The Power of Moral Knowledge
TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIENTIOUS ACTION
AND A THEORY OF THE PRACTICALITY OF REASON:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Abstract
My thesis is that there is a way of understanding moral knowledge in terms of Husserl’s theory of the fulfillment of consciousness, which may unify the main types of views held with respect to “the practicality of reason.” By “the practicality of reason” I mean the claim that moral knowledge of the appropriate kind constrains moral action. This knowledge is intuitive or experiential knowledge in contrast to mere thought, intentionality or reasoning. I claim that such knowledge is possible and that it places a greater constraint on action than mere moral thought or reasoning.
The aim of the historical part of my thesis is to delimit the three main types of views held with respect to this thesis, i.e. , the traditional, the Humean empiricist and the Kantian idealist, and to show that they all concede some form of “intuitive” or experiential constraint over action, but do not provide an adequate elucidation of it. In Hume’s case, the attribution of selectively intentional features to moral sentiment allows for a plausible interpretation of Hume’s view as consistent with, if not a concession to, the thesis. In Kant’s case, his repeated, although unclarified, appeal to moral “experience” in conjunction with his ultimate appeal to reason supports our contention that he too adheres to the thesis.
The primary “proof” of my thesis, however, proceeds by way of an independent phenomenological analysis of conscientious action. The moral intuitionism of Richard Price is refined and defended by the application of Husserl’s analysis of the intuitive fulfillment of consciousness to moral experience and the will thereto in conscientious action. This analysis reveals that all thought, but especially intuitive thought, involves motivational structures with specific active tendencies. Intuitive moral thought, therefore, constrains to a much greater degree than mere intentional moral thought alone. We conclude with the observation that although the theory of moral perception (and its practicality) is highly complex, it is in principle no more complex than an adequate theory of knowledge generally. The intuitive justification of moral knowledge may stand or fall with the intuitive justification of anything at all.
Introduction
At the dawn of scientific reflection the paradigmatic philosopher, Socrates, cried out to a morally confused age that the lost pearl of great price was Philosophy herself or the love of Wisdom. The heart or soul of man was no doubt cold and insensitive–almost lost in a dark cave of blindness and despair–but there was still a flicker of light beckoning him from without–calling him to open his eyes to see the Truth which alone could set him free.
Nowhere in the history of Western philosophy, perhaps, has this call been more forceful sounded than by Socrates, Plato’s mentor, in his allegory of The Cave.1 There he likens the condition of man to that of prisoners chained their whole lives to a wall in the darkness of a cave. Their whole “knowledge” of objects is derived from shadows they cast upon a wall before them. He describes, too, what it would be like if one were suddenly freed of one’s chains and able to walk out of the cave into a world of light. We need, of course, in order to appreciate the full force of the illustration, to imagine vividly what it would be like if we were really blind or nearly so from the moment of our birth and then one day, suddenly, we could see. The world would then appear new to us and its beauty would enrapture us as it does young children and young lovers falling in love for the first time. We need to imagine, for example, what it would be like to see a world of soft, white clouds; of blue skies and clear waters; of sparkling dew drops on young green leaves in the morning light of a summer day; of richly colored rainbows and birds flying and singing songs after a short rain–all clearly seen for the first time.
If our imagination is rich enough, it will be difficult for us not to admit that such an experience would transform our lives.2 Given a choice, we would be hard pressed to return to the old way of life. But, in the Socratic allegory, the pilgrim who had seen the Sun and the New World illuminated by the radiance of its light, does return–not for himself, nor to remain there always, but for the sake of his fellows, whom he now loves and pities and is willing to suffer and die for, if that can bring them out of their cave into the glorious light of the Sun.
They, of course, accuse him of being a fanatic, and, but for their chains, would beat him and kill him, disbelieving all he says. For the blind man has no conception of color, nor the deaf of sound, and if everyone around kill him, disbelieving all he says. For the blind man has no conception of color, nor the deaf of sound, and if everyone around us were blind and deaf we too, no doubt, would resist the call to leave our security for “something more.” But the aim of the allegory is precisely to open our minds or hearts to the possibility of the reality of a Goodness, which, once seen, like the light of the Sun in its radiance, would free us from “evil” and the dark world of its bondage. It would give us liberty to walk as young children in a world of goodness and love without fear or shame. In Socratic terms, the aim of the allegory is to convince us of the truth that “knowledge [of the Good] is virtue and vice ignorance.” In more contemporary terms, it is to convince us of the truth of the thesis of the Practicality of Reason: the claim that if one knows, in the appropriate sense, that a contemplated act is good or evil, then one is strongly constrained, perhaps even compelled, to act in accordance with that knowledge. Seeing the Good in particular acts and acting in accordance with that vision, therefore, can be likened to the seeing and acting of a blind man as his eyes are progressively opened: In darkness one cannot find one’s way and must be led by others, but in the light–or to the extent one sees all things illuminated by the light–one is free.
To read the entire thesis, click here: The Power of Rational Insight for Conscientious Action