essence of femininity or masculinity but the essence of both. No doubt, it may also be true, as Socrates believed, that we are ignorant of the essence or distinctive character of objects generally, moral or otherwise. But this too does not imply that the object or the essential characteristics in question do not exist or that they cannot be, or are not, discerned. Doubt is only meaningful and understandable given a background of clear truth and loses its meaning or point to the degree that it lacks such a background. In the moral case, therefore, it is because we are aware of moral truth that doubt or confusion in unclear, vague or borderline moral cases has any meaning. It is for this reason that we attempted in the case above to provide a relatively explicit or clear case in which moral evil is exemplified. It is, no doubt, true, however, that even here there are those who may not even conceive of such a case as evil. The person committing the act, for example, may well be such a person.

If we reflect on the misdescriptions of the moral phenomena above, I think one can discern an underlying or foundational problem, which they share. This, I believe, is the completely general epistemological problem, which we found to lie at the heart of the possibility of knowledge itself, i.e., the problem of the non-sensuous or categorial intuition of ideal objects. For, it is undeniable that the moral quality allegedly inherent in various objects or states of affairs, does not present itself with any correlative or corresponding sensation or primary content. As Hume repeatedly pointed out, moral qualities are not, for example, sensuously seen, smelled, tasted, heard or felt. In the moral example presented above we can sensuously imagine the kidnaper and the little girl as well as the physically relevant actions or relations holding between them as we "see" the knife piercing her flesh, "hear" her cries for help, etc.. In such cases there is a certain directness, immediacy and concreteness that is quite familiar to us all. The persons stand before us, they block our vision, they are tangible. This is so even if the object or actions in question do not exist and are merely thought of or imagined. But this is not so in the moral case. When we attempt to "look," in this more immediate manner, for the evil in the actions of the man with respect to the little girl it, like thought generally, appears to vanish, disappear or become "diaphanous." This is so independently of the issue of whether the moral "object" is merely thought of or actually exists. It is precisely for this reason that we said that the thought and knowledge of such non-sensible objects was so problematic.

Yet, if we consider a clear moral case like the one above, the moral character of such states of affairs has a kind of presence which, we claim, can be made "visible," although not in the same sense or manner as the presence of physical objects. We cannot hope or reasonably expect to "see" right or wrong, good or evil in the same way we sensuously see or imagine the man and child. But nor could we reasonably expect to do this in the case of thought, number, existence, truth, the positivistic criterion of meaning, etc., etc.. A thought, for example, is not itself blood red, 6 feet tall, a high pitched screaming sound, etc., although it may refer to, or be of, something that has these qualities. But the mere fact that there is a real difference in the manner of presence of such objects by no means implies that they have no manner of presence at all or that thoughts of them can be reduced to thoughts of sensuously discerned objects (much less sensations themselves). Hence, the vivid conception or consciousness of the torture, rape, mutilation and murder of the two year old child brings with it, we contend, a vivid conception of a non-natural consequential moral quality of evil just as vividly, if not more so (although differently), than a vivid image of a man or tree.

The moral case, therefore, is no different from the standpoint of intentionality generally than any other non-sensuous apprehension of a non-sensible object or state of affairs. Moreover, such "categorial" apprehension, as we have seen, is essential for the knowledge of anything at all. Although the "empiricist" quite liberally uses such terms as "essence" or "nature" with respect to the alleged objects of sense perception, no such essences or natures are strictly given in direct, immediate or first order acts of sense perception. No one "sees" in this merely direct manner what thought is or even the nature of any of its objective correlates. What does a thought look like?, taste like?, smell like? What does even the generic sensuous quality, color, look like? Even some particular color, e.g., blueness, is not something we can "see" in its essence in immediate sense perception--this is especially apparent when we consider what all such instances or shades of blue share to qualify them as the same. What a book is, a linguistic type, a meaning, a law, a principle--even a sensation--becomes "diaphanous" when we attempt to gain authentic knowledge of them. If, therefore, knowledge is to be consistently reduced in the "empirical" manner to mere sense contents, we can "know" nothing at all.

The moral quality attributed to a concrete object or state of affairs, therefore, has a certain kind of presence distinct from the presence of the sensuously discerned elements in that whole. This does not imply, however, that the moral quality in such cases is, or is presented as, separable from them. That is, the moral quality of the action above is (in the case of mere thought, allegedly; and, in the case of genuine knowledge, actually) found present or embedded in the concrete whole moral state of affairs which, in this case, includes certain physical actions, e.g., the insertion of the spikes under the child's finger nails, etc.. More specifically, the moral intentional quality of the act of thought, i.e., the moral referential constituent instanced in the act of thought which refers to a corresponding moral quality attributed to the object of reference, is itself found embedded in lower order, direct or immediate acts which include references to certain physical parts and properties of the objectivity. The lower order acts, therefore, "found" the higher order act which apprehends the moral quality as in the concrete objectivity or state of affairs. The moral referential quality, therefore, is a distinct but inseparable element in the moral act of thought as a whole.

For a clear understanding of the nature of such moral thought we must be careful not to err with respect to the object of reference. Above all, we must be careful to avoid the empiricistic temptation to shift reference to sensation. In the apprehension of moral evil in this or any case we do not actually or essentially first focus on the physical objects or constituents of the act, e.g., the puncture of the child's skin by the knife, and then procede to perform some explicit act of new reference (or inference) to obtain the moral concept. There is in the moral case not two objects of reference but one, i.e., the whole moral action of the torture, rape, mutilation and murder of a two year old child which presents itself with a certain moral quality. There is, however, in this and all cases of thought or cognition, a distinction that can be drawn and elucidated with respect to the constituents of the intentional "acts" themselves as well as with respect to their objects. Above all, we can distinguish acts and objects of higher and lower order. In the elucidation of such distinct "contents" we must, of course, refer to those parts and properties as distinct objects of reference. But the elucidation of the contents of an act or an object of such an act is not the same thing as the act or objectivity themselves. In the case of moral belief or thought, therefore, we simply find that certain whole complex states of affairs present themselves as value laden and we can, if we choose, elucidate the nature of this value quality as presented by abstracting or extracting out from this whole the relevant moral parts, constituents or properties.

It is also crucial for us to observe that even in the case where the particular moral state of affairs essentially involves reference to some physical action or objects, there is absolutely no essential reference to sensation at all! There is no essential reference in the moral case even to physical objects much less sensations corresponding to such objects. For, we equally attribute moral qualities to psychical motives and acts of will or volition--not to mention truth or reality itself--which cannot by mere presumption, and without considerable argument, be essentially characterized as physical objects. But even in the case of reference to physical objects, e.g., the man, the child and the physical actions taking place between them, there is not, as we have seen, any essential reference to sensation. This would only be the case, for example, if we were to analyze certain constituents of the experiences of the persons referred to or ourselves. But even in the case of a reference to such experiences, i.e., the thoughts and feelings of the people involved, there is no essential reference to sensation. Intentions, motives (or desires) and acts of will are none of them sensations. Sensations, of course, are experienced but they are rarely if ever seen, perceived or made objective. Nor does it follow from the fact that they may be essential to thought generally and moral thought in particular that everything can be reduced or identified in the empiricistic manner to them.

<ii> The Act of Moral Knowledge

Having briefly considered the general nature of moral thought or belief we need now to turn to the elucidation of the nature and possibility of moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. Our contention is that one may have inadequate or relatively "empty" moral thoughts or intentions which can be "filled" through an appropriate process of fulfillment. But in order to show that this is the case as well as to elucidate the distinctive character of moral fulfillment and its correlative existing moral objectivity, let us begin by considering some concrete cases.

You are told by Mr. Cohen during a dinner party that someone you both know, Ms. Lilly, is a thief and a liar and you wonder whether or not it is so. Later that evening you notice Ms. Lilly conversing with Mr. Granet, a blind pianist, sitting at the piano. She asks him to play a tune for her and he does so. As all eyes are riveted on Mr. Granet, Ms. Lilly adeptly takes a small, but very expensive, museum quality Art Nouveau picture frame off the host's table and places it under her jacket. You, however, see her do this out of the corner of your eye. She then proceeds slowly, quietly, methodically--yet, in the most natural manner--to slip outside completely unnoticed by everyone but you. You look out the window and although it is dark you clearly see her hand the frame to a man who quickly disappears from view. She then returns to the party, unnoticed as before. She merges back in the crowd around Mr. Granet just in time to applaud him as he finishes his tune. Later, the host notices his frame missing. Mr. Cohen accuses Ms. Lilly on the basis of past experience. Ms. Lilly denies the allegation and in a very offended manner asks for proof. All claim that Ms. Lilly was present during the recital, nor did Mr. Cohen see Ms. Lilly take the frame or leave. He cannot, therefore, verify his allegation. You, however, can because you actually experienced the theft, as well as her lie or attempt to conceal it.

In this case, we claim that one can see that same structure of fulfillment that we found to be applicable to a great many other existing objectivities. One perceives, or has knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, that Ms. Lilly is a thief and a liar. But, the ad hoc character of such a case may help us to appreciate, by comparison, an authentic case of fulfillment, i.e., the case where existing moral objectivities themselves are "lived through" or actually experienced. Before undertaking our analysis of the nature of moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment let us, then, briefly turn our attention to another concrete case that we may all, perhaps, be familiar with, viz., the recent scandal involving Jim and Tammy Bakker.

It is plausible that prior to this scandal many supporters of Jim and Tammy Bakker thought of them under various moral determinations, e.g., they may well have thought of the Bakkers as people who would not use the money entrusted to them by their supporters for personal gain; nor would they be easily tempted, or yield to the temptation, of marital infidelity. More specifically, with respect to the former, they may have thought that the Bakkers were especially sensitive to the contributions by the poor for the poor--that this was money entrusted to them for feeding malnourished and starving children, providing clothes and shelter for the naked and homeless, providing basic medical care for the sick and suffering, education for the ignorant, the blind and deaf, etc.. With respect to the latter moral determination, these supporters may also have thought that the Bakkers were a model of Christian fidelity. To them this may have meant a mutual commitment or vow directed toward the formation of a bond or unity in which two persons become "one flesh," i.e., their personalities or psychical experiences become so engrafted to one another that there is a shared under-standing--a common vision of life and reality within the Christian schema. Within such a schema let us assume the Bakkers and their supporters mutually acknowledged the morality of an intimate and sexual unity and commitment that excluded other sexual partners. In short, it is plausible that many supporters of Jim and Tammy Bakker gave money to the P.T.L. ministry because they thought of the Bakkers as having such moral qualities.

Sooner or later, however, some of these supporters undoubtedly questioned whether or not the Bakkers had the moral qualities they had attributed to them. We, too, may have wondered whether the allegations against them were or were not true, just as we may have had similar doubts concerning Ronald Reagan's role in "Iran-gate." In view of recent testimony by others and by the Bakkers themselves it is plausible that this thought or belief was confirmed, realized or fulfilled while the earlier thought of their moral virtue was disconfirmed in a correlative experience of shock or frustration. Jim Bakker conceded his attempted liaison with Jessica Hahn, and he did not attempt in any way to deny that he himself believed (or "knew") it was wrong. He only attempted to mitigate his guilt by attempting to shift attention to his intentions, i.e., to certain marital problems allegedly attributed to his "whole hearted" or diligent devotion to his church. But neither did Jim or Tammy deny their illicit use of P.T.L. funds for personal use, e.g., the purchase of several private estates, frivolous shopping sprees--even thousands of dollars for central air-conditioning for their dog. It is true that when asked about their exorbitant personal use of funds earmarked for charity Jim Bakker appealed once again to good intentions, albeit involving an error in judgment in leaving such financial decisions or responsibilities to others. It is also true that when Tammy Bakker was asked about her exorbitant and frivolous use of P.T.L. funds for shopping sprees she likened it to a woman's "pet vice" of merely enjoying to shop. As she put it, "I do like to shop!" (with a smile and a girlish giggle). But in her case too there was no attempt made to deny the clear facts themselves.

With such cases in view, then, we may better see how moral thought may be subject to inadequate representations, which are "filled" through appropriate processes of fulfillment. All thoughts or intentions "point to," "aim at" or motivate a field of possible intentions, some of which constitute relevant procedures for confirmation or disconfirmation of an object of that type. But, unlike cases of non-existent objects, moral properties attributed to an object or state of affairs may be experientially found to be instanced therein. One comes to know, or experientially verify as actually the case, something one merely thought of before. In all such cases there is, therefore, a relation between relatively "empty" moral intentions or beliefs on the one hand, and correlatively "filled" moral intuitions on the other. In virtue of our detailed analysis of fulfillment above, it should be sufficient for us to merely summarize what this means.

First, the same object or state of affairs merely thought to have certain moral properties is the object or state of affairs found to have those properties. There is a synthesis of identification. The same person thought to be a thief and a liar was the person found to be so. The same persons thought to be maritally unfaithful and to have misused charitable funds, were found to be or to have done so. Second, in all such authentic moral cognitions or fulfillments there is a reflective, marginal or apperceptive grasp of the relation or advance holding between relatively empty thoughts or intentions and correlatively filled ones. There is, then, a synthesis of knowing (*erkennen*) which provides the foundation for the higher order moral perception of the objective moral qualities in the objectivities or states of affairs in question. Our thought of Ms. Lilly as a thief and a liar is characteristically different with respect to its epistemic essence prior to our actual observation of her theft and deceit. Yet, characteristic of fulfillment is the apperceptive experience or felt sense of these distinct intentions in relation. Finally, in order for us to have experienced genuine moral fulfillment one and the same person must have apperceptively experienced this sense of advance and must have done so with the goal or end of obtaining moral knowledge. In such a case this knowledge is not presented as necessitated or imposed but as a mere possibility for further thought and experience. The "matter" of the moral thought dictates relevant procedures for fulfillment or verification for an object of that type, but it does not necessitate that we undertake such a process. Nor do moral thoughts dictate procedures of sensuous confirmation as do thoughts of unicorns or mermaids. We cannot reasonably expect to "see" and, thereby, verify the existence of moral qualities by merely looking with our eyes.

In view of this last consideration in particular it should be apparent that the fulfillment with respect to moral objectivities is characteristically different from the fulfillment with respect to physical objects. In the latter case, we experience or apperceive in lower order acts of sensuous perception a certain increase in the fullness of the sensa or primary content's properties corresponding to similar properties in the existing objectivity. In the non-sensuous or moral case, however, the fullness feature supervenes on these lower order perceptions themselves. That is, the containment or instantiation of moral qualities or universals in particular complex wholes of various types is mirrored in the containment of a higher order moral "act" of fulfillment in its lower order acts of intuition. The first order or direct acts of sense perception, then, actually give something of the existing moral objectivity itself as a whole to the act of intuition which apprehends it. The real or first order aspects of the objectivity, however, (the various sensuously perceived physical correlates of the vicious acts in question) are not separated from the objectivities moral qualities. But the higher order moral "act" of fulfillment is also not separated from the real or first order cognitive acts on which it is founded. Hence, the "abstraction" of the higher order moral fulfilling act from its lower order contents or acts is an act which "lifts out" or presents to, (or, rather, in) a higher order fulfilling moral intuition the existing moral contents in the existing moral objectivity itself.

Section 3: Moral Knowledge and Moral Value

The discussion above seems sufficient for a general elucidation of the possibility and nature of moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment from the side of the act (state) of thought. We now need, however, to turn to the elucidation of the existing transcendent object of that knowledge in order to fully elucidate that act + existing object unity or relation. In other words, the elucidation of the "content" of the moral act of knowledge from the side of the "act" is an elucidation of its parts, i.e., the intentions and relations between intentions culminating in a higher order or crowning act of fulfillment. But knowledge is essentially a relation between such an act and the existing transcendent object of that act. Hence, an adequate account of moral knowledge will essentially involve an elucidation of the essence or nature of moral value as such.

To "extract" out the real or existing essence of moral value as such we must have presented to us concrete instances of actual or existing moral states of affairs. With such cases before us we must disregard everything in the concrete objectivity that is irrelevant to the acquisition of the authentic concept of morality or moral value as such. This, as we now know, does not mean that the contents disregarded cease to exist or are not experienced. They are merely pushed off into the periphery or margins of our consciousness so that other elements or features can become more centralized. In this case, since our goal is to acquire the authentic concept of moral value, we disregard all the more specific determinations of the concrete objectivities before us that present themselves as irrelevant to this end. We disregard, then, a multiplicity of objects, properties and relations which are, nonetheless, experienced. For example, in the case of Ms. Lilly's theft and deceit, we disregard the fact that Ms. Lilly has a prominent wart on her long nose, that Smith and Jones are also at the party, that the piano Mr. Granet is playing is out of tune, etc.. What initially resists such exclusion, however, is Ms. Lilly's nature or essence as a rational creature, her conscious and volitional states with respect to the moral action in question, the object stolen and the person stolen from, the people lied to and, above all, certain properties or relations of "fittingness" (appropriateness or rectitude) that present themselves as holding between these various entities and states of affairs in virtue of their natures. It is in conjunction with these existing objectivities, then, as a complex whole, that the characteristically moral quality is associated. Specifically, the moral quality presents itself as determinative of the "appropriateness" or "inappropriateness" of the function of these objects in relation. In this particular case it characterizes the inappropriateness of Ms. Lilly's acts in relation to those objects or states of affairs. In short, moral value initially presents itself as a non-sensuous and consequential or supervenient value quality of "actions."

This initial account may well appear disturbingly vague, but I believe it presents itself as being so primarily because of its heterogeneity or complexity. Moral value most commonly presents itself to us as a quality of actions, i.e., personal actions and especially, "conscientious actions"--actions grounded in our conceptions of right and wrong. But it is not as if this value quality presented itself independently of one's own cognitive condition in relation to other objects or states of affairs. Rather, the value quality seems to depend or supervene on an appropriate or inappropriate manner of unification or relation between distinct entities. Hence, when we look at, and attempt to abstract out the value character of concrete cases of conscientious or unconscientious action it is never sufficient to refer to the action as if it were completely independent or separable in existence and essence from the nature of the individual who acts and the nature of that which he is conscious of and acts in relation to. Whether we are considering relatively "simple" or straightforward cases of moral action, or more complex cases, the elucidation of the distinctively moral character of the actions proceeds by way of an elucidation of the natures of the entities involved.

In the moral controversy surrounding the issue of abortion, for example, we find the solution to that problem turning on the issue of the nature of personality and interpersonal relationships in conjunction with reality as a whole. For a determination of the moral status of abortion we want to know: what is a person? Is there any value or goodness pertainable to life or reality as a whole? If there is, wherein does it lie? What is the distinctive value of personality and how does its value differ from the value of other things? Specifically, what is the nature and value applicable or pertainable to the specific state of affairs involving a pregnant woman and a fetus in the present circumstances of our world?; in cases of conflict which "life" takes precedence?, etc.. But in view of such considerations, we believe the complexity of the moral phenomena is magnified even further. For, moral value presents itself as by no means restricted to the sphere of conscientious or even personal action, but as a value quality supervenient upon everything there is in all the complexity of their relations.

To clarify this point, and thus eventually to clarify, above all, moral value as it pertains specifically to conscientious and unconscientious action, let us briefly consider the distinction between good and evil value qualities as they present themselves to us in various types of existing objectivities or states of affairs. First, if moral value is a supervenient quality of existing objectivities of all kinds, what constitutes the specifically good and evil characteristics of these objectivities? We contend that Goodness presents itself as just that quality which supervenes on the "essence" of things, i.e., the unifying feature or principle of unity (order, harmony, law) applicable to objectivities of all types, hence to objectivities in all their myriad relations to each other.

In other words, it presents itself as a quality applicable to reality itself as a whole, and all the things that are--as that principle which governs their natures and their various interrelations with other things. For there to be anything at all it is necessary for there to be unity, i.e., distinct things in relation. For those things to hold together in those relations, or to retain that unity or identity while undergoing change, these distinct entities must retain their own essence or individuality and function according to Law, i.e., the laws of unity, harmony or order for things of that type. If any of these things, however, violate this Law or its more specific determinations, or if any of these objectivities is itself violated by other things, there will be "discord," i.e., a lack of order or harmony. The object will not, in such cases, function in accordance with the "goodness," law or "end" of its nature. It will not function "rightly." Evil, then, presents itself as a moral quality of an object when in such a state or condition of discord or disorganization. In such a case an object may function contrary to its good or end, i.e., contrary to both the particular order or law applicable to its nature as well as to Law or Order generally. In more common sense terms, the evil actions of such an object are harmful to that object and tend toward discord, disorganization and destruction.

In terms of this general elucidation of good and evil we may readily see that everything has a value. Even purely material objects have a unity or nature which governs them, without which they would simply fall apart. Modern physics eschews the old atomistic view of material reality as particles jammed together or separable from each other without relations in favor of energy or waves which bind things together into unities.[7] Such unity or order has always been a source of astonishment for every reflective or rational creature when one has looked, for example, at the stars above on a clear night. It does not follow from this, however, that all things are presented with the same value. Inorganic matter is generally regarded as of less value than the apparent preciousness of all life. And sentient life, especially personal life and action, is generally regarded as of value above all else.

As we turn to the more specific analysis of the moral value applicable to action, these general considerations may make us more receptive to the possibility of a sense of moral value applicable to actions independent not only of one's intentions or consciousness of it, but independent of personality altogether. We often speak, for example, both with respect to inorganic objects and with respect to organic but non-personal life forms, of their actions having a certain moral value. Smog causes emphysema and sometimes, as a result, premature death; many bacteria's and viruses, e.g., A.I.D.S., rabies, polio, smallpox, bubonic plague, etc., prematurely kill both animals and people. A dog may eat its puppies or turn on a child or its master and kill them. In such cases we speak of these actions as evil or wrong in contrast to action or behavior we believe is right or fitting. The assumption, then, is that the entities in question have a certain nature which determines how they "ought" to act regardless of whether or not they have the capacity to apprehend or comprehend such rectitude. In other words, such entities present themselves as having a certain "appropriate" function, and, in the case of organic life, a "tendency" toward "goodness," and when this is violated we sense that something is wrong, out of place, inappropriate, unfitting.

The empiricist may quickly judge that in such cases we are "projecting" on animate and inanimate things our own moral feelings, sensations and conceptions. We give them properties they do not, the empiricist claims, possess. In support of this claim he may point out that we often attribute to animals the same moral experiences, "feelings" or conceptions as ourselves. We say that our pet dog is lonely, sad, moody, frustrated, etc.. But, although it is undeniable that we too often falsely attribute properties to things which do not have them, it simply does not follow from the fact that we sometimes falsely project qualities on things that do not possess them, that there are no cases in which objects may present themselves with the qualities they actually do possess. This is no exception in the moral realm. The empiricist concedes the general distinction between thought and knowledge and he concedes the appearance of the distinction in the moral realm. The question, once again, is whether he can consistently maintain the one and not the other.

To return to our consideration of moral action independently of personality, the possibility of such moral value independent of consciousness does not exclude the possibility of its ultimate "origin" in intentional or conscientious action. As we shall see in more detail shortly, intentional wrong doing, for example, might result in unintentional and relatively irrational immoral habits; such habits might become socialized or deeply embedded in the fabric of social systems far beyond or below the explicitly intentional level, and such intentional acts may lead to devastating and lasting effects in the apparently non-personal material world. This seems clearly the case with smog, the pollution and destruction of our oceans and marine life, the deteriorization of the ozone layer, nuclear fall out, etc..

Whether or not the considerations above, with respect to the possibility of a moral value applicable to objects and actions independent of personality, are true, we claim there is a recognizable distinction to be drawn between personal moral action independent of one's intentions and relative to them. If moral value is a consequential or supervenient quality applicable to reality itself as well as to all the things that are, we might more readily see how such a value quality would also be attributable to rational creatures in their myriad relations to that reality. If so, we might conceive, on the one hand, of an ultimate or absolute Value of Reality that in virtue of our capacity as rational creatures may, in principle at least, be made an ultimate end of action. That is, what has been called a "spiritual vocation for Man"--truth concerning how Man "ought" to live in relation to his world or reality as a whole--independent of the contingent cultural or social circumstances in which he finds himself. On the other hand, we might conceive of a more relative or contingent value for man rooted in his actual moral condition at a certain period of his development, especially with respect to his actual cognitive state with respect to more or less proximate or ultimate moral ends. That is, given that value qualities are relative to the natures of things, we can see how there might be a relative sense or meaning of rectitude as we shift the "object" of reference or as the same object falls under different determinations. If such a claim was adequately elucidated, it would show, we believe, that there is no essential conflict between "goods" and that the apprehension of such conflict is due to simple confusion or error with respect to the nature of the objects in relation.

But regardless of the status of moral value outside of the personal domain, that there is a general distinction to be drawn between rectitude "independent" of thought and rectitude relative thereto is clearly intuitively verifiable when we consider familiar cases of personal moral action. In our earlier discussion I mentioned a concrete case where I acted wrongly in taking a bird away from its environment, although with good intentions. Other examples, too, were cited. One acts rightly in feeding the hungry, whether or not one's motives or intentions are good or ill. A child acts wrongly, although unintentionally, when he blows his brother's head off with his father's gun, believing it is just a toy. Reagan confesses to wrong doing in his dealings with Iran, although he claims he did so with good intentions. Jim Bakker confesses to wrong doing with respect to sexual infidelity and his personal misuse of charitable funds, although he, too, attempts to mitigate his guilt by an appeal to good motives or intentions. In multitudes of cases with which we are all familiar, there is a common-sense distinction to be drawn with respect to the moral quality of an action independent of or relative to one's intentions. On the one hand we speak of the rectitude of the action as a quality supervenient on the entities and relations in question independent of one's conception of it. On the other hand, we speak of a value quality attributable to one's action given one's cognitive condition, i.e., one's conceptions and volitions with respect to one's beliefs about the rectitude of one's action.

These two distinct senses of good or right, however, may either conflict or coincide. The possibility of conflict may help to explain the perfectly reasonable and consistent sense in which goodness or rectitude may be applicable to the action even of an evil man. With respect to the next "possible" step he can take toward good, his action may be judged evil "absolutely" or independently of his intentions, yet good from the standpoint of what he can do at the present time. To deny one's self an extra swig of wine may be all an alcoholic can do on some particular occasion or set of circumstances. In religious discussions, too, one hears of different religious "dispensations." The assumption is that there is a different sense of rectitude applicable to different religions and to people under different conditions of ethico-religious knowledge. When Christ, for example, was confronted with an apparent ethico-religious dilemma concerning the rectitude or evil of divorce, he seems to have appealed to just such a distinction.

Under the Mosaic dispensation (i.e., condition of moral knowledge) it may well have been the case that only by socialized or "legalized divorce" could one refrain from killing a wife one no longer wanted. Conventions of the time, apparently, made it quite acceptable and/or relatively easy to murder a wife that was undesired. Divorce, therefore, may well have been a "good" option or action given the present moral belief system. This does not imply, however, that divorce--apprehended from an "absolute" standpoint, i.e., from the standpoint of the essence or nature of rational creatures in conjunction with their ideal end, is good. As Christ put it, "It was because your hearts were hard that Moses wrote you this law."8 The apparent inconsistency, therefore, is resolved when we observe the shift of reference or shift of intentional object from a relative to absolute good.

The possibility of authentic intuitive moral knowledge also allows for the possibility that the two senses of good or right may coincide. In such a case, not only is one's action right in the sense that one acts on the basis of one's belief or conception of rectitude (ala Kant), but one may actually know an action is right independently of that belief. One's action, then, is right both intentionally, or relatively to one's conception and volition, and absolutely or independently of that conception and volition. We ought to feed the destitute child and we know that we ought to. We ought to honor the truth in our thoughts and actions rather than lie or deceive and we know that we ought to, etc..

We believe that this distinction between absolute and relative rectitude is essential for an adequate elucidation of moral thought or belief and the rectitude associated therewith. As we saw in our discussion of Kant, if we cannot have non-sensuous knowledge of moral states of affairs independent of our conceptions, then surely we cannot hope to have non-sensuous knowledge of such states of affairs dependent on, or relative to, our conceptions. For, in either case, the issue revolves around non-sensuous cognitions of non-sensible existing objectivities or states of affairs. More specifically, without an elucidation of the distinction between absolute and relative virtue, and without an adequate appreciation of the character of moral knowledge as subject to a process of fulfillment (of shorter or longer duration), we would lack the wherewithal for the understanding that the power of moral knowledge is equally absolute and relative. Absolute moral knowledge, i.e., where there is *Evidenz* with respect to the moral character of reality itself and our place, as rational creatures in it, would bring, we believe, absolute power to act in accordance with it. But given both our relative ignorance of the moral character of reality, and the likelihood of a present state of moral corruption or dysfunction with respect to it, this knowledge and its associated power may be considered relative. The attainment of moral knowledge, therefore, is not a matter of merely "seeing," in some more or less vague sort of way, a simple or formal moral quality in concrete actions as if restricted to them alone. Rather, it is a matter of gaining an ever broader vision of moral truth or a fuller apprehension of reality and our place in it. It is, therefore, as extensive or seemingly infinite as reality itself.

In view of this discussion above we may see, perhaps, that even in cases where one acts wrongly from an absolute standpoint, yet rightly from a conscientious standpoint, there is inherent in that act (in the form of an irrational motivational tendency) a form of openness or yielding to truth, order, or rectitude which in tendency forms the foundation for moral knowledge on lower and higher levels. This point cannot be overemphasized. For here we have Price's insistence that we should act on the basis of what seems to us good, even if we may be wrong. Here we have that Augustinian "faith" or openness to the goodness of reality which does not consist in an empty or presumptuous claim of knowledge, but in precisely that openness that allows knowledge to be received. Here we have Socrates' optimism despite his confession of ignorance. Here we have that openness of the child to see. It is on this foundation of truly conscientious action, then, that we claim moral insight itself ultimately rests and the power of that insight is relative to its relative degree of fulfillment.

But, then, it should be equally clear that as a result of unconscientious action not only does one turn away from the presence of moral order or law, but one forms as a result an irrational motivational tendency toward disorder. This evil irrational tendency retains its presence and tendency in the soul or within one's life stream regardless of anything one can alone do to remove it. It amounts to a suspiciousness or mistrust of Law, Order or the Goodness of reality and it forms a foundation for greater ignorance and the consequential weakness or lack of power to act well associated therewith. We believe, that such an account, if adequately developed, would fully elucidate and vindicate the thesis of the practicality of reason. It would show how one could have a vague sense of rectitude and lose it through a process of evil action. It would show how one might become so unconscionable that one could do the kinds of malicious and malevolent deeds that some of us actually can and have done. It would show, too, how one could have a vague glimpse of rectitude and still lack the power to act in accordance with it, i.e., how one can in such cases still lack the power essentially tied to a clearer or more vivid apprehension of rectitude not immediately accessible to experience. But, it would show, above all, the detailed nature of that Good, the knowledge of which brings true fulfillment and the power to act in freedom without the fear rooted in the apprehension of living in opposition to the eternal moral law.

No wonder, then, that moral issues have resisted easy solution and have always been of principal concern to philosophers of all ages. For, they are as complex and profound as our knowledge of reality itself. The elucidation of all the dimensions of the highly complex problem of the practicality of reason or moral action in all its complexity, therefore, is clearly not a possible undertaking for us here. But fortunately this is not necessary to substantiate our most fundamental claims. For, we claim that moral knowledge constrains moral action even on the simplest levels of moral knowledge and action. It was, however, of considerable importance for us to tie these more complex issues into our discussion. For, the great burden that weighs us down and makes us feel so powerless is indeed our own wrongdoing and is indeed powerlessness, i.e., a weakness or inability to do good on higher levels of action. We simply find we cannot just get up and do or be "good." We cannot just get up one day and have the character of a truly good or holy person. To become truly good requires a process: an ever growing intuitive knowledge of the moral character of reality which essentially involves fulfillment. Hence, if one wishes to become good one must come to recognize that such a process is essential and so one must subject one's self to the authority of its law.

One might do well to compare this general view or picture of the moral problem with the picture offered by Hume. For Hume seems to have been driven, as so many philosophers have, by the desire for simplicity--to find the philosophical key to unlock the door to all knowledge and all moral knowledge in particular. It is apparent, however, that this complexity is so great that we can barely expect to approach its resolution. Toward doing so, however, let us now turn to the more detailed examination of conscientious action as a step in helping us to more clearly elucidate the fundamental constituents of the particular unity that constitutes reason's constraint over moral action.

Section 4: Conscientious Action

Conscientious action, we said, presents itself as moral action grounded on one's conception of the rectitude of an action whether or not the action actually has that quality; hence, whether or not the action is actually right or wrong. In such cases, therefore, we distinguish the value quality of the action as conscientious from the value quality attributable to the action independent of thought. But even with respect to conscientious action itself, i.e., with respect to its parts or constituents, there are distinctions that can and must be drawn with respect to the value character of the "action." We commonly speak, for example, of one having good or bad "motives" and "volitions" as well as "actions" when we speak of conscientious action. In order, therefore, to adequately elucidate such conscientious action as a whole we shall need to consider the nature and role of some of its main constituents. We cannot take the time, however, to provide a detailed elucidation of all these constituents and their various interrelations. Nor do we think that this is necessary to substantiate our main claims. A brief discussion of such constituents, however, may well provide some degree of clarity and orientation for our subsequent, more detailed analysis of those constituents most relevant to the elucidation of the constraint of reason over action.

First, in all conscientious action there is, of course, some "consciousness of right or wrong" with respect to some motive or action directed on more or less proximate or ultimate ends. This means, as we have seen, that we can have moral "thoughts" or intentions of some action as having distinctively moral properties whether or not it actually has them and whether or not, therefore, it actually exists. But, as have also seen, we may also have more or less pure, empty or mixed moral intuitions with respect to the moral quality of an action. That is, we may have intuitive moral knowledge or moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment. This is the case where an existing moral objectivity imports something of its real nature into the higher order mental "act" (or state) which apprehends it.

As we indicated earlier, the intentions or thoughts experienced (not, however, necessarily made objective) with respect to a particular moral state of affairs will elicit certain types of moral motivations. As we shall see in detail shortly, these motivations may be more or less present or objective, hence rational or irrational. Irrational moral motivations may most generally be construed as non-rational, spontaneous moral habits or customs, i.e., moral tendencies to act, feel or think as a result of rooted "associations between ideas." This, we believe, is the aspect of conscientious action that Hume, for example, had especially in mind in his analysis of moral action. But, as a result of the grounding of these irrational habits in mere thought or intentionality, as well as in contingent relations between such thoughts or intentions, these motivations may or may not coincide with moral truth. Rational moral motivations, therefore, enter in as indispensable for the grounding of irrational moral motivations in truth. That is, rational moral motivations may be most generally distinguished from irrational moral motivations in terms of the explicit presence of an intentional or actual moral object, which is present in the rational case and lacking in the irrational case. Whether the motivations themselves, however, are rational or irrational, the fact that they move or incline us (as we shall see) toward good or evil action makes them also capable of having a certain moral quality.

In addition to such moral motivations, we believe there is, in all conscientious action, an act of will which also has its own distinctive value quality. This act of will may be generally described as an explicit and "centrifugal" action or causal force of the ego, as compared with the "centripetal" force of moral motivations acting "inwardly" on the ego. The force of moral motivations acting on the ego demands a decision and the action of will taken in response is, we contend, a unique causal contribution by the agent distinct but inseparable from those aspects of conscientious action mentioned above. The moral act of will, therefore, is to be analyzed as a complex whole essentially constituted by an act or "mental stroke" of the ego on the basis of various moral intentions, intuitions and motivations. Surely we can see how this act of will might be considered a moral act in its own right, i.e., have a certain moral quality independent of the action that may or may not result from it. As we saw in our discussion of Augustine, for example, the mind or ego may command the body to act and yet the body may resist the command or not be able to act in accordance with it. Even in the familiar non-moral case of phantom limb experiences one may command one's leg to rise when, unknowingly, the leg has been cut off.

Having a will and exercising it--especially in the case of the will to moral fulfillment--are very different things. The latter, we contend, is absolutely indispensable for the higher order moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment, which constrains--even compels--good action and life in the fullest and most meaningful sense. For this reason we must not fail to comment on its role and impor-tance in our discussion. But it should not be forgotten that the detailed analysis of either Will or its role in moral fulfillment is not essential to our most fundamental claims concerning the thesis of the practicality of reason. For, we contend, that intuitive moral knowledge constrains action even in the case where it is involuntarily acquired. Hence, when we speak of moral reason constraining "action" it does not matter for our concerns whether we mean by this a centripetal force on the ego (or Will) to act, or a force that bypasses the ego (or Will) so that the moral thought or intention itself places a constraint on the externalized moral action. If so, we may roughly define conscientious action as action done in conformity with our consciousness of rectitude, while we may define unconscientious action as action done in opposition to our conception of rectitude.

But, finally, as a result of this willful action of the ego, as well as various physical processes going on in the agent himself, we generally (but not necessarily) have an externalized or manifested moral action which is a complex whole consisting of all those elements above. It, too, of course, has a value quality. In fact, in virtue of our discussion so far, it should be clear that it has both a relative and absolute value quality. But, before turning to the more detailed analysis of those constituents of conscientious action above that are most relevant to our central claims, we hope to provide some additional clarity of the distinct nature and role of each of these constituents of conscientious action by briefly examining some of their general interrelationships in the broad field of conscientious and unconscientious action. Let us first consider cases where one merely believes an act is right and then consider some cases where one knows an act is right.

One may believe an act is right which is not right and be willing to act on the basis of that belief. In this case we act on the basis of good intentions while our act is nonetheless wrong. We may also speak of such action as action according to one's "principles" or one's conception of rectitude. This, no doubt, brings Kant to mind. We have, however, presented numerous cases of this kind to illuminate this sense of "conscientious action." But, one may equally well believe an act is right which is not right and will not to act in accordance with that belief. One may, for example, believe that one should quit one's job, leave one's home and family and go off and become a monk. Yet, one may be in error about this belief. Overcome by a guilty conscience and false views of God and the moral life, the individual may really believe that only by such "self sacrifice" can he hope to purge his soul of sin. But the individual keeps his job, his home and family because he is unwilling to endure the sacrifice. He dares not risk the criticism or condemnation of others that he believes would result if he quit his job; and, he dares not risk the comfort, security and love associated with his home and family. As will become more apparent later on, such cases are undoubtedly considerably complex. For, there are in such cases a number of thoughts and motives experienced with respect to the complex moral decision at hand, many of which lie deeply "hidden" from the agent himself. His "guts," therefore, may motivate him to keep his job, home and family while his "thoughts" tell him otherwise. But, third, one may believe an act is right when the act is truly right and either willfully act in conformity with that belief, or willfully act against it. In either case, however, it may be apparent that here, too, the cases will invariably be highly complex in view of the presence of numerous irrational as well as rational motivations. For example, in the willful case, one's action may be in conformity with one's moral convictions and with moral truth; yet still not be moral action on the basis of of such conviction or truth. One gives money to feed the poor in the conviction that this is right (and it is right), yet one does so primarily because one wishes to gain a philanthropic reputation or to gain financial support from some charitable organization.

With respect to some cases involving knowledge of the moral quality of an action, one may, first of all, know an act is right which entails that it is right and be willing to act in accordance with that knowledge. This is the case of authentic conscientiousness with respect to moral action. Here too, however, we may distinguish: first, the case of knowledge in the sense of a mere knowing that some moral state of affairs obtains and the case where one actually has the moral state of affairs authentically present. In the latter case, we may also distinguish the relative degree of fullness one may have with respect to the moral quality of the action in conjunction with one's knowledge of the moral character of reality as a whole. We shall examine this case in more detail shortly. For now, however, it may be helpful to point out that it may well be possible for one to intuitively know that an act is wrong and still do it, or intuitively know that an act is right and still be unable to do it. This is because mere intuitive knowledge does not entail either that one has undertaken a process of fulfillment in which the moral objectivity itself is brought before one, or that one has not sufficiently attained fulfillment in relation to the moral character of reality as a whole. One may have sufficient moral insight and correlative power to refrain from gross deceit, but lack sufficient insight and power to refrain from its subtler forms.

But the crucial question is, whether it is possible for a truly evil action to be present more or less fully (i.e., intuitively) and one still do it; or, correlatively, whether it is possible for a truly good action to be more or less fully present and one act against it. Is it possible, for example, for one to commit adultery while at the same time clearly or vividly thinking of the harm and pain such an act might cause one's wife, one's children and one's self both immediately and in the long run? We think it is not, and our justification proceeds by way of our analysis of moral knowledge as subject to a process of fulfillment of greater and lesser proximity or complexity. In terms of such an account, we can see how one might see something of an existing moral state of affairs and be constrained to act accordingly; yet one might still lack sufficient moral vision or clarity for a sufficiently powerful impetus to act. More specifically, in view of such a process of fulfillment (as well as its correlative process of frustration or failure), it may be apparent that distinctions with respect to conscientious and unconscientious actions may involve more deeply rooted structures than on the level of mere isolated moral actions. Consider, for example, the case of what we may call a good conscience in contrast to a sick one. In the former case, we have a moral capacity or moral consciousness that is reliable or trustable both with respect to moral decision making and with respect to more spontaneous moral actions. In judging of moral conflicts one can see moral distinctions with sufficient clarity to act rightly in accordance with reason and, in the relative spontaneity of action where one's character, rather than one's insight, determines conduct, one also can rest assured that one will act rightly. In the case of a sick conscience, however, one's moral conscious-ness is unreliable or not trustable with respect to both deliberative and spontaneous action. One's capacity to perceive moral distinctions is so impaired that one cannot trust or rely on one's own judgment. One finds, for example, in cases of moral conflict that one generally or frequently judges incorrectly. Hence, one can place no trust in one's moral thoughts; nor, consequently, can one perform the appropriate act of will. But nor can one rely on one's spontaneous actions to help him, since here too one acts wrongly independent of evil intention and volition. In terms of such an account one may, perhaps, see how one might become, through a process of moral degeneration, so insensitive or blind to moral distinctions that one may be oblivious to the true condition of one's soul, believe one is good when one is evil, or even take a positive satisfaction in the abuse of others including one's self. But let us now turn to the elucidation of those aspects of the conscientious act most relevant to the constraint of reason over moral action.

Section 5: Moral Motivation & the Elucidation of the Constraint of Moral "Knowledge" on Action

Section 5A: Aim of This Section

Our intention now is to focus attention on the motivational connections holding between various types of moral intentions as most essential for the elucidation of moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment and its constraint on moral action. We hope to show that even moral thought may plausibly be said to constrain, although moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment does so in a way mere moral thought does not. We said that one of the central problems with this claim has to do with confusion with respect to more complex cases of moral knowledge, power and action, i.e., cases where one's action seems determined by highly complex moral states. Our hope, therefore, is to provide an elucidation of a relatively simple structure inherent in all such cases where reason constrains moral action. We believe that on the basis of such an elucidation we shall have all that is necessary in principle to resolve some of the more complex cases. Our hope, in other words, is to present an adequate foundation for the elucidation of a genuinely "possible" form of moral knowledge that might truly be said to determine one's life for good, i.e., to give one all the power necessary to actually live a good life.

Section 5B: The General Nature of Moral Motivation

From our account of moral thought and knowledge above, as well as our general account of motivation, it should be clear that moral motivations are the tendencies of moral intentions to pass over into correlative moral intentions and especially intuitions, some of which may constitute possible processes of fulfillment. More specifically, the matter of the act, which corresponds to the intentional object (and, in some cases, the actual object) of the act as it is presented, "points to" a field or horizon of other moral intentions, actual and possible, with varying degrees of force. The force or motivational tendency itself is essentially a tendency directed toward truth or fulfillment. That is, the "strength" of the motivational tendency associated with intuitions, or objects as susceptible to fulfillment, is greater than the strength, force, or motivational tendency associated with relatively empty intentions which present their objects as unfulfillable. What this amounts to is that the same epistemologically relevant features that have a bearing on the certification of know-ledge and existence have a bearing on the constraint of reason on action.[9]

This latter claim, however, asserts little more than Hume himself would concede--at least in principle, since he greatly restricts the range of particular objects known. As we observed in our earlier study, Hume claims: "it is not in our power . . . to voluntarily annex this particular idea [of existence] to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases."[10] This act of mind [belief] "gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination."[11] "It gives them more weight and influence . . . and renders them the governing principle of our actions."[12] He concedes, in short, that knowledge (in the sense of "acquaintance"), or belief generally, has more power over action than any mere thought or fiction. But when he turns to the analysis of distinctively moral apprehensions, he also concedes that if we "bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons . . . our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments."[13] In fact, he claims that such moral apprehensions have the "strongest" influence over us and over all other passions. But given these concessions, and given our account of moral thought (belief) and knowledge above, we must ask: *what possible grounds can Hume have for rejecting moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment and its power over moral action?* We believe if this point were sufficiently developed and made explicit the empiricistic opposition to the thesis of the practicality of reason would be effectively neutralized.

Section 5C: The General Distinction Between Rational and Irrational Moral Motivations and the More Exact Elucidation of Rational Moral Motivations

Earlier, we distinguished two main forms of motivation, viz., rational and irrational motivations. We mentioned that this distinction was equally applicable in the moral domain and of considerable significance for our elucidation of the power of reason over moral action. Most generally, we described rational moral motivations as motivations elicited by the explicit intentional apprehension of an object as having moral properties whether it has them or not. Irrational moral motivations, on the other hand, are cases where moral intentions are experienced, but they are not noticed, made objective or perceived. These intentions as well as their correlative motivations, therefore, are "hidden" or unconscious. A more exact elucidation of these two types of motivation is requisite to support our most fundamental claims. It is to this, therefore, that we must now turn.

In light of our earlier account of rational motivations generally, we distinguished two forms of rational motivations. We may, therefore, justifiably draw that distinction in the moral realm. On one hand, we have moral motivations which are grounded in an explicit yet merely intentional or conceptual apprehension of an object as having certain moral properties. On the other hand, we have moral motivations grounded in an explicit intuition of some moral object or state of affairs which may in turn serve as an underlying or foundational constituent in more complex acts or states of moral knowledge and action. With respect to the former, let us consider first of all, cases where moral action proceeds on the basis of such explicit moral beliefs. One may certainly believe that some action is right and act on the basis of that conviction. But since one merely believes this to be the case one may well be wrong. In such cases one conceives of an object or state of affairs as having certain properties that it may not have. Saul of Tarsus, presumably, persecuted the early Christians in the sincere but erroneous belief that they were evil or had done various evil deeds. A politician may sincerely but erroneously believe that nuclear "war" is a necessary means to a good end. A leader for the "moral majority" may sincerely but erroneously believe that sexual intercourse in any context outside of marriage is evil, etc.. In the realization of action in accordance with such beliefs or conceptions, therefore, a field of intentions will be called forth or centralized which cognitively function as means toward the realization of the end in question. In such cases there also will be correlated with one's original moral belief a field of intentions and intuitions more or less clearly or vaguely pointed to with respect to possible fulfillments or intuitive verifications of that moral conception. One is, however, by no means necessitated to verify or fulfill one's moral belief prior to action. Hence, the fact that one's original moral intention or belief is relatively, perhaps even wholly empty, allows for the possibility of moral (or immoral) action which is good or "conscientious" relative to that intention or belief yet evil considered independently of such intentionality and volition. We have, in short, evil action with "good intentions."

Whether the case at issue seems especially malevolent as in the case of a Manson, Jones or Hitler, or whether it seems innocuous in comparison as in the case, perhaps, of a Reagan, Bakker or Oli North, they may all share this common characteristic of being "certain" or "convinced" of their moral beliefs and in that conviction give their whole heart to a cause which may nonetheless be evil. They are convinced, yet blind, to the moral character of their acts. A man's children are ignored because their father believes he must give himself to a "higher calling." Another's child is thought to be "a bad seed" and so burned at the stake as a witch to save others. A black or Jewish child is destroyed in the conviction that they contain "evil genes," i.e., biological or genetic defects destructive to the human race. In view of such cases the saying that "hell is paved with good intentions" rings true.

With respect to such rational, yet merely intentional motivations, one may also "act" in the sense of first drawing moral conclusions from one's original moral intentions taken as premises and acting on the basis thereof. We have here the quite familiar pattern, in the non-moral case, of the scientist or logician explicitly asserting certain premises as "givens" in order to evaluate the various resulting permutations or conclusions with respect to their plausibility or absurdity. In the case of moral analysis, therefore, it should not be surprising for us to equally observe cases where certain moral premises are assumed or taken as given in order to infer and evaluate moral conclusions derived therefrom. One finds historically, for example, the deduction of various moral obligations on the basis of the presumed "nature" of things, e.g., on the basis of the presumed nature of God or Reality. It is assumed, for example, that philosophical "determinism" or theological predestination are true. One concludes, therefore, that one can literally do nothing to extricate oneself from one's miserable condition. As we mentioned earlier, all of Hume's arguments against traditional moral theory were directed against such moral arguments. But if his attention was indeed focused on such moral arguments, and the alleged moral knowledge associated therewith, one might well see why Hume's claim of the powerlessness of moral reason might appear correct. For, whether we are referring to moral action which proceeds on the basis of some mere moral intention, or some mere conclusion derived therefrom, there is no guarantee at all that such intentions will motivate. As is clearly the case in many modern classrooms where Ethics is taught, we find exactly the opposite. We fully concede with Hume, therefore, that mere moral intentions may lack power to effect action in accordance with them.

"Reason," however, is by no means restricted to such empty intentions or conceptions. In fact, we have repeatedly shown that excessive reliance on such intentions and mere argument or consistency with respect to them is to exclude all hope of the attainment of truth. For, in order to attain truth one must first adequately elucidate by intuition intentions themselves or the ultimate or foundational premises upon which alone sound argument can stand. The moral philosopher who fails to do this offers sophistical "moral" logic rather than moral insight or wisdom. The wise man is replaced by the moral logician. No wonder, then, that the modern moral philosopher is no longer sought, as he once was, to provide direction on how to live. For, without any doctrine of intuition, hence of moral intuition or knowledge, the elucidation of its distinctive motivation or power becomes impossible. We have here not the case, as Kant might have believed, of the "authentically conscientious" person who acts on his belief that his act is right, but, rather, the case where the mere ascription of belief to moral states of affairs becomes nonsensical.

We must distinguish, therefore, rational motivations of this kind from rational motivations grounded in moral insight or intuition. This is the case especially where motivations issue forth from moral knowledge (in the sense of fulfillment) or from the existing object of that knowledge. We mentioned above, with respect to mere moral thought or belief, that an object may well be presented as having certain moral qualities whether or not it actually has them. As the German child thought of the Jew as a murderer of gentile children, so too, allegedly, Saul of Tarsus thought the early Christians were a sect bent on undermining what he took to be the Moral or Mosaic Law inherent in Judaism. In such cases one may initially see nothing of the existing moral facts at all or, possibly, something of it. In either case, however, one's thoughts or intentions "point to" or aim at, i.e., motivate with varying degrees of force, a field of possible intentions and intuitions some of which may, but need not, constitute relevant procedures of verification or fulfillment. In other words, they influence a range of possible moral or conscientious actions based on insight.

Even in this case, however, we can draw important distinctions. In the case where the original intention is to some degree intuitive to begin with we may, as in the case of mere belief, act on the basis of such intentions in various ways. We may, for example, immediately act on the basis of that apprehension; or, we may decide to act on the basis of some inference from that intention where that intention functions as a premise in a moral argument. But we may also, especially in cases of moral conflict, propose to undergo a process of moral fulfillment in which the morally relevant features of the object or states of affairs in question are brought more and more fully to light. It is this latter case that is of crucial significance for our most fundamental claims. For, it is in this case that we can see how "reason" constrains moral action in a way mere belief or intention does not. That is, in cases where such a process of fulfillment is possible there is a modification of the epistemologically relevant features of the acts of thought associated therewith which has a direct bearing on their motivational power or force. It equally has a bearing on the essential tendency of thought with respect to higher order moral knowledge, action and the power associated therewith. To make this point clear, however, we must examine in some detail a concrete case of moral action in which such moral fulfillment takes place.

Let us consider a case of sexual virtue and vice in terms of such a morally insightful rational or conscientious process of thought and action. Initially let us suppose a man sees a woman, even his wife, acting in a way he takes to be sexually provocative, e.g., he notices her licking her lips, dressed in tight jeans and sweater, etc.. He finds himself, as a result, drawn or pulled toward her sexually. But let us suppose, too, that he believes--even "knows"--that in this particular case and under these particular circumstances, sexual intercourse with her would be wrong. In such a case the woman is seen under certain determinations, which present her as desirable in relation to one's own particular nature and condition. But seen within the context of the state of affairs as a whole, i.e., under all morally relevant determinations, the contemplated action of sexual intercourse presents itself more or less vaguely as wrong or evil. If we attend care-fully to such cases what is most noteworthy is that we find this initial awareness of the act's wrongfulness to be marginal, peripheral, symbolic, relatively empty, yet all the same still there or present to consciousness. As a result of this conflict of intentions (or, rather, this conflict of correlative value qualities) are experiences a quite familiar conflict of motivations. On one hand, we have sexual desire associated with the thought of having sexual intercourse; on the other hand, we have the thought of the wrongfulness of that act drawing us in the opposite direction.

More specifically, associated with each intentional object or end of action there is a motivational tendency of that intention to point to a correlative (and opposed) field of intentions or possible fulfillments essentially correlated with the proposed action. The apprehension of the woman or her body under certain determinations will motivate or solicit a closer attention, or series of possible intentions and intuitions, with respect to just that object under that field of intentions; while the moral apprehension, i.e., the vague sense of the supervening moral quality of the state of affairs as a whole, will also motivate a closer attention or series of possible intentions and intuitions with respect to the morally relevant features of the act. One senses, there-fore, marginally at least, a conflict with respect to which end or process is to be realized of which both cannot, i.e., which field of thoughts and proximate actions are to become more centralized or brought into the forefront of consciousness, which, in turn, brings into view another correlative field of possible intentions, intuitions and actions. This centralization of a field of intentions may be exemplified in morally indifferent cases as well. One thinks of spending one's vacation at home or going away. In thinking about it one thinks, no doubt, of positive and negative features associated with each option. But once an end is chosen one finds a new, more distinct, field of thoughts presented--especially thoughts relevant as means to that end--which were at best only marginal before.

In the case where one chooses to yield to the solicitation of sexual desire, the field of intentions and intuitions associated with just that end will become more centralized. One thinks of, imagines or looks at certain parts of her body more than others, her mouth, breasts, legs, etc.. One imagines, in some detail, past sexual encounters and the satisfaction associated therewith, or, one imagines various sexual scenarios or fantasies, which would further stimulate one's desire. As one proceeds in this manner, there invariably comes more forcibly to mind various ways to attain one's desired end. We may well call these ways relevant procedures of attaining satisfaction if not fulfillment. What is especially important at least to note here is the contrast between cases of this kind and cases of virtuous love making. In the vicious case one notices that imagination or fantasy plays a greater role than insight. This, as we shall see shortly, if of considerable moral significance.

In the case where one chooses to be guided by the call of conscience rather than the solicitation of sexual desire, there is also a field of intentions, and in this case a relevant process of fulfillment, which may enter into the forefront of consciousness. The range of this field will vary (and equally so in the case of vicious action) depending on one's past actions, cognitive state, etc., but some such range will, nonetheless, invariably present itself. One looks into her eyes and listens to her voice implicitly if not explicitly manifesting her unwillingness to make love at this time and under these circumstances. One presents to mind concrete cases of morally virtuous men: Those who truly love their woman or wife, are kind to them and sensitive to their thoughts, desires and volitions. Those who will not use anger, false guilt, deceit or lies to get what they want. One may also think of sexually vicious men: Those who would rape a woman they claim to love while forcing themselves upon her against her will. One may even think of one's self being violated in some manner against one's will: One thinks of past teachers using their intellectual powers to intimidate rather than teach, of a father using his child's love to force him to arbitrarily obey his will, etc..

What is crucial for us to note in the virtuous case, in contrast to the case of vicious action, is the greater reliance on insight. That is to say, in the virtuous case one allows the true or actual character of the state of affairs as a whole to come into the forefront of consciousness. For, it is on the basis of these characteristics that the supervenient moral quality can come more clearly and forcibly into view. This stands in striking contrast to the vicious case where certain morally relevant features are and must be evaded or avoided consciously in order to realize one's desired end. One feels, therefore, the power or force of the moral apprehension to the degree it is seen, especially in conjunction with one's apprehension of moral value or reality as a whole. In either case, however, moral value presents itself as a form of lawfulness originating in that actual state of affairs itself in opposition to the contrary end. It presents itself as a constraint on freedom. It shouts a No! of warning to the contemplated vicious act. One senses, therefore, marginally at least, a certain danger and fear associated with the thought of violating that law not unlike the danger or fear one might experience when one thinks of going sky diving, crawling into a narrow, dark drainage tunnel, etc..

These characteristics, then, serve to distinguish the case of moral conflict from morally indifferent conflict cases. For, in the latter case, no truth of the matter is presented concerning which of the conflicting ends ought to be done. There is no law opposing one end over the other. In the morally indifferent case one senses one can't do both, but one senses one can do neither. Not so in the moral case. Nor is there any inherent sense of danger or fear as one experiences in the moral case. In the morally indifferent case one senses no opposition to look on either end fully and remain more or less equally motivated or constrained. That is, one senses no greater strength or power inherently associated with the contemplation of one end over another, while in the moral case it is precisely because one senses the inherent power of moral insight over one's action that one steadfastly avoids just that apprehension.

As a result of this conflict, therefore, one experiences in the case of vicious action the absolute necessity of modifying or changing (manipulating or distorting) certain of the characteristics of the object or state of affairs as it is presented to one's mind. Rather than being open to perceiving the whole state of affairs as it really is, one retreats to the level of the merely intentional or conceptual to "fill in" missing properties or simply to evade actual ones. For, it is here alone where manipulation of thought and thought's object can take place. We are all familiar with rationalization that enters in after one commits a vicious action. But, even prior to and during the act there are a multiplicity of forms of "rationalization" used to gain the support of reason in order to realize one's vicious end. In our example above, one attempts to convince one's self that "one can't control one's self;" or one "justifies" the action on the basis of "a wife's duty to please her husband;" or one barters with the moral law or conscience by the appeal to future "good intentions," e.g., one plans to give her flowers afterwards (which she must, of course, accept), etc..

As an afterthought one wonders whether or not the rejection of intuitionism and the appeal to constructionalism or idealism may, on some level, be symptomatic of deeper degrees or levels of evil even if it is unintentional. In any case the elucidation above may help us see that there can be no purely evil act, i.e., an alleged evil action which is done for the sake of evil in the full apprehension of its character as evil. This, of course, is to be distinguished from acting from the most malicious or malevolent of motives or principles. It is not the clear apprehension of evil that motivates. Indeed, one is almost wholly oblivious to it. Rather, it is one's presumed and distorted apprehension, e.g., of power over others, that motivates. This is often revealed in cases where one's victim fails to respond in fear, but instead responds out of genuine pity for one's persecutor.

Before concluding this discussion of intuitive rational moral motivation, we must attempt to gain more clarity with respect to how the motivational efficacy or force associated with good or evil action is modified in the process of their realization. In either case, we said that the field of intentions and intuitions correlated with the end of action becomes more centralized. As this happens, new fields of intentions qua possibilities of thought, knowledge, volition and action emerge which function primarily as means to that end. When, and in so far as these new fields are centralized, the motivational character of the act of thought as a whole, as well as its constraint on that action, is also modified. In the case of vicious action, for example, the field of intentions and intuitions correlated with the original good or moral end may completely disappear from view in this process. The experience of guilt, in particular, recedes from view. As a result, there may even be points during the illicit act, e.g., in cases of alcoholism or sex abuse, where one may literally lose all willful control with respect to the further realization of that action. What one does may no longer be voluntary.

This conception of a "process" of development in which new intentions as well as possibilities of correlative action come into view on the basis of others may help us to gain a general sense of the possible origin of deeper levels of vicious and virtuous action. In the case of vicious action, for example, the completed action itself as a complex intentional-motivational-volitional structure provides the foundation for a new field of possible thoughts and actions to come into view along with the correlative loss of the possibilities correlated with specific types of virtuous action. We have, then, a greater distance from the voice of conscience which makes it more difficult to trust in Goodness sufficiently to see its character as it might have been manifested on the foundation provided by the correlative virtuous thought and action. If one had acted well one would have entered into a process where one simply finds new possibilities of good thought, action or power, i.e., possibilities of value, opened up on that foundation. One believes one ought to learn to read and after learning to read one discovers there are worlds of things that one can come to know that one never even dreamed of before. But a new field of possibilities for evil thought and action may equally come into view on the basis of prior vicious action. Having sexually abused a woman on one occasion it becomes easier on the next, as well as easier to consider as viable options possibilities one did even think of before. One now wonders, "why not get her inebriated or give her a drug of some sort to lower or weaken her resistance;" or, "why not use physical force rather than mere verbal intimidation to get one's way," etc.. We suggest that in every case of the most malicious actions there is a process of this kind in which one, or many individuals, are led deeper and deeper until they can think and do things they could not before.

But, having committed, e.g., a vicious act, there is now a fullness quality attributable to one's experienced intention or thought of having done an evil act which cannot be unexperienced, although it can be made more or less present. It also retains a certain presence with respect to one's general conception of, and relation to, the value of reality as a whole and one's place in it. Specifically, in every vicious act one's implicit relation to reality as governed by law is essentially violated. This forms an irrational motivational tendency in opposition to truth as such. More specifically, it sets up an opposition to one's inherent motivation toward the truth about the moral character of reality as a whole. Given the inherent motivational tendency of intentionality toward truth, this results in the deepest or most foundational possible moral conflict within one's soul which is not reconcilable by any mere act of will alone. The problem has gone deeper than volition alone can deal with.

To more clearly elucidate our discussion of the bearing of moral knowledge in the sense of fulfillment on moral action, as well as to further elucidate this notion of deeper forms of virtue and vice, we need to turn now to the more detailed analysis of irrational moral motivations. This is especially important in view of the fact that it is the power of such tendencies (customs or habits) that, we believe, is at root of the general denial of the power of reason over action and life. For, it seems indubitable that one may become so habitually conditioned to some particular vice that when the object of illicit desire is presented, hidden or irrational associations, habits or motivational structures may bring to mind immediately the field of thoughts, actions and motivations correlated with that illicit end. In some cases this may be so much the case that one finds them irresistible. We may "know" an act is wrong but do it anyway and do it even independently of our will.

Section 5D: Irrational Moral Motivation

As we mentioned earlier, irrational motivations are motivations essentially correlated with intentions which are experienced, and thus have a kind of presence and motivational force, yet their intentional objects are not perceived or made objective. These intentional-motivational complexes are, therefore, "hidden" or "unconscious," i.e., experienced in the "dark depths" of the ego or one's experiential life stream. Psychoanalysis may even fail to bring them to light. Hence, their moral significance lies in the fact that they may influence, and, in the case of spontaneous, non-deliberative or non-conscientious moral action, even determine such action without them being present as explicit objects of thought. Their influence, therefore, is more or less "passive," i.e., they are motivations, which are not essentially generated by an act of will or volition. As the Pavlovian dog salivates when a bell is rung, so may a gluttonous person drool or reach for a sweet when seen; a sexually avaricious man may drivel at the sight of a voluptuous woman and a generous person may be moved to tears of compassion at the sight of a starving or destitute child.

In light of our earlier discussion of irrational motivations generally, we may recall that the broadest or most general relations between intentions may set up new motivational tendencies greater than that provided by the intentional matters of those distinct acts alone. This means that past correlations between intentions, e.g., between the intentional object and the properties ascribed to it, will set up "laws of association," the motivational force of which is greater than the distinct "material" content(s) of the act(s) taken alone. Whether the past correlation has to do with the ascription of properties to real or fictitious objects or with relations between them the mere repetition of the correlations increases the motivational tendency or force to the point where there is a certain habitual or spontaneous "expectancy" to find one content upon the presentation of its usual correlate.

In view of these considerations, we must especially take note of the following: First, the possible grounding of such motivations in mere contingent or association relations does not guarantee that the objective correlates of such intentions or the relations between them exist. An object or action, therefore, may be "presented" (not necessarily made objective) as having certain moral properties which it in fact lacks. One may be quite strongly motivated to act or react on certain occasions when the object is present and certain intentions are experienced while at the same time be oblivious to the true moral character of that object or action. We may well be motivated falsely, and as a result wrongly, in response to moral objectivities which are not as we "experience" them to be. One "feels" hatred toward Jews and at the same time is oblivious to the socially inculcated correlation between Jews and the butchering of gentile children for passover rituals or Jews as murderers of Christ. Another "feels" paralyzed and doomed to misery because of an equally socially inculcated correlation between happiness and an alleged medical vocation one has failed to obtain. As an afterthought, one may also see, in light of such cases, some justification for the tendency of modern philosophy to treat meaning generally as subjective or culturally relative. For, the properties ascribed to certain objects or states of affairs may well have their origin in mere socially inculcated correlations without those properties being the actual properties of those objects or states of affairs themselves.

But second, the fact that one may have actually "experienced" (not necessarily made objective) some existing objectivity, or some specific type of relation between existing objectivities, may also set up a new motivational tendency. In such a case the intentional-motivational structure correlated with an object may be "used" or function in more complex or higher order thought and activity. In logic, in scientific research of every kind--even in ordinary communication--the complex meaning one spontaneously associates with some object, state of affairs or linguistic symbol, together with its motiv-ational force, lies "hidden" in the background of thought. This is indispensable for there to be freedom or spontaneity with respect to selective intentional or intuitive apprehensions of the multiplicity of features attributable to or actually inhering in an object. Espec-ially in cases of highly complex objects or states of affairs, the range of properties inherent in that object or state of affairs may be broad indeed. Few of these properties will initially be explicitly seen or perceived--nor can they all at once. It may be relatively easy to conceive of and invent (or reinvent) the wheel, but not so with respect to the automobile which has among its basic constituents a vast number of wheels (or gears). In all such cases there is a background of knowledge of the basic constituents that make up such an object that founds the higher order knowledge of the more complex object based thereon. It was in view of this fact that we spoke of the growth of moral knowledge and power as essentially involving an intuitive process in which one comes to see and see more clearly the various aspects of moral reality as a whole. In this way and in this way only one comes to be able to see "at one glance" or know the true character of morality without explicitly intuiting all its parts and properties at the moment of apprehension. This intuitive apprehension, too, can become "hidden" and thereby govern all of one's particular actions in accordance with it without it constantly being intuited or made objective. It is this knowledge, moreover, which we claim has ultimate power over moral action and life.

Our aim now is to examine in greater detail evil and good irrational moral motivations respectively. In doing so we hope, by the analysis of concrete cases, to show that in either case the motivational tendency is essentially directed toward truth. This is so, we claim, despite the seeming power of evil irrational motivations over many of our actions. For, we contend, they have power over us only when and to the degree that intuitive moral knowledge is lacking. Although such intuitive moral knowledge is not necessitated when it is present it undermines, weakens and destroys false intentional correlations together with their power. It also influences or constrains in tendency toward ever higher forms of fulfillment and higher forms of moral action.

<i> Evil or Vicious Irrational Moral Motivations

In virtue of the fact that a supplemental motivational force may be grounded in contingent correlations or associations between mere intentions, we can readily see how this might lead not only to a false attribution of moral properties to an object or state of affairs, but a new and evil intentional-motivational tendency (habit, custom or dispositions) may be formed directing us toward actions which are evil. Earlier, we gave examples of such irrational evil motivations when we discussed motivation in general. We mentioned, for instance, the case of young German children being told by their parents that Jews murder young children and use their blood for their passover rituals. In view of our elucidation so far, one might now see why or how such children might run in fear, especially after repeated such correlations, the moment they were confronted by what they took to be a Jewish person. There is in this case a new motivational tendency rooted in the relation between the Jewish person and the property of murdering children which is significantly greater than the motivational tendency provided by the conception of the Jew without that property. But in such a case there is no 1:1

correspondence between that merely intentional objectivity and any actual existing moral state of affairs. There cannot be, therefore, any "origin" in intuitive rational experience to justify such an alleged correspondence. No such moral quality of any such existing objectivity is imported into any such act of thought itself to give it "fullness" whether in the individual's own case or in that of others.

In that intentional acts may be "mixed," as well as empty or full, we also can see how especially complex intentional-motivational moral structures may in part have a foundation in truth and in part not. That is, in mixed cases something of an existing moral objectivity or state of affairs may have been originally imported into the act of thought, while other morally relevant properties remain relatively empty. In such a case the veridical aspects may, by similarity or association--especially in cases of rationalization and willful deception--be used to give a false correlation the "appearance" of truth. It may, thereby, add weight to the motivational tendency of the intentional act. For example, a child may be told by one's parents or peers that black people are inherently more ignorant and aggressive than white people. Moreover, in a particular cultural environment one may actually experience, in concrete or particular cases, genuine correlations between some black persons and ignorance and violence. In such a case, therefore, the matter of the act, i.e., that which presents just this object under just these determinations, may present the same object under the same determination or sense, yet with a different degree of fullness. One experiences black people in conjunction with acts of violence, but one does not experience any fullness with respect to these qualities as necessary versus merely contingent. There is in such cases, therefore, a motivational tendency associated with the false socially inculcated intentionality that black people are inherently more ignorant and aggressive than white people and a motivational tendency associated with experiences of some blacks. But the latter motivation may also be "used" by vicious persons to convince such a person that one's experiences alone lie at the basis of one's prejudice with respect to black people as a whole.

With such a case in mind we may see how false moral beliefs and motivations may be partially mixed with truth to give them the appearance of truth by their association or similarity. Once again, we see the need to enlist the aid of truth in order at the same time to act contrary to it. To more clearly elucidate the nature of such evil irrational motivations and their power, however, let us now turn to an examination of the "origins" or causes of evil irrational motivations.

{a} The Origin of Irrational Motivations Generally and of Evil Irrational Motivations in Particular

We come into the world experientially naive, i.e., with little in the way of sensation and thought much less intuition. In Locke's famous words, we are a "tabula rasa" or clean slate. Our lack of experience, therefore, places us at the mercy of others not only for our physical safety but for our "initial view" of reality and its worth. The ascription of properties to objects generally, and moral properties to objects in particular, is almost exclusively taken on "trust." In non-moral cases, for example, we are told that the earth is round, that there are whales in the ocean, that mermaids do not exist, etc.. In moral cases, we are told which types of actions or behaviors are "right" or "wrong," or which types of ends are or are not of value. In either case, intention (thought or belief) clearly precedes intuition (knowledge)--we do not initially verify these claims ourselves. Hence, how we think of the character of reality as a whole and our place in it initially presents itself to us as a matter of predominantly pre-volitional and pre-experiential social training or "education." (We might also say "social law" or "social morality" in order to draw a distinction between mere conventional moral law and authentic moral law.) Those primarily responsible for this training in our world or society today are, of course, our parents and teachers, although we must surely include friends or peers as well as the more extended teaching rooted in the general social environment in which we are all raised. Certainly these days television may be as much our teacher as anything or anyone else.

Such an education, however, by no means implies that these beliefs (customs, habits of thought) themselves are rooted in any rational, i.e., explicit, intentional (much less intuitive) or volitional awareness of truth on the part of our teachers. They too may well be oblivious to the truth or falsity of the received wisdom. They may even manifest their own faith in these socially inculcated beliefs on a level of action far more powerfully or effectively than anything they may be conscious of or say to the contrary. A child is not blind to the inconsistency of one's parent screaming at one not to fight with one's siblings or not to be selfish with one's food as one's father reaches for the best portion for himself. Primo Levi observed a religious Jew on his knees thanking God as another was "selected" for the gas chambers in his place. A minister speaks of humility, although he storms out of church the following Sunday when "only" a handful of people show up to hear his sermon. Experienced correlations of this kind (of a concrete action as an instance of a general rule or principle of behavior), then, may become rooted whether their origin lies in some voluntary transgression of the child, his parents or in the irrational fabric of society itself. When the child grows up he may simply find that on what may appear to be an "instinctive," "natural" or pre-volitional level he, too, acts precisely as his parents did even though he may be, in some sense, "aware" that these habits are bad. The alcoholic and drug addict, the foodaholic and "self" addict, etc., find themselves habituated or conditioned to their vice and believe themselves unable to do much if anything about it.

Whether or not one's "teachers," therefore, are themselves aware of the true nature of the beliefs or values inculcated in the young the child takes on primarily, although not exclusively, the intentional-motivational structures of one's parents, teachers or society. But what is of crucial practical significance for us to attend to is that this set of values extends far beyond (or below) the mere level of some relatively unconnected group of commonplace or socially acceptable actions to a highly complex "unified" conception of the value of reality as a whole and one's self worth in conjunction with it. This more universal intentional-motivational structure also retains a certain more deeply rooted presence in all we think and do. It guides, governs or orients our thought and action as a more ultimate end. Even in the non-moral case there is a relatively clear sense in which any end may be present in, and determining of, one's conduct especially all subordinate actions with respect to that end--and yet that end may not be consciously or constantly perceived. For example, one's more ultimate end of getting to work in the morning is present in, and determining of, all subordinate actions with respect to it; and although it is in some sense "experienced" it is not generally or constantly perceived or made objective. One is allowed the utmost freedom with respect to what one can think of and act on as one proceeds to work, but there are boundaries one cannot cross and retain that original end. One cannot, for example, retain that end and at the same time yield to the thought or intention of staying home or going on vacation. But this is equally true in the case of explicitly moral ends. One may believe a good life consists in material well being, which may become rooted as an irrational motivation that is experienced, yet not ordinarily, if ever, made objective.

But given such an ultimate end, most if not all of one's more particular actions will be governed thereby. One may generally be quite a nice fellow, but if anything conflicts with this end then one will be compelled either to retain that end and reject the end contrary to it, or to relinquish that end and be governed by the end opposing it. Perhaps this may explain why the rich often appear, but are not better than the poor. They are not placed in circumstances or conditions wherein one's character is truly tested. But if this is the case, we can immediately see how conflict might arise between such an end and moral truth itself as an end. In life threatening circumstances, in particular, the ultimate value one places on one's material well being is clearly manifested by one's sacrifice of any and all moral considerations for physical survival. As concentration camp survivors know so well, even a parent who "loves" one's children may sacrifice them if by that means one believes one might survive.

On the basis of our elucidation so far, one may also see how such an end, or view of the moral character of reality and its value, may be highly complex and have multifaceted aspects or instantiations which equally determine what we think or do in more particular cases of action. One's parent, for example, may really believe that a person's worth is determined by one's occupation. At least for many people, being a medical doctor (lawyer, professional, etc.) determines self worth, while being a trucker is a sufficient condition for being worthless. A child may observe one's father's anger and misery and hear one's father say: "I am unhappy because I was forced to sacrifice my "true calling" to make a living for my family." Presumably, the child is to appreciate his father's great self-sacrifice. Instead, the child comes to believe (acquire an irrational intentional-motivational structure) that success or failure in life is determined by what ones does, i.e., what one's occupation is; or, on the other hand, that failure in life has its roots in merely "making a living." As a result, occupation becomes all important for the determination of self worth and mere "making a living" an evil to be avoided at all costs. Such conceptions can become so deeply rooted as "hidden" intentional-motivational structures, and can become so tenacious because of their association with ultimate value, that they not merely resist all attempts at uprooting them, as well as determine most everything one does, but they may also determine thought and action while the individual remains wholly oblivious to them. In consequence, the successful executive may conceive of himself as of value because of that label, while his brother, the trucker, is cast down in self-contempt because of the same label. In the meantime their father proudly associates himself with the executive son he is proud of, and disassociates himself with the son he is secretly ashamed of--claiming, of course, all the while to love them both equally.

Not only do such complex intentional-motivational structures root themselves as hidden governing principles of life and action, they are maintained or resist exposure by often equally hidden structures of habit formation or social indoctrination in the name of "education." In such cases, the power or "strength" of these evil intentional-motivational structures is not grounded merely in repetitive associations or haphazard connections between intentions. Nor is it grounded in experienced connections as in the case where one spontaneously reaches for one's keys after one puts on one's jacket because one usually does so-even though in this case one has no need of them. Rather, these false habits of thought are presented as if they were cases of knowledge, equally grounded in deeper or more complex intentional-motivational structures (power struc-tures), and inculcated into the field of received wisdom by the "appropriate" use of pleasure and pain. In such cases, pleasure or pain is not used merely as an aid or means to help one "see" truth more clearly or even to inculcate "good habits," i.e., to educate one to greater receptivity and openness to truth via the formation of good spontaneous actions. For, if one was educated in the latter way, one might well oppose the existing power structure, i.e., become independent of social law--a "Law unto himself," or a child of the Moral Law. Rather, the social structure functions in opposition to such insight or truth and it uses pleasure and pain as a form of social conditioning or indoctrination of the individual into the society's false values. As an ideal product of such indoctrination, society's student boldly and with an air of confidence, claims he or she acts "from gut level"--that he or she is an independent or free thinker--which simply means that no one need tell him or her anymore what the values of the society are, for they have become mastered or internalized in his or her own soul. The fanatic willingly sacrifices him or her self for "the Fatherland." The German child, for example, does not run from what he takes to be a Jew because of some innocent and haphazard attribution of the property of being a murderer of children to some person who happens to be Jewish. He runs because he is told, and repeatedly told, that this is as much an attribute of the Jew as light is a property of the sun. And in order to instill these convictions, he is rewarded for behavior in accordance with these convictions--even if that means turning one's parents over to the Gestapo; and he is punished for "inappropriate" behavior which may consist in a preference for truth and love over institutionalized values.

Pleasure and pain (physical and psychical), therefore, are used not merely to enforce external action or "blind" obedience to social "laws," but also to enforce obedience to its intentional thought patterns, i.e., its "overall view" of reality. Various forms of force, manipulation, indoctrination or training are used to instill the "appropriate" thought patterns or conceptions as well as their correlative motivations. We are all familiar with various forms of them: silence, ostracism, removal of affection, isolation, intimidation, criticism, condemnation, anger, violence, etc.. We have as a result, an evil "social morality," i.e., a particular society's general and false view of what constitutes a good life.

American society, for example, is often described as materialistic which, for the reasons above, may be considered tantamount to denying that moral virtue is an ultimate versus relative end. One is brought up to believe that one's dress, physical attributes, wealth and material success determine one's worth or correlative lack of worth in American society. This seems too evident to require justification. But what is crucial for us to attend to is that if one even thinks of such objects as possibly lacking the value qualities ascribed to them, then one begins to set up new motivational tendencies pointing to a range of possible fulfillments which run directly contrary to the prevailing social morality. If one actually comes to fulfill some aspects of the anti-social belief, we can see immediately how conflict might arise not merely between an individual and the established social morality but intrapersonally, i.e., within the individual himself. For, one discovers that the evil "world" one cannot but now condemn as one more clearly perceives its moral indifference, injustice, coldness and cruelty is equally present in one's own psychical make up. In fact it is present on such a deeply rooted level that it may, in some sense, be and appear to be "natural," "instinctive" and certainly not within one's present volitional power to control. But it does not follow from the fact that one perceives this much (i.e., from such a genuine but limited perception), that one has a clear or full conception of the true nature of reality and its value. Hence, given an initial or relative ignorance or lack of experience of true value, and given one's indoctrination into the accepted social morality, we may readily see how, if one begins to question the social viewpoint, one may suffer the pain of social rejection. One may even take it to be justified! For, one also now suffers the new found pain and guilt rooted in the perception of evil which is immanent in one's own soul. The authentic, yet new moral knowledge lacks fullness with respect to the multiplicity of properties applicable to reality with respect to its value. One knows there is evil, but may not see any good. As a result, one may indeed suffer and fall into despair--even give up all hope--from the confusion that results when no clear end or object of trust is in sight. One despises the evil "world" and one's self as a part of it. Even in the case where one begins to see a light beckoning him, he may well fear the truth which both exposes him and threatens whatever "security" he may retain in the society he ambivalently, in Kafka-ish manner, seems to need.

In mentioning Kafka we add as an afterthought the reflection that pessimistic existentialism, despite its profundity with respect to its vision of evil in the world and ourselves, is, in view of this account, morally simplistic. Sartre, Camus and Kafka, to name a few; and even Ingmar Bergmann and Woody Allen have their value to a point, but they leave us empty unless or until a certain Value or Goodness begins to call them and us from our sleep and our darkness and our despair into its glorious light. Although Primo Levi, for example, was held forth as a model for those who believe in the triumph of reason over evil, his death does not call this view in doubt. It only reveals the sadness associated with the false but understandable conviction that "He who has suffered torment can no longer find his place in the world. Faith in humanity--cracked by the first slap across the face, then demolished by torture-can never be recovered."14 In any case we have here the beginnings of the Socratic doubt, or questioning of the man in the cave who has dared to call in question the shadows on the wall. But, in addition to this familiar allegory of "the Cave," let us consider another allegory to help drive home the elucidation above.

There is a movement one sometimes feels: a hurry, a rush, a quickness that is wholly at variance with the apprehension of truth and of value. One finds one's self, as it were, on a train going faster and faster, yet in those short or fleeting moments when the train slows down or stops, one may more or less vaguely sense that one is going nowhere or in the wrong direction. Still, there is this "necessity" about getting staying on the train. A simple fact about the train is that it may go so fast that one loses sight of the scenery along the way. It's true that it sometimes slows down enough to allow one the opportunity to look and see the things outside. But one must, of course, be awake or prepared to look when those moments arrive. Even then, just as the things outside begin to present themselves more clearly, the train may get going again and they are lost to view.

In light of such a picture, we might see more clearly how the ability as well as the desire to do things that are bad or evil may be wholly bound up with the refusal to question social values, i.e., "staying on the train." There is a deep inner dissatisfaction or emptiness one experiences--even if one does not perceive it--that lingers while on the train. An emptiness, moreover, that one must attempt, in one way or another, to fill. Yet the one thing that can fill it is excluded simply by being on the train--the Real world together with its Real Values is a Blurrrrr. Perhaps, one is fortunate enough during a brief stop to meet a stranger in the station who lives outside the train. One hears of things and places one has never even thought of before. One wonders whether what is said is true and may even sense a certain quickening of life stirring--of hope, even, perhaps, a fullness which one just wants to hold onto without letting go. But the whistle blows and one must get back on the train.

One wonders, "Why in the world must I get back on the train?" And another replies, "It is because that is where Reality and one's life is. Everyone you know, except this stranger, and especially those closest to you, is on the train." So when you mention that you're thinking of staying behind, they mock you or laugh at you, as if you were irrational even to think such a thing. One has dared to question the line between "normalcy" or alleged sanity and "social insanity" or the lonely pilgrimage. One recalls, no doubt, "Christian" in Pilgrim's Progress. They say, "There is nothing of value to find out there [although they themselves have never looked]. There is also the danger to yourself and your family if you leave." And If one even thinks too much on it, one finds that this prophecy seems realized. For another takes your seat or your family gets angry and starts screaming for you to get back on the train. If you dare to take your mind off the train and look at the world outside, you risk the loss of all that is dear to you as it takes off and leaves you all alone.

We have here, or so it seems to me, the experience of a false and evil world structure that nonetheless attempts to convince us of its truth if not its "goodness." On a level deeper than we can voluntary contest, we may sense a coldness or indifference about the world or reality. Sartre would, no doubt, say that our "bad faith" is rooted precisely here in our refusal to confront this "reality" as we hide in the "false security" of the train, i.e., our family, job, social group, church or temple, etc.. Deep down we secretly believe that reality is meaningless or without value. It cares nothing for us. "Life's a bitch and then you die," as the saying goes. And because we secretly believe that this is so, whether or not one kicks and screams there is a tenacity about this belief that will not let us go. As Hume recognized, we cannot arbitrarily attribute the "quality" of belief to objects at will.

But it should now be clear that the mere fact that we believe that this is the character of reality, does not entail that it is so. The tenacity of the belief does not lie in our clear perception of truth, but in our socially inculcated moral ignorance. Our society as a whole does not see the Goodness of reality or live in its presence. How, then, can its children be expected even to sufficiently believe it is so to bother to look. But whether or not one sees this evil condition of the world from the side of darkness alone or from the side of light, we believe that it has presented its actual character to every true philosopher or seeker after wisdom despite their differences in other respects. We have here, for example, Socrates' condemnation of the oral-epic tradition, Augustine's or Christianity's condemnation of "the world" of original sin, Hobbes' condemnation of social-political law and Hume's condemnation of the false authority of the church. It is this, therefore, that philosophy or true education is to save us from. Our final question then is: How can it do so? Wherein lies its power?

<ii> Good Irrational Moral Motivations, and the Power of Reason over Action

We said that in virtue of particular correlations between morally relevant ideas or intentions new irrational moral motivations may result, the force of which is greater than that provided by the distinct matters of the acts taken alone. But this is equally so in the case of good or virtuous--yet still irrational--moral motivational tendencies, habits or customs. In their case, one may be motivated to act in accordance with a belief, the proper-ties of which actually correspond 1:1 with the moral properties of some existing objectivity or state of affairs, and yet be oblivious to this fact. That is so whether or not the good moral beliefs one holds are ultimately grounded in relatively empty intentions or in actual insight. In the former case, for example, the motivational tendency may originate in parental influences, themselves either intuitively discerned or irrationally rooted in the truly moral teachings of society itself. In either case, however, the peculiar character of such motivations as good lies in the fact that they do have existing objective moral correlates, although they are not, qua irrational motivations, necessarily perceived or made objective.

The value of such good motivations or habits is universally conceded on the level of certain classes of particular actions. Even Hume concedes the value of the virtues as indispensable means for all ends. One is "conditioned" to be frugal or to save money rather than to extravagantly spend it (which is especially of value when one doesn't have it); to be diligent in one's undertakings rather than slothful; to be patient rather than to yield to anger, etc.. On the basis of such good or virtuous habits, therefore, one prevents a great deal of harm that might otherwise result both to one's self and others. But in such cases one may well do such things, or be motivated to do them, with no "insight" into the moral character of these facts themselves and especially no insight into their relative value in conjunction with the moral value of reality as a whole. One acts on the basis of what we might call a "natural" or "instinctive" goodness, or a case where one's right hand does not see what one's left hand is doing. The fact that there is an actual correlation between the act of thought, i.e., the object as presented, and the object as it really is, therefore, does not guarantee that there is, or ever has been, any actual correspondence between the two in one's knowing act. One may, therefore, be said to act on blind faith. We have here the case of a morally good person who seems naturally good and yet may never have seen a moral virtue or quality in his life.

If excessive attention is given to such cases one may well be tempted to believe that goodness (as well as badness) of character is essentially a "natural" affair. One does so anyway in a materialistic society where morality is inconsistently denied while at the same time attributed to "genetic pre-dispositions" or socialization, i.e., more or less "natural" gifts one has, or has been fortunate enough to acquire. One believes that some people are born well and others ill, or one believes that some are formed by their environment well and others ill formed. It may seem, therefore, that there is little or nothing one can do to change one's "moral" character. In the conviction that this is so there is no question that many people young and old have given up hope of a "good" life and have, as a result, committed suicide.

But toward dispelling this temptation we need to recall, first of all, that irrational moral motivations, good and evil, may originate in rational and volitional insight into the respective moral qualities themselves. Hence, even if we are "ill-formed," morally handicapped or have a sick conscience when we come to "the age of reason," i.e., the place where moral insight is, at least on some occasions, possible, there is something we can do to change evil intentional-motivational structures. But second, we must also recall that these irrational evil motivations or habits that appear so resistant to reason essentially involve deeper structures of thought (intentionality), motivation and will than any mere group of particular contingent correlations between experienced intentions. They involve, as should now be clear, a complex inten-tional-motivational structure which presents reality itself under false determinations and with, therefore, a false value. This world view, then, lies hidden yet present in, and determining of, all of our more particular thoughts and actions.

But then it may also be apparent that there is a sense in which one's vicious habits are willfully retained precisely because one does not see the possibility and necessity of change in relation to a truly good end. One's Will does not act in a vacuum but on the basis of presented options or possibilities for action. We find in the case of young college students, for example, that when they enter into the university the experience can sometimes be overwhelming and certainly misdirected unless or until they are shown viable options from which they may then choose and direct themselves accordingly. But it does not follow from the mere awareness of the need for change that one can just will it into being. That is, much that we may see, or believe we see, that needs to be changed cannot be wholly uprooted by a mere, relatively blind, act of will. Learning or true education has always been understood, at least implicitly, to involve a process of gradual change and adjustment rather than one of great leaps before one is adequately prepared for the power they unleash. My son will risk the short leap from this low wall into my arms. He will risk on the next occasion a greater distance. But there is a point where even if I know I can catch him, he does not and the greater leap may only come with time, patience and continued growth. We cannot, therefore, hope for true and lasting moral change if we fail to perceive that such change necessitates a process of shorter and longer duration. In the case, therefore, of a highly complex object such as reality in its relation to personality and the value pertaining thereto, one of the greatest dangers lies in over-simplifying the process by which that structure may be overturned.

But in saying this, we equally must beware of the tendency to construe this process as so complex that one is to despair of change. Quite the contrary. For, by under-taking this process we immediately and necessarily change. That is, the false world view is, as with any intention, essentially and necessarily changed or modified whenever truth of any kind or form is intuited or authentically presented to the knowing mind. More specifically, the fullness feature of intuitions, as we have seen, has a direct bearing on the motivational character of the intentionality associated therewith. In the case of false intentional correlations, therefore, the "power" or motivational tendency of that structure as a whole is essentially weakened whenever truth is presented. When the German child discovers that Jews do not, after all, murder gentile children and are no different in their nature than any one else, the power of one's false belief structure is weakened by the clarity of one's apprehension that this is so. When a car salesman attempts to convince you of acting wrongly in not "trusting him" without a written contract, your acquired experience of being deceived and your understanding both that trust is mutual and written contracts help avoid misunderstanding, overcomes the vulnerability tied to innocence and ignorance. And so also in a multitude of cases of which we are all familiar.

No doubt this change or modification of power essentially rooted in insight is not always readily apparent. It is not so because, on the one hand, one does not see that in certain cases, i.e., highly complex intentional-motivational-volitional structures or strong habits, there are features of that whole that one truly despises and yet other features of that same whole one still loves and is unwilling to relinquish. One does not see in such cases the true nature of a vicious habit in conjunction with one's life and reality as a whole. On the other hand, the essential power of intuitive reason, or the change or modification in one's intentional-motivational structures, is often not readily apparent because one may be focusing on greater changes and because the modifications are immediately internalized and so become "hidden" or irrational motivations.

With respect to the former, for example, one may have enough morality to feel the necessity of willfully acknowledging some degree of guilt or even an evil conscience in general after having committed some act of vice. But one may do so, in part at least, to reduce or mitigate the sting of evil or the force of guilt or conscience without wholly giving up the vice itself. In such cases one may still resist those thoughts--that field of intentions and especially moral intuitions--that would not merely expose the particular act as evil but would reveal the deeper rooted evil of that type of act or habit as well as the evil quality of one's life as a whole. One resists these thoughts precisely because they would require, and one knows they would require, the sacrifice of just that vice or condition of one's life as a whole which one steadfastly refuses to give up. In short, one may well hide from truth, or rationalize away the reality of the evil of acts one has done and fully intends to do in the future.

With respect to the latter case, i.e., the subtle transformation of the motivational structure, if one perseveres in the acquisition of insight or truth, *even though one does not clearly notice the real change one's personality is undergoing*, false conceptions or intentional complexes are replaced sufficiently for there to be noticeable shifts of viewpoint and power associated therewith. One now more clearly sees things as they really are, i.e., one sees objects and states of affairs with their actual properties as compared with merely assuming that they have properties they do not in fact have. As a result, one comes, through a process of fulfillment, to see more and more where true value lies and in doing so one comes to the place where one sees that the vicious habits one has heretofore been holding onto, and unwilling to let go of, are in truth mere hindrances or obstacles to one's well being. One may, therefore, in a way one could not before, let them go. One is tired of wallowing in the mire, the train no longer holds much interest and the Cave is simply too dark.

In virtue of such cases we can see better, perhaps, what Husserl meant when he spoke of a "presuppositionless philosophy" and how such a philosophy may have an application to our moral concerns. For, he did not mean that one was expected to have clearly in view at every moment of thought and action a clear intuition of the ultimate foundations or premises grounding some present belief or conviction. He meant that at least in cases of more complex thought and action it was possible to make our presuppositions explicit and reformulate our theories accordingly on the basis of clear insight. In the moral realm, then, this would mean that one cannot hope or expect to instantaneously rehaul one's total world view. But one can do so through a process by making the most important things more explicit--bringing them under the gaze of intuitive insight--and reformulating that world view thereby. But even after one comes to "master" that apprehension, i.e., to make it one's own, we shall not have clearly in view at every moment of thought and action that ever clearer intuition of the true character of Reality. Rather, its presence is retained or is "experienced" for the most part, as a "hidden" motivation that now and then surfaces but in either case governs all we do as a principle of Truth and Goodness. No longer is it merely a principle inherent in Reality. Now it is a principle immanent in one's own heart or soul that can be relied on in all we think and do.

True education or true morality, then, presents itself as a training ultimately founded on, and governed by, a certain confidence in truth or the goodness of reality. One is not governed by a fear of truth, but by a sense that in the knowledge of truth all will somehow work out. Such education, then, is essentially guidance that would bring one to the place where one could be open enough to truth to see and act on the basis of one's own insight of it without fear of the judgment of others. Nor is there any essential incongruity between such education and the process by which we are relatively "blindly" trained by others who them-selves are governed by such insight. One needs to trust or have faith in the vision of one's teachers until one can come to the place of seeing those truths for one's self. But even in the case where such responsibility is abused by false teachers or blind guides and one finds one's self sick in conscience one may still find one's way in a sick and dark world. For, the only power of evil over one is its darkness and one's own belief or faith in that darkness, i.e., one's own skeptical belief that there is no truth to be found.

Notes: Chapter Five

1. See, for example, John Dreher, "Moral Sentiment," pp.6-7,21,23.
2. Ibid., pp.1,13.
3. Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p.108: "Most they took were kids--some 2 or 3 years. Some kids were screaming and screaming. They couldn't stop. So the Germans swinged them by the legs against a wall . . . And they never anymore screamed."
4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1148b.
5. Dreher, "Moral Sentiment," p.6.
6. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, in Johnson's, Ethics, p.186.
7. See quote by the physicist, Sir James Jevons, in Letters of the Scattered Brotherhood, Mary Strong ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 188.
8. Mark 10.5 (NIV).
9. Nor does this seem in any way rendered false by considerations of "nature." In view of our account so far it is plausible for there to be a certain fittingness, suitability or rectitude of the nature, e.g., of a person or animal--even a particular person or animal--in conjunction with various other natural objects. There is, then, a "truth of the matter" regarding this fittingness which may in the case of animals determine action and in the case of person influence action accordingly. Hence, the horse desires and seeks hay when seen, while a man desires, but need not seek, a cherry pie when seen.
10. See this text p.160.
11. Ibid., pp.160-1.
12. Ibid., p.161.
13. Ibid., p.165.
14. Ibid., p.44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott, Thomas Kingsmill, trans. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1873.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. In Pegis, Anton C. ed. The Basic Writings of Thomas Aquinas. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1945.

Augustine, A. Contra Academicos [Against the Academics]. Translated by John J. O'Meara. New York: Newman Press, 1951.

________. Confessions. Translated by F.J. Sheed. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942.

________. Faith, Hope and Charity. Translated and annotated by Louis A. Arand. New York: Newman Press, 1947.

________.De Quantitate Animae [The Greatness of the Soul]. Translated by Joseph M. Colleran. New York: Newman Press, 1950.

________. St. Augustine On the Freedom of the Will. Translated by Carroll Mason Sparrow. University of Virginia Studies, vol. 4. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia, 1947.

Ayer, A.J., ed. Logical Positivism. The Library of Philosophical Movements. New York: Free Press, 1959.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by T. E. Hulme. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

________. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Translated by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brerton. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935.

Broad, C.D.. Five Types of Ethical Theory. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy & Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, 1934.

Butler, Joseph. The Works of Joseph Butler. Edited by W.E. Gladstone. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896.

Chisholm, Roderick. The Problem of the Criterion. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973.

Cua, Antonio J. Reason and Virtue: A Study in the Ethics of Richard Price. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966.

Dorff, Elliot. "Sabbath Spirit and Sabbath Law." University of Judaism, N.D.

________. "Study Leads to Action." Religious Education, vol.75, #2. March-April, 1980.

Dreher, John. Foundations of Ethical Theory. N.P., 1985.

________. "Moral Sentiment." N.P., 1987.

Field, Hartry. Science Without Numbers:A Defense of Nominalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

Geer, Russel M., trans. Letters, Principle Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings. Library of Liberal Arts. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.

Haanstaadt, Paul, trans. Husserliana IV, Ideen II. N.P., N.D.

Hamilton, Edith & Cairns, Huntington, ed. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Bollingen Series, no.71. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Hartmann, Nicolai. Ethics. Translated by Stanton Coit. With an introduction by J.H. Muirhead. 3 Vols. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932.

Havelock, Eric. Preface to Plato. The Universal Library. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1967.

Hudson, W.D. Reason and Right. San Francisco, California: Freeman, Cooper & Co., 1970.

Hume, David. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1977. Edited with an introduction, comparative tables of of contents and analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902.

________. Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited with an introduction by Charles W. Hendel. Library of Liberal Arts. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957.

________."My Own Life." In David Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited with an introduction by

Norman Kemp Smith. Library of Liberal Arts. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947.

________. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited with an analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888.

Husserl, Edmund. Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

________. Ideas I. Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931.

________. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. Translated by F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.

________. Logical Investigations. Translated by J.N. Findlay. 2 vols. New York: Humanities Press, 1970.

________. On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses. Translated by Dallas Willard. Philosophia Mathematica IX, Summer 1972.

________. Philosophy As a Rigorous Science. Translated by Q. Lauer. In Q. Lauer, ed. Phenomenology and the Crises of Philosophy. New York: Harper, 1965.

________. Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic. Translated by Dallas Willard. The Personalist LVIII, October 1977.

Joachim, H.H. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Joseph, H.W.B. Knowledge of the Good in Plato's Republic. Oxford Classical & Philosophical Monographs. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.

Jowett, Benjamin, trans. The Dialogues of Plato. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875.

Kaplan, David. "Quantifying In." In L. Linsky ed. Reference and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Keller, Helen. Teacher Anne Sullivan Macy: A Tribute to the Foster-child of Her Mind. With an introduction by Nella Braddy Henney. London: Victor Gollancz, 1956.

Kierkegaard, Soren. Training in Christianity. Translated with an introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1941.

Levi, Primo. Survival in Auschwitz. Translated by Stuart Woolf. New York: Collier Books Macmillan, 1961.

Liddell & Scott, comp. A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Locke, John. The Philosophical Works of John Locke. With a preliminery discourse and notes by J.A. St. John. London: George Virtue, 1843.

Luther, Martin. A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. A revised and completed translation based on the 'Middleton' edition of the English version of 1575. London: James Clarke & Co., 1953.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

Martineau, James. Types of Ethical Theory. Clarendon Press Series. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898.

McCormick, Peter and Elliston, Frederick, ed.. Husserl: Shorter Works. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

Melden, A.I., ed. Ethical Theories. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967.

Midgley, Mary. Wickedness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.

Moore, G.E.. Philosophical Studies. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy & Scientific Method. New York: Humanities Press, 1951.

Morgan, William. Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Richard Price. London: Printed for R.Hunter, successor to J. Johnson, 1815.

Nygren, Anders. Agape and Eros. Translated by Phillip S. Watson. London: S.P.C.K., 1953.

Oates, Whitney J., ed. The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers. New York: Random House, 1940.

Ostwald, Martin, trans. Nicomachean Ethics. Library of Liberal Arts. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962.

Parfit, Derik. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Pfander, A. Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation. Translated by H. Spiegelberg. Northwestern University Press, 1967.

Price, Richard. A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals. Edited by D. Daiches Raphael. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.

________. Four Dissertations. London: Harlow, Printed by Benjamin Flower, 1811.

Quine, Willard Van Orman. From A Logical Point of View. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961.

________. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy. New York: Columbia University press, 1969.

________. Word and Object. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1960.

Russell, Bertrand. Why I am Not a Christian: And Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects. Edited with an appendix by Paul Edwards. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957.

________. Logic and Knowledge. Edited by Robert Charles Marsh. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956.

________. Mysticism and Logic. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1929.

Schneider, H.W., ed. Sources of Contemporary Philosophical Realism in America. Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.

Sidgwick, Henry. Outlines of the History of Ethics. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.

Smith, Norman Kemp. Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy. London: MacMillan & Co., 1902.

________, trans. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: MacMillan & Co., 1963.

Spinoza, Baruch. On the Improvement of the Understanding, Ethics & Correspondence. Translated by R.H.M. Elwes. With an introduction by Frank Sewall. New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901.

Stewart, J.A. Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892.

Stille, Alexander. "Primo Levi: Reconciling the Man and the Writer." New York Times Book Review, July 5, 1987.

Strong, Mary, ed. Letters of the Scattered Brotherhood. New York: Harper & Row, 1948.

Tennant, F.R. The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.

Thomas, D.O. The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1977.

Tsanoff, Radoslav. The Nature of Evil. New York: Macmillan, 1931.

Watson, Gary. "Free Agency." In Watson, Gary ed. Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Willard, Dallas. Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: A Study in Husserl's Early Philosophy. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1984.

________. "Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Phenomenology." N.P., 1988.

Williams, Michael. Groundless Belief. Library of Philosophy and Logic. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Yonge, C.D., trans. Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. New York: Harper & Bro's., 1888.